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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Water management is a significant challenge in The Republic of Cyprus. The country is subject 
to a number of water problems based on scarcity and quality, with these stemming from limited 
precipitation inputs, drought, the overuse of groundwater, as well as the spatial disparity of 
supply and demand due to population growth, agriculture, tourism, and climate change. The 
convergence of these aspects has generated water problems, which necessitate the use of 
particular problem-solving responses by government that are targeted at securing the provision 
of water services and sustaining socio-economic development. 
 
To understand how government in Cyprus has responded to water management problems this 
thesis adopts an understanding based on John Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities of 
administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic rationalism. These reflect 
and build on the three methods that societies use to coordinate and organise responses to socio-
environmental problems, namely mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches. The 
problem-solving rationalities provide a unique way of understanding government problem-
solving due to an interpretation that focuses on the specifics of problem-solving, based on; actor 
roles, motives, and behaviour; rhetoric; the evolution of responses over time; as well as the use 
of multiple concepts that are brought together to offer a more inclusive conceptualisation. 
 
This research adopts a qualitative approach to data collection and utilises semi-structured 
interviews to understand the views, roles, and experiences of key actors in problem-solving. A 
case study approach provides an appropriate context and facilitates detailed analysis of the 
problem-solving rationalities. The Republic of Cyprus offers a unique and appropriate case 
study setting. This is justified based on; tangible problems of scarcity and quality in practice; 
the potential to generate new insights in relation to small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU 
state experiences; as well as limited previous research understanding government responses and 
considering actor roles and behaviour when responding to water problems.  
 
Based on the findings, Dryzek’s rationalities demonstrated a good level of applicability, with 
certain aspects shown to be justifiable such as the basis of administrative rationalism, the idea 
that some civil servants act in the public interest, and evidence of management challenges 
expected by Dryzek. Some differences were also found in relation to the existence or non-
existence of certain methods or constructs; differences in some natural relationships; as well as 
variability in actor type, role, behaviour, and motivation. A range of emerging themes were 
identified as a result of the findings. These included; an alternative understanding of the 
evolutionary format of problem-solving; the role and influence of supranational governance; the 
importance of aspects such as culture and economic status; as well as the strong influence of 
politics. Ultimately, the management challenges of the rationalities, similarities and differences 
found in practice relating to the characteristics of the rationalities, as well as the emerging 
themes identified through the findings, have been utilised to develop understanding of problem-
solving in Cyprus. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
“Contemporary water resources decision-making is an inherently complex undertaking. Every 
decision affects people in some way, whether as individuals, industries, communities, regional 
economies, or the environments on which they depend.” (Hart & Doolan, 2017: pg xix) 
 
“Our current intellectual challenge is to develop the analytical and theoretical underpinnings of 
an understanding of the relationship between social and natural systems. Our policy challenge is 
to identify and implement effective decision-making approaches to managing the global 
environment.” (Choucri, 2006: pg ix) 
 
 
1.1 Context and motivation for research 
This is a timely thesis that investigates the importance of water problems and how they have 
been managed in relation to government responses, within the context of a first-world, 
European, Mediterranean, peripheral EU, and small state perspective. A Cypriot case study is 
used to explore water problems and is justified based on the unique perspective this gives as a 
result of; tangible problems of scarcity and quality in practice; status as a small, Mediterranean, 
and peripheral EU state; as well as limited previous research considering government 
approaches and actor roles or behaviour when responding to water problems. 
 
To explore government responses to water problems in Cyprus the thesis adopts an 
understanding based on the three social-coordination mechanisms that are defined through 
mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches. These form a basis of understanding and have 
been used to categorise government responses (Cubbage, O’Laughlin, & Peterson, 2017; Kraft, 
2017). A theoretical framework is applied, which is founded on the approaches and developed 
through John Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities that provide a unique way of 
understanding government problem-solving. In this case, Dryzek (2013) provides a unique 
interpretation by focusing on the specifics of problem-solving, particularly; actor roles, motives, 
and behaviour; management practices; rhetoric; the evolution of responses over time; and the 
use of multiple concepts that are brought together to offer a more inclusive conceptualisation.  
 
Ultimately, it is important to better comprehend government problem-solving as it is these 
responses that shape real-world policy and management outcomes when attempting to solve 
socio-environmental issues such as water problems (Carter, 2018; Conca & Weinthal, 2018). 
Figure 1.1 outlines the context and motivation of this research. The rest of this chapter 
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introduces the thesis, providing the context for the research, while the rationale and objectives 
are highlighted, and an outline of the thesis structure is also provided. 
 
Figure 1.1: The context and motivation of this research 
 
 
1.1.1 How water management problems have been explored 
Water management problems such as scarcity, the over-abstraction of groundwater resources, 
pollution, and declines in freshwater quality have provided significant management and policy 
dilemmas for central governments and governing agencies (see Gleick, 2000; Dryzek & 
Schlosberg, 2005; Barr, 2008; Mauser, 2009; Grover, 2016; Cook, 2017; Conca & Weinthal, 
2018). These issues have occurred as a result of unsustainable human activities and associated 
socio-environmental challenges including resource exploitation, population growth, the 
intensification of agricultural activities, ecosystem encroachment, and climate change 
(Stephenson, 2003; Goudie, 2006; Middleton, 2008; Mulroy, 2017). Over time, an improved 
scientific understanding and awareness of water management problems, as a threat towards 
human populations and socio-economic development, has also prompted concern within the 
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public realm and an increase in political attention (see Fransson & Gärling, 1999; Anisfield, 
2010; Cook, 2017; Doolan & Hart, 2017; Hossen, 2017; Jensen, Lange, & Refsgaard, 2018). 
 
Traditionally, water resources have been managed by government and service providers 
through approaches that focus on the two key attributes of availability/scarcity and quality (see 
Gleick, 2000; Sterner, 2003; Biswas, 2008; Anisfield, 2010; Grover, 2016; Cook, 2017). Water 
management problems in these categories have been tackled through a variety of pathways, 
with responses broadly differentiated based on; supply and demand management in terms of 
availability, and pollution management in terms of quality (see Whipple, 1998; Gleick, 2000; 
Mauser, 2009; Anisfield, 2010; McDonald, & Mitchell, 2014; Lubell & Balazs, 2018). 
 
A significant proportion of the literature relating to water management has also focused on 
developing understanding of physical processes, concepts of supply and demand management, 
industry adaptation, climate change scenarios and their potential influences on water, conflict, 
as well as the use of specific management tools in given political settings (see Dobson, 1995; 
Smith, 1995; Arnell, 1999; Barr, 2008; Hansen, 2010; Cook, 2017; Edalat & Abdi, 2017; 
Mulroy, 2017; Lonergan, 2018). Furthermore, it is well established that water resource and 
management problems faced by society are directly related to governance, and thus may be 
resolved through more effective decision-making, policy, and governance (Conca, 2006; 
Ballabh, 2008; Iyer, 2008; Tortajada, 2010; Carter, 2018; Conca & Weinthal, 2018). 
 
Research investigating the governance of water has tended to focus on; describing and 
exploring institutional structures; availability scenarios for specific countries, regions, sectors or 
industries; adaptation measures in relation to regimes, practices, and policy; as well as 
exploring the roles and actions of state and private institutions in the provision of services (see 
Brenton, 1994; Smith, 1995; Weale, Pridham, Williams, & Porter, 1996; Lowe & Ward, 1998; 
Szarka, 2002; Biswas, 2005; Gupta, 2009; Araral, 2010; Bakker, 2013; Dinar & Tsur, 2014; 
Lautze, De Silva, Giordano, & Sanford, 2014; Araral & Wu, 2016; Padowski, Carrera, & 
Jawitz, 2016; Owens, 2017). However, attempts to understand the processes and relationships 
that drive governing agents to act and behave in a particular manner have been more limited, 
despite evidence of some work on social, institutional, and economic perspectives to water 
issue problem-solving that have explored topics such as stakeholder engagement, integrated 
planning, and governance (see Dobbie, Brown, & Farrelly, 2016; Tawfik, 2016). Nevertheless, 
attempts have often focused on general characteristics or certain singular perspectives, while an 
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understanding of water management and decision-making intricacies has been underdeveloped, 
particularly in relation to the role, motives, and behaviour of actors and the broad rationales 
they employ, key tools used, as well as the evolution of responses. As a result, the specifics of 
problem-solving at actor level require further analysis as they can offer an important insight 
into how governments tackle water management challenges, which is critical when developing 
effective responses and policy. Ultimately, when exploring these aspects in practice and 
understanding government responses to water problems, a country-specific context is necessary 
to consider the specifics of problem-solving and provide greater detail on the characteristics and 
behaviours that cause those in a given system to operate in a certain way. 
 
1.1.2 Rationale for a case study focused on the Republic of Cyprus 
In order to effectively investigate government responses to water problems a suitable context 
must be established. The Republic of Cyprus has been selected as it offers a unique, relevant, 
and appropriate case study setting, which is important for furthering knowledge as well as being 
suitable for exploring responses to water problems and considering the applicability of 
Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities when advancing understanding of mandatory, voluntary, and 
economic approaches. The suitability of a Cypriot case study is based on; an experience of 
tangible water problems through availability/scarcity and quality in practice; limited previous 
research considering actor roles and behaviour when responding to water problems; alongside 
the potential to generate new insight and understanding in relation to a Mediterranean 
perspective, a small state perspective, as well as a peripheral EU nation perspective. Figure 1.2 
outlines this focus from the general to the specific, while the noted aspects that make Cyprus 
suitable are expanded upon in the following sections. 
 
Figure 1.2: Research focus - from the general to the specific 
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Wider perspectives 
From a Mediterranean state perspective, although it is noted that the region is not homogenous 
in terms of hydrologic and demographic features (Burak & Margat, 2016), Cyprus does 
represent a range of characteristics that apply more widely. These include; a semi-arid climate, 
an experience of scarcity and drought, the challenge of increasing demand, as well as the over-
consumption of groundwater (Chartzoulakis & Bertaki, 2006; Garcia-Ruiz et al., 2011; 
Papadaskalopoulou et al., 2015a; Myronidis et al., 2018). 
 
Cyprus is a nation that has limited water resources, which must be managed carefully in terms 
of pressures such as population growth, climate change, and the increasing demands of 
agricultural activities and tourism (Charalambous, Bruggeman, & Lange, 2011; Iacovides, 
2011a; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014; Naukkarinen, 2015). These challenges are also reflected in 
other Mediterranean nations, and thus many of the water problems faced in Cyprus are relevant 
in the wider region. For example, previous research has explored a range of aspects, including; 
scarcity and drought (Correia, 1999; Lange & Donta, 2006; Holst-Warhaft, 2010); supply 
management adaptation (Kumar et al., 2016); water quality and irrigation (Faycel, 2010); 
demand changes (Grouillet et al., 2015); water reuse, recycling, and desalination (Ait-Mouheb 
et al., 2018; Navarro, 2018); the risks of scarcity and climate change (Iglesias et al., 2007); the 
application of policies to manage use conflicts, scarcity, and non-renewable water consumption 
(Burak & Margat, 2016); as well as principles of integrated management (Moutsopoulos & 
Petalas, 2018). Despite extensive research on water problems in the Mediterranean, a gap in 
knowledge is apparent when considering different government responses, through mandatory, 
voluntary, and economic approaches that have been used to manage these water problems, as 
well as actor roles, motives, and behaviour and how responses have evolved. 
 
From a small state perspective, there is scope to use a Cypriot case study to further develop 
understanding of government problem-solving through comparison between experiences in 
smaller and larger states1. This can raise questions as to whether government responses and 
institutional approaches have been similar or different relative to state size, scale, and systems 
in place, while allowing for understanding of the potential drivers of similarities or differences.  
 
                                                          
1 For the purposes of this study, an EU state is regarded as small or large based on relative shares of votes in 
day-to-day decision-making in the EU’s Council of Ministers. For example, as Panke (2015: pg59) notes “all 
states that possess fewer than average votes in qualified majority voting in the EU’s Council of Ministers as 
the venue in which states’ interests are expressed during EU secondary law-making are regarded as being 
small”. In this case, Cyprus is one of the three smallest EU states based on voting weight (Kirsch, 2010). 
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This small state perspective can be developed according to similarities or differences between 
larger and smaller EU nations. Previous research has focused on institutional approaches and 
administrative procedures, power and influence in legislative processes, as well as economic 
capacity (Panke, 2015; Thorhallsson, 2016; Grimaud, 2018). In terms of governance, smaller 
states such as Cyprus have been found to exhibit certain vulnerabilities that differ from larger 
states, including; limited administrative size, lack of expertise and experience, political 
disadvantages in EU council setting, and also limited economic capacity (Grimaud, 2018). 
Furthermore, previous research regarding comparisons of water management in different EU 
states has explored a range of aspects, including; responses to scarcity and climate change 
(Francés et al., 2017); water markets and economic instruments (Rey et al., 2018); flood risk 
management and citizen involvement (Mees et al., 2016); efficiency of utilities (Cruz et al., 
2012); agricultural use, technological change, and cost recovery (Llop & Ponce-Alifonso, 
2016); water reuse (Angelakis & Gikas, 2014); as well as implementation, economic 
challenges, and experiences associated with directives (Kelly et al., 2009; Berbel & Expósito, 
2018). Despite evidence of comparisons in the literature on aspects of water management as 
well as differences between smaller and larger EU state governance, the understanding of the 
specifics of government problem-solving in such context has been limited. In this case, work on 
regulatory processes (Berbel & Expósito, 2018) and the application of economic instruments 
(Rey et al., 2018) reflect the mandatory and economic approaches respectively, however, a 
deeper understanding of problem-solving responses that can emerge through exploring actor 
roles, motives, relationships, and behaviour has been less forthcoming. As a result, there is 
potential to explore this area further. 
 
From an EU state perspective, two important aspects emerge when developing understanding, 
namely; EU member status and how this influences and shapes problem-solving; as well as 
Cyprus’ standing as a peripheral EU state2. Previous research on water problems and 
management in EU member states has been extensive, with a range of topics considered. These 
include; scarcity, drought, and demand (Staddon, 2010; Spinoni et al., 2017; Stavenhagen, 
Buurman, & Tortajada, 2018; Tuncok & Eslamian, 2018); pollution and quality (Diamantini, 
                                                          
2 The concept of peripherality is complex and involves administrative, organisational, geographic, economic, 
environmental, and cultural variables that relate to the standing and contextual status of a nation within a 
wider system (Yearley, Baker, & Milton, 1994; Baimbridge et al., 2018). For the purposes of this study, a 
peripheral EU state is defined as the standing of a nation based on; the noted variables, comparison with 
large or core nations, and decision-making power in the context of the EU system. Notably for Cyprus, certain 
peripheral characteristics are evident such as; economic peripherality due to a smaller economy; geographic 
peripherality due to a location at the edge of Europe; and administrative peripherality due to status as a small 
EU state with limited decision-making power (Sepos, 2008; Kirsch, 2010; Michael, 2011; Demetriades, 2017). 
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2018); climate change adaptation (Quevauviller, 2011; Bosello et al., 2018); groundwater use 
and control (De Stefano et al., 2015); integrated management of shared resources (Mylopoulos 
& Kolokytha, 2008); agricultural water management (Iglesias & Garrote, 2015); water reuse 
and recycling (Angelakis, Bontoux, & Lazarova, 2003; Paranychianakis et al., 2015); economic 
approaches and privatisation (Liotard & McGiffen, 2009; Reynaud, 2016); as well as 
implementation of EU directives (Chave, 2001; Moss, 2008; Bähr, 2016; Voulvoulis, Arpon & 
Giakoumis, 2017; Berbel & Expósito, 2018). In these cases a range of findings were noted, 
including; core water issues being widely applicable; the need for greater integration across 
sectors when tackling water issues; groundwater issues being primarily related to agricultural 
use; EU directive requirements remaining distant from practical realities; the potential for cost 
recovery to impact water affordability, which gives justification for governments to develop 
targeted policies; while for responses to environmental issues it was often political, economic, 
and social aspects that prevailed over the legal obligations set by supranational authorities. 
 
In terms of peripheral EU member states, previous research has explored aspects such as; core-
periphery dynamics, which consider interactions and conflict between core and peripheral 
nations (Laffan, 2016; Magone, Laffan & Schweiger, 2016); economic policy and structural 
changes (Barry, 2002; Bieler & Jordan, 2017; Parker & Tsarouhas, 2018); as well as politics 
and trade (Baimbridge et al., 2018). In relation to water, there has been a focus on aspects like 
management of scarcity, quality, and governance (Zachariadis, 2010; Celma, 2012; Izquierdo, 
2012; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014); economic challenges (Bieler & Jordan, 2017); the 
liberalisation of public services and imposed pressures of privatisation (Bieler, 2017; Van Den 
Berge, Boelens, & Vos, 2018); water reuse and technology such as desalination (Ortiz et al., 
2010; Angelakis & Gikas, 2014; March, Sauri & Rico-Amorós, 2014); as well as management 
through the Water Framework Directive (Munné, Ginebreda & Prat, 2016). The focus on these 
aspects has generated a range of findings. For example; water problems of scarcity or quality 
[or both] were widely applicable; there have been concerted attempts to apply comprehensive 
stakeholder engagement; directives have had uneven application, with this implying that 
specific policies or methods were more or less effective for certain peripheral nations; while 
economic challenges through austerity and restructuring imposed on peripheral nations were 
noted to have resulted in pressure to privatise state assets such as water. 
 
Despite this extensive work, the wider literature on EU influences and peripheral status has 
been limited when investigating the specifics of government problem-solving. In this case, 
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more detailed components such as actor roles, motives, relationships, and behaviour, as well as 
rhetoric and changes in response have had limited focus despite their potential for furthering the 
understanding of government problem-solving. 
 
A greater focus 
The justification of Cyprus as a case study is also validated as a result of underdeveloped 
research considering water policy and decision-making in this specific setting. Previous work 
has primarily focused on investigating water through a range of topics, such as; water scarcity 
and potential for integrated management (Socratous, 2011a; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014); water 
management and drought (Charalambous, 2001; Myronidis et al., 2018); agricultural water use 
and associated impacts (Iacovides, 2011a); the water-energy-food nexus (Halbe, Pahl-Wostl, 
Lange, & Velonis, 2015); groundwater management (Demetriou & Georgiou, 2004); the 
analysis of supply infrastructure (Iacovides, 2011b; Hoffmann, 2018); the role and feasibility of 
desalination (Tsiourtis, 2001; Loucaides & Koutsakos, 2015); sustainability and water 
ecosystem management (Birol, Koundouri, & Koundouris, 2008); water pricing and subsidies 
(Stedman, 2012; Kossida, Tekidou, & Mimikou, 2015); consumer attitudes and demand 
(Papasozomenou & Dimitrios, 2009; Polycarpou & Zachariadis, 2013); the potential impacts of 
climate change on water (Zachariadis, 2010; Papadaskalopoulou et al., 2015b; Zachariadis, 
2016); as well as the implementation of EU water directives (Koundouri & Birol, 2011). In the 
case of the focus on these aspects, a range of findings were also noted. These included; tangible 
water issues of scarcity, drought, and groundwater quality decline widely evident in practice; 
the need for a range of options when managing water problems and drivers such as climate 
change; as well as the need for greater integration across sectors for water management. 
 
Despite these findings, the understanding of government responses to water problems in Cyprus 
has been limited from the perspective of mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches. 
Therefore, an opportunity emerges for the chance to develop understanding of government 
problem-solving, the roles and behaviours of governing actors, as well as responses to water 
management problems; with this possible through the use of Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving 
rationalities [explored in the next section]. 
 
Taking this into account, a Cypriot case study is based on three key elements from the general 
to the specific. Firstly, a need for research as a result of underdeveloped knowledge for 
Mediterranean, small, or peripheral EU nations in terms of government responses to water 
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problems. Secondly, a need for research based on; the importance and relevance of 
understanding the specifics of problem-solving, and the role of governing agents with regard to 
water management problems in a country [and wider region] that experiences stresses on both 
availability and quality. Thirdly, a need for research to better comprehend government 
responses to water problems in Cyprus, based on the intensifying threats these issues pose to 
environmental ecosystems, agricultural subsistence, and socio-economic development.  
 
Ultimately, this thesis offers the opportunity to address underdeveloped areas of research and 
contribute to empirical evidence and wider knowledge. This is achieved by; investigating a 
theoretical framework in the new and unique context of Cyprus, which is situated as a small, 
Mediterranean, and peripheral EU state; as well as furthering knowledge of government 
problem-solving by developing understanding of mandatory, voluntary, and economic 
approaches through exploring the specifics of given responses based on the role, motives, 
relationships, and behaviours of governing actors. The lessons learnt in Cyprus, relating to 
responses to water problems and particularly scarcity and drought, are pertinent within the 
wider region and thus give the study greater relevance. This is necessary when attempting to 
offer a contribution to knowledge. 
 
1.1.3 Social coordination mechanisms and Dryzek’s problem-solving rationalities 
To understand how governments have responded to water management problems in Cyprus this 
thesis adopts an understanding based on three social coordination mechanisms that are defined 
through mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches. These reflect the methods that 
societies use to coordinate and organise responses to socio-environmental problems [such as 
those based on water availability/scarcity and quality]. Notably, Dryzek’s (2013) problem-
solving rationalities build on these mechanisms, which are reflected by the definitions of 
bureaucracy, democracy, and markets. 
 
The coordination mechanisms are highlighted as the basis of organisation and governance by a 
range of comparable definitions and examples (see Hood, 1976; Taylor, 1982; Powell, 1990; 
Frances, Levačić, Mitchell, & Thompson, 1991; Wurzel, Zito, & Jordan, 2013; Hill & Hupe, 
2014; Normand, 2016). Indeed, each of the approaches is centred on a different set of 
organisational principles, defined as accepted forms of social coordination (Colebatch & 
Larmour, 1993; Parsons, 1995), governance typologies (Wurzel et al., 2013), and modes of 
organisation (Powell, 1990; Keast, 2016), while ultimately being deemed to be the most 
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effective way of enabling society to collectively tackle problems. Figure 1.3 outlines the 
mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches, with the definitions and characteristics used to 
describe these also given. 
 
Figure 1.3: Methods of social coordination: key characteristics and organising principles 
(Hood, 1976; Taylor, 1982; Colebatch & Larmour, 1993; Wurzel et al., 2013; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Keast, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of environmental policy, the three mechanisms have also been identified through a 
variety of typologies and focuses. Firstly, mandatory approaches have been defined through 
terms such as regulation, command-and-control, legislative and traditional regulation, as well as 
interventionist and hierarchical instruments (see Holzinger, Knill & Schäfer, 2006; Bähr, 2010; 
Organisational Models / Approaches 
 
Governance type: 
 Bureaucracy 
 Hierarchy 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Governance typology: 
 Regulatory policy 
instruments 
 Coercion and governance 
by government 
 Top-down government 
intervention 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Governance modes: 
 Public good 
 Vertical and top-down 
decision-making 
 Dependent relationships 
 Legal authority 
 Policies and procedures 
 Rule-based and procedural 
negotiation dynamics 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Attributes & characteristics: 
 Unitary organisation 
 Uniform structure 
 Common norms & values 
 Perfect compliance 
 Hierarchal management 
 Expert information 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Organising principles: 
 Rules 
 Authority 
 Hierarchy 
Mandatory 
 
Governance type: 
 Community 
 Network 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Governance typology: 
 Suasive policy instruments 
 Self-regulation and 
governance without 
government 
 Information and appeals 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Governance modes: 
 Social good 
 Horizontal external 
decision-making 
 Interdependent 
relationships 
 Social exchanges 
 Purpose and reciprocity 
 Interest-based and longer-
term negotiation dynamics 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Attributes & characteristics: 
 Direct and multi-faceted 
interactions / relationships 
 Common beliefs & values 
 Variable structure 
 Reciprocity 
 The use of networks 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Organising Principles: 
 Norms and values 
 Affiliations 
 Networks 
 
Voluntary 
 
Governance type: 
 Economic systems 
 Market-based 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Governance typology: 
 Economic or market-based 
policy instruments 
 Competition and 
governance with 
government 
 Fiscal incentives 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Governance modes: 
 Private good 
 Horizontal internal 
decision-making 
 Independent relationships 
 Transactions and prices 
 Supply and demand 
 Bargaining, competitive, 
self-interested and short-
term negotiation dynamics 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Attributes & characteristics: 
 Many buyers and sellers 
 Values are defined 
 Changeable structure 
 Flexible agreements 
 Freely available 
information 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Organising Principles: 
 Financial incentives 
 Prices 
 Competition 
 
Economic 
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Jordan, Wurzel & Zito, 2013). Secondly, voluntary approaches have been defined using terms 
such as cooperative, suasive, communication-based, informational, and voluntarism (see 
Bemelmans-Videc, Rist & Verdung, 1997; Gunningham, Grabosky & Sinclair, 1998; Bähr, 
2010; Halpern, 2010). Thirdly, economic approaches have been defined through terms such as 
competition, market-based, financial instruments, and subsidisation (see De Bruijn & Hufen, 
1998; Golub, 1998; Holzinger, Knill & Lenschow, 2009). 
 
A range of understandings are argued to be relevant in terms of how the mandatory, voluntary, 
and economic approaches have been applied in practice. This relates to interpretations of 
institutional processes, policy implementation, and actor motivations. These understandings are 
positioned in terms of each approach [and are discussed in more detail within chapter three]. 
 
Firstly, for mandatory approaches, understandings involve; top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives, bargaining and negotiation, power approaches such as elitism and technocracy, as 
well as public choice theories focused on bureaucratic structure. These have been situated in 
terms of bureaucracy, while being explored as they are seen to reflect characteristics associated 
with the mandatory approach, such as; governance based on hierarchy; authority; unitary and 
administrative organisation; dependent relationships; as well as vertical forms of decision-
making (see Mitchell, 1991; Colebatch & Larmour, 1993; Holzinger et al., 2006; Wurzel et al., 
2013; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Keast, 2016). Notably, mandatory approaches have been applied in 
terms of water and through these aspects in relation to; enforced pollution policies (Ribaudo, 
2009); sustainable water governance (Reese & Gawel, 2017); climate change mitigation 
through water (Srinivasan et al., 2018); top-down interpretations of water footprints (Feng et 
al., 2011); water policy and technological elitism (Feldman, 1991); as well as water restrictions 
through regulation (Grafton & Ward, 2008). 
 
Secondly, for voluntary approaches, understandings include the concept of pluralism as well as 
policy networks and communities. These are explored as they reflect specific characteristics 
associated with the voluntary approach, such as; governance based on networks; multifaceted 
interaction; interdependent and multi-dimensional relationships; the concept of community; 
cooperation; as well as horizontal but external forms of decision-making (see Taylor, 1982; 
Powell, 1990; Thompson, 1991; Colebatch & Larmour, 1993; Wurzel et al., 2013; Hill & Hupe, 
2014; Keast, 2016). Indeed, voluntary approaches have been applied in relation to water and 
through these aspects, with examples involving; urban water demand management (Fielding et 
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al., 2013); networks and policy implementation (Bourblanc, 2017); pluralism and social rights 
for water and sanitation (Obani & Gupta, 2014); transnational policy networks (Goldman, 
2007); voluntary pollution control (Suter et al., 2010); as well as water governance and 
stakeholder networks (Medema et al., 2017; Ogada et al., 2017). 
 
Thirdly, for economic approaches, understandings involve; economic models of understanding, 
public choice theories focused on economic interpretation, as well as the concept of economic 
institutionalism. These have been explored as they are seen to reflect characteristics associated 
with the economic approach, in particular; market-based governance and structures; variables of 
self-interest; competition; multiple buyers and sellers; pricing; independent relationships 
involving exchange; as well as horizontal but internal forms of decision-making (see Levačić, 
1991; Colebatch & Larmour, 1993; Parsons, 1995; Wurzel et al., 2013; Hill & Hupe, 2014; 
Keast, 2016). Notably, economic approaches have been applied in terms of water and through 
these aspects in relation to; incentives for water quality protection (Olmstead, 2010; Shortle, 
2017); market instruments and governance (Metz & Leifield, 2018); water rights (Wang, 2018); 
institutional arrangements (Hassenforder & Barone, 2018); as well as water markets (Owens, 
2016; Pérez, 2017; Raffensperger & Milke, 2017; Holley & Sinclair, 2018). 
 
The mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches, as well as the various understandings that 
can be positioned in terms of these approaches, have been useful in understanding general 
models of coordination and modes of governance. However, these approaches have still been 
limited when conceptualising the specifics of problem-solving, in particular, representing; a 
lack of specific details in approaches and individual understandings; limited recognition of 
interactions between actors that form the dynamics of problem-solving; and also a lack of focus 
on actor behaviour which is vital to understanding different conceptions of problems as well as 
how and why certain responses develop or are selected in reality. 
 
Rationale for Dryzek’s problem-solving rationalities 
To build on the mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches, and explore government 
responses to water problems in Cyprus, this thesis investigates the applicability of the problem-
solving rationalities of; administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic 
rationalism, as conceptualised by John Dryzek (2005; 2013). Notably, the mandatory, 
voluntary, and economic approaches form the basis of this research, however, Dryzek’s (2013) 
rationalities reflect and develop the understanding of these approaches. In this case, the 
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rationalities advance understanding by providing an interpretation that focuses on the specific 
details and interactions of problem-solving, particularly; actor roles, motives, and behaviours; 
management practices; rhetoric; the evolution of responses; and the use of multiple concepts 
that are brought together to offer a more inclusive conceptualisation. This helps to provide a 
deeper understanding of actor behaviour and the interactions of problem-solving, which are 
vital components of how a problem is understood and how certain responses are selected.  
 
In theoretical terms for Dryzek (2013), three organisational approaches are embraced by 
democratic societies, namely; bureaucracy, democracy, and markets, with these being accepted 
principles of organisational action that reflect the mandatory, voluntary, and economic 
approaches. As a result, the approaches of bureaucracy [mandatory], democracy [voluntary], 
and markets [economic] generate the three problem-solving rationalities that are defined with 
the use of discourse analysis by Dryzek (2013). 
 
Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities serve as a focus of this study. The key feature of 
these rationalities [and his associated discourse analysis], which differs from other conceptions, 
emerges through a unique interpretation of how democratic societies organise problem-solving 
responses within the context of the three social coordination mechanisms. This interpretation 
considers bureaucracy, democracy, and markets as a foundation, while also noting the processes 
in which institutions and practices, associated with a given response, converge and interact as a 
result of the behaviour of policy actors. In particular, Dryzek (2013) is interested in exploring 
how basic entities are recognised or constructed; the assumptions organisations make with 
regard to natural relationships; how the involvement of agents or actors in policy-making, along 
with their motives, can vary; as well as how metaphors and rhetorical devices are used to justify 
certain positions. This focus encourages an evaluation of the rationale for different approaches, 
and gains importance as each problem-solving approach generates a different viewpoint as to 
the meaning and nature of a specific problem. Indeed, understanding the justifications for 
adopting a given approach is central to understanding the behaviour of those involved in 
decision-making, and thus why policy has been implemented in a certain way (Parsons, 1995; 
Lowe & Ward, 1998; Dryzek, 2013). This can provide insight into the way problems have been 
tackled by government. 
 
Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities differ from previous singular theoretical understandings as he 
instead utilises multiple theories to explain behaviours and actions relative to each of the 
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proposed rationalities. This is relevant in terms of mandatory, voluntary, and economic 
approaches, as in many cases these have been considered in isolation (see Tang, Liu, & Yi, 
2016; Tietenberg & Lewis, 2016; Brink 2017) or through particular individual constructs such 
as public choice theory (Raymond, 2014; Holcombe, 2016), pluralism (Smith, 1990; Hoberg, 
1992), or economic institutionalism (Saleth & Dinar, 2004). Thus, Dryzek’s (2013) technique 
of drawing from different theories is unique and relevant when forming a framework to 
understand real-world problem-solving which is made up of complex behaviours and practices. 
Moreover, specifically for interpretations of public choice theory, Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities 
are further distinguished as he moves away from considering self-interest as the primary driver 
for bureaucratic action, and instead suggests that public servants often act [or have the ability to 
act] in the public interest. This directly contrasts with other rational conceptualisations such as 
work by Niskanen (1971) relating to budget maximisation and the bureau-shaping model put 
forward by Dunleavy (1986; 1991). 
 
The three problem-solving rationalities proposed by Dryzek (2013) also consider how policy 
responses change over time. This is based on an understanding of evolving responses and how 
change coincides with certain characteristics, institutional changes, or policy outcomes. Dryzek 
(2013) implies that problem-solving occurs in a successive evolutionary format, with alternative 
responses developing as a result of challenges associated with preceding approaches. In this 
case, administrative rationalism develops as the foundation of problem-solving, with 
democratic pragmatism and then economic rationalism subsequently emerging. This is a 
notable feature for understanding change over time, as it is argued that policy development and 
implementation should be analysed over an appropriate timeframe to account for changing 
policy dynamics, variable roles or influences in decision-making, as well as the intended and 
unintended outcomes of policy (Bernstein, 1976; Sabatier, 1986; Nelson, 1993; Jordan, 1995; 
Agere & Mandaza, 1999; Weimer & Vining, 2016). 
 
The concept of change also relates to the development of mandatory, voluntary, and economic 
approaches, which can be considered to be; focused on a foundation of strong hierarchy with a 
joining of economic aspects in relation to the organisation of educational structures (Greany & 
Higham, 2018); as well as based on varying scales of organisational independence and 
relationship types that can result in competitive or cooperative prevailing structural formats 
(Thompson, 1991). In the case of environmental policy instruments, changes in responses have 
been identified through a range of findings. Firstly, the adoption of approaches and policy 
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instruments can vary in speed and scale in different jurisdictions, with particular policy 
instruments considered more appropriate in certain contexts (Wurzel et al., 2013). Secondly, 
once established within a particular jurisdiction policy instruments often retained their relative 
role, with this related to the dominant role of regulation and the importance of the state (Bell & 
Hindmoor, 2009). Thirdly, in line with neoliberal economic theory, sequence patterns were 
argued to begin with soft policy, involving horizontal governance related to voluntary 
approaches, and proceed to harder policy, namely coercive top-down government linked to 
mandatory approaches (Verdung, 1997; Gunningham et al., 1998; Salamon, 2002). In contrast 
to this view, it has also been argued that a pattern emerges in which traditional environmental 
regulations that reflect mandatory approaches are adopted first, and then supported by other 
softer instruments characteristic of voluntary and economic approaches (Jordan et al., 2012). 
 
 
1.2 Aims and objectives 
As a result of the preceding discussion, it is possible to identify a range of interesting questions 
concerning how governments respond to water management problems and how actor roles, 
motives, and behaviour vary according to different responses. In particular, how can the 
understanding of mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches be developed? How can 
knowledge of problem-solving and policy implementation in Cyprus, which represents a small, 
Mediterranean, and peripheral EU state, be advanced? How do actor roles and behaviour vary 
in the context of different responses or according to other variables such as supranational 
governance, socio-cultural constructs, or politics? 
 
To address these questions, this thesis utilises the problem-solving rationalities developed by 
Dryzek (2013) and applies these to Cyprus. Notably, previous work in relation to the 
rationalities has focused on; general interpretations of environmental discourses (Adger, 
Benjaminsen, Brown, & Svarstad, 2001; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Mühlhäusler & Peace, 2006); 
the implementation of EU drinking water policy (Jenkins, 2007); the underlying role of 
administrative rationalism in terms of water quality and agricultural policy (Raina & Sangar, 
2002); evidence of the discourses with regard to conflict in environmental partnerships 
(Poncelet, 2004); as well as consideration of the discourses when exploring public perceptions 
of climate change (Schüle, 2001). However, research has been limited when considering the 
rationalities, and also the roles, behaviours, and motivations of key governing agents, in terms 
of Cyprus, as well as small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU state experiences; and explicitly 
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set in the context of understanding how mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches work. 
Thus, by developing an understanding of government problem-solving through how actors 
coordinate responses it is possible to explain policy and the outcomes of decision-making, 
which in turn can provide a contribution to knowledge in the case of Cyprus. 
 
Aim 
 To investigate government problem-solving responses by developing an understanding of 
how government in Cyprus is tackling water problems. 
 
Objectives 
1. To advance understanding of how mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches 
operate, and to build on these using Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities. 
2. To ascertain the potential utility and applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving 
rationalities in Cyprus. 
3. To widen the empirical understanding of small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU state 
experiences through Cyprus. 
4. To examine the roles, behaviours, and motivations of key governing agents in relation to 
water problems in Cyprus, thus contributing to empirical findings on these aspects that 
have been underdeveloped in previous research. 
 
 
1.3 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis is comprised of nine chapters, with this introduction being the first. The topics 
discussed within subsequent chapters are outlined in the following sections. 
 
Chapter two: government responses to water resource issues 
The aim of chapter two is to present an overview of different approaches that have been 
adopted by governing agents, industry actors, and authorities, when tackling water management 
problems such as scarcity, groundwater exploitation, pollution, and quality decline. These 
aspects are explored from the perspectives of small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU states 
that relate to Cyprus. The key elements of availability and quality are contextualised in terms of 
mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches, while water management is considered in 
terms of broad responses that have focused on supply and demand solutions for availability, as 
well as pollution control for quality. The chapter relates to objectives one and three. 
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Chapter three: understanding problem-solving responses 
Chapter three is structured according to the three mechanisms used to conceptualise how 
societies coordinate responses to problems, namely through mandatory, voluntary, and 
economic approaches. Within the context of these approaches, the chapter focuses on how 
government responses to water problems have been understood, while subsequently comparing 
and developing these with Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities. For example, 
different concepts and perspectives including top-down, bottom-up, elitism, technocracy, 
negotiation, institutionalism, policy networks, and public choice have been analysed in terms of 
the coordination mechanisms, based on commonalities or disparities between key elements, 
structural characteristics, and theoretical concepts. Notably, the limitations of past approaches 
and studies, in addressing management challenges, have helped to form the focus of this 
overview, with recognition of the idea that limitations assist in generating alternative 
approaches. Indeed, this reflects Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of how different rationalities 
emerge as a result of the practical limitations of previous attempts at problem-solving. 
 
The latter part of the chapter explores Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities, which are 
defined as administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic rationalism. These 
offer useful insights by building on the previously discussed perspectives that sit within the 
context of mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches. Dryzek (2013) offers an alternative 
way of differentiating between responses by interpreting the specifics of problem-solving and 
drawing on multiple theories, while also establishing a unique understanding with regard to 
actor roles and behaviour, the concept of self-interest, and the evolution of problem-solving. 
Notably, this chapter relates to objectives one and two. 
 
Chapter four: research methodology 
Chapter four outlines the methodological approach used for this thesis. A justification for this 
selection is given, while the rationale and importance of a Cypriot research setting is also 
recognised. The methods used to select potential interviewees are discussed, with reasons for 
selection noted, alongside the method used and the need for secondary data as part of a process 
of triangulation. Subsequent sections clarify the development of the interview structure and 
procedure, questions asked of the interviewees, the collection and analysis of data, as well as 
the detailed applicability analysis used to compare the expected characteristics of the 
rationalities with real-world findings in Cyprus. 
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Chapter five: water management in Cyprus 
Chapter five develops understanding of how government has managed water problems in 
Cyprus. The first section explores water problems in Cyprus, and these have been categorised in 
terms of availability and quality, which are the main categories of water management identified 
in chapter two. Specific issues for Cyprus include; scarcity that is inherent or imposed; 
groundwater over-abstraction and associated quality issues such as saline intrusion; as well as 
the threat of drought. 
 
The second section considers the different phases of water management that are identified in 
Cyprus, and it is argued that these have occurred to address the observed water problems. The 
three phases have been identified by the researcher and validated through primary and 
secondary data. They are important when understanding the evolution and change of problem-
solving responses. 
 
The third section outlines the organisational structure of the water sector in Cyprus. This 
considers the different departments, bodies, and actor groups that have been responsible for the 
provision of services and management responses to identified water problems. This structure 
has been formed through primary and secondary data, with an understanding of institutions and 
government departments being useful when exploring the characteristics of Dryzek’s (2013) 
rationalities in Cyprus. The chapter relates to objectives two, three, and four. 
 
Chapter six: administrative rationalism in Cyprus 
Chapter six develops understanding of how government in Cyprus has responded to water 
problems by considering the existence of administrative rationalism. This is the first of 
Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, and it is considered to reflect the mandatory approach.  
 
The main section of the chapter discusses administrative rationalism and the characteristics of 
Dryzek’s (2013) discourse analysis in comparison to real-world government responses observed 
in Cyprus. In this case, practical observations and the existence of the characteristics that signal 
administrative rationalism are explored, while also being compared with other theoretical 
understandings such as public choice theory, power approaches, and the top-down perspective. 
The discussion is also positioned and related more broadly to the mandatory approach. The 
practical management challenges of administrative rationalism are explored in the concluding 
sub-section of the chapter, with these discussed according to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation and 
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their relative existence in Cyprus. Challenges such as implementation gaps, problem 
displacement, shifts in locus of control, and dispersed or limited expertise, exist as the 
perceived and observed challenges to the rationality. These are expected to develop and are 
argued to prompt the evolution of other problem-solving approaches (Dryzek, 2013). This 
chapter relates to objectives one and three. 
 
Chapter seven: democratic pragmatism in Cyprus 
Chapter seven continues to develop understanding of how government in Cyprus has managed 
and responded to water problems by considering the existence of democratic pragmatism. This 
is the second of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, and it is considered to reflect the voluntary 
approach. The discussion follows on from the chapter on administrative rationalism, as 
democratic pragmatism signals the evolutionary progression of problem-solving.  
 
The main section of the chapter explores democratic pragmatism and the key topics of Dryzek’s 
(2013) discourse analysis in comparison to the real-world responses observed in Cyprus. In this 
case, practical observations and the existence of characteristics that signal democratic 
pragmatism are explored, while being compared with other theoretical understandings such as 
pluralism, policy networks, and the bottom-up perspective. The discussion is also positioned 
and related more broadly to the voluntary approach. The practical challenges of democratic 
pragmatism are explored in the concluding sub-section of the chapter, with these discussed 
according to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation and their relevance in Cyprus. Challenges such as 
the existence and influence of political power, conceptions of reasoned debate and public 
interest, as well as the privileged position of business and its influence on public opinion, exist 
as perceived and observed challenges to the rationality. These are important in terms of the 
evolution of problem-solving, as Dryzek (2013) notes how economic rationalism emerges as a 
remedy to the challenges of democratic pragmatism [and also administrative rationalism]. The 
chapter also relates to objectives one and three. 
 
Chapter eight: economic rationalism in Cyprus 
Chapter eight continues to develop understanding of how government in Cyprus has managed 
and responded to water problems by considering the existence of economic rationalism. This is 
the third of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, and it is considered to reflect the economic approach. 
The discussion follows on from the chapters on administrative rationalism and democratic 
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pragmatism, as economic rationalism signals the final stage of problem-solving in the context 
of Dryzek’s (2013) framework. 
 
The main section of the chapter discusses economic rationalism and the topics of Dryzek’s 
(2013) discourse analysis in comparison to real-world responses observed in Cyprus. In this 
case, practical observations and the existence of characteristics that signal economic rationalism 
are explored, while being compared with other theoretical understandings, such as; economic 
institutionalism, elitism, top-down approaches, as well as economic models of understanding 
including budget-maximising and bureau-shaping. The discussion is also positioned and related 
more broadly to the economic approach. The practical challenges of economic rationalism are 
explored in the concluding sub-section of the chapter, with these considered according to 
Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation and their relevance in Cyprus. Challenges such as the slow 
diffusion of economic approaches, limited institutional change, resistance of established norms, 
political influences, implementation gaps, as well as the limited recognition of certain agents, 
exist as perceived and observed challenges to the rationality. These challenges are important in 
relation to the evolution of problem-solving, as Dryzek (2013) notes how they guide the 
development of alternative perspectives such as ecological modernisation and green radicalism 
[that are beyond the scope of this study]. This chapter relates back to objectvies one and three. 
 
Chapter nine: conclusions 
Chapter nine summarises the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities, 
and builds on the findings by recognising the existence, role, and influence of emerging themes 
identified in Cyprus. This relates to objectives two, three, and four. The first section of the 
chapter validates the use of Dryzek’s (2013) work by considering key findings and evidence in 
Cyprus. This includes a summary of the applicability analysis (appendix 6), which compares 
the theoretical characteristics of the rationalities with the findings. The second section of the 
chapter is separated into parts that discuss the emerging themes identified in Cyprus. These 
include; the understanding of sequentiality and the evolutionary format of problem-solving; the 
role and influence of supranational governance; the importance of factors such as culture and 
economic status; as well as the role and influence of politics. The final section of the chapter 
summarises and reflects on the study as a whole, while also offering scope for potential further 
research that can build on the study findings through future work. 
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Chapter 2: Government Responses to Water 
Resource Issues 
 
 
2.1 Chapter overview 
The main aim of this chapter is to present an overview of government responses used to manage 
and tackle water problems, with these generally categorised in terms of availability and quality. 
The chapter is structured in two sections. Firstly, the management of water resources is 
considered in terms of the broad responses of availability and quality. This focuses on supply 
and demand solutions as well as pollution control, which involve issues such as scarcity, 
groundwater exploitation, and quality decline. In this case, the different management responses 
used are considered in terms of small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU state experiences, 
which relate to Cyprus. Secondly, these water management responses are also explored and 
contextualised in terms of mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches, which relate to 
Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities. A concluding section provides a summary and 
links this discussion with the next chapter. 
 
 
2.2 Managing water resources 
A realisation of the threat water resource issues pose to human populations has prompted an 
increase in concern within public and political realms (see Arnell, 1999; Fransson & Gärling, 
1999; Dryzek & Schlosberg, 2005; Barr, 2008; Grover, 2016; Cook, 2017; Carter, 2018). As a 
consequence of growing public concern, a strengthening environmental movement, and demand 
for action, governments have faced increasing pressure to generate reasoned responses and 
effective approaches to water problems. In particular to manage; increasing scarcity, drought, 
groundwater depletion, desertification, flood risk, and climate change (see Smith, 1995; 
Frederick & Major, 1997; Şen, 2009; Hansen, 2010; Kanakoudis et al., 2017; Conca & 
Weinthal, 2018; Lubell & Balazs, 2018). 
 
As a result, there has been a convergence of scientific, political, economic, and public realms, 
through which various agents, such as political scientists, hydrologists, biologists, economists, 
and government actors, have attempted to develop responses that utilise appropriate forms of 
governance in order to solve these water problems (Dobson, 1995; Smith, 1995; Wapner, 1995; 
Connelly & Smith, 2003; Oates & Portney, 2003; Kraft, 2007; Gober, 2018). 
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Traditionally, water resource problems have been managed through approaches that focus on 
the two key attributes of availability and quality (Gleick, 2000; Sterner, 2003; Biswas, 2008; 
Gober, 2018). These management responses have been further differentiated in terms of supply, 
demand, and pollution management (Whipple, 1998; Mauser, 2009; Cook, 2017; McMillan, 
2017; Abansi, Hall, & Siason, 2018). The management pathways based on availability and 
quality are explored in the following sections. 
 
 
2.3 Water availability 
The concept of availability involves both supply and demand aspects of management, which are 
each bound by a range of parameters, including; the status of existing hydrological systems, 
relative water requirements of different group interests, and the adequacy of infrastructure 
systems to enable efficient resource allocation and distribution (Love, 1999; De Villiers, 2001; 
Simon, 2003; Anisfield, 2010; Brouziyne et al., 2018). The concept of water availability has 
been a primary management focus for governments, as the control of spatial and temporal 
variability has been necessary to ensure a reliable service to public, agricultural, industrial, and 
corporate consumers (Hoekstra, 1998; Gleick, 2000; Johnson & Handmer, 2002; Reese & 
Gawel, 2017). Thus, the management of supply and the control of demand have gained 
importance as governments have endeavoured to effectively manage availability and maintain 
the water requirements necessary for socio-economic development (Gleick, 2000; Hoekstra & 
Chapagain, 2008; Grover, 2016; Gober, 2018). 
 
2.3.1 Supply management 
Historically, supply management has been widely used as an approach to solve issues relating 
to water availability (Gleick, 2000; Anisfield, 2010). This response seeks to increase 
availability by expanding the supply system, and involves the control, organisation, and 
development of water resources, primarily through the improvement of network facilities and 
extensive infrastructure projects (Dzurik, 2003; Stephenson, 2003; Johnson, Ratnayaka, & 
Brandt, 2009; Edalat & Abdi, 2017). The approach has often been driven by a developmental 
paradigm based on an ideology of unrestricted growth, which has caused governing agents to 
adopt a ‘predict and provide’ response to the expansion of supply (Gleick, 2000; Carter, 2007; 
Stephenson, 2012). 
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Water management, planning, and development have been largely dependent on the projection 
of key variables such as population growth, per capita demand, agricultural production, and the 
extent of productivity in a given economic system, which were considered to directly influence 
water needs (Gleick, 1996; Griffin & Mjelde, 2000; Dzurik, Kulkarni & Boland, 2019). These 
variables were predicted to continuously increase over time, and so the need for water was also 
expected to rise, thus meaning that future water demands would surpass existing supplies, 
ultimately leading to a supply-demand gap (Mauser, 2009; Anisfield, 2010; Cech, 2018). As a 
result, more traditional [often deemed as pre-1980] management responses were centred on 
paradigms of growth and focused on the use of supply-side solutions to address the supply-
demand gap (Dziegielewski, 2003; Solomon, 2010; Grigg, 2011; Clausen, 2017). 
 
In the case of small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU states, problems of availability and 
responses focused on supply management have been explored through a range of topics. Firstly, 
for small states these have included; supply challenges caused by tourism development (Essex, 
Kent, & Newnham, 2010; Gössling, Hall & Scott, 2015); and also, the need for a supply mix 
involving a range of methods (Voivontas et al., 2003; Emmanuel & Clayton, 2017). Secondly, 
for Mediterranean experiences, these have involved; water sustainability and adaptation 
strategies in relation to climate change (Collet et al., 2015); supply-demand ratios based on 
global change scenarios (Garcia-Ruiz et al., 2011; Boithias et al., 2014); supply challenges 
associated with non-perennial rivers (Skoulikidis et al., 2017); adaptation for supply in drought 
prone basins (Kumar et al., 2016); environmental impacts of supply in water stressed regions 
(Uche et al., 2015); as well as supply control through integrated management (Moutsopoulos & 
Petalas, 2018). Thirdly, for peripheral EU states, these have been considered through; a focus 
on developing supply infrastructure and the emergence of desalination (March, Sauri & Rico-
Amoros, 2014); supply variation and drought resilience (Di Matteo et al., 2017); management 
through EU directives (Moutsopoulos & Petalas, 2018); and also influences of privatisation 
(Martinez-Espineira, Garcia-Valinas & Gonzalez-Gomez, 2009). 
 
2.3.2 Demand management 
The failure of supply management approaches to solve water problems, alongside changes in 
social values [toward the environment], political conditions, and economic systems, forced 
governing agents and planners to consider an alternative paradigm of water development 
(Gleick, 2003; Sokolov, 2011; Smith, McDonald & Murray, 2014; Cook, 2017; Edalat & Abdi, 
2017). This has emerged through the management of demand-side variables (Dziegielewski, 
 CHAPTER 2: Government Responses to Water Resource Issues 
 
36 
 
2003; Brooks & Linton, 2009; Mualla, 2018). The response is not solely dependent on supply 
expansion, but instead, it involves a form of management that utilises an array of policy tools, 
such as incentives to change behaviour, to reduce user demand for water (Winpenny, 1997; 
Buckle, 2004; Pahl-Wostl, 2007; Brooks & Linton, 2009; Sipes, 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2011; 
McDonald & Mitchell, 2014). 
 
Demand management has also been defined as an approach employed by governing agents and 
suppliers that seeks to better control water consumption, while motivating different user groups 
to regulate their usage and adopt opportunities to increase efficiency through technology 
(Savenije, 2002; Brooks, 2006; Anisfield, 2010; Russell & Fielding, 2010; Mualla, 2018). The 
approach focuses on controlling demand for water, to ensure levels of demand do not exceed 
the levels of supply that are deemed sustainable for a given region, basin, or groundwater 
source (Baroudy, 2005; Brooks, 2006; Mays, 2007; Abansi et al., 2018). 
 
Demand management has been utilised to tackle water resource issues through three main 
factors. Firstly, the approach seeks to challenge the societal and behavioural status-quo 
regarding water use, as its core principles oppose overconsumption and exploitative pathways 
(Mehta, 2000; Gleick, 2003; Cook, 2017). Secondly, it may be employed by governing agents 
and service providers in an attempt to improve overall water savings, through an increase in 
system and usage efficiency, the appropriate allocation of water to specific sector needs, as well 
as participatory mechanisms (Gleick, 2000; Cech, 2018; Dzurik et al., 2019). Thirdly, water 
quality may be safeguarded by utilising appropriate water types, such as greywater, wastewater, 
green-water, and brackish water, which are deemed suitable for specific activities (Baroudy, 
2005; Brooks, 2006; Loucks & van Beek, 2017). 
 
Much research has been produced in relation to demand management, including; work based on 
general concepts and principles associated with the approach (see Gleick, 2000; Simon, 2003; 
Brooks, 2006; Brooks & Linton, 2009; Lane, Ryan & Norton, 2017); theoretical understanding 
and analysis (see Guy, 1996; Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002; Buckle, 2004; Cantin, Shrubsole, 
& Aït-Ouyahia, 2005; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2011; Xiao, Fang & Hipel, 2018); practical application 
and tangible results (Billings & Day, 1989; Edwards, 2006; Roaf, 2006; Vairavamoorthy & 
Mansoor, 2006; Stavenhagen, Buurman & Tortajada, 2018); as well as definitions of soft path 
management and more integrated management responses involving notions of public 
participation and sustainable basin management (see Wolff & Gleick, 2002; Gleick, 2003; 
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Priscoli, 2004; Arnell & Delaney, 2006; Pahl-Wostl, 2007; Roumasset & Wada, 2015; Fritsch, 
2017; Elfithri & Mokhtar, 2018). 
 
In the case of small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU states, problems of availability and 
responses focused on demand management have been evident through a range of examples. 
Firstly, for small states these have included; social, economic, and institutional influences 
(Abansi et al., 2018); impacts of tourism on demand (Garcia & Servera, 2004); as well as 
management for agriculture and responses to the pressures of groundwater over-abstraction 
(Hallett et al., 2017). Secondly, in terms of Mediterranean experiences, these have involved; 
relationships between urban growth and demand (Bouziotas, Rozos & Makropoulos, 2015); the 
influence of residential tourism (Morote, Sauri, & Hernandez, 2016); and also, agricultural 
water demand management (Hamdy, Abu-Zeid & Lacirignola, 2009). Thirdly, for peripheral 
EU states, these have been considered through; analysing determinants of demand (Romano, 
Salvati & Guerrini, 2014); urban typology and influences on demand (Kolokytha & 
Mylopoulos, 2004; Morote & Hernandez, 2016); as well as the design and application of 
demand management schemes (Baki, Rozos & Makropoulos, 2018). 
 
 
2.4 Water quality 
The second parameter of water resources management, which exists in parallel with 
availability, involves the management of water quality that often occurs through the control and 
mitigation of pollution (Grigg, 1996; Farmer, 1997; Bouwer, 2000; Hunt, 2004; Cook, 2017). 
The concept of water quality relates to the physical, chemical, and biological properties of a 
given water resource [surface, groundwater, or marine] that may be altered through natural 
processes or human activities (Agarwal, 2009). The management of pollution has been regarded 
as a prominent water issue facing society due to the visible effects of pollutant accumulation on 
the environment and the direct potential impacts on public health (Larsen, Ipsen, & Ulmgren, 
1997; Perry & Vanderklein, 2009; Grover, 2016). More specifically, for small, Mediterranean, 
and peripheral EU states, problems of quality have been explored through a range of aspects, 
including; hydrological and quality trends (Lutz et al., 2016); the impact of variables such as 
climate change, land use, and agricultural activities (Casali et al., 2008; Serpa et al., 2017); the 
effects of point and non-point pollution (Gikas, 2017); the quality of groundwater and 
reservoirs (Onorati  et al., 2006; Hildebrandt et al., 2008; Marce & Armengol, 2010; Stamatis et 
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al., 2011); as well as water quality trends and variation (Bouza-Deano, Ternero-Rodriguez & 
Fernandez-Espinosa, 2008). 
 
2.4.1 Pollution management 
Sources of pollution for water are wide-ranging and variable. They can be fundamentally 
defined as any substance, waste product, effluent, contaminant, or catalyst for change that 
enters a water system and alters the natural properties of the ambient quality, thereby causing 
harm to either humans or the natural environment (Farmer, 1997; Peirce, Weiner, & Vasilind, 
1998; Agarwal, 2009; Boyd, 2015). For example, pollutants may include chemical effluents 
released into a river as a result of industrial processes; fertilizer and pesticide by-products 
generated by intensive agricultural practices; or the saline intrusion of groundwater aquifers due 
to seawater encroachment in coastal areas (Logan, 1993; Bouwer, 2000; Rajaram & Das, 2008; 
Cook, 2017; Marignani et al., 2017). 
 
Pollution can have either singular or diffuse characteristics [also termed point or non-point], 
with diffuse pollution posing the most significant management dilemma as the source location 
is often unknown and highly variable (Smith, 1995; Novotny, 2003; Laws, 2017). Pollution can 
have an effect on water resources in two distinct ways, namely; the concept of quality-scarcity 
and also system capacity (Kinnersley, 1994; Chave, 1997; Stauffer, 2013). 
 
Firstly, an increase in polluting substances can have an adverse effect on availability, by 
causing water to become ‘quality-scarce’ (Kinnersley, 1994; Stephenson, 2003). This occurs 
when a decline in quality causes a reduction in the quantity of water available for activities that 
require an adequate level of quality above a given threshold (Stephenson, 2003; Tebbutt, 2013). 
These levels of quality relate to the water requirements of specific activities and may be 
categorised in terms of a water-use hierarchy (Postel, 1992; Grigg, 2011). For example, sources 
for public supply and drinking water need the highest level of quality due to the potential 
impact of poor-quality water on public health, while water used for navigation and transport 
holds a lower threshold due to limited human contact (Kinnersley, 1994). Subsequently, if 
pollutants are permitted to accumulate in a water system, the quality of this resource declines, 
and so, the availability of high-quality water also declines, ultimately causing a condition of 
scarcity that emerges due to the initial decline in quality (Gautier, 2008; Tebbutt, 2013). 
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Secondly, the effect of pollution on water can occur as a result of the water environment’s 
interconnected character and limited capacity to absorb wastes, especially those that are highly 
toxic or persistent (Kinnersley, 1994; Curley, 2011; McMillan, 2017). This is considered to be 
the system capacity to mitigate pollution. A management challenge emerges as pollution poses 
a threat to both the natural environment, through impacts on ecosystems, as well as human 
populations, through an influence on public health and a potential decline in social security (see 
Larsen et al., 1997; Novotny, 2003; Hranova, 2006; Perry & Vanderklein, 2009; Benson et al., 
2017; Cech, 2018). 
 
Management responses to water pollution also exhibit common principles, which remain 
fundamental to government approaches and are evident in different legislative cases and at a 
variety of management levels (Larsen et al, 1997; Peirce et al., 1998; Tebbutt, 2013). For 
example, these involve; approaches that utilise preventative, precautionary, and polluter-pays 
principles; the use of regulatory mechanisms; as well as the integration of economic 
instruments alongside regulations (Grigg, 1996; Chave, 1997; Larsen et al., 1997; Burchell & 
Lightfoot, 2001; de Sadeleer, 2002; Stephenson, 2003; Peel, 2005; Beder, 2006; Siebert, 2008; 
Bell et al., 2017; Clausen, 2017). In this case, regulatory mechanisms, such as strict pollution 
standards or also nudge regulations reflect mandatory approaches, while economic instruments 
such as tradable permits, incentives, or taxes, reflect economic approaches. 
 
Notably, the preventative, precautionary, and polluter-pays principles have often been applied 
in practice through the use of tools that relate to mandatory and economic approaches, namely; 
regulations, pollution standards, as well as economic forms of management such as incentives 
(Young & Karkoski, 2000; Sterner, 2003; Bell et al., 2017). Regulations involve strict rules or 
guidelines that are formed, developed, and enforced by governing agents or institutions, in 
order to restrict or completely prohibit a specific behaviour or action (Carter, 2018). Standards 
attempt to set defined limits on polluting actions or variables, such as the concentration of a 
pollutant permitted or the specific types of pollutant that are permitted to be released from a 
source (Beder, 2006). Economic management tools involve market mechanisms that are used to 
modify polluter behaviour and limit harmful practices (Smith, 2011). Various economic tools 
have been used to control water pollution, namely; pricing adjustments, charges, marketable 
permits, licenses, subsidies, and enforcement incentives (Gayer & Horowitz, 2006; Borghesi, 
2014; Gómez Gómez et al., 2018).  
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In the case of small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU states, problems of quality and 
responses focused on pollution control have been evident through a range of examples. For 
small states these have involved; spatial and temporal influences of pollution (Daou, Nabbout, 
& Kassouf, 2016); agricultural practices and wastewater (Dare & Mohtar, 2018); and river 
contamination due to heavy metals (Shehu et al., 2016). In turn, for Mediterranean nations, 
topics have included; managing non-point pollution (Patterson, Smith & Bellamy, 2013); 
assessing groundwater pollution (Libutti & Monteleone, 2017; Miglietta et al., 2017); and also 
analysing relationships between pollution, scarcity, and river ecosystems (Karaouzas et al., 
2018a). Furthermore, for peripheral EU states, responses to pollution have been considered 
through; assessments of pollution sources (Palma et al., 2009); pollution in temporary rivers 
(Karaouzas et al., 2018b); as well as the use of EU directives to determine the existence of 
pollutants (Golfinopoulos et al., 2016). 
 
 
2.5 Contextualising water management and policy responses 
The dominant forms of approach used by government [and society] when responding to socio-
environmental problems such as water resource issues, can be contextualised in terms of the 
three coordination mechanisms identified in chapter one. These are mandatory, voluntary, and 
economic approaches (Frances et al., 1991; Kelly & Palumbo, 1992; Freeden, 1996; Rhodes, 
1996; MacKenzie, 2003; Meuleman, 2008; Powers, 2010; Birkland, 2011). 
 
A range of policy responses have been utilised to varying degrees to tackle water management 
problems (Cantin et al., 2005; Arnell & Delaney, 2006; Conca, 2006; Pahl-Wostl, 2007). These 
responses reflect the mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches through; regulations; 
public participation and stakeholder interaction; as well as market-based system approaches and 
instruments (Wu & Babcock, 1999; Papadakis & Grant, 2003; Keast, 2016). Firstly, in response 
to surface and groundwater use, regulatory measures have been established to manage and 
control practices, as shown by the EU Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the EU 
Groundwater Directive (2006/118). Also, when addressing the pollution of water systems, 
regulation has been important in controlling water quality, as noted in the cases of; the US 
Clean Water Act; the EU Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive 91/271; and the EU Drinking 
Water Directive 98/83 (Gross & Dodge, 2005; EU Water, 2012). Secondly, voluntary 
approaches have been evident in the case of reducing ambient pollution (Suter et al., 2010), and 
when managing urban water demand (Fielding et al., 2013) or encouraging water conservation 
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(Khoo, 2009). Thirdly, economic forms of management, such as permits, have been established 
in certain cases to encourage the reallocation of existing resources, as shown by the Water Act 
2003 [of England and Wales] (Dinar, 1998; NetRegs, 2011), while economic instruments such 
as pricing, taxes, penalties, incentives, and subsidies have been used to manage demand and 
scarcity, encourage certain behaviours such as the uptake of recycled water for irrigation, as 
well as control supply during drought periods (see Zoumides & Zachariadis, 2009; Renwick, 
2017; Shortle & Horan, 2017; Berbel & Expósito, 2018; Gómez Gómez et al., 2018). 
 
In relation to the tangible successes and failures of policy outcomes and management responses, 
it is argued that in many cases new approaches will often be sought if; existing responses do not 
satisfy policy objectives, outcomes are inadequate in the face of public demands, or specific 
responses attract widespread scientific, public, or political criticism (Gray, 1997; Hahn, 2001; 
Lazarus, 2004). This procedure represents a form of incrementalism, through which the 
response to a problem is continually adjusted and evolves in accordance with different variables 
such as increasing scientific knowledge, change in public opinion or demand, and political or 
external pressure for improvement (Burstein, 2010; Dye, 2016). For example, the introduction 
of market-based and voluntary policy instruments has occurred over time due to the perceived 
failures of regulatory actions, as many water issues, including the pollution of waterways and 
the exploitation of groundwater sources, have continued to deteriorate despite seemingly strict 
regulation and control (Frances et al., 1991; Hahn & Stavins, 1991; Kraft, 2017). 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Government responses to water issues have been framed and explored according to specific 
challenges encountered. A significant proportion of the literature relating to water management 
has been devoted to a better understanding of availability and quality (Stephenson, 2012; Boyd, 
2015; Cook, 2017). This has emerged through work on general approaches and challenges 
associated with the provision of services, such as supply and demand solutions, pollution 
control, as well as mitigation and adaption methods employed to tackle scarcity and quality 
issues (Smith & Thomassey, 2002; Wescoat Jr. & White, 2003; Arnell & Delaney, 2006; 
Pereira, Cordery, & Iacovides, 2009). For example, work relating to supply-side development 
and infrastructure (Gleick, 2000; Griffin & Mjelde, 2000; Jin & Young, 2001; Moutsopoulos & 
Petalas, 2018) as well as the management and control of demand (Guy, 1996; Dziegielewski, 
1999; Dziegielewski, 2003; Gleick, 2003; Brooks, 2006; Brooks & Holtz, 2009; Brooks & 
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Linton, 2009; Pereira et al., 2009; Sokolov, 2011; Abansi et al., 2018) has been extensive, 
while in terms of quality, different responses to pollution management and technological 
advances have been considered (Logan, 1993; Bouwer, 2000; Novotny, 2003; Ribaudo, 2009; 
Suter et al., 2010; Parris, 2011; McMillan, 2017). 
 
It is acknowledged that the effective management and provision of water services is often 
dependent on appropriate institutional responses, and thus research in this case has tended to 
focus on; describing and exploring institutional structures; availability scenarios for specific 
countries, regions, sectors or industries; as well as adaptation measures in relation to regimes, 
practices, and policy (Smith, 1995; Saleth & Dinar, 1997; Dinar, 1998; Subak, 2000; de Loë, 
Kreutzwiser, & Moraru, 2001; Crabbé & Robin, 2006; Dessai & Hulme, 2007; Larson et al., 
2009). The understanding of management and decision-making intricacies has however been 
underdeveloped, particularly the role, motives, and behaviour of actors and the broad rationales 
they employ, key tools used, as well as the evolution of responses. The aspects discussed in this 
chapter have also been quite limited in scope, being concentrated on certain countries such as 
the United Kingdom (Hassan, 1998; Ducros & Watson, 2002; Rouse, 2017), France (Ladrech, 
1994; Szarka, 2002; Salvetti & Canneva, 2016; Colon, Richard, & Roche, 2017), China (Xie et 
al., 2009; Yining, 2010; Araral & Wu, 2016), Australia (Crase, 2008; Tisdell & Ward, 2011; 
Grafton & Horne, 2014), and the United States (Gleick, 2009; Glennon, 2009; Lindstrom, 2011; 
Robinson, 2013; Mulroy, 2017), while being underdeveloped in certain contexts, such as for 
small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU nations [such as Cyprus]. 
 
Now attention will turn to methods of problem-solving, which have been used to form 
collective responses to existing and emerging water management problems, such as the issues 
of availability and quality that are of detriment to the future provision of water resources. 
 CHAPTER 3: Understanding Problem-Solving Responses 
 
43 
 
Chapter 3: Understanding Problem-Solving Responses 
 
 
3.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter explores how government responses to socio-environmental problems have been 
understood from a range of approaches and perspectives. 
 
The first section considers the three core approaches used to conceptualise how societies 
coordinate collective responses to socio-environmental problems, namely through mandatory, 
voluntary, and economic approaches. Each of these exhibit certain types of governance, formats 
of decision-making, policy instruments, modes of organisation, as well as interactions between 
governing actors and those being governed (Wurzel et al., 2013). Notably, the approaches are 
considered through a range of aspects such as; bureaucratic systems and methods for 
understanding policy implementation and the roles of key agents; democratic and pluralist 
approaches such as policy networks and communities; as well as economic models of 
understanding and market-based concepts. Different perspectives, including top-down and 
bottom-up understandings, bargaining, policy networks, public choice theory, and economic 
institutionalism, have been analysed in terms of each relevant approach based on commonalities 
between key elements and structural characteristics. Notably, the limitations of previous 
approaches have helped to form the focus of this analysis and overview, with recognition of the 
idea that limitations help to generate alternative approaches. This reflects Dryzek’s (2013) 
understanding of how different rationalities emerge as a result of the practical limitations and 
challenges of previous problem-solving responses. 
 
The second section focuses on exploring the three problem-solving rationalities developed by 
Dryzek (2013), namely administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic 
rationalism. These form a key part of the study, and reflect and build on the mandatory, 
voluntary, and economic approaches. It is proposed that Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities have the 
potential to offer useful and unique insights into understanding how governments respond to 
socio-environmental problems. This argument is based on how Dryzek (2013) offers an 
alternative way of differentiating between responses, while also establishing a unique 
understanding of policy actor roles, motivation, behaviour, the concept of self-interest, rhetoric, 
and the evolution of problem-solving, through his discourse analysis. 
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3.2 Mandatory approaches 
The mandatory approach has been the basis of government responses to socio-environmental 
problems, essentially involving approaches based on administrative and bureaucratic structures 
(Mitchell, 1991; Hill & Hupe, 2014). It has been characterised through aspects such as unitary 
organisation and a dependence on administrative organisation, task specialisation, and rational 
methods (Holzinger et al., 2006; Hill & Hupe, 2014); while as a bureaucratic model, the main 
organising principles are identified as rules, authority, and hierarchy (Hood, 1976; Colebatch & 
Larmour, 1993). Furthermore, in terms of environmental problem-solving, it can be generally 
defined as an approach based on regulation, command-and-control, and the idea of behaviour 
being altered through the threat of punishment (Connelly & Smith, 2003; Wurzel et al., 2013; 
Cubbage, O’Laughlin & Peterson, 2017). 
 
The mandatory approach exhibits a range of characteristics, namely; governance based on 
hierarchy; policy instrument types that are identified as administrative regulations; government 
intervention in a top-down format; as well as interactions between actors that are based on 
coercion in the form of governance by government (Bevir, 2012; Wurzel et al., 2013). The 
approach has also been defined through a state mode of governance that is based on aspects 
including; a service focus on the public good; a locale of bureaucracy and hierarchy; decision-
making in a vertical and top-down format; a focus on dependent relationships; rule-based and 
procedural styles of negotiation; as well as integration mechanisms such as legal authority, 
formal rules, policies, procedures, and regulations (Powell, 1990; Keast, 2016). The main 
characteristics of the approach, namely hierarchy and bureaucracy, have also been described 
according to specific modes of organisation and compliance. These involve; the notion of 
coercive relationships (Etzioni, 1961); the idea of command (Rigby, 1990); the feeling of threat 
(Boulding, 1990); as well as a basis of authority (Lindblom, 1977; Bradach & Eccles, 1991). 
Notably, these conceptualisations highlight how the mandatory approach can be defined, what it 
aims to do, and the constructs associated with it. However, an understanding of the specifics of 
problem-solving, by considering how and why actors behave in a certain way and how these 
actors can be distinguished, remains an underdeveloped area in terms of water problems and 
small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU state experiences, as noted in chapter two. It is in this 
context that Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities can be useful to advance understanding. 
 
The following sections explore different understandings and perspectives that relate to the 
mandatory approach. Firstly, the concept of bureaucracy is considered as the foundation of 
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mandatory approaches. Secondly, the top-down and bottom-up perspectives offer insight into 
the role of governing agents in terms of policy implementation. Thirdly, bargaining and 
negotiation consider the interactions between governing agents, with the policy-action 
continuum emerging as a component for understanding implementation and the application of 
bargaining constructs. Fourthly, power approaches such as elitism and technocracy are 
explored, as these help to explain the importance of hierarchy and the roles of certain actor 
types. For elitism, importance is placed on bureaucratic hierarchy and control by a group of 
elites, while technocracy focuses on control through technical experts. 
 
3.2.1 Understanding bureaucracy 
The concept of bureaucracy is characterised as a system of administration through which the 
officials and experts of a government or organisation are given responsibility for the formation, 
development, and implementation of policy (Beetham, 1991; Mitchell, 1991; Parsons, 1995; 
Smith & Ingram, 2002; Workman, 2015). This relates to the mandatory approach through 
characteristics such as traditional forms of regulation, hierarchy, and command-and-control 
policy (Holzinger et al., 2009; Bähr, 2010; Wurzel et al., 2013). In these terms, bureaucracy 
seeks to exercise control based on knowledge and relies on a hierarchal organisational structure 
to tackle problems by consolidating individuals and experts into groups to ultimately establish a 
prevailing problem-solving and policy direction (Desveaux, 1995; Meier & O’Toole, 2006). 
Bureaucracy is noted to be a centralised form of coordination that focuses on implementing 
decisions made by actors with authority, while restricting isolated autonomy in decision-making 
(Sartori, 1991; Page & Jenkins, 2005; Tullock, 2005; Garston, 2012). 
 
Administration relates to the concept of bureaucracy and can be defined as the coordination and 
implementation of policy in response to a given issue (Parsons, 1995; Milakovich & Gordon, 
2013). A system of administration can be understood as the organisation of offices or agencies, 
for example within a government, institution, or organisation, concerned with the formation and 
development of policy and legislation (Beetham, 1991; Peters, 2010). As a construct, policy 
exists as a political solution to contested interests that emerge because of different resource or 
socio-economic requirements (Miller, 2002; Schmid, 2002; Pahl-Wostl, 2015). Governing 
agents3 are faced with the challenge of developing, guiding, and implementing policy in 
response to water management problems related to availability and quality, including; scarcity, 
                                                          
3 For example, these agents include civil servants, administrative officials, ministers, cabinet members, 
decision-makers, experts, managers, bureaucrats, and planners (Parsons, 1995; Dryzek, 2013) 
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drought, over-use, and a decline in surface and groundwater quality (Roberts, 2004; Allan, 
2005; Miller, 2009; Kraft, 2017; Smith, 2017; Cech, 2018). 
 
A range of aspects have been explored regarding bureaucracy, bureaucratic administration, and 
hierarchal organisational systems. This has included; definitions, operational structures, and 
theoretical constructs (see Weber, 1946; Hall, 1963; Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1987; Wilson, 
1989; Frances et al., 1991; Downs, 1993; Weber, 1998; Du Gay, 2000; Parkin, 2002; Sager & 
Rosser, 2009); individual and collective motivations in bureaucratic structures (see Crewson, 
1997; Page & Jenkins, 2005; Powers, 2010; Hodder, 2011; Schermerhorn, 2011); the function 
of bureaucracy in relation to democracy, competition, and the issue of corruption (see Meier, 
1997; Drugov, 2010; Peters, 2010; Hodder, 2011; Vohnsen, 2017); as well as related policy 
tools and the concept of representative bureaucracy (see Selden, 1997; Sowa & Selden, 2003; 
Bradbury & Kellough, 2011; Kingsley, 2016). 
 
3.2.2 The top-down perspective 
The top-down perspective has been used to understand policy processes and the results of 
decision-making procedures. It reflects the mandatory approach based on the characteristics of 
hierarchy and a focus on the governing agents at the top of the policy process, including senior 
government officials, high-level bureaucrats, and elected politicians (Sabatier, 1986; Younis, 
1990; Dye, 2002; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Zafarullah & Huque, 2017). As Miller (2002) and 
Hummel (2008) argue, the concept of bureaucracy, which is a part of mandatory approaches, 
can be considered the archetypal top-down perspective as a result of an importance placed on 
certain organisational features. These include; a hierarchal system of management; decision-
making at the top of the policy chain; increasing authority in a vertical format within 
government or an administrative body; as well as senior governing agents having the primary 
role in policy implementation (Dye, 2002; Miller, 2002; Birkland, 2015). 
 
The top-down perspective offers a particular view on how socio-environmental problems have 
been tackled by drawing attention to the role of senior officials and arguing that they directly 
shape policy (Stewart, Hedge & Lester, 2008; Sabatier, 2014). Research on this has focused on 
a diverse range of aspects, including; definitions and concepts (Hood, 1976; Ringquist, 1993; 
Sapru, 2004; Birkland, 2015); the formation of theoretical models and analytical frameworks to 
identify policy realisation (see Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979; 
Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Sabatier, 1986); the analysis of tangible outcomes [both positive 
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and negative] involving case studies and policy examples that have been shaped through top-
down frameworks (see Pülzl & Treib, 2007; Winkler, Höhne, & den Elzen, 2008; Brandes & 
Curran, 2017); as well as suggested parameters that are considered to be necessary for effective 
policy implementation (see Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979; Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Knill & 
Lenschow, 2000; Sabatier, 2014; Birkland, 2015; Azhoni, Jude, & Holman, 2018). 
 
In relation to water policy, the top-down perspective has been used to explain and interpret 
policy implementation issues, thus giving an insight into this specific aspect of the mandatory 
approach. Firstly, in the context of EU water policy, the Bathing Water Directive (76/100), the 
Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (91/271/EEC), and the Water Framework Directive 
(2000/60/EC) experienced problematic implementation in certain cases based on a lack of 
member state government commitment, insufficient financial capability or support, and the 
failure of the EU Commission to impose directives in separate member states (Jordan, Ward, & 
Buller, 1998; Barnes & Barnes, 1999; Wurzel, 2002; Voulvoulis, Arpon, & Giakoumis, 2017). 
In nations such as France, Germany, and England and Wales, more effective implementation 
was possible, when compared to peripheral EU states, due to sufficient administrative and 
financial capabilities working alongside enforcement achieved by the Commission (Jordan et 
al., 1998; Aubin & Varone, 2004; Pahl-Wostl, 2015; Marek, Baun, & Dabrowski, 2017). 
 
The top-down perspective fails to provide a balanced understanding of policy implementation, 
and it has been criticised by those who argue that politicians, senior officials, and high-level 
governing agents actually have a minor role in daily policy practices (Houston, 1998; Birkland, 
2015). In this case, it is instead claimed that lower-level officials and the public are of greater 
importance in the policy implementation process (Elmore, 1985; Ham & Hill, 1993; Grin, 2008; 
Lipsky, 2010; Brodkin, 2016). This interpretation contrasts with top-down perspectives, in turn 
suggesting that implementation is more effectively understood by considering the actions of 
relevant individuals or groups that are involved in or affected by the everyday intricacies of 
decision-making and policy implementation (Hill & Hupe, 2009; Sabatier, 2014). 
 
3.2.3 The bottom-up perspective 
The bottom-up perspective focuses on how problems can be tackled from the view of 
individuals that are responsible for implementing policy (Sabatier, 1986; Bogason, 2000; Sapru, 
2004). It has emerged in direct response to the top-down perspective and offers an alternative 
understanding of policy implementation by considering the importance of lower-level 
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governing actors or ‘ground / street-level bureaucrats’ [as defined by bottom-up advocates] 
(Lipsky, 1978; Houston, 1998; Greenawalt, 2016; Weimer & Vining, 2017). This differs from a 
top-down understanding by shifting focus onto individuals that are deemed responsible for 
enacting policy, rather than the high-level bureaucrats or politicians that often do not have 
everyday control over policy implementation (Wilson, Petersen & Holl, 1999; Raadschelders, 
2003; Birkland, 2015; Bähr, 2016). The bottom-up perspective also relates to the mandatory 
approach based on characteristics of regulation [with a focus on ground-level control] and 
interactions between actors that are based on coercion in the form of governance by government 
(Wurzel et al., 2013). In the context of mandatory approaches, the bottom-up perspective 
develops the view of policy implementation alongside the top-down perspective to consider all 
levels of the administrative structure. 
 
In terms of water policy, the bottom-up perspective has been used to explain and interpret a 
range of aspects related to implementation and management. These have involved; the 
governing of integrated water management (Serra-Llobet, Conrad, & Schaefer, 2016); water 
service practices and forms of governance (Conca, 2006); the integrative benefits of sustainable 
water management and the protection of livelihoods (Mabiza, 2013); organisation in relation to 
flood risk adaptation and drainage (Kuks, 2009); as well as responses to scarcity (Griffin, 2011) 
and the vulnerability of the water sector to climate change (Brown et al., 2012). 
 
A key aspect of the bottom-up perspective has emerged through the notion of individual 
discretion, which is understood to have importance in relation to the everyday actions and 
experiences of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1978; Dunleavy, 1981; Brodkin, 2016). 
Individual discretion and judgement is often applied by governing actors or implementers for 
the formation and prioritisation of different policy aims and objectives, thus enabling those 
responsible for ground-level implementation to shape policy in a suitable manner (Ham & Hill, 
1993; Jordan, 1995; Hill & Hupe, 2014). However, individual discretion can also facilitate the 
manipulation of policy to satisfy the interests of certain individuals or groups that are 
responsible for implementation. This shares similarities with the top-down perspective, 
although in this case discretion is instead attributed to high-level bureaucrats that have the 
power to shape and influence policy objectives according to individual or group interests 
(Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Grin, 2008; Evans, 2011; Azhoni et al., 2018). This concept also 
gives insight into the potential characteristics of actors that operate within mandatory 
approaches and how they attempt to implement regulation and command-and-control policies. 
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For water policy, individual discretion has been evident regarding the implementation of the EU 
Bathing Water Directive (76/160) and the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC). In this 
case, implementation processes have been influenced by the decisions of lower-level [local] 
governing officials. Firstly, for the Bathing Water Directive, water quality standards were 
influenced by decisions relating to the design and location of waste system projects, as a result 
shaping both the implementation process and ground level objectives (Jordan et al., 1998). 
Secondly, for the Water Framework Directive, stakeholder involvement and the application of 
integrated management were influenced by discretion. Actors or groups exhibited control in 
procedures, with outcomes being variable through discretion and administrative capacity or 
political choice (Howarth, 2009; Watson, 2014; Voulvoulis et al., 2017). Furthermore, by 
identifying the concept of discretion and its presence in the policy process, street-level 
bureaucrats often alter policy content (Gouldson and Murphy, 1998). In this case, discretion 
emerges as a key element that facilitates an understanding of why policy implementation can 
fail (Hudson & Lowe, 2004; Yandle, 2001; Evans, 2011). Discretion also highlights the 
important role played by certain actors in policy, such as experts or managers, and the ability 
they have in shaping implementation or translating policy at ground-level. This is noted in the 
case of integrated water resources management and the application of EU policy (Watson, 
2014) as well as surface-water pollution control (Hunter & Waterman, 2016). 
 
Ultimately, the bottom-up perspective fails to provide a balanced understanding of policy 
implementation, as successful implementation has been dependent on sufficient financial 
resources and the commitment of high-level senior officials (Birkland, 2015; Bähr, 2016; 
Weimer & Vining, 2017). Therefore, a focus on understanding the role and actions of street-
level bureaucrats becomes problematic as the importance of other actors and their influences on 
the policy-making process are not recognised (Houston, 1998; Meyers & Vorsanger, 2003). 
Although exponents of the bottom-up perspective argue that successful implementation relies 
on officials at ground-level, this understanding still fails to explain how relevant policy is 
formed prior to reaching the point at which these street-level bureaucrats can have an influence 
(Vinzant & Crothers, 1998; Weimer & Vining, 2017). These aspects emphasise an uncertain 
basis of investigation, which suggests bottom-up analysis merely seeks to understand the 
behaviour and interactions of specific governing agents rather than comprehending the full 
extent of policy implementation (Sabatier, 2014). 
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3.2.4 Bargaining and bureaucratic negotiation 
The bargaining and negotiation perspective attempts to fill the gap between top-down and 
bottom-up perspectives by offering a view that appreciates the importance of both concepts and 
their relationship (Anderson, 2015; Birkland, 2015). In this case, policy implementation and 
decision-making are considered complex processes that rely upon the interactions and 
exchanges between governing actors at a variety of positions (Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Schucht, 
2001). For example, bargaining and negotiation occurs between actors at the top and bottom of 
the policy process, or more specifically between politicians, senior officials, elites, and the 
street-level bureaucrats or lower-level officials (Turner, 1997; Anderson, 2015). In this case, the 
perspective offers insight into the implementation of policy and regulation, with this related to 
mandatory approaches through characteristics such as dependent relationships as well as a rule-
based and procedural style of negotiation (Powell, 1990; Keast, 2016). 
 
The policy-action continuum 
The bargaining and negotiation perspective suggests that decision-making and policy 
implementation is best understood in terms of a policy-action continuum, which establishes a 
rational sequence of policy-making based on stages (Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Sapru, 2004; 
Arnscheidt, 2009; Wurzel et al., 2013). These include; the initial passing of statute law; policy 
decisions of implementing organisations and governing actors; the compliance of target groups 
in accordance with the original decision; the intended and unintended impacts of a given 
decision; the perceived impacts of this decision; as well as any necessary adjustments of statute 
(Hill, 2005; Hill & Hupe, 2014). 
 
In terms of water policy, bargaining and negotiation [as well as a continuum understanding] has 
been evident regarding the implementation of policies such as the EU Water Framework 
Directive and the Bathing Water Directive within the context of member states (Chave, 2001; 
Wurzel, 2002; Jordan, 2005). More specifically, for the Water Framework Directive, factors 
such as policy scope, implementation timing, and the extent of corrective action have been 
influenced through intergovernmental bargaining in the Council of Ministers and negotiations 
between the Environmental Commission and governing authorities and actors (Borzel, 2005; 
Voulvoulis et al., 2017). The requirements of policy implementation have also resulted in use 
of bargaining and negotiation at national levels. This has been noted between authorities, 
communities, and separately administered regions, when managing issues caused by; high 
financial costs of implementation; a lack of expertise; and a demanding timeframe for the 
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achievement of full implementation (Birol, Koundouri, & Remoundou, 2011). Bargaining and 
negotiation at these different points of the continuum can reflect characteristics of the 
mandatory approach, namely; a primary focus on implementing regulation, which is a key 
component of the approach; and also, mechanisms such as bureaucracy and legal authority. 
 
3.2.5 Power approaches 
Through the discussion on bargaining, it becomes apparent that a key part of policy and 
decision-making involves the interactions and motivations of governing agents. As a result, 
when understanding who controls the policy process and why they act in a certain way it is also 
possible to draw from power approaches such as elitism and technocracy. These relate back to 
the mandatory approach through characteristics such as hierarchy, a basis of authority, and the 
idea of command, which are argued to be relevant (Rigby, 1990; Bradach & Eccles, 1991). 
 
Power approaches view decision-making and policy implementation as processes that are 
shaped and determined by power constructs, including; class, wealth, bureaucratic arrangement, 
professional status, and technical knowledge (Parsons, 1995; King, 2011). In terms of 
bureaucracy, the most relevant power approaches involve the constructs of elitism and 
technocracy (Johari, 1982; Peters, 2010; Thompson, 2013). These place an importance on 
expertise and the control of knowledge to gain authority, while also sharing similarities with the 
top-down perspective due to the prioritisation of higher-level governing officials (see Barsoux 
& Lawrence, 1997; Birch, 2007; Peters, 2015; Clemons & McBeth, 2017). 
 
Elitism 
Elitism can be defined as a concept that focuses on the different ways power is concentrated or 
directed (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950; Lasswell, 1965; Yadav, Bigsby & MacDonald, 2016). 
Elitist models of understanding suggest that power within the policy and decision-making 
process is centralised and controlled by certain groups or individuals [defined as ‘elites’], which 
can ultimately shape and determine a given decision outcome or policy direction (Schumpeter, 
1974; Parsons, 1995; Birkland, 2015). 
 
The elitist understanding can be related to the mandatory approach as it highlights the 
importance of a hierarchal organisational structure and the apparent need for expert knowledge 
(Parry, 2005; Holzinger et al., 2009). This view also reflects the top-down perspective, by 
suggesting that high-level [or ‘elite’] actors and senior officials that sit at the top hold the most 
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prominent role in problem-solving (Parsons, 1995; Kersey, 2016). This understanding is further 
developed through claims that decision outcomes can often be influenced by high-level actors 
to help them achieve personal or group interests (Parry, 2005; Kersey, 2016). For example, 
these may involve; financial gains; increased control and authority; or the protection of 
electoral status to maintain political legitimacy (Dye, Zeigler & Schubert, 2012). 
 
Elitism has been evident in terms of water policy through the federal management of irrigation 
practices and the development of water infrastructure in the United States (Parsons & 
Matthews, 1990; Gonzalez, 2001). In this case, high-level [elite] governing agents were found 
to have extensively influenced decision-making and water management (Kann, 1986; Gonzalez, 
2001). For example, legal agreements were defined and implemented by central government 
and local authorities that resulted in the allocation of more water for human consumption than 
certain river and groundwater sources could feasibly supply. This was noted in the case of the 
Colorado River system, with urban areas and the agricultural sector being given priority for 
water by those at the highest levels of government (Miller & Spoolman, 2009; Pulwarty, 2011). 
 
Technocracy 
The concept of technocracy offers an alternative understanding of control and organisation for 
decision-making that focuses on the key role of technical experts in the policy process (Fischer, 
1990; Burris, 1993; Söderbaum, 2009). The concept has emerged from the development of 
transforming bureaucratic structures, and places greater importance on experts and scientific 
knowledge (Muttalib, 1980; Bucchi, 2009; Lentsch & Weingart, 2009). Technocracy is an 
evolved concept of rationalisation that integrates a range of previously conceived aspects of 
structural control and power, namely; bureaucracy and hierarchy, technical control, and 
professionalism (Parsons, 1995; Evans, 2007; Radaelli, 2017). Indeed, technocracy also reflects 
certain characteristics of the mandatory approach, namely; hierarchy, regulation by experts, 
formal procedures, a focus on dependent relationships, as well as decision-making in a vertical 
and top-down format (Wurzel et al., 2013; Keast, 2016). 
 
The technocratic understanding is founded on two key elements that explain decision-making 
through the perceived relationship between experts, political decision-makers, and the public 
(Lentsch & Weingart, 2009). Firstly, technocrats consider that both political decision-makers 
and the public represent a level of scientific knowledge that is severely limited, and thus the 
need for their expert knowledge to guide policy and decision-making becomes apparent 
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(Fischer, 1990). Secondly, advocates of technocracy claim that governing actors or politicians 
and the public are often influenced by irrational fears and misinformation when forming 
decisions (Bucchi, 2009). Thus, it is argued that experts should have the greatest responsibility 
and authority in decision-making, as they can provide the highest level of scientific rationality 
and offer a response based on research and scientific evidence (see Fischer, 1990; Evans, 2007; 
Peters, 2010; Webler, Tuler & Dietz, 2011; Radaelli, 2017). 
 
The concept of technocracy is evident in relation to water policy through the United Nations 
Water division. This authority consists of an array of working groups that include experts 
focusing on research requirements, such as; scarcity, quality and wastewater, sanitation, 
transboundary management, and responses to climate change (UN Water, 2015). The experts 
are responsible for monitoring and publishing reports, as well as informing and guiding policy, 
with core definitions, necessary actions, and targets defined (Hendry, 2015). This is a practical 
representation of technocracy based on the way technical experts are positioned at the top of 
problem-solving, while important characteristics of the mandatory approach are also present, 
such as bureaucracy, hierarchy, and top-down constructs. 
 
 
3.3 Voluntary approaches 
The voluntary approach encompasses the concepts and understandings that have been the basis 
of inclusive responses to socio-environmental problems, particularly those based on pluralism, 
networks, communities, and participation (Wurzel et al., 2013; Hill & Hupe, 2014). It has been 
broadly defined through the concept of community and governance based on networks, while 
being dependent on less formal and more egalitarian and cooperative approaches (Thompson, 
1991). In terms of environmental problem-solving, it can be generally defined as an approach 
based on cooperation, suasive policy, information and communication, and consensus building 
between different stakeholders (Segerson & Miceli, 1999; OECD, 2003; Halpern, 2010). 
 
The voluntary approach is argued to represent certain characteristics, such as; suasive policy 
instrument types; content based on information and appeals; as well as a relationship of 
interaction between governing actors and those being governed based on societal self-regulation 
and governance without government (Bevir, 2012; Wurzel et al., 2013). The approach has also 
been defined through a network mode of governance, which is based on a range of aspects. For 
example; a service focus on the social good; a setting of community; decision-making in a more 
 CHAPTER 3: Understanding Problem-Solving Responses 
 
54 
 
widely scoped and horizontal format; a focus on interdependent relationships; an interest-based 
and inclusive negotiation style with a long-term focus; as well as tools and mechanisms of 
integration focused on social exchange, relationships, mutuality, reciprocity, and a common 
vision or purpose (Taylor, 1982; Powell, 1990; Colebatch & Larmour, 1993; Keast, 2016). 
Furthermore, the main characteristics of the voluntary approach, namely network and 
community, have also been described through specific modes of organisation and compliance. 
These include; the idea of a moral foundation (Etzioni, 1961); the dynamic of persuasion 
(Lindblom, 1977); the notion of custom (Rigby, 1990); the feeling of love (Boulding, 1990); as 
well as a concept and basis of trust (Bradach & Eccles, 1991). Notably, these conceptualisations 
highlight how the voluntary approach can be defined, what it aims to do, and the constructs 
associated with it. However, an understanding of how and why actors behave in a certain way, 
and how these actors can be distinguished, remains an underdeveloped area in terms of water 
problems and small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU state experiences. It is in this context 
that Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities can be useful. 
 
The following sections consider different understandings and perspectives that have been 
central to the voluntary approach. Firstly, the concept of pluralism is explored, with this being a 
basis of more inclusive responses, diversity, and different groups having power to apply 
pressure. Secondly, policy networks and communities are considered and offer an interpretation 
of relationships and interactions between governing agents. They attempt to illustrate who 
controls policy-making and why these individuals or groups act in a certain way, for example as 
a result of network dynamics and the influences or agendas of a given group. 
 
3.3.1 Pluralism 
Pluralism focuses attention on the way power is distributed within society, assuming that policy 
is the outcome of competition between ideas and interests (Roelofs, 2003; Clemons & McBeth, 
2017). It has been defined as a system of interest representation that involves the organisation 
of multiple groups, structured in a non-hierarchy format, based on voluntary and self-
determined categories (Hill & Varone, 2017). Participation in the policy process is open to all 
individuals and groups, and as a result it is suggested that power is equally distributed within 
society, with decision-making not being dominated, controlled, or primarily shaped by any 
single actor group (Schlosberg, 2006; Lassman, 2011). 
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Proponents of pluralism have suggested that the policy process can be driven by public demand 
and opinion, with this being a consequence of widely distributed power and a highly organised 
political system (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963; Hill & Varone, 2017). The state is considered to 
adopt a neutral role when responding to the interests or demands of non-state groups and policy 
actors (Blowers, 1984; Ham & Hill, 1993). It is further argued that within a democratic socio-
political context, power and control can become equally distributed if no single interest group 
takes command and influences decision-making [contrasting the expected dynamic generated 
by mandatory approaches and constructs such as elitism] (Dahl, 1961; Lassman, 2011). For the 
pluralist view, interest groups also include government agencies that compete alongside other 
groups to exert pressure on and influence state responses (Clemons & McBeth, 2017).  
 
Pluralism further contrasts with the mandatory approaches of top-down and elitist 
understandings, by considering participation in the policy and decision-making process to be 
open to all groups or individuals, and as such it should be an inclusive process that involves the 
public (Haas, 1992; Lassman, 2011; Dye et al., 2012). This reflects the disparity between 
mandatory approaches and concepts of bureaucracy, and voluntary approaches and pluralism 
(Haas, 1992; Dye et al., 2012). In this case, mandatory approaches consider problem-solving 
through government officials, hierarchal management, and the concentration of expert 
knowledge, while voluntary approaches and pluralism instead consider this through networks 
and communities that encourage public and stakeholder involvement in decisions and the 
inclusive formulation of policy (OECD, 2003; Hill & Varone, 2017). 
 
3.3.2 Policy networks and communities 
Policy networks and communities are primarily concerned with the relationships, interactions, 
and informal aspects of the policy-making process (Goverde & Tatenhove, 2000; Knoke & 
Kostiuchenko, 2018). They respond to the incomplete understandings of policy actor interaction 
by concepts such as bargaining and negotiation, while attempting to specify where in the policy 
process interactions take place (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992; Brouwer, 2015; Metz, 2017). The 
networks and communities reflect characteristics of the voluntary approach based on 
relationships of interaction and concepts of self-regulation (Bevir, 2012; Wurzel et al., 2013). 
 
Policy networks endeavour to formulate an understanding of decision-making that is based on 
the different views of actors and organisations (Smith, 1993; Goverde & Tatenhove, 2000). It is 
argued that the interactions between actors exist as a fundamental part of policy design and 
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implementation (Rhodes, 1988, Rhodes & Marsh, 1992; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Rhodes, 
2017). As a result, networks act as mechanisms for transferring information, allowing extensive 
communication, and facilitating an exchange of resources between policy actors (Knoke & 
Kuklinski, 1991; Thatcher, 1998; Marsh & Smith, 2000; Knoke & Kostiuchenko, 2018). 
 
Networks can be viewed as systems that are variable in structure according to the integration of 
their individual parts, for example individual policy actors or specific departments within an 
organisation (Rhodes, 1985; Brouwer, 2015; Metz, 2017). The extent of integration is 
considered to be dependent on factors that give networks their structure, such as; the type of 
resources actors try to control; the extent to which a given policy network is isolated from other 
networks or the public; as well as how permanent or constrained membership can be in practice 
(Rhodes, 1985; Knoke & Kostiuchenko, 2018). Further supporting the idea of integration, other 
research has argued that policy networks vary in accordance with five dimensions. These have 
included; network member interests; the membership process and its perceived importance; 
network actor interdependence; the extent of network isolation; and the variable distribution of 
resources between members (Wilks and Wright, 1987; John, 1998; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; 
Metz, 2017). Based on these, Rhodes (1988; 2017) has developed an expanded concept of 
integration involving network types positioned along a spectrum of understanding (figure 3.1). 
These have been defined as; issue, producer, intergovernmental, professional, territorial, and 
policy community networks (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992; Peterson, 1995; Rhodes, 1997; Miller & 
Demir, 2006; Rhodes, 2017; Knoke & Kostiuchenko, 2018). 
 
Figure 3.1: The policy network concept according to Rhodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (Source: Rhodes, 1988; Rhodes & Marsh, 1992; Parsons, 1995; Peterson, 1995; Rhodes, 2017) 
 
According to the definitions proposed by Rhodes (1988; 2017), community networks are 
located at one end of the spectrum and involve close relationships between a small group of 
policy actors, while issue networks are at the other end of the spectrum and represent 
changeable interactions that involve weaker relationships between numerous policy actors 
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(Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Hudson & Lowe, 2009). In relation to voluntary approaches, the 
policy networks and communities develop understanding of the way more interactive decision-
making can occur and how groups form as part of these processes. For example, a range of 
characteristics associated with voluntary approaches are represented by the different networks, 
namely; widely scoped relationships in the case of issue networks; interest-based and inclusive 
negotiation styles in relation to producer networks; interdependence and integration in the case 
of intergovernmental networks; a service focus on the social good and policy implementation 
for professional networks; and stable relationships alongside a common purpose in terms of 
territorial communities (Powell, 1990; Bevir, 2012; Wurzel et al., 2013; Keast, 2016). 
 
Policy network characteristics 
Considering networks more widely, it is argued that a specific type of network can define a 
range of characteristics that influence decision-making (Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Rhodes, 2017). 
For example, networks can; define the role and behaviour of policy actors; prioritise key issues 
as part of an agenda; attach different levels of importance to certain interests or actors; and 
ultimately help to encourage public accountability in policy-making while diminishing the role 
of government (Rhodes, 1997; Löffler, 2009; Brouwer, 2015). As a result, network types can be 
related to the mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches as well as policy outcomes based 
on the characteristics they encourage (Bressers, Huitema, & Kuks, 1995; Metz, 2017). Firstly, 
networks with limited interrelatedness and commitment [issue networks] encourage governance 
positioned more towards mandatory approaches, direct regulation, and command-and-control. 
Secondly, networks that represent strong commitment, but weak interrelatedness, emphasise the 
use of economic approaches and market instruments such as subsides. Thirdly, networks with 
weaker commitment but strong interrelatedness focus attention on self-regulation and 
responsibility, which relate to voluntary approaches, inclusive decision-making, and 
stakeholder participation (Bressers & O’Toole, 1998; Howlett, 2004; Azhoni et al., 2018). 
 
In terms of network characteristics and water policy, research has been focused on; general 
interpretations and comparative analysis (Bressers, O’Toole, & Richardson, 1995; Eberhard et 
al., 2017); structural perspectives and social mechanisms (Metz, 2017); governance and water 
resilience in response to climate change (Caniglia et al., 2016); local networks and regulatory 
enforcement (Scholz & Wang, 2006); state transformation through water policy networks and 
difficulties of changing hierarchical power structures (Bourblanc, 2017); as well as the 
dynamics of network type, policy implementation, and decision-making (Brouwer, 2015). 
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Specific case studies have also considered policy outcomes based on network types. For 
example, in the Netherlands, implementation and policy have been determined by network type 
in expected and patterned ways within a small EU nation (Bressers & O’Toole, 1994). In turn, 
water policy has predominantly been implemented through a policy community in the United 
Kingdom, which has generated challenges such as implementation issues, high financial costs, 
as well as fragmented interactions and disputed outcomes (Maloney & Richardson, 1995; Ward, 
1998; Weale et al., 2000). Furthermore, a comparative study of water policy networks 
highlighted that governments often keep authority despite the use of networked approaches. In 
this case, implementation was found to be challenging due to the hybrid nature of water policy 
governance, with the need for an improved understanding of power dynamics and politics of 
networked governance within hierarchical systems also evident (see Eberhard et al., 2017). 
 
 
3.4 Economic approaches 
The economic approach encompasses the concepts and understandings that have been the basis 
of market-based responses to socio-environmental problems, particularly those focused on 
economic models, public choice, competition, financial incentives, and market instruments 
(Levačić, 1991; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Hymel, 2016). It has been broadly defined through the 
dynamics of economic structures and governance based on markets, while also being 
understood as a decentralised coordinating device that involves multiple buyers and sellers, 
independent action, free movement in the system, and availability of information (Colebatch & 
Larmour, 1993; Parsons, 1995). In terms of environmental problem-solving, it can be generally 
defined as an approach based on competition, incentives, allocation, as well as agreement for 
exchange (Levačić, 1991; Wurzel et al., 2013; Cubbage et al., 2017). 
 
The economic approach represents certain characteristics, including; market-based policy 
instrument types; content focused on pricing and fiscal incentives; as well as a relationship of 
interaction between governing actors and those being governed based on competition and 
governance with government (Bevir, 2012; Wurzel et al., 2013). The approach has also been 
defined through a market-based mode of governance that is characterised by attributes such as; 
a service focus on the private good; a locale and context of the market and firm; decision-
making in a horizontal and internal format; the presence of independent relationships; a 
negotiation style focused on bargaining, competition, self-interest, and the short-term; as well 
as mechanisms of integration based on price structures, contractual transactions, and also 
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supply and demand (Powell, 1990; Keast, 2016). Furthermore, the main characteristics of the 
economic approach have been described through certain modes of organisation and compliance. 
These include; the idea of a remunerative basis (Etzioni, 1961); the concept and process of 
exchange (Lindblom, 1977; Boulding, 1990); the notion of contract (Rigby, 1990); as well as a 
basis of pricing (Bradach & Eccles, 1991; Cubbage et al., 2017). These conceptualisations 
highlight how the economic approach can be defined, what it aims to do, and the constructs 
associated with it. However, an understanding of how and why actors behave in a certain way, 
and how these actors can be distinguished, remains an underdeveloped area in terms of water 
problems and small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU state experiences. In this case Dryzek’s 
(2013) rationalities can be useful to further understanding. 
 
The following sections consider different understandings and perspectives that have been 
central to the economic approach. Firstly, the concept of economic institutionalism and the use 
of economic instruments are explored, with this being used as a model to understand interests 
and the role of institutions in shaping behaviour. Secondly, economic models of understanding 
have also been considered. These involve public choice theories that focus on understanding 
actor interest and the role of individuals responsible for decision-making, while considering 
their actions and motivational drivers. Notably, these aspects are relevant when considering 
conceptions of self-interest and when developing understanding of economic approaches, as 
they share similarities and differences with Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of actor motivation. 
 
3.4.1 Economic institutionalism 
The concept of economic institutionalism focuses on the role of institutions, and those who are 
part of them, in shaping decisions and economic behaviour. This is positioned within the 
context of the market, with actors considered to be fundamentally motivated by self-interest and 
economic processes being embedded in social and political procedures (Spulber & Sabbaghi, 
1998; Jaeger, 2017). Institutionalist models often encompass approaches that seek economic 
efficiency and the utilisation of market-based approaches and instruments to tackle problems 
and achieve policy outcomes (Merrett, 1997; Green, 2003; Dinar & Schwabe, 2017). For 
example, such approaches and instruments have included; marketisation and privatisation, 
property rights, pricing structures and charges, permits, licenses, subsidies, as well as cost 
recovery (Merrett, 2005; Lago et al., 2015; Renzetti, 2017; Wheeler et al., 2017). 
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In terms of water management and policy, previous research on economic approaches has 
focused on the noted tools and instruments. Firstly, marketisation and privatisation have been 
explored from a variety of aspects, including; theoretical understandings (Harris, 2013; Owens, 
2017); tools for governance and the process of decentralisation (Rouse, 2013; Varghese, 2013; 
Herrera, 2017); practical applications for management (Yining, 2010; Zurita et al., 2015; 
Grafton, Horne, & Wheeler, 2016); politics, dispossession of resources, and rights issues 
(Ahlers, 2010; Subramaniam & Williford, 2012); as well as challenges such as management 
inefficiency (Bakker, 2010; Ohemeng & Grant, 2011; Robinson, 2013). For privatisation, a 
range of limitations have also been evident. These include; a potential weakening of the state, 
thus restricting capacity for social equity and decreasing participation; commercial objectives 
being prioritised ahead of public goods such as environmental status or cultural values; an 
increased cost of providing public services as a result of the need for private service providers 
to achieve commercial returns; as well as the idea that private sector groups never fully take on 
the risk of public service provision (Weizsäcker, Young & Finger, 2005; Hodge, 2018). 
 
Secondly, water rights have been understood in relation to aspects such as; definitions and 
influences of right types (Jaeger, 2017); property rights, control of resources, and challenges at 
transboundary level (Ansink & Weikard, 2009; Seemann, 2016); as well as limited enforcement 
that can cause inefficient allocation or conflict (Torell & Ward, 2010). For rights, a range of 
limitations have been evident, such as; difficulties in enforcement and monitoring rights for 
example in relation to groundwater abstraction; schemes often have not accounted for social 
equity; as well as issues of conflict especially in the case of irrigation water rights (Caponera, 
1992; Hodgson, 2006; Hendricks, 2010; Woodhouse & Muller, 2017). 
 
Thirdly, pricing structures and charges have been explored in terms of; definitions and models 
(Webb, 2006; Reznik et al., 2016); scarcity and pricing for domestic, urban, and irrigation 
supply (Ohab-Yazdi & Ahmadi, 2016; Senante & Donoso, 2016); tools for demand 
management (Lahlou, 2005; De Fraiture & Perry, 2007); and pricing for cross-border supply 
(Banovec & Domadenik, 2017). The limitations of pricing structures and charges have been 
identified through; limited signals for the marginal costs of water; the potential for encouraging 
irrigation subsidies; as well as agricultural water demand being unresponsive to lower prices 
(AWWA, 2000; de Fraiture & Perry, 2007; Palanisami, Kakumanu & Malik, 2015). 
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Fourthly, permits and licenses have been considered in relation to; general application (Spulber 
& Sabbaghi, 1998; Borghesi, 2014); groundwater abstraction (Young & Brozović, 2016); 
agricultural supply (Latinopoulos & Sartzetakis, 2015); tradable effluent permits in the case of 
pollution management (Prabodanie, Raffensperger, & Milke, 2010); as well as licensing for 
allocation (Grafton & Horne, 2014). Limitations have also been evident in terms of permits and 
licenses, with these noted in relation to; difficulties of enforcement and monitoring, especially 
for groundwater; the political issues of certain officials essentially granting water rights through 
permits or licenses; as well as potential challenges caused by transferrable permits (Grigg, 
2010; Borghesi, 2014; Jamshidi & Niksokhan, 2015; Griffin, 2016). 
 
Fifthly, subsidies have been used for the management of scarcity and pollution, being explored 
with regard to; institutional processes and supply (Hoekstra, 2014; Hernández-Mora & Moral, 
2015; Jaeger, 2017); direct and indirect types (Varshneya & Patel, 2007; Lago et al., 2015); 
policy outcomes in practice and comparative studies (Gomez-Lobo & Contreras, 2003; 
Molinos-Senante & Donoso, 2016); influences on pricing structures and market participation 
(Burger & Jansen, 2014); as well as resultant challenges and issues, such as undervaluation of 
resources, inefficient usage, or limited incentives to conserve water (Ahmad, 2017). For 
subsidies, limitations have been identified, such as; the potential to encourage inefficiency and 
greater use or abstraction; increased economic stress on smaller governments; as well as the 
emergence of ‘free-rider’ scenarios in the case of domestic supply (OECD, 2005; Bassi, Soares 
& Valsecchi, 2010; Wahl, 2013; Odhiambo, 2017). 
 
Lastly, the concept of cost recovery has emerged as a method of achieving economic efficiency 
for water management, and has been considered in terms of; definitions involving water and 
wastewater services (Rouse, 2013; van den Berg, 2015); practical application through EU 
directives such as the Water Framework Directive (López-Gunn et al., 2016; Reynaud, 2016); 
the management of reused and reclaimed water (Molinos-Senante, Hernandez-Sancho, & Sala-
Garrido, 2013); the role of the user-pays principle and recovery for urban supply services 
(Kanakoudis & Gonelas, 2014); the challenges of contextual variation (Berbel, Calatrava, & 
Garrido, 2007); as well as comparative research for tariff design (Nauges & Whittington, 2017). 
For cost recovery, limitations have been identified such as; inconsistent implementation; 
affordability issues for users; poor uptake for intermittent services; and discrepancies of cost 
recovery objectives involving either infrastructure development or the allocation of resources 
(Jaglin, 2002; Massarutto, 2007; Hall & Lobina, 2009; Jayaramu, Kumar & Rashmi, 2015). 
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All of these aspects reflect characteristics that relate to the economic approach. For example, 
the use of marketisation, privatisation, and property rights represent integration based on price 
structures, competition, the concept and process of exchange, and the notion of contract (Bevir, 
2012; Cubbage et al., 2017). In turn, permits, licenses, and subsidies reflect market-based 
policy instruments, relationships of allocation, and content focused on pricing and fiscal 
incentives (Wurzel et al., 2013). In the context of these economic approaches, an understanding 
of the specifics of problem-solving, such as actor behaviour and rhetoric, has however been 
limited. In this case, the primary focus has been related to interpretations of bureaucrat 
motivation through economic models of understanding that are explored in the next section. 
 
3.4.2 Economic models of understanding and public choice theory 
Alongside economic institutionalism and market instruments, economic models of 
understanding through conceptions of public choice theory have been relevant when 
understanding decision-making and the role of policy actors. These offer a focused view on the 
role of bureaucrats responsible for decision-making, while considering their motivational 
drivers in bureaucratic and economic terms. 
 
Public choice theory is an economic understanding of decision-making and politics that 
contemplates how institutional and bureaucratic organisational structures can determine 
incentive patterns or shape the benefits gained by individuals or groups within a given system 
(Parsons, 1995; Downs, 1998; Mueller, 2003; Russell, 2011). The concept attempts to better 
understand policy actor behaviour and suggests that individuals within institutional structures 
must make a choice to either act in the public interest or to gain personal benefits by satisfying 
individual or groups interests, which can exist in the form of career progression, financial gains, 
or political security (Udehn, 1996; McNutt, 2002). 
 
Public choice theory considers government and decision-making from the perspective of 
bureaucrats and politicians, while assuming these actors often perform through an economic 
ideology that endeavours to maximise individual or group interests (Tullock, 1976; Mueller, 
2003; Johnson, 2006; Miller & McTavish, 2014). The literature related to public choice theory 
has focused on understanding the position of relevant individuals [bureaucrats, officials, or 
governing agents] within decision-making and the policy process. Key work has been put 
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forward by a range of authors (see Tullock, 1965; Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 
1976; Dunleavy, 1991; Tullock, 2002), and has been explored in the following sections. 
 
Interpreting decision-making through economic models 
Work by Tullock (1965 & 1976) suggests that decision-making can be understood through 
economic models traditionally used to conceptualise the behaviour and actions of corporations, 
business sector individuals, and consumers. More specifically, the key element of self-interest 
[acting to satisfy personal goals or interests] emerges as the defining feature of public choice 
theory in this case (Udehn, 1996; O’Neill, 1998; Miller & McTavish, 2014). By accepting that 
individuals do not constantly act in the interest of the public, it is possible to form an 
understanding of the bureaucratic and political motives represented by government officials 
(Parsons, 1995; Holcombe, 2016). For example, these bureaucrats may often put forward 
excessive or false assurances to secure political status and gain public votes, while potentially 
utilising their position of power to form agreements that increase financial resources both in 
personal terms and in relation to their own bureaucracy or organisation (Tullock, 1976; Parsons, 
1995; Russell, 2011). In a wider context, Tullock (2002) concludes that the political 
complexities of a liberal democratic system fail to contend with the influences of bureaucratic 
power, thus generating the issue of self-interest. From this, it is also claimed that to combat 
expected issues of self-interest and the pressures of individual motives, the use of market 
approaches is necessary (Parsons, 1995; Udehn, 1996; Miller & McTavish, 2014). 
 
Organisational function, bureaucrat type, and motive drivers 
Downs (1967) explores public choice theory and decision-making within bureaucratic 
structures by developing a conceptual model of bureaucratic behaviour. It is claimed that 
decision-making within the bureau is fundamentally driven by self-interest, which reflects the 
economic ideology and the findings of work by Tullock (1965), while officials seek to attain 
personal benefits in a rational way and internal bureaucratic structures serve to influence social 
functions (Parsons, 1995; Holcombe, 2016). The key element of self-interest is further 
developed by Downs, through the definition of organisational function, bureaucrat type, and 
motive drivers (Downs, 1967; Mueller, 2003; Miller & McTavish, 2014).  
 
Firstly, in relation to bureaucratic and organisational function, certain ‘laws’ [sixteen laws as 
defined by Downs] are developed. These include notable examples such as; the inherent 
development of hierarchal authority in the absence of market structures; an apparent lack of 
 CHAPTER 3: Understanding Problem-Solving Responses 
 
64 
 
control regarding individual bureaucratic behaviour; as well as diminishing control and 
coordination due to increased organisational size or capacity (Downs, 1998; McNutt, 2002).  
 
Secondly, five types of bureaucrat are defined. These include; ‘climbers’ that seek to increase 
their personal power, prestige, and financial income; ‘conservers’ which attempt to minimise 
organisational change; ‘zealots’ who force the development of certain policies; ‘advocates’ that 
seek to maximise bureaucratic resources; as well as ‘statesman’ who represent a certain level of 
public interest in order to increase personal power and satisfy individual goals (Parsons, 1995; 
Udehn, 1996; Poppelaars, 2009).  
 
Thirdly, Downs (1967 & 1998) claims that the different types of bureaucrat may be 
subsequently driven by different motivations, which are categorised in terms of ‘pure’ self-
interest or mixed factors (Parsons, 1995; Poppelaars, 2009). Factors of pure self-interest involve 
motives that compel individual decision-makers to act in a way to satisfy personal goals (Miller 
& McTavish, 2014). A condition of pure self-interest can involve motives such as; power, 
financial income, prestige, convenience, and political or job security (Downs, 1967). In turn, 
factors of mixed interest are noted to involve motives that may not directly benefit individual 
decision-makers. For instance, these can involve motives such as; personal or group loyalties, a 
pride in work performance or achievements, commitment to a specific policy programme, and a 
desire to serve the public interest (Downs, 1967; Parsons, 1995; Holcombe, 2016). 
 
Budget-maximising 
Alongside the conceptual understanding of public choice put forward by Downs (1967), which 
is reliant on behavioural functions and based on a theory of psychological motivation, Niskanen 
(1971) introduces a public choice model based on economic advantage. Whereas Downs (1967) 
focuses on motivations that are manifest through different types of behavioural drivers, 
Niskanen (1971) instead proposes a conceptualisation that interprets bureaucratic self-interest 
through neo-classical economic theory. More specifically, this ‘budget-maximising’ model 
assumes that policy-makers, and organisations, fundamentally pursue the maximisation of self-
interest (Niskanen, 1971). These interests are represented by a desire to achieve financial gains, 
just as a business or corporation would seek to maximise profit within the market system 
(Parsons, 1995; Russell, 2011). In this case, it is argued that policy-makers attempt to maximise 
their budgets within the bureaucracy, and ultimately increase the size of the bureaux to 
maximise their own individual interests over time (Niskanen, 1971; Holcombe, 2016). 
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Bureau-shaping 
The public choice models put forward by Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971) share similarities 
by considering self-interest in terms of individualistic benefits and financial gains. In contrast to 
this work, Dunleavy (1986) advances the conceptual understanding of bureaucratic self-interest 
through a model that critiques the traditional public choice view (Parsons, 1995). The ‘bureau-
shaping’ model by Dunleavy (1986) suggests that economic budgets, power structures, and the 
actor relationships between different types of bureaucrat are more complex than the 
representations provided by both power approaches [such as elitism or technocracy] and the 
forms of public choice defined by Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971). Instead, it is argued that 
the concept of bureaucratic self-interest should be considered through the concept of ‘shaping’ 
(Dunleavy, 1986; Dunleavy, 1991; Holcombe, 2016). 
 
The work on bureau-shaping draws upon privatisation experiences in the United Kingdom and 
United States to refute public choice models that have emphasised large financial budgets and 
extensive bureaucratic structures as being the primary drivers of self-interest. In the case of 
privatisation, it is argued that senior policy and decision-makers focused on shaping their 
departments and budgets to maximise their own personal interests, in a similar way to actors in 
the business sector (Dunleavy, 1986; Schilder, 2000; Hill, 2005; Russell, 2011). 
 
 
3.5 Contrasting perspectives and challenges 
The mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches have demonstrated that governing agents 
and policy actors hold the ability to greatly influence the formation, development, and 
implementation of policy. Despite valid arguments existing for the use of these approaches 
when understanding decision-making or responding to problems, the previous discussion 
reveals a limited and partial understanding of; the role and behaviour of actors or groups; how 
different approaches exist and operate together; how rhetoric can influence problem-solving; 
and how responses are adjusted over time. Indeed, challenges for mandatory, voluntary, and 
economic approaches have also been evident through a range of examples. 
 
Firstly, in the case of mandatory approaches, top-down understandings neglect to consider the 
role of political developments, administrative issues, and cultural changes in the policy-making 
process (Bowen, 2001; Ciot, 2014; Birkland, 2015). In turn, bottom-up perspectives represent 
challenges based on a disregard for actors and inputs generated at the top of the policy process, 
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as well as the idea of policy actor discretion, which implies that individuals can directly 
influence policy implementation (Love & Sederberg, 1987; Gouldson & Murphy, 1998; 
Houston, 1998; Bowen, 2001; Birkland, 2015). Furthermore, bargaining and negotiation 
neglects to understand how governments oversee and coordinate policy responses, while also 
failing to state the point at which interactions between different actors can occur during the 
policy process (Ham & Hill, 1993; Parsons, 1995; Ciot, 2014). 
 
Secondly, for voluntary approaches, pluralism represents challenges in its understanding of 
actor motivation, behaviour, and interest, while the conceptions of given problems can also be 
vague (Roelofs, 2003; Connolly, 2010; Lassman, 2011). Even though policy networks often 
help to conceptualise interactions and changes over time through a continuum understanding, 
they fail to explain how networks of actors coordinate responses and what events or processes 
shape the behaviour of these actors (Marsh, 1998; Hill & Hupe, 2014). In essence, they fail to 
account for the dynamics of decision-making (Connolly, 2010; Hill & Varone, 2017). 
 
Thirdly, in terms of economic approaches, models of understanding and public choice 
conceptions of self-interest have been limited when describing actor behaviour and motivation, 
as they tend to focus on just one dimension and the potential for acting only in the public 
interest is not considered (McNutt, 2002; Holcombe, 2016). For economic institutionalism and 
institutionalist models of understanding, challenges have been evident due to the ideas of 
human behaviour, values, compromises, and adaptation being neglected (Gilpin, 2001; Nee, 
2005). Furthermore, although bureaucratic approaches based on economic policy instruments 
and structures can account for the perceived inefficiencies of traditional administrative models, 
by contextualising decision-making in terms of existing margins of capitalist political 
economies, they are also limited when considering evolving political structures, cultural 
changes that shape the policy process, and emerging administrative issues (Russell, 2011; Hill 
& Hupe, 2014; Birkland, 2015; Holcombe, 2016). 
 
Ultimately, understanding how policy actors coordinate responses to socio-environmental 
problems can help to better explain responses to water management problems, particularly as 
policy-makers can often generate flexible definitions of ‘what’ the problem is, and ‘how’ the 
problem may be tackled at an organisational level (Colebatch & Larmour, 1993; Parsons, 1995; 
Dryzek, 2013). As the discussion has highlighted, mandatory, voluntary, and economic 
approaches have been limited when understanding the specifics of problem-solving, 
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particularly; actor roles, motives, and behaviour; the rhetoric and dynamics of responses; 
management practices; the evolution of responses over time; and the use of multiple concepts 
that can come together to offer a more inclusive conceptualisation. Indeed, the mandatory, 
voluntary, and economic approaches have been relatively singular in their understandings of 
problem-solving. Therefore, by exploring the specifics of problem-solving, such as how and 
why actors respond to problems in a certain way, it is possible to further develop understanding 
of the policy and decision-making process. This is important when understanding government 
responses to tangible water problems, such as scarcity, drought, and quality decline, as well as 
when understanding these processes in small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU states that have 
a need to better manage their vulnerable water resources. Attention now turns to Dryzek’s 
(2013) alternative understanding of problem-solving to help explore these topics and build on 
the mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches. 
 
 
3.6 Conceptualising environmental problem-solving responses 
Dryzek (1997; 2005; 2013) identifies and explains a range of environmental discourses that are 
key to developing a better understanding of how societies view and respond to environmental 
problems. This section consists of four parts. The first considers how Dryzek’s (2013) work 
advances theoretical understanding, while the subsequent parts explore the problem-solving 
rationalities of administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic rationalism. 
 
3.6.1 Advancing conceptual understanding 
To further advance the conceptual understanding of how government has responded to water 
problems in Cyprus, the problem-solving rationalities (figure 3.2) put forward by Dryzek 
(2013) have been utilised. These have been selected as they reflect the three ways in which 
society coordinates responses to socio-environmental problems, namely through; mandatory 
approaches, based on the use of bureaucratic structures; voluntary approaches, based on the use 
of networks and participation that guide decision-making according to the requirements of 
certain groups; as well as economic approaches, based on the operation of economic systems 
and instruments (Frances et al., 1991; Birkland, 2015). 
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Figure 3.2: Environmental problem-solving approaches as conceptualised by Dryzek (2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dryzek’s Problem-Solving Rationalities 
 
 
Key Themes: 
 
 Administrative state is most 
important in structural terms 
 
 Experts and managers control 
the policy and decision-
making process 
 
 Actors [experts and 
managers] are motivated by 
the public interest 
_________________________ 
 
Institutions, Practices, Policy 
Tools and Techniques: 
 
 Professional resource-
management bureaucracies 
 
 Pollution control agencies 
 
 Regulatory policy 
instruments 
 
 Environmental impact 
assessment 
 
 Expert advisory commissions 
 
 Rationalistic policy analysis 
techniques 
_________________________ 
 
Discourse analysis: 
 
1. Recognised or constructed 
entities 
- Liberal capitalism 
- Administrative state 
- Experts and managers 
 
2. Assumed relationships 
- Nature subordinate to human 
problem-solving 
- People subordinate to state  
- Experts and managers control 
state  
 
3. Agents and their motives 
- Experts and managers 
- Motivate by public interest 
and defined in unitary terms 
 
4. Metaphors and rhetorical 
devices 
- The administrative mind 
- Mixture of concern and 
reassurance 
 
Administrative 
Rationalism  
 
Key Themes: 
 
 Citizens are most important 
in structural terms 
 
 Encourages an interactive 
decision-making process with 
many actors involved 
 
 Actors are motivated by a 
mix of self-interest and public 
interest 
_________________________ 
 
Institutions, Practices, Policy 
Tools and Techniques: 
 
 Public consultation 
 
 Alternative dispute resolution 
 
 Policy dialogue 
 
 Lay citizen deliberation 
 
 Public inquiries 
 
 Right-to-know legislation 
_________________________ 
 
Discourse analysis: 
 
1. Recognised or constructed 
entities 
- Liberal capitalism 
- Citizens 
 
2. Assumed relationships 
- Equality among citizens 
- Interactive political 
relationships, mixing 
competition and cooperation 
 
3. Agents and their motives 
- Many different agents 
- Motivation is a mix of 
material self-interest and 
multiple conceptions of 
public interest 
 
4. Metaphors and rhetorical 
devices 
- Public policy as a resultant 
outcome of forces 
- Policy like scientific 
experimentation 
- Thermostat of intervention 
- Network [of governance] 
Democratic 
Pragmatism  
 
Key Themes: 
 
 Markets and property rights 
are most important in 
structural terms 
 
 Economic principles govern 
the decision-making process 
 
 Actors are motivated by self-
interest. Some officials must 
act in public interest 
_________________________ 
 
Institutions, Practices, Policy 
Tools and Techniques: 
 
 Market mechanisms 
 
 Subsidies 
 
 Property rights 
 
 Privatisation 
_________________________ 
 
Discourse analysis: 
 
1. Recognised or constructed 
entities 
- Economic actors [Homo 
economicus] 
- Markets 
- Prices 
- Property [and rights] 
- Governments [but not 
citizens] 
 
2. Assumed relationships 
- Competition 
- Hierarchy based on expertise 
- Subordination of nature 
 
3. Agents and their motives 
- Economic actors [Homo 
economicus]: self interest 
- Some government officials 
must be motivated by pubic 
interest 
 
4. Metaphors and rhetorical 
devices 
- Mechanistic 
- Regulation stigmatised as 
‘command and control’ 
- Idea of freedom [free market 
approach] 
Economic 
Rationalism 
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In relation to Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, the mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches 
are represented and defined through bureaucracy, democracy, and markets. These mechanisms 
of coordination have also been recognised by other work (see Thompson, 1991; Colebatch & 
Larmour, 1993; Parsons, 1995; Wurzel et al., 2013; Keast, 2016), and are considered by Dryzek 
(2013) to be fundamental modes of organisation that form the basis of problem-solving. 
 
Although Dryzek (2013) recognises mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches as the 
mechanisms of coordination, his conceptualisation is not the same as the other formulations. 
Instead, he focuses on how the institutions, practices, and characteristics related to a given 
response come together. This focuses on the specifics of problem-solving, including; actor 
roles, motives, and behaviour; management practices; rhetoric in decision-making; the 
evolution of responses; and the use of multiple concepts. Dryzek’s (2013) understanding 
considers four important elements, namely; how basic entities are recognised or constructed; 
the assumptions made by agents regarding natural relationships; the variable motives and roles 
of policy-making actors; as well as how metaphors and rhetorical devices are utilised to justify 
certain policy directions, positions, or agendas (Dryzek, 2013). These elements are important, 
as each response generates a definition of what the problem actually is. Therefore, it becomes 
necessary to contemplate the justification for a given approach to better understand the 
behaviour of policy-makers and comprehend why policy is implemented in a certain way within 
a specific context (Lowe & Ward, 1998; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
How Dryzek’s understanding is different 
The problem-solving rationalities put forward by Dryzek (2013) also offer three unique aspects 
of interpretation that help to focus on the specifics of problem-solving, and which further 
differentiate his formulation from other previous models of understanding such as top-down 
perspectives, pluralism, and public choice theory that have been singular in their interpretation. 
These aspects include; the use of a discourse interpretation; a more detailed understanding of 
how government decisions are made based on actor roles, motives, and behaviour; as well as 
the concept of evolutionary responses that develop in a successive format. 
 
Firstly, the inherent structure of Dryzek’s (2013) framework is designed for discourse 
interpretation. Dryzek (2013) uses this model of investigation to effectively focus attention on 
the behaviour of policy actors. As a result, this gives the potential to generate constructive 
insights into the understanding and analysis of both the decision-making process as a whole, as 
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well as associated problem-solving responses (Darnton, Elster-Jones, Lucas & Brooks, 2004; 
Gelcich, Edwards-Jones, Kaiser & Watson, 2005; Paltridge, 2012). 
 
Secondly, by recognising actor behaviour, it is possible to highlight the different way in which 
problem-solving approaches are discussed by Dryzek (2013). The rationalities are further 
distinguished from other models through a subtler interpretation of how and why decisions are 
made. For example, in the case of self-interest maximisation, Dryzek (2013) proposes that 
policy actors or public servants can [and do] act in the interest of the public. This argument 
establishes a shift away from public choice theory conceptualisations, which instead consider 
self-interest maximisation, through financial gains, career development, increasing power, or 
gaining votes, to be the primary driver of decisions and actions (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; 
Tullock, 1976). In this case, Dryzek’s (2013) view contrasts work put forward by public choice 
theorists (see Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Dunleavy, 1986; Boyne, 1998; Russell, 2011). 
 
Thirdly, the problem-solving rationalities are also understood as being evolutionary in 
character. It is argued that responses change over time, as governments attempt to correct the 
failures of preceding policy outcomes. Dryzek (2013) claims that administrative rationalism 
emerges as the prevailing government response to socio-environmental problems. Democratic 
pragmatism then emerges in an attempt to remedy the perceived challenges of administrative 
policy approaches (Dryzek, 2013). Subsequently, economic rationalism then emerges due to 
advances in political life that seek to account for the challenges of both bureaucratic and 
democratic governance responses (Dryzek, 2013). Notably, the idea of policy development and 
continual improvement also partly reflects the concept of incrementalism. This is defined as a 
method of policy making that encourages successive change over time to modify a response 
according to emerging political influences or contextual variables (Hayes, 2001; Dye, 2002).  
 
The evolutionary order, which suggests a given problem-solving response is superseded by an 
alternative that acts as a corrective tool for the challenges of the previous response, is central to 
Dryzek’s (2013) conceptualisation. However, other findings contrast with this view. For 
example, policy-making in terms of mandatory approaches and bureaucracy has been 
understood to exist as a response to the failure of market systems, while the emergence of 
economic approaches has also been seen to develop as a result of the limitations of mandatory 
approaches and bureaucratic decision-making (Thompson, 1991; Meuleman, 2008; Hill & 
Hupe, 2014). In turn, voluntary approaches and associated responses of networks and 
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community have been argued to emerge due to the failures of both mandatory and economic 
approaches (Taylor, 1982; 1987). Notably, in ideological terms, there is a lack of agreement 
regarding which organisational approaches should be embraced by government and how these 
should be adjusted if a pre-selected approach fails (Colebatch & Larmour, 1993; Hill, 2005). 
Based on the alternative views regarding the correct order of problem-solving responses, it 
becomes apparent that the significance and accuracy of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities must be 
examined within relevant contexts. By considering how evolution occurs and highlighting 
potential influences that cause this evolution in practice, it is possible to advance understanding 
on the shaping of problem-solving. 
 
Lastly, the problem-solving rationalities gain further relevance in terms of the wider research 
due to the distinguishing features of institutional practices, tools, and devices (Meuleman, 2008; 
Dryzek, 2013). These help to determine the presence of a given rationality in terms of policy 
and implementation, which exist as key elements of governance and decision-making. Based on 
how policy actor behaviour is interpreted by Dryzek (2013), each of the responses can be 
individually distinguished and differentiated from other theoretical constructs, such as public 
choice theory, elitism, economic institutionalism, or pluralism (Dahl, 1961; Downs, 1967; 
Niskanen, 1971; Cawson, 1986; Dunleavy, 1991; Russell, 2011; Holcombe, 2016; Kersey, 
2016). This is useful when attempting to understand policy-making and the behaviour of 
bureaucrats, politicians, and decision-makers. 
 
In the following sections, a comparison of the similarities and disparities between Dryzek’s 
(2013) framework and the other understandings considered in the context of mandatory, 
voluntary, and economic approaches are explored. 
 
3.6.2 Administrative rationalism 
Administrative rationalism emerges as the first pillar of Dryzek’s (2013) framework, and it is 
proposed that organisational responses founded on bureaucratic structures compel this response 
to develop. Administrative rationalism is bound by the structural status quo of liberal 
capitalism, while the importance of experts in the decision-making process is also highlighted. 
This emphasises a social relationship that is dependent on hierarchy rather than democratic 
equality or market-based competition (Dryzek, 2013). As a result, administrative rationalism 
fundamentally reflects and builds on the mandatory approach. 
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According to Dryzek (2013), as environmental issues have gained importance as part of 
political agendas, administrative responses have traditionally been applied and often assumed to 
be the most effective response despite limited comparison with alternative approaches. 
Administrative rationalism can be identified through the presence of specific institutions, 
practices, methodologies, and policies. However, the most distinctive feature of this 
understanding, which separates it from other mandatory approaches to problem-solving such as 
top-down or elitist perspectives, occurs due to the way bureaucratic and expert behaviour is 
interpreted and explained. In this case, Dryzek (2013) argues that key policy actors and experts 
are motivated to act in the public interest, rather than according to self-interests. This provides 
an alternative explanation of policy actor behaviour, which also contrasts other concepts such as 
public choice theory that have emphasised the maximisation of individual or group interests 
(Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Dunleavy, 1986; Russell, 2011; Holcombe, 2016). 
 
Administrative rationalism fundamentally reflects the mandatory approach and concept of 
bureaucracy. In this case, it is claimed that the most effective way to tackle socio-environmental 
issues is through a form of hierarchal organisation, which seeks to separate individuals and 
experts into sub-groups that can address specific problems (Simon, 1981; Parsons, 1995; 
Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Based on this understanding of bureaucracy Dryzek (2013) proposes 
that administrative rationalism can be highlighted and analysed through the existence of 
inherent institutions and practices that are used to organise actors within bureaucratic systems. 
These include; professional resource-management bureaucracies; pollution control agencies; 
regulatory policy instruments; environmental impact assessment; expert advisory commissions; 
as well as rationalistic policy analysis techniques (Dryzek, 2013). Notably, the institutions and 
practices are not unique to the concept of administrative rationalism, and although they are 
necessary in terms of analysis and to facilitate identification of the rationality, they only act as 
indicators of existence if performance reflects theoretical or expected intent. 
 
Institutions and practices 
The institutions and practices identified by Dryzek (2013) can also be linked back to mandatory 
approaches. Firstly, professional resource-management bureaucracies emerge when threats of 
resource exploitation are tackled in a scientific and rational way by prioritising the role of 
experts; with this reflecting a hierarchal structure that relates to characteristics of the mandatory 
approach (Beetham, 1991; Deal, 2003; Wurzel et al., 2013; Keast, 2016). Secondly, pollution 
control agencies are formed to monitor and control pollution using standards and guidelines, 
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while claiming authority based on scientific and professional expertise, which is indicative of 
hierarchal forms of organisation and mandatory approaches such as technocracy (Sterner, 2003; 
Dryzek, 2013). Thirdly, regulatory policy instruments are developed by experts to control 
specific activities relating to the environment. From a top-down perspective, they are 
considered to gain a regulatory standing when they are applied by politicians, while 
implementation by actors at ground-level can be related to a bottom-up perspective (Stookes, 
2009; Keast, 2016). Fourthly, Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA] involves a systematic 
assessment of environmental damage that is likely to occur because of major development 
projects (Gilpin, 1995; Wood, 2003; Noble, 2015; Morrison-Saunders, 2018). This reflects 
forms of negotiation and influences decision-making in agencies by encouraging actors to 
acknowledge environmental values (Lawrence, 2003). It has also been evident in some 
Mediterranean and peripheral EU nations (see Quinteiro et al., 2015; Pereira et al., 2017). 
Fifthly, expert advisory commissions are established to guide and advise central government 
regarding the actions required when tackling environmental problems (Dryzek, 2013). They 
exist and operate as independent agencies that provide expert advice and scrutinise the 
government’s policy direction, while in terms of mandatory approaches they reflect technocracy 
and dependent relationships (Everest, 1993; Lentsch & Weingart, 2009; Carlarne, 2010). Lastly, 
rationalistic policy analysis techniques are used to identify potential policy outcomes and 
involve techniques such as cost-benefit analysis, risk analysis, and computer modelling 
(Dryzek, 2013). These highlight the importance of experts, as the techniques are often complex 
and technical causing them to be inaccessible for non-experts such as the public (Dryzek, 2013; 
Birkland, 2015). This represents a form of decision-making that is founded on hierarchy and 
justified through expert knowledge, which subsequently reflects mandatory approaches through 
technocracy, vertical relationships, and top-down perspectives (Spicker, 2006; Miller, 2009). 
 
Key characteristics of administrative rationalism 
Administrative rationalism is differentiated from other approaches because of the role of 
specific institutions and practices (Dryzek, 2013). The most significant function of these 
defined institutions and practices involves how they are justified by Dryzek (2013) and used to 
link a given rationality with the behaviour of policy actors. This explanation contrasts with 
previous attempts to understand and conceptualise behaviour, which has been considered to be 
primarily driven and motivated by the maximisation of self-interest (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 
1971; Dunleavy, 1986; Van Haute & Deschouwer, 2018). As a result, Dryzek (2013) proposes 
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an alternative view of bureaucratic behaviour, contextualised through administrative 
rationalism, which instead suggests that governing agents can [and do] act in the public interest. 
 
In contrast to the different forms of public choice theory (see Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; 
Dunleavy, 1986), administrative rationalism offers an alternative way of interpreting the 
behaviour and motivations of policy actors. The most significant contrasting feature involves a 
move away from self-interest as the primary driver of bureaucratic decision-making, as 
government and policy actors are considered to be motivated by acting in the public interest 
(Dryzek, 2013). For administrative rationalism, environmental problems are viewed as 
technical issues and require a response that involves appropriate organisational action and 
scientific expertise (Meuleman, 2008; Dryzek, 2013). As an institutional construct, 
administrative rationalism has been more prominent in certain settings. For example, Dryzek 
(2013) highlights its existence in Germany and France, while in the United Kingdom a 
generalist approach has diluted its influence and potential to become the most prominent 
institutional style (Howes, 2005). 
 
If administrative rationalism exists in a given setting, a range of actions and practices would be 
expected. Firstly, government would be likely to view an environmental problem as a technical 
issue, which necessitates scientific analysis by experts to define the problem, ascertain its 
severity, and recommend the best possible solution (Dryzek, 2013). Secondly, legal 
investigations would be expected as part of identifying the responsibilities of different 
individuals or groups that are charged with tackling problems. This would also establish 
liability regarding the costs of environmentally harmful actions, for instance the remediation 
and management of groundwater pollution (Dryzek, 2013). Thirdly, effective organisational 
problem-solving is likely to be apparent if administrative rationalism exists. This would ensure 
appropriate policy implementation, while enabling legal investigations and the attachment of 
liability to occur more efficiently. Lastly, it is also expected that decision-makers responsible 
for forming and implementing environmental policy would seek to reassure the public to 
validate their position and policy decisions (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In terms of environmental policy, administrative rationalism has been embraced by national 
governments in a range of cases (see Raina & Sangar, 2002; Bailey & Rupp, 2004; Howes, 
2005; Dryzek, 2013; Lo & Francesch-Huidobro, 2018). Water policy has signalled the 
existence of administrative rationalism as it has often been focused on experts that manage the 
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formation, development, and implementation of policy (Maloney & Richardson, 1994; Rüdig & 
Kraemer, 1994; Gutiérrez, 2010). For example, the formation and implementation of water 
policy in the United Kingdom has been found to be controlled and shaped through mandatory 
approaches and a policy network made up of professionals and industry experts (Maloney and 
Richardson, 1995). These have helped to guide water management while determining the 
necessary measures to be implemented for the appropriate protection of public interests. 
 
Different governments have often represented contrasting behaviour in the context of 
administrative rationalism. In terms of legal investigations and the attribution of responsibility 
for environmental issues, EU member states have been shown to experience differing rates and 
styles of policy directive interpretation and implementation (see Lowe & Ward, 1998; Weale et 
al., 2000; Voulvoulis et al., 2017). In turn, the administrative structures used to investigate and 
guide practices, associated with policy implementation, often differ in form and function. For 
example, water quality reports produced by member states are published on an annual basis and 
have been used to reassure the public and show that appropriate management is taking place 
(Weale et al., 2000). Administrative structures and practices however are shown to differ 
greatly as only a small number of member state governments produce the reports. This 
demonstrates that bureaucratic responses can be inconsistent in practice because of a variety of 
influencing factors, such as; prevailing political ideologies; inherent institutional structures and 
functions; as well as the shaping role of individuals responsible for decision-making, which are 
further influenced by knowledge, positionality, socio-contextual factors, and politics (see 
Peters, 2010; Meier & Morton, 2015).  
 
The concept of differing behaviour in administrative rationalism is further illustrated in terms of 
how experts have been inclined to manage environmental problems using technical knowledge 
(Dryzek, 2013). For example, experts in the United Kingdom have preferred the existence of 
‘cause and effect’ relationships that encourage scientific certainty before a policy or response is 
developed and implemented (Lowe & Ward, 1998; Connelly & Smith, 2003; Jones & Gomes, 
2014). This contrasts with use of the precautionary principle evident in nations such as the 
Netherlands and Germany, which instead suggests lack of scientific evidence should not inhibit 
action or environmental protection (Wilkinson, 2002). This also claims preventative measures 
should still be used despite a limited understanding of a given environmental issue (Burchell & 
Lightfoot, 2001; Stookes, 2009). Notably, these different approaches can shape how a problem 
is perceived by actors, thus influencing how problem-solving materialises in practice. 
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3.6.3 Democratic pragmatism 
Dryzek (2013) defines his second problem-solving response as democratic pragmatism, and this 
also acknowledges liberal capitalism as the given context. Whereas administrative rationalism 
prioritises the experts in terms of problem-solving and decision-making, democratic 
pragmatism instead emphasises the role of the citizen (Dryzek, 2013). The understanding 
considers better interaction, participation, and communication between governing officials and 
the public, which can increase and broaden the debate regarding environmental issues. This 
viewpoint argues that by including the public and other stakeholders in decision-making, it is 
possible to increase engagement, encourage commitment to environmental protection, and 
enhance the authority and validity of policy decisions. The opening-up of decision-making 
through democratic pragmatism reflects the voluntary approach. 
 
It is argued that a shift away from decision-making driven by officials and experts, towards a 
more democratic process that encourages public involvement, is necessary to help tackle 
environmental problems more effectively and efficiently (see Mason, 1999; Bocking, 2004; 
Barrow, 2006; Crabbé & Leroy, 2008; Kronsell & Bäckstrand, 2010). According to Dryzek 
(2013), the presence of democratic pragmatism can be established through the identification of 
key devices, while the explanation and justification of policy-maker actions in this setting 
emerges as the most significant variable when determining the existence of this response. 
 
A remedy for the challenges of administrative rationalism 
Democratic pragmatism emerges as an alternative response that attempts to rectify challenges 
generated by the institutions, practices, and behaviours associated with administrative 
rationalism (Dryzek, 2013). In the context of water management, the application of 
administrative rationalism can only be validated if outcomes such as sufficient water 
availability and quality are achieved (Dryzek, 2013). However, the performance and ability of 
the administrative state to deliver these outcomes has been disputed because of implementation 
deficits in practice (Udehn, 1996; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In response to the management challenges associated with administrative rationalism and 
bureaucratic structures, it is argued that more interactive and cooperative problem-solving is 
required to tackle environmental problems (Dryzek, 2013). This emphasises a move away from 
mandatory approaches, the administrative state, experts, and top-down perspectives represented 
by administrative rationalism, as being the focus of decision-making, towards an approach of 
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democratic pragmatism that is more pluralist in character and recognises the importance of the 
citizen. Indeed, a realisation also emerges noting that technical knowledge should not be 
centralised and held exclusively by experts within bureaucratic structures (Kronsell & 
Bäckstrand, 2010). It is argued that a more flexible decision-making process, which involves 
the public, can facilitate problem-solving that is more receptive to the requirements of society 
(Dryzek, 1997; Simmons, 2007). Ultimately, Dryzek (2013) suggests that the modification of 
administrative function and practice is necessary for problem-solving, to ensure public support 
which must exist to give government decisions both legitimacy and authority. 
 
Pluralism and democratic pragmatism 
Democratic pragmatism recognises that a wide range of actors, including elected governing 
officials, scientific experts, non-governmental organisations, pressure groups, and the public, 
can facilitate change through decision-making. This shares similarities with the voluntary 
approach and the concept of pluralism (Parsons, 1995; Cunningham, 2002; Conti & Gupta, 
2014). As a construct, pluralism focuses attention on the way power is distributed within 
society and assumes that policy is the outcome of competition between ideas and interests 
(Roelofs, 2003). It is suggested that power is equally distributed within society, with the policy 
process not being dominated by any single actor group (Schlosberg, 2006; Lassman, 2011). 
 
Pluralism is limited when characterising the role of government as a neutral actor that mediates 
the competing interests of different groups (Smith, 1990). In this case, pluralism does not 
account for the fact that governing officials hold personal aims and objectives (Olson, 1965; 
Connolly, 2010). These can often influence the role of government and shape the policy 
process, while government may also form or sponsor groups to gain more control (Howlett & 
Ramesh, 2003; Lassman, 2011). In terms of democratic pragmatism, the concept of government 
and actor behaviour is understood in a different way. Dryzek (2013) recognises that governing 
agents and policy actors can seek to maximise their own personal self-interests, however at 
certain points during the decision-making process these actors can be motivated by public 
interest. For democratic pragmatism, the public interest is not defined by the experts as 
presumed by administrative rationalism, but instead, control falls to multiple actor groups and 
involves a deliberative process with extensive dialogue and communication (Dryzek, 2013). 
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Devices and practices 
Based on the importance of public support when legitimising decisions, Dryzek (2013) 
identifies a range of devices and practices that are essential to democratic pragmatism. These 
include; public consultation; alternative dispute resolution; policy dialogue; lay citizen 
deliberation; public enquires; and right-to-know legislation. These devices and practices can be 
linked back to voluntary approaches. 
 
Firstly, public consultation endeavours to facilitate greater engagement between governing 
actors and the public by offering citizens the chance to express their opinion about a project [or 
issue] that is expected to impact the environment (Martin, 2009; Hildingsson 2010; Norton & 
Hughes, 2018). In this case, consultation reflects consensus-building and relationships of 
interaction that relate to the voluntary approach. Secondly, alternative dispute resolution [ADR] 
involves a process of bringing together interested actor groups under the support and mediation 
of an independent third party (Fiadjoe, 2004; Fisher & Sablan, 2018; Kumar, 2018). This relates 
to aspects such as social exchange and interaction that reflect voluntary approaches. Thirdly, 
policy dialogue is a device that involves discussion between all actor groups interested in a 
problem and attempts to help develop an agreement that can produce recommendations, with 
this outcome potentially being used by government to aid the policy process. This reflects more 
widely-scoped decision-making in terms of the voluntary approach. Fourthly, lay citizen 
deliberation endeavours to integrate non-administrative interest groups within decision-making 
(Dryzek, 2013). In this case, participants are brought together to deliberate issues or topics, 
ultimately helping to contribute towards the development of policy recommendations (Agnew 
& Woodhouse, 2011; Dryzek & Pickering, 2017). This represents the voluntary approach 
through horizontal interaction. Fifthly, public enquiry is deemed to be applicable for specific 
project proposals and attempts to encourage engagement in problem-solving (Dryzek, 2013). 
Public enquires have been used to contribute towards policy recommendations regarding 
environmentally harmful projects (Torgerson, 2003; Berger, 2010; Norton & Hughes, 2018); 
while the device reflects appeals and interdependence that relate to the voluntary approach. 
Lastly, right-to-know legislation aims to give the public the ability to use relevant information 
to challenge expert decisions and apply pressure on government, with a view to influencing 
decision-making (Birkinshaw, 2010; Dryzek, 2013). The perceived right to information and a 
feeling of participation underpins democratic pragmatism, which subsequently reflects 
characteristics of information and communication associated with the voluntary approach. 
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Key characteristics of democratic pragmatism 
The devices explained indicate the ongoing inclusion of democratic pragmatism within the 
administrative state. However, as Dryzek (2013) suggests, democratic pragmatism does not 
only involve the implementation of specific devices, reforms, and practices, but it can also be 
considered as an entirely unique viewpoint or direction to government and governance.  
 
In terms of decision-making and environmental policy, democratic pragmatism is characterised 
as an ‘orientation to governing’ which involves all aspects of government and decision-making, 
and not just the use of devices (Dryzek, 2005: 108). As a result, it is argued that democratic 
pragmatism can exist in a variety of contexts through different interactions, such as; committee 
meetings; legislative debate; public addresses; legal disputes; rule-making; as well as policy 
implementation and enforcement. These interactions reflect aspects of the voluntary approach, 
while also involving a range of processes, such as; lobbying; advising; informing; deceiving; 
image-building; and questioning (Dryzek, 2013). In this case, governance becomes more about 
the informal and unseen interactions or relationships, which can be characterised as political 
dynamics, rather than the constitutional outcomes, formal responsibilities, and processes that 
materialise in plain sight (Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & Sørensen, 2012; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
The presence of democratic pragmatism is identifiable as a result of the devices, reforms, 
practices, and behavioural indicators that characterise the response. For example, in relation to 
water policy, privatisation during the 1980s in England and Wales was greatly assisted through 
an increased number of actors becoming involved in networks within the water industry 
(Maloney & Richardson, 1994; Richardson, 1994). However, while at face value this process 
could be deemed to offer benefits because of greater inclusion and engagement of non-
administrative actors, from a more sceptical viewpoint the opening-up of the policy process 
could be considered to be an action by government to legitimise decision-making, thus 
enhancing the control, authority, and power held by experts and professionals (Maloney & 
Richardson, 1994; Richardson, 1994; Turle, 2005; Wolf, 2011). Ultimately, governments have, 
at times, embraced voluntary approaches to aid and legitimise policy and decision-making. 
These actions may be argued to operate as merely tools to secure public support and maximise 
government interests, rather than attempts to truly act in the public interest through more 
inclusive methods (Schmalz-Bruns, 2002; Heinelt, 2012). 
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3.6.4 Economic rationalism 
The third problem-solving response defined by Dryzek (2013) is economic rationalism, and this 
also acknowledges liberal capitalism as a given context. The response argues that 
environmental problems can be solved by a policy and decision-making process that accepts 
and embraces economic principles (Wright, 2002; Dryzek, 2013). In this case, the environment 
is managed by contextualising it in terms of economic markets, while encouraging the 
development and implementation of market-based instruments (Ashford & Hall, 2011; Hackett, 
2011; Dryzek, 2013). Fundamentally this reflects the economic approach as well as forms of 
economic institutionalism and economic models of understanding based on public choice 
theory. It is argued that administrative rationalism and democratic pragmatism do not 
effectively tackle the cause of environmental problems, which are a result of conflicting 
economic and environmental values. Therefore, in response to the challenges of both 
rationalities, governments focus attention on economic political constructs (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Economic rationalism has adopted a variety of guises in real-world politics, such as market 
liberalism, classical liberalism, neo-liberalism, and free-market conservatism (Dryzek, 1997; 
Wright, 2002; Hackett, 2011; Hasselman & Stoker, 2017; Pusey, 2018). For Dryzek (2013), 
although the actors and interest groups relevant to economic rationalism, namely consumers 
and producers, tend to focus on the maximisation of material self-interests, it is also argued that 
they hold a key role when tackling environmental problems. A notable difference from other 
understandings and rationalities emerges through the perceived role and function of government 
in the market system. In this case, the use of economic principles to solve socio-environmental 
problems relies on the rise of markets in managing public demands and contemporary life, 
while the idea of governments being viewed as economic actors also emerges (Dryzek, 2013). 
Thus, it is claimed that the public interest can be achieved by government through ensuring 
market systems are appropriately regulated (Hackett, 2011; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Private property rights and quasi-market tools 
Economic rationalism is characterised by two ideals. Firstly, at the very extreme end of the 
spectrum, it is suggested that all aspects of the natural environment should be strictly managed 
by market systems (Dryzek, 2013; Nevile, 2016). This ideology is based on the concept of 
private property rights, which seeks to attach ownership and categorise environmental goods or 
services within a given economic system (Hajer, 1995; Mol, 1996; Dryzek, 2013; Tietenberg & 
Lewis, 2016). Fundamentally, this compels the pricing of all environmental goods, including 
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water, while the creation of these types of market system operate based on the premise that 
individuals [and corporations operating as singular entities] tend to care more for privately 
owned goods when compared with commonly owned goods (Dryzek, 2013). This also relates to 
the tragedy of the commons theory (see Campbell & Corley, 2015). The creation of property 
right markets advocated by economic rationalists encourages a more careful approach to 
resource management, as the exploitation and mismanagement of these resources would in turn 
jeopardise the pursuit of economic interests (Pearce, Markandya, & Barbier, 1989; Jacobs, 
1991; Panayotou, 2016; Tietenberg & Lewis, 2016). 
 
The second and less extreme ideal of economic rationalism suggests that governments should 
form managed markets, or if this is not possible the use of quasi-market incentives should be 
encouraged (Wright, 2002; Dryzek, 2013). This emerges if the hard-line position of private 
property rights cannot be feasibly established and enforced. According to Dryzek (2013), the 
most common form of a government managed market involves the allocation of pollution 
rights, which functions through the identification of a pollution level deemed appropriate for a 
given setting [such as a watershed that determines the maximum level of pollution allowed]. 
The allowance of pollution for a defined environment or situation is then divided into units, 
which are sold to the individual or group that are willing to bid the highest, and after this 
process is complete polluters can trade rights relative to their needs (Pearce et al., 1989; Jacobs, 
1991; Connelly & Smith, 2003; Dryzek, 2013). As a result, a structured market managed by 
government emerges through which polluters seek to abide by government-specified pollution 
levels in the most cost-effective way, as exemplified by carbon emissions trading (Grubb & 
Neuhoff, 2006; Skjærseth & Wettestad, 2008; Tietenberg & Lewis, 2016). 
 
Alongside the concept of rights, quasi-market tools such as green taxes and trade quotas have 
also emerged as important techniques for reducing pollution. These reflect the market-based 
instruments identified as part of economic approaches and economic institutionalism. Tradable 
quotas have been established to more effectively manage common resources, for instance to 
protect fisheries and mitigate the effects of depletion and exploitation (Dryzek, 2013; Le 
Floc’h, 2015). In turn, quasi-market incentives are more widely adopted to reduce and control 
pollution, often taking the form of standards, charges, or green taxes (Dryzek, 2013). Economic 
rationalists argue that a regime of green taxes can encourage more efficient consumption and a 
reduction in polluting waste products, as polluter discretion for abatement is encouraged, with 
the view that the polluter will always seek the most cost-effective option for compliance 
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(Dryzek, 2013). Prominent examples of green taxes have been evident in the United Kingdom, 
which as a nation and government has been accepting of [and committed to] market values for 
environmental problem-solving and pollution control (Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006; 
Dryzek, 2013). Examples include; the Landfill Tax introduced in 1996 to reduce solid waste 
destined for landfills; and the Value Added Taxes applied to varying types of fuel. These have 
been justified, in political terms, based on their ability to control consumption through the 
application of a financial penalty [taxation], which encourages reduced consumption as a result 
of high usage [or ongoing activity] becoming less cost-effective (Jacobs, 1991; Mitchell & 
Simmons, 1994; Tietenberg & Lewis, 2016). 
 
Functions of economic rationalism 
The reasons why a policy has been adopted or implemented in a particular way can be 
understood by observing the behaviour of actors involved in problem-solving (Birkland, 2015). 
In theoretical terms, the integration of economic principles within problem-solving attempts to 
enable consumers and producers to maximise self-interest, which in turn allows environmental 
issues to be addressed to avoid any potentially negative financial repercussions (Meuleman, 
2008; Anderson, 2010; Hackett, 2011; Nevile, 2016). The development and implementation of 
economic principles are deemed necessary to achieve environmental objectives with minimal 
financial cost and socio-political opposition (Clifton, Comin & Fuentes, 2006; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In terms of the role and behaviour of policy actors, economic rationalism partly reflects 
administrative rationalism as well as economic institutionalism and economic models of 
understanding. In this case, experts are the most important actor group in problem-solving, 
which is achieved through the creation and regulation of market-based structures (Dryzek, 
2013). It is also argued that the design and application of market principles and economic 
instruments is necessary and often dependent on the existing political economy (Maloney & 
Richardson, 1995; Petrella, 2001; Holland, 2005). Economic rationalism also considers the use 
of market instruments to be vital, thus reflecting economic institutionalism, while governing 
actors are deemed to be primarily driven by self-interest, which reflects models of public choice 
theory that focus on bureau-shaping and budget-maximising (Holcombe, 2016). 
 
Advocates of economic rationalism also attempt to justify the application of market principles 
by highlighting both the advantages of the response and the ineffectiveness of other responses, 
namely those based on mandatory approaches and bureaucratic administration as well as 
 CHAPTER 3: Understanding Problem-Solving Responses 
 
83 
 
voluntary approaches and networks (Dryzek, 2013). More specifically, economic rationalists 
[and proponents of applying market-based principles to solve socio-environmental problems] 
label direct government action as a process that is inefficient, convoluted, and very costly in 
financial terms (Dryzek, 2013; Wright, 2002; Nevile, 2016). For example, it is argued that the 
implementation of strict pollution control measures by government can prevent or restrict the 
ability of producers utilising other lower cost solutions (Dryzek, 2013). As a result, this type of 
government action is perceived to generate unwarranted economic costs for business and 
society, thus becoming an option that is neither cost-effective nor efficient (Nelson, 1993; 
Haigh, 1999; Wright, 2002; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Expected characteristics 
In terms of understanding the extent to which governments have embraced economic principles, 
there is evidence to suggest that this has occurred to varying degrees, especially in the case of 
water policy. In relation to the privatisation of water services in England and Wales, it was 
believed that the process would enable the water industry to operate within the confines of a 
business model and allow appropriate management to occur at minimum financial cost 
(Maloney & Richardson, 1995; Hassan, 1998; Dore, Kushner & Zumer, 2004; Parker, 2012; 
Rouse, 2017). Advocates of privatisation argued that water services would be self-funded by 
charging the consumer the full costs associated with water and sewage services, while these 
costs would also seek to include the expenditure necessary to meet environmental quality 
standards [or internalising the externalities of water service provision] (Maloney & Richardson, 
1995; Ward, 1998; Parker, 2012; Bakker, 2013; Rouse, 2017). In contrast, attempts to integrate 
economic principles and privatise water services in France have generated different results 
(Nelson, 2015; Lieberherr, Viard & Herzberg, 2016; McDonald, 2018). In this case, water and 
sewage services have remained publicly owned but fundamentally operated by private sector 
companies, with an inherent polluter-pays ideology underpinning this approach (Dore et al., 
2004; Staddon, 2010; Frérot, 2011). Therefore, despite the differing extent to which 
governments have adopted economic principles and privatisation to address environmental 
problems, these approaches have been evident in terms of resource management and problem-
solving. Indeed, the application and function of privatisation remains dependent on institutional 
structures (Kickeri, Nellis & Shirley, 1994; Frérot, 2011). 
 
It is apparent that economic rationalism has been embraced in certain cases to overcome the 
limitations of administrative rationalism and democratic pragmatism. The response endeavours 
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to address environmental problems through the application of economic principles, which 
fundamentally involve the allocation of private property rights and quasi-market incentives. 
This reflects the economic approach as well as economic institutionalism and models of 
understanding such as public choice theory. As a problem-solving response, economic 
rationalism is variable in application and function, while its presence and role are often 
dependent on the arrangement of political forces and relationships. 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Government problem-solving responses have been broadly categorised in terms of mandatory, 
voluntary, and economic approaches. The problem-solving responses of administrative 
rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic rationalism, as conceptualised by Dryzek 
(2013), have sought to build on these by offering a unique understanding on; how governments 
respond to socio-environmental issues; different actor roles, motives, and behaviours that exist 
in practice; as well as how problem-solving responses evolve (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
The discussion has highlighted that the problem-solving rationalities can be differentiated in 
terms of the institutional practices and operational devices that help determine the role of policy 
actors. More importantly, it is the way in which actor behaviour is interpreted that distinguishes 
Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities from other explanations of behaviour, such as the understandings 
considered as part of mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches, including; top-down and 
bottom-up perspectives, elitism, technocracy, corporatism, bargaining and negotiation, policy 
networks, pluralism, economic institutionalism, as well as public choice theory (see Downs, 
1967; Niskanen, 1971; Dunleavy, 1985; Cawson, 1986; Parsons, 1995; Russell, 2011; Birkland, 
2015; Holcombe, 2016; Kersey, 2016; Radaelli, 2017; Knoke & Kostiuchenko, 2018). 
 
The problem-solving rationalities defined by Dryzek (2013) are further distinguished from 
other approaches based on a more detailed explanation of behaviour, which draws on multiple 
theories rather than the more singular and detached theories put forward previously. It is 
apparent that each of the rationalities makes use of other conceptual theories to better explain 
behaviour. Administrative rationalism prioritises the expert and draws upon the idea of 
technocracy as being central to problem-solving, while also reflecting top-down concepts as 
well as some aspects of public choice theory to contrast the perceived role and behaviour of 
officials regarding the pursuit of self-interest. Democratic pragmatism uses notions of policy 
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networks and the concept of pluralism to explain the expansive policy dialogue process that 
occurs as part of decision-making to engage and include non-administrative interest groups 
such as citizens. Economic rationalism shares similarities with economic institutionalism and 
corporatism regarding the integration of market principles in problem-solving, while also 
drawing upon public choice theory understandings to argue that self-interest is an inherent 
driver within economic systems and is necessary to help resolve socio-environmental problems. 
 
Ultimately, administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic rationalism have 
the potential to build on and develop the understanding of mandatory, voluntary, and economic 
approaches. This is achieved by focusing on the specifics of problem-solving through aspects 
such as; the explanation of actor motives and behaviour; indicative management constructs and 
practices; rhetoric; metaphorical devices that describe processes or relationships; and the 
evolutionary character of problem-solving. This offers a unique interpretation, as previous 
understandings have failed to emphasise the importance of explaining differences in the roles, 
interactions, and behaviours of policy actors. A summary and comparison of the approaches 
and perspectives considered in this chapter has been provided in appendix 1. In this case, an 
analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats for all the perspectives considered 
has not been carried-out, as the aspects of ‘opportunities’ and ‘threats’ were not deemed 
relevant and thus this type of analysis was not warranted. Nevertheless, strengths and 
limitations associated with the different approaches and perspectives have been recognised in 
the comparison within appendix 1 to provide balance. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
 
 
4.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter discusses the methods used to achieve the aims and objectives of the thesis and has 
been separated into six sections. The first section provides an overview of the adopted 
methodological approach and offers justification for this selection, while further explaining the 
relevance and importance of a Cypriot setting. The second section focuses on the methods used 
to select potential interviewees, with reasons for selection also given, as well as the need for 
secondary data as part of a triangulation process. The third section considers the development 
of the interview process, while outlining the questions and topics asked of the interviewees. The 
fourth section details the process of data collection and the method through which the interview 
was implemented. The fifth section outlines the key techniques used to analyse primary data 
from the interviews and other information gained from secondary sources, while also 
highlighting the applicability analysis used to compare the theoretical expectations of the 
rationalities with findings in Cyprus. Finally, the last section provides a conclusion which 
summarises the key points of the chapter. 
 
 
4.2 Design 
This research has employed a qualitative case study approach involving primary interviews and 
the analysis of data from secondary sources. An investigation of government responses to water 
management problems in Cyprus was conducted by carrying out semi-structured interviews 
with key actors and groups responsible for water management. These interviews facilitated an 
analysis of the underlying roles, motives, experiences, and behaviour of policy actors to 
ascertain the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities. Secondary sources 
of information from a Cypriot context, such as parliamentary proceedings, government and 
departmental reports, water board reports, newspaper media, and information circulated by non-
governmental organisations, were also consulted to aid the analysis and provide a sufficient 
level of supporting evidence for the primary interview data. 
 
4.2.1 Justifying the primary data collection approach 
It is widely considered that the two key approaches for data collection and analysis involve 
either qualitative or quantitative research methods (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 2010; Yin, 2011). 
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The suitability of an approach is based on how appropriate it is for specific research 
requirements, or how well suited it is for data collection (Bell, 2005; Walliman, 2011). 
 
In relation to water policy research, quantitative methods can be utilised to analyse the 
responses given by a large group of individuals regarding a more restricted and defined set of 
issues or parameters (Sadovnik, 2007; Packer, 2011). For example, this has been represented 
through the understanding of; public perspectives on water policy in terms of participatory 
decision-making (Larson et al., 2009); assessment of attitudes and participation for water 
resource management (Larson & Lach, 2008); influences on public perception of drinking 
water quality (Doria, 2010); water pricing policy and agricultural demand (Aidam, 2015); as 
well as the assessment of sustainability and impacts of desalination (Lior, 2017). This allows 
the identification, comparison, and evaluation of general trends, for example within a data set, 
which can ultimately offer a representation of wider patterns in a socio-economic or political 
setting (Yanow, 2007). In contrast, qualitative approaches can be used to gain more detailed 
information, such as opinion about a given topic, from a smaller group of respondents regarding 
a specific issue (Bell, 2005; Bryman, 2012). For water policy, a range of qualitative research 
examples have been evident, including analysis of; adaptive management and water reform 
(Hasselman, 2017); recycled water and regulatory incentives (Watson, Mukheibir, & Mitchell, 
2017); public opinion of water quality policies (Rissman, Kohl, & Wardropper, 2017); public 
authority management of water governance (Kirschke et al., 2017); as well as integration and 
policy implementation considered through interviews that question certain regimes and the 
mechanisms used to facilitate adaptive governance (Rouillard et al., 2013). 
 
Information gained through the qualitative approach can enable an in-depth level of 
understanding based on a more open, detailed, and flexible data collection format. This is due to 
the method facilitating an exploratory understanding because of a less restrictive 
methodological approach, and the fact that characteristics associated with different responses 
are less determined in advance (Bryman, 2012). In this case, an interviewer [or researcher] is 
afforded more flexibility when performing an interview and may follow any leads or topical 
directions that are provided by respondents regarding certain questions and their answers (Bell, 
2005; Miller & Glassner, 2011; Yin, 2011). For instance, a respondent could potentially give a 
reason or rationale for acting in a particular manner that was not previously considered by the 
researcher and thus may require further investigation. As a result, the researcher can decide to 
clarify or expand upon the importance of this answer, by exploring the decision in more detail 
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and potentially ‘mining’ for more information on this point (Singleton, Straits, & Straits, 1993; 
Patton, 2002). This process is vital when seeking to develop original insights on issues about 
which a great deal may not be known. Indeed, original insights are argued to be a prerequisite 
of worthwhile research, alongside important aspects such as theoretical and methodological 
robustness as well as trustworthiness and reliability (Ozga, 2008; Romesburg, 2009; 
Denscombe 2010; Robson & McCartan, 2016). 
 
The approach for this study 
The thesis has adopted a qualitative approach to data collection. It utilised a semi-structured 
interview approach to identify and explore the roles, experiences, motives, behaviour, and 
perspectives of actors involved in the management of water in Cyprus. Through this approach it 
was possible to obtain information to help understand and conceptualise the complex and often 
flexible roles of key actors within the problem-solving and decision-making process. For 
example, a range of important questions were answered such as; how and why governments act 
in the manner they do; how decision makers influence and shape the policy process as a whole; 
how proposed policy responses and resultant outcomes compare; as well as how problem-
solving responses have evolved. 
 
In the context of policy research, qualitative methods such as the semi-structured interviews 
used for data collection in this thesis have been deemed to be useful and appropriate. This has 
been noted in terms of; comparing the transposition and implementation of EU drinking water 
policy in different cases (Jenkins, 2007); application when exploring collaborative water policy 
making (Connick & Innes, 2003); as well as understanding public perception of drinking water 
(Jones et al., 2007). Qualitative methods enable researchers to gain unique knowledge about 
policy dynamics, while the strength of the method becomes evident based on its ability to 
provide detailed explanations that appreciate contextual setting and reveal how and why 
different policy outcomes may occur (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Hoepfl, 1997; Sadovnik, 2007; 
Yin, 2011; Susskind & Schulman, 2013). 
 
The qualitative approach is also particularly appropriate when respondents or interviewees hold 
multiple perspectives and realities, as it can afford the opportunity to explore such complex 
differences (Fine 1994; Babbie, 2013). This is highly relevant in terms of this study, as 
interviewees often hold different perspectives regarding policy formation, development, and 
implementation, with contrasting realities also existing based on the fundamental understanding 
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and definition of a given problem (Frensch & Funke, 1995). Notably, if the researcher excludes 
the potential for varied responses and does not seek confirmation of different ideas, the 
understanding of rationalities can become restricted in subsequent analysis. This can prevent 
the emergence of generalities that serve to further knowledge within the area of environmental 
and water policy, political theory, as well as problem-solving and decision-making. 
 
4.2.2 Justifying other methodological approaches 
A combination of methodological approaches has been utilised for this study in addition to the 
primary qualitative approach. In particular, a grounded theory approach has been used based on 
the potential for developing theory as a consequence of data analysis, while the research is also 
argued to be deductive and exploratory in nature. 
 
A grounded theory approach 
A grounded theory approach is relevant as by utilising deductive reasoning, the researcher seeks 
to test the applicability and potential utility of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities [a theoretical 
perspective in itself] (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Oktay, 2012; Bryant, 2017). Thus, although a 
starting framework is in place [essentially to test the existence and applicability of the 
rationalities], this process, and the analysis of interview data [alongside triangulation with other 
data] ultimately has the potential to generate an alternative theoretical viewpoint (Glaser, 1998; 
Oktay, 2012; Corbin & Strauss, 2015). The approach is argued to be adaptable and pragmatic, 
while also being suitable based on its ability to consider relationships between concepts, or to 
form and develop integrated theoretical constructs that are developed from empirical data [for 
example gained from the interviews and the triangulation of secondary sources] (Glaser, 1998; 
Denscombe, 2010; Simmons, 2011; Bryant, 2017). 
 
The grounded theory approach offers a range of advantages that are relevant for this thesis. 
Firstly, it is suited to small scale research as it can be constructed by an individual researcher, 
while also being adaptable to allow the use of different qualitative data collection methods 
(Bryant, 2017). Secondly, it provides a recognised rationale for qualitative research 
(Denscombe, 2010). Thirdly, it makes use of a systematic method of analysing data based on 
categorisation and coding of data, thus offering a clear direction and method of analysis 
(Robson & McCartan, 2016; Bryant, 2017). Lastly, the approach fundamentally encourages the 
development of theory, and is well suited to exploratory research and investigating new topics, 
due to an inherent flexibility for sample inclusion and data analysis (Seale, 1999; Oktay, 2012).  
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Furthermore, the grounded theory approach also suggests that all data is relevant, which serves 
to validate and encourage the use of different data types, again highlighting the applicability of 
this approach in the context of this research (Glaser, 1998). This contributes to a more robust 
analysis that is strengthened by triangulation, in which qualitative interview data is supported 
[or challenged] by other secondary sources through the cross-referencing and cross-validation 
of relevant themes (Denscombe, 2007). In practice, these themes relate to the characteristics 
associated with Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, as actor roles, motives, behaviour, relationships, 
rhetoric, and metaphorical devices emerge through different data types. The inclusive use of 
these different data types, alongside comparison and cross-referencing of sources, ultimately 
helps to build a better understanding of problem-solving. 
 
A deductive approach 
Research themes used to generate questions and identify the existence [or non-existence] of the 
problem-solving rationalities were developed using the key themes resulting from Dryzek’s 
(2013) discourse analysis. This is indicative of a deductive approach, based on the idea that the 
three forms of government coordination focused on mandatory [bureaucracy], voluntary 
[democratic], and economic [market] approaches fundamentally exist, while the nature of these 
responses is reflected by Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities and these general rules hold true in terms 
of political theory and as a prerequisite of the rationalities.  
 
The deductive approach further emerges as a relevant methodological construct as the existence 
of certain key themes or characteristics and theoretical components are apparent in the case 
study setting, and the subsequent existence of a given attributed rationality is also true 
(Crowther & Lancaster, 2008; Ruane, 2016). The existence of the components attributed to a 
rationality directly represents the presence of the associated rationality in some form, thus 
inferring that a deductive construct is evident as defined premises [characteristics associated 
with a given response] are linked to conclusions [the real-world existence of the associated 
rationality] (Ruane, 2016). For example, through deduction, the existence of components such 
as expert advisory committees or rationalistic policy analysis techniques [cost-benefit analysis] 
implies that administrative rationalism has been evident to some extent in practice. This 
deduction is also true for democratic pragmatism and economic rationalism if the existence of 
associated characteristics is identified. 
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An exploratory approach 
An exploratory approach is also deemed relevant for this study. As the existence and feasibility 
of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities are tested, new themes were found to emerge as a result, which 
in turn lead to insights and alternative perspectives (McNabb, 2010; Robson & McCartan, 
2016). This exploratory approach ties in with the concept of grounded theory, which is 
fundamentally an approach dedicated to generating alternative understandings in relation to a 
given topic area (Ruane, 2016; Bryant, 2017). 
 
4.2.3 Justifying a case study approach 
This thesis utilises a case study approach to investigate the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) 
problem-solving rationalities and to analyse how government in Cyprus has sought to tackle 
water management problems related to scarcity and quality. 
 
Understanding how government in Cyprus is responding to water management problems is 
affected by the need to focus upon a single national context, to secure a manageable research 
project with respect to data collection and analysis. This focus, as with case studies in general, 
offers a more detailed level of information that can be used to highlight how the convergence of 
different variables within a given situation can produce an outcome (Robson, 2002; Robson & 
McCartan, 2016). The purpose of the case study is to allow the researcher to analyse 
phenomena in a specific setting to gain a deeper level of understanding, rather than a broader 
and more superficial overview of general trends or patterns (Yin, 2008; Babbie, 2013; Robson 
& McCartan, 2016). As Hancock (1998) argues, case studies generally offer a ‘richness and 
depth of information’ that often cannot be obtained through other data collection techniques. 
This allows the analysis of a convoluted system of variables [such as the characteristics of a 
rationality] that come together to form a coherent outcome (Babbie, 2013; Bryant, 2017). 
 
Although it is acknowledged that the use and general contextualisation of the results obtained 
from single policy research can be potentially limited, because of issues such as a lack of 
objectivity, limited sample size, and associated expectancy effects that can shape results 
(Gerring, 2006; Jackson, 2009), it does not diminish the importance and capacity of the case 
study method, which is also understood to hold strong meaning in reality (George & Bennett, 
2004; Blaxter et al., 2010). The purpose and main strength of a case study is its ability to 
develop a deeper level of understanding, rather than merely a broader but more superficial 
analysis of overall trends or patterns in relation to a given system or process (Yin, 2008; 
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Woodside, 2010). Therefore, to achieve this level of depth, the study must be narrowed while 
accounting for the often-limited resources attributed to a single study (Simons, 2009). In terms 
of water management, case studies have been used to explore a range of aspects. For example, 
these include; urban water supply decision-making (Abrishamchi, Ebrahimian, Tajrishi, & 
Marino, 2005); addressing scarcity (Xie et al., 2009); privatisation challenges (Bakker, 2000; 
Bayliss, 2003); surface water quality improvements (Choe, Whittington, & Lauria, 1996); water 
demand analysis (Zhou, McMahon, Walton, & Lewis, 2000); attitudes towards water markets 
(Tisdell & Ward, 2011); as well as water pricing in relation to influences on conservation 
(Qdais & Nassay, 2001) and irrigation schemes (Expósito & Berbel, 2017). Furthermore, in 
terms of small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU states, case studies have been evident when 
exploring; water demand (Morote & Hernandez, 2016); groundwater pollution (Miglietta et al., 
2017); management of quantity and quality (Khoo, 2009; Gikas, 2017); as well as regulation of 
quality through EU directives (Golfinopoulos et al., 2016). 
 
Ultimately, this thesis and type of research required a case study approach, as a high level of 
detail is necessary to investigate and understand complex responses that exist within a given 
socio-economic and political setting. Without a narrow focus, the meaning of the research can 
become diluted, and thus, its value can diminish if a generalised and broader position is adopted 
(Hancock, 1998; McNabb, 2010; Woodside, 2010; Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Ruane, 2016). 
 
4.2.4 The Republic of Cyprus as a case study focus 
The purpose of the study is to contribute towards a better understanding of government 
responses to water management problems in the context of a given socio-economic and political 
setting. The thesis advances knowledge in this area by understanding how government in 
Cyprus is responding to water problems, such as scarcity and quality, by drawing upon and 
subsequently assessing the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities. 
 
A unique and relevant case study 
The Republic of Cyprus has been selected as it offers a unique and relevant case study setting. 
As previously noted in chapter one, a Cypriot case study can be broadly justified based on a 
range of aspects. Firstly, the need for research because of underdeveloped knowledge for 
Cyprus and other Mediterranean and peripheral EU nations in terms of understanding 
government responses to water problems. Secondly, the need for research based on 
understanding decision-making and the role of governing agents regarding water management 
 CHAPTER 4: Research Methodology 
 
93 
 
problems, in a country [and wider region] that experiences stresses on both availability and 
quality. Thirdly, the need for research to better comprehend government responses to water 
problems, based on the intensifying threats these issues pose to environmental ecosystems, 
agricultural subsistence, and socio-economic development in Cyprus and other small, 
Mediterranean, and peripheral EU states. 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the geographical location of Cyprus, which is an island situated in the 
Mediterranean basin and often argued to be part of Europe [noted through EU member status], 
the Mediterranean, and the Middle East (see Faustmann, 2009; CIA, 2013). The island contains 
two different administered regions, and in the context of this thesis it is only the internationally 
recognised southern area of the island, officially defined as the Republic of Cyprus and the area 
under government control, that is to be investigated (Iacovides, 2011a). This has been selected 
based on a range of factors, namely; access to information; available data on water; EU member 
status when considering the implementation of legislation; as well as compliance with the 
theoretical parameters of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities. 
 
Figure 4.1: Geographical location of the Republic of Cyprus (CIA, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From a perspective of research relevance, Cyprus is a nation that has limited water resources 
that must be managed carefully in terms of multiple pressures such as; population growth, 
climate change, and the increasing demands of the domestic sector, agricultural activities, and 
Europe 
The Republic of Cyprus 
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the tourism industry (see Charalambous, Bruggeman, & Lange, 2011; Iacovides, 2011a; 
Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014; Naukkarinen, 2015). These water management challenges present 
different problems that government must manage and respond to, thus an opportunity emerges 
to consider the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities in practice. The 
profile of Cyprus and the evident water management problems are summarised in figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: The Republic of Cyprus - profile and summary of water resources 
(Aletraris, 2010; Iacovides, 2011b; CIA, 2013; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
From a methodological perspective, Cyprus also exhibits the features required by Dryzek’s 
(2013) framework when considering evidence of the rationalities, namely; status as a liberal 
democratic society and a capitalist political economy (Faustmann, 2009; Ker-Lindsay & 
Faustmann, 2011; Koundouri & Birol, 2011). The structural setting of liberal capitalism is a 
COUNTRY PROFILE 
 
Description 
- Area under government control: 
5,800km2 [Total area: 9,250km2] 
- Semi-arid temperate Mediterranean 
climate with hot dry summers and 
cool winters 
- Gained EU accession in 2004 
 
Location 
Mediterranean; Europe; Middle East 
 
Population 
1,155,403 [estimated] 
 
Economy 
- Dominated by service sector; 
Tourism 
Financial services 
- Agriculture 
 
WATER RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT 
 
Types                  Infrastructure 
- Surface water   - Water plants / works 
- Groundwater   - Pipelines / conveyors 
- Desalination   - Dams / Reservoirs 
- Recycled water   - Treatment plants 
- Springs    - Desalination plants 
 
Water Balance 
- Usable balance of water = 370Mm3 
- Surface water = 235Mm3 
- Groundwater = 135Mm3 
 
Demand 
- Agriculture = 182Mm3 (68%)     - Domestic = 68Mm3 (26%) 
- Environment = 13Mm3 (5%)     - Industry = 3Mm3 (1%) 
 
Management Issues 
Quantity  
- Increasing demands      - Limited resources  
- Mainly dependent on rainfall    - Drop in precipitation in 1970s 
- Major threat from drought    - Non-licensed boreholes 
- Over pumping of aquifers    - Groundwater is main resource 
 
Quality 
- Groundwater / aquifer deterioration  
- Saline intrusion of coastal aquifers 
 
1. Point Source Pressures: 
- Municipal wastewater - Livestock waste 
- Industrial waste  - Solid waste disposal sites 
- Mining and quarrying - Aquaculture and desalination 
 
2. Diffuse Source Pressures: 
- Agricultural activities - Livestock waste 
- Rainwater runoff  - Municipal wastewater 
- Areas where no sewerage networks or treatment facilities exist 
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prerequisite for Dryzek’s (2013) framework. This also reflects the mandatory, voluntary, and 
economic approaches, which are claimed to be defining mechanisms of coordination because of 
their prevalence in liberal democratic governance systems and capitalist political economies 
(Mitchell, 1991; Wurzel et al., 2013). Administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and 
economic rationalism operate within the structural and contextual parameters of liberal 
capitalism, with the presence of this system enabling the rationalities to exist (Dryzek, 2013). 
This is important, as the liberal capitalist democratic system has been the most prevalent 
structural setting in contemporary industrial societies, which have been committed to growth in 
terms of goods, services, and material wellbeing (Dryzek, 2013). In Cyprus, the presence of a 
structure centred on liberal capitalism is observed to be the governance system and political 
economy in place (Jansen & Akkerman, 2014; Welz, 2015). This provides the necessary 
context for the rationalities to potentially exist, and thus for this study to investigate their 
applicability in practice when understanding responses to water problems. 
 
Ultimately, the case study offers the opportunity to address underdeveloped areas of research 
and contribute to empirical evidence by; investigating the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) 
framework in a new and unique context; developing knowledge of problem-solving, water 
policy, as well as the role and behaviour of governing agents in a small, Mediterranean, and 
peripheral EU nation; as well as developing the understanding of decision-making in a setting 
that involves the management of shared water resources. The lessons learnt in Cyprus, through 
the application of Dryzek’s (2013) understanding, in relation to water problems, management, 
and EU status, are pertinent for the wider region and give the study relevance. 
 
 
4.3 The interview basis and structure 
The following section considers the basis and structure of the semi-structured interviews used 
for primary data collection. A range of aspects are explained, namely; interviewee selection and 
type; sampling techniques used; as well as the triangulation process and the importance of 
secondary data. It must also be noted that for the interviews there was a need to gain risk 
assessment and ethics approval as part of protocol for studies involving human subjects. This 
was achieved and was valid for the full duration of the interview phase of the study. The 
relevant ethics approval number was LS1/7/12P. 
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4.3.1 Interviewee selection 
In Cyprus, interviews were conducted with individuals [both active and retired] from the actor 
groups highlighted in figure 4.3. These consist of the main internal and external actor groups 
involved in decision-making, problem-solving, and management responses to water problems in 
Cyprus. Internal actor groups have been defined as those who act as a part of the administrative 
bureaucracy and government ministries, departments, or authorities, while the external actor 
groups involve those who are not directly linked with government but act alongside [or in 
opposition to] the administrative bureaucracy when dealing with water problems. In practice, 
the actor groups included; administrative public bureaucracies and state civil services; 
ministerial bodies or agencies such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and 
Environment [MANRE] or the Water Development Department [WDD]; the Department of 
Agriculture [DofA]; the Environment Department; the Geological Survey Department [GSD]; 
the state General Laboratory; as well as other authorities and providers at municipal level. In 
addition, individuals from water and sewerage boards, non-governmental organisations, 
research institutions, other relevant groups such as farmer unions, as well as retired officials 
that are deemed to be relevant by Dryzek (2013), were also interviewed to provide views from 
those external to administrative management systems and government. 
 
Figure 4.3: Key actors in the context of water management in Cyprus 
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All the groups highlighted were selected as they represented the actor types associated with 
[and expected to exist in terms of] Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities. Firstly; civil 
servants, experts, and managers in the case of administrative rationalism, with these actors 
positioned in government ministries such as the MANRE, departments such as the WDD, 
municipal authorities such as district offices, as well as town water boards. Secondly; citizens 
and other stakeholders in the case of democratic pragmatism, with these actors represented 
through non-governmental organisations, unions, and community boards. Thirdly; government 
officials in the case of economic rationalism, with these actors situated within government 
ministries and departments, municipal authorities, and water boards. Actor types interviewed 
from all these groups included; ministers; directors of government departments; senior civil 
servants; experts within government departments, water boards, and non-governmental bodies; 
managers in government departments, water boards, municipal authorities, and district offices; 
politicians; institutional experts; as well as community and pressure group representatives. 
 
The individual actors chosen for interview were identified and selected through a range of 
sources, namely; the organisational structures associated with relevant government agencies 
and departments; articles from professional publications; academic research literature; as well 
as direct contact and liaison with individuals responsible for decision-making. This multi-
dimensional approach was adopted for three main reasons. Firstly, to limit the potential for bias 
in the interview process; secondly, to minimise the risk of being restricted by the development 
of an unsuitable interview network held by previous research; and thirdly, to reduce the 
potential impact of disruptive or unhelpful interviewees (Robson, 2002; King & Horrocks, 
2010; Rubin & Rubin, 2011; Robson & McCartan, 2016). 
 
A key aim in the formation and development of interview networks and selection was to ensure 
that interviewees could cover a period sufficient for gaining an understanding of the dynamics 
of policy development and implementation, as well as when analysing the evolution of 
problem-solving. For this study, a period from 1960 [when Cyprus gained independence] 
onwards until 2014 [ten years after EU accession] was selected, with the historical water 
management setting during this period also recognised in terms of management. Firstly, this has 
been relevant in terms of policy research, based on the need for a suitable timeframe to allow 
policy outcomes to emerge. For example, a sufficient period offers the opportunity to observe a 
ten to twenty-year timeframe [approximately], which is argued to be the minimum period 
necessary to allow the intended and unintended consequences of policy to fully emerge 
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(Sabatier, 1986; Schneider, 1991; Colebatch, 2009). Secondly, a suitable period was also 
relevant in terms of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities. In this case a sufficient timeframe was 
deemed necessary to interpret the evolutionary format of problem-solving and to consider if 
real-world responses follow the timeline and format expected by the framework. 
  
Alongside a sufficient period for the justification for policy analysis and the evolution of 
problem-solving; the chosen date range signals a more settled political time period in Cyprus 
[after the Turkish invasion of 1974 and subsequent socio-political issues] and the existence of a 
more stable liberal democracy as also required by Dryzek’s (2013) framework. The period also 
encompasses notable points of governance change in Cyprus, such as accession to the EU in 
2004, as well as the implementation of EU water legislation, such as the WFD (2000/60/EC) 
(Ker-Lindsay & Faustmann, 2009; Mirbagheri, 2010; Iacovides, 2011a). Ultimately, it was vital 
to interview a range of individuals [both past and present as well as active and retired] and gain 
secondary data covering a sufficient timeframe, to allow for a thorough understanding of water 
management and changing problem-solving responses. 
 
4.3.2 Sampling 
A purposive and snowball [or chain] sampling technique was used in terms of the twenty semi-
structured interviews. This allowed for new information and perspectives relating to problem-
solving and decision-making to be gathered, while also enabling the development of an 
interview network that was not linked to previous research (Arksey & Knight, 1999; Rubin & 
Babbie, 2010; Robson & McCartan, 2016). The technique was employed at first contact, with 
the relevant individuals of each key actor group, and was imperative for the development and 
expansion of the interview sample (Seidman, 2013; Robson & McCartan, 2016). 
 
The purposive and snowball sampling technique was well suited in the context of Cyprus 
because of the relatively closed nature of the community and the characteristics of the political 
culture which favoured networking and contact recommendations (Seidman, 2006; Yin, 2011). 
Although a numerical sample limit for interviews was not defined at the start of the research, it 
was identified that additional interviews would be curtailed when new information was not 
forthcoming. In this case, the point at which the emergence of new information had failed to 
occur was identified when the repetition of themes and regularities became apparent in the 
interviewee descriptions of processes, activities, and events (Guba, 1978; Robson & McCartan, 
2016). Establishing boundaries for network closure is a tried and tested research method, 
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especially in the case of interviews, with this offering a sufficient level of rigour despite 
concerns relating to the reliability and strength of findings that are gained from a small sample 
size (Minichiello, Aroni, Alexander, & Timewell, 1995; Baxter & Eyles, 1997; Patton, 2002; 
Seidman, 2006; Robson & McCartan, 2016). Indeed, Rubin and Rubin (2011) consider this 
concept of ‘network closure’ by suggesting that interviewees should be added to the survey 
sample until additional interviewees fail to contribute new information to what has already been 
found. At this point of closure through repetition [or saturation], the sampling process can be 
concluded (Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky, 1992; Patton, 2002; Engel & Schutt, 2014). 
 
4.3.3 Triangulation and the importance of secondary data 
By targeting individuals within a diverse range of actor groups it was possible to gain different 
perspectives on the approaches used by government when responding to water management 
problems. This allowed a deeper understanding of the existence [or absence] of characteristics 
associated with Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities. These findings could then be compared with 
secondary sources to formulate a more detailed representation of problem-solving in Cyprus. 
 
The method of primary data collection and comparison with other sources is defined as 
triangulation and provides an enhanced level of credibility and reliability for research findings 
(Patton, 2002; Flick, 2004; Robson & McCartan, 2016). Insights involving different 
perspectives and experiences that are guided by triangulation can help to reveal any 
inconsistencies in data, while potentially generating new questions that must be answered if our 
understanding is to be advanced (Denzin, 1989; Flick, 2009; Bazeley, 2017). 
 
The triangulation of information enabled the enrichment of interview findings based on the 
identification of themes within the data. A range of secondary sources were used, including; 
government legislation; reports published by government ministries and departments, water and 
sewerage boards, non-governmental organisations, and EU institutions; parliamentary 
proceedings; the official government journal [defined as the ‘gazette’]; expert advisory board 
reports; public consultation reports; statistical data from the Cypriot government and the EU; 
privately commissioned research; as well as journal articles. In addition to these sources, 
newspaper media, particularly the Cyprus Mail, Cyprus Weekly, Phileleftheros, and Financial 
Mirror, were consulted for articles relating to management, governance, and EU legislation in 
terms of water, highlighted issues of scarcity and quality, as well as representations and rhetoric 
of water problems and responses. These were selected due to representing; the most widely 
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circulated English and Greek-language newspapers [Cyprus Mail and Phileleftheros]; the most 
popular weekly newspaper [Cyprus Weekly]; and the leading business and financial newspaper 
[Financial Mirror] (Vassiliadou, 2007; Whitten-Woodring & Van Belle, 2014). 
 
By utilising the vast array of secondary sources alongside the interview data, the process of 
triangulation could be extended to provide a more robust set of findings (Hoggart, Lees, & 
Davies, 2002; Patton, 2002; Robson & McCartan, 2016). This process helped to form a more 
complete research picture by allowing the information gained from interviews to be confirmed 
[or refuted], while also enabling the researcher to explore any gaps in these responses (Denzin, 
1989; Arksey & Knight, 1999; Flick, 2017). As Hodder (2000) states, other sources of 
information, such as written texts, are useful when seeking to gain other layers of information 
that may not be provided, either intentionally or unintentionally, through interviews. 
 
It must also be noted that caution is necessary when using information from different sources 
(Denscombe, 2007; Flick, 2009; Bazeley, 2017). This is based on recognising that this 
information can be the result of individual assumptions, instead of different aspects of the same 
experience or event (Rubin & Babbie, 2010; Flick, 2017). To counter the potential for findings 
to be questioned because of their reliability, secondary information and the triangulation 
process is important in the context of this study to increase confidence in the overall results; 
while also limiting the negative aspects of ‘intrinsic bias’ that emerge as a result of singular 
methods, observations, or theoretical constructs, which are very much a part of this research 
(Denzin, 1989; Denscombe, 2007; Bazeley, 2017). 
 
 
4.4 The interview process 
A semi-structured interview method was adopted to provide flexibility during the data 
collection process (Galletta, 2013; Creswell, 2014). A general interview format was used to 
enable the interviewing of representatives from key actor groups (figure 4.4). This allowed 
exploration of the roles, attitudes, behaviour, and experiences of these actors, as well as gaining 
a better understanding of institutional responses regarding the approaches adopted by 
government when tackling water problems. All conducted interviews were started with a 
standard set of questions that were designed to put the interviewee at ease and identify specific 
responsibilities and roles in relation to decision-making and water management (King & 
Horrocks, 2010; Bell, 2017). Subsequent questions sought to gain information relating to the 
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1. Please could you provide a brief summary of your career and different responsibilities within [relevant government 
department / organisation / NGO etc] 
2. How do the responsibilities you have described relate to water management / scarcity / quality / policy in Cyprus – and 
more specifically in terms of the WFD? 
3. What do you see as the most important objectives of Cypriot government / the Water Development Department in 
responding to the issues of water scarcity and quality? 
4. What do you see as the most important objectives of the WFD? 
5. What problems or conflicts have emerged due to past and present government policy responses to water management / 
scarcity and quality? 
6. What problems or conflict has transposition of the WFD given rise to? 
7. What factors or issues have influenced government responses to water scarcity / implementation of policy / WFD? 
8. What factors or issues have influenced the transposition of the WFD? 
9. What parameters of water policy / management have been problematic? And why have these been problematic? 
10. What parameters of the WFD have been problematic? And why have they proven to be? 
11. In your opinion, what are the most important entities / bodies / concepts that are recognisable in relation to the 
management of water scarcity and quality? 
12. In your opinion, what are the most apparent or prominent structural features of water management / policy / 
management of scarcity and quality [E.g. the state is most important? - Experts and managers have most control? - 
Interactive political relationships with citizens involved? - Competition is most important with a management hierarchy 
based on expertise?] 
13. In your opinion, who have been the key actors (individuals and/or organisations) responsible for the formation, 
development, and implementation of policy in Cyprus? And the management of scarcity / quality? [E.g. experts, 
managers, citizens, or politicians?] 
14. In your opinion who have been the key actors (individuals and/or organisations) responsible for the 
transposition/implementation of the WFD? 
15. In your opinion, what are the primary motives of these actors? [E.g. motives: public interest, a mixture of self-interest 
and multi-faceted public interest, or self-interest alone? 
16. How have these key actors interacted with each other over time? Have there been any notable changes in how these 
actors have interacted with each other? 
17. How has [organisation/department they are/were from] responded to water scarcity and issues of quality on the island? 
Have there been any notable changes in this response over time? 
18. How has [organisation/department they are/were from] responded to the WFD? And have there been any notable 
changes in this response over time? 
19. What factors or issues have affected the response of [organisation/department they were/are from] to the formation, 
development, and implementation of policy in response to water scarcity and quality? – And transposition of the WFD? 
20. What factors or issues do you think have influenced how central government [and the water development department] 
has responded to the formation, development, and implementation of water policy? 
21. What factors or issues do you think have influenced how government [and the water development department] has 
responded to the development & transposition of the WFD 
22. In your opinion, do you think the political agenda of central government [and the MANRE / WDD] has impacted upon 
the formation, development, and implementation of water policy? – And upon the development and transposition of the 
WFD? – If so, in what way? 
23. In your opinion, what has been the dominant form of governance style in the case of water policy in general – and more 
specifically in relation to scarcity and quality [e.g. regulation, a market approach, or a network/community approach]? 
24. In your opinion, how effective have regulatory approaches been in managing water scarcity and quality issues? How 
could these be improved? 
25. In your opinion, how effective have market-based approaches been in managing water scarcity and quality issues? How 
could these be improved? 
26. In your opinion, how effective have community-based approaches been in managing water scarcity and quality issues? 
How could these be improved? 
27. Do you think the WFD has had a beneficial impact upon water policy in terms of scarcity and quality? 
28. What else do you think has had an impact on water policy/management of scarcity and quality in Cyprus? 
29. In your opinion, what would improve the current situation in Cyprus with regard to the management of water resources 
/ scarcity and quality? 
30. Can you recommend anybody that you believe may be pertinent for me to interview in connection with my research? 
experiences, perspectives, and behaviour of actors, with a view to establishing the presence of 
characteristics associated with each of the problem-solving rationalities. 
 
Figure 4.4: Interview schedule - questions used to guide interviews 
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The interview was administered using a face-to-face technique, which allowed each specific 
interview to be shaped in an appropriate way based on the information being provided [or not 
provided in some cases] (Galletta, 2013). Carrying out the interviews in person had distinct 
advantages, namely; being more personal in style allowing the interviewer and interviewee to 
gain trust in each other and build rapport; enabling the questioning process to be developed and 
expanded according to given responses; as well as affording a chance to consider interviewee 
reactions to specific topics through aspects such as facial expression, body language, and other 
gestures (Kitchin & Tate, 2000; Bell, 2017). 
 
The semi-structured interview process allowed information to be obtained in relation to 
situations and topics that are not easily accessible (Robson & McCartan, 2016). The technique 
enabled the exploration of perceptions, attitudes, and values that together form underlying 
decisions, which may not be gained through other qualitative methods [such as single track 
observational approaches for instance] (Kitchin & Tate, 2000; Mason, 2002). The interview 
method is particularly effective and suitable in the context of policy analysis, where flexible 
components often exist, such as variable perceptions, attitudes, values, and factors such as 
socio-cultural constructs and politics that serve to influence decision-making (Robinson, 1998). 
This is particularly relevant in the case of exploring Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, due to the 
potential for these components to exist in practice through the characteristics associated with 
different types of problem-solving. The semi-structured interview method also facilitated the 
potential for a greater understanding of these components and characteristics, by allowing 
interviewers to probe, query, explore, and develop on given responses during data collection. 
This affords an opportunity for the discussion and further expansion of topics between the 
interviewer and respondent (Hitchcock & Hughes, 1995; Galletta, 2013; Bell, 2017). 
 
The semi-structured approach is also particularly effective and appropriate in relation to policy 
studies as it avoids the limitations of strict and highly structured interviews. In many cases these 
strict interview formats do not permit the development of spontaneous questions that can be 
used to reply and build on unanticipated responses, or follow-up specific topics made relevant 
by the interviewee (Arksey & Knight, 1999; Ducros & Watson, 2002; Robson & McCartan, 
2016). Therefore, a key advantage of the semi-structured interview process was the ability to 
provide freedom and flexibility, while also appreciating the complexity and variability of 
responses. This served to suitably frame the interview and prevent [or greatly minimise] the 
collection of untargeted, unwanted, or random data (Hoepfl, 1997; Fontana & Frey, 2000; 
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Robson & McCartan, 2016). Flexibility was vital when questioning interviewees on topics that 
highlighted the existence of characteristics associated with the problem-solving rationalities. 
For example, when discussing aspects of water management such as the application of EU 
legislation or desalination projects, the interviewer could shape the discussion towards 
exploring public consultation, which emerges as a characteristic of democratic pragmatism. 
 
It is also important to note that several brief meetings and communications with individuals 
responsible for water management were also deemed necessary to identify appropriate 
individuals in a Cypriot context. This helped to validate key actors highlighted in the wider 
literature pertaining to water management in Cyprus. These meetings were particularly helpful 
when identifying unknown or retired individuals who were not apparent in the context of 
existing research [which was underdeveloped]. 
 
 
4.5 Data collection 
Primary data were collected through the semi-structured interviews, thus providing a qualitative 
descriptive data type (Field, 2009; Robson & McCartan, 2016). The interviews [a total of 
twenty] were performed over a period of ten months, from December 2012 to September 2013, 
while they were often carried-out at offices or places of work in a range of towns that were 
relevant to the location of the given respondent. The interviews varied in length, ranging from 
the shortest at 43 minutes to the longest at 159 minutes, while they also averaged around 91 
minutes (see appendix 2 for full details regarding the interviews). All raw data was recorded on 
a survey data log, with each interview being recorded using a speech audio recorder as well as 
detailed hand-written notes. Transcripts were subsequently produced for each interview. The 
combination of both audio recording and extensive hand-written notes was preferred as this 
helped to facilitate a more efficient and effective data collection [and interview] process 
(Seidman, 2013). Written notes were used to compliment all recorded material, for instance 
providing information regarding body language, facial expression, and important gestures, as 
well as being used to document key points and reports or items shown. 
 
All the techniques used as part of the interviews were implemented to develop a relationship 
between the interviewer and interviewee, and thus facilitated a relaxed setting in which all 
required data could be extracted as part of the collection process (Bell, 2017). In the case of 
audio recording, this afforded the interviewer a freer and more relaxed role in the interview, 
 CHAPTER 4: Research Methodology 
 
104 
 
which in turn meant that the focus was not on note-taking but instead on developing the 
interview, building rapport, and asking appropriate follow-up questions to initial responses 
from the interviewees. Without the distraction of constant note-taking throughout the interview, 
the interviewer could be fully attentive to the interviewee, with many respondents commenting 
that a more relaxed atmosphere was created as a result. This created a feeling of a more open 
discussion rather than an interview under pressure, which further helped the interviewer to gain 
trust and encourage interviewee openness (Seidman, 2013). Although varied opinion on the 
audio recording of detailed interviews is noted (see Weiss, 1994; Patton, 2002), authors such as 
Briggs (1986) and Seidman (2013) argue that to accurately portray the words of interviewees, 
audio recording [if feasible] should always be used. 
 
For the primary interviews, a purposive and snowball sampling technique was used to collect 
data. Twenty interviews were completed, and this was deemed a suitable benchmark when 
attempting to obtain a good representation of all key actor groups. However, this measure 
remained flexible based on the snowball technique, which dictated the need for new 
information or signalled if interview network closure had taken place and thus a sufficient 
number of interviews had been completed (Arksey & Knight, 1999; Patton, 2002; Rubin & 
Babbie, 2010; Yin, 2011; Robson & McCartan, 2016). 
 
All secondary data relating to water management problems were collected from appropriate 
sources to represent topics such as; the water scarcity and quality issues in Cyprus; the 
implementation of EU legislation; the representation of topics in the parliamentary proceedings, 
government journal, and newspaper media; as well as the evidence of characteristics associated 
with Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities. Various methods were used to gain a range of data types. 
For example, in the case of legislation, policy, parliamentary proceedings, and the government 
journal, data was collected both in terms of written notes as well as digital content via 
government archives [online and office-based]. In turn, secondary data sources consisting of 
newspaper media were collected via online databases and hard-copies in Cyprus. Finally, all 
secondary data was collected, ordered, and categorised [in a similar format to the primary 
interview data] within the context of the pre-defined research themes, with coded data being 
accumulated and categorised accordingly. These data were used to contextualise the primary 
interview data in terms of water scarcity, quality, and characteristics associated with each of 
Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities. 
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4.5.1 Contacting the interviewees 
To gain the trust, confidence, and support of prospective interviewees, an introductory 
letter/email was sent to all desired actor groups and potential respondents. This first point of 
contact was used to explain the thesis, achieved by providing an abstract, while also detailing 
the importance of the research and how the given respondent had been selected for potential 
interview (see figure 4.5 for introductory letter/email example). This letter/email varied 
according to the organisation, background, role, and actor group type of each prospective 
interviewee. The privacy and confidentiality of the interview was also reiterated, with potential 
respondents being invited to make contact and ask any questions pertaining to the research topic 
and the interview procedure. When an initial response failed as a result of the introductory 
letter/email, a subsequent letter/email was sent, or a telephone call was made to further explain 
the research and ease any concerns raised by the potential interviewee. 
 
Figure 4.5: Example of introductory letter / email sent to potential interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear ** name of potential interviewee ** 
 
I am currently undertaking doctoral level research at the University of Hertfordshire investigating government 
responses to the issues of water scarcity and quality. In particular, I am attempting to better understand how 
government in the Republic of Cyprus is responding to these issues, while also considering the applicability of 
an alternative conceptual understanding in this setting. 
 
To help better understand and improve the policy and decision-making process [which is the foundation of a 
collective government response to the issues at hand], I will be interviewing people in Cyprus who have 
knowledge of government procedures, water management, or currently have [or have had] some level of 
involvement or responsibility for decision-making with regard to water management and the policy process. 
Therefore, it was with interest that I learnt of your role as ** role ** within ** Department/Organisation ** - 
and as recommended by ** relevant name / contact ** 
[If the individual was recommended by another interviewee – this was also noted at this point] 
 
I would be honoured if you could spare some time to discuss the topic and subsequently be interviewed for my 
research. Please note that all discussions and interviews with regard to my research are treated as confidential 
with comments being made completely anonymous in the main text of the final write up of my research. 
 
You will also find attached an abstract to my thesis, which will hopefully contextualise my research for you. If 
you are able to be of assistance in my research efforts I would be happy for you to suggest a date and location 
to meet, which will of course involve me travelling to Cyprus in the near future. Please do not hesitate to 
contact me at any time to discuss my research further. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you soon and thank you for your time. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Alexis Pericli 
Postgraduate Research Student 
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The importance of undertaking a pilot study has been highlighted by a range of authors (see 
Arksey & Knight, 1999; Patton, 2002; Seidman, 2013; Robson & McCartan, 2016). As a result, 
a set of pilot interviews were performed to assess a range of interview characteristics, 
including; question suitability; interview timing; required follow-up topics or questions; and 
necessary adaptations to the interview format. An initial review of these preliminary results was 
undertaken to reflect on how the interview had progressed. Some key concerns emerged as a 
result of this evaluation, based on the fact that some respondents did not represent a suitable 
level of expertise and knowledge with regard to certain topics. Thus, the ‘snowball’ method was 
vital in identifying actors with appropriate knowledge, expertise, and experience on certain 
topics. It was also understood that the forced change in interviewee work and time demands, 
resulting from agreeing to meet and be interviewed, would have an influence on the time 
allocation given to perform the interview. This issue was mitigated by ensuring questions were 
prioritised or reorganised to gain the most out of each interview. This practice was deemed 
appropriate to further ensure that the respondent felt as comfortable as possible during the 
interview process (Flick, 2009; Bell, 2017). 
 
The importance of researcher background 
In terms of data collection, interview techniques, and contacting potential interviewees, the 
ethnicity and social identity of the researcher played an important role.  
 
Firstly, in terms of contacting potential interviewees and arranging a mutually agreed meeting 
time, the process was often aided by an understanding of the Greek language and being more 
aware of socio-cultural norms when conversing via email and crucially via telephone [often in 
Greek]. In numerous cases, despite the introductory email being sent to the potential 
interviewee in English, an initial reply was given in Greek before subsequent communication 
took place in English. Therefore, without these language skills, the arrangement of interviews 
with certain key individuals would have been difficult or in some cases impossible. 
 
Secondly, in relation to interview techniques, the use of the Greek language and knowledge of 
common social practices was important when first meeting with interviewees. This enabled the 
researcher to make the interviewee feel more comfortable, develop rapport, while also creating 
a relaxed atmosphere through wider conversation and the adherence of accepted norms that are 
necessary to avoid the possibility of offending the interviewee. 
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Thirdly, in terms of data collection and carrying-out the interview, the researcher’s Greek-
Cypriot heritage and knowledge of the Greek language was important. For example, the 
secondary data often required translation, as many sources of data were obtained in Greek with 
no English versions available. In turn, when undertaking the interviews, Greek language was 
used to converse with interviewees at certain points to translate specific words, phrases, 
concepts, definitions, events, or to generally clarify meaning. Ultimately, the Greek-Cypriot 
background and knowledge of language held by the researcher was useful in gaining access to 
senior actors and developing a suitable interview network. 
 
 
4.6 Data analysis 
To test the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, data were generated and analysed in 
relation to key themes that enabled the researcher to better understand government responses to 
water management problems. Research themes formed the basis of the interviews and were 
developed as a result of the discourse analysis themes and characteristics associated with 
Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities. These involved; the administrative response of government; the 
main policy actors and their roles in tackling water scarcity and quality issues; the 
organisational and political factors that have influenced responses; the views, attitudes, 
experiences, and behaviour of actors involved in policy development and application; the extent 
to which policy goals have been achieved; as well as how policy and problem-solving responses 
have evolved and changed over time. 
 
The primary data gained from interviews were accumulated in the form of detailed transcripts, 
with quotes and illustrative points being extracted for use within the thesis discussion. The 
interview and secondary data were evaluated using a content analysis that was pre-defined 
according to key research themes and content variables. For instance, these included; policy-
maker attitudes to legislation; the interpretation of policy by individual actors; the perceived 
role and impact of EU legislation; the role of finance in policy formation and implementation; 
historical management and organisational issues; relationships and interactions between actors 
[or groups]; the evolution of the policy and decision-making process over time; concepts and 
attitudes relating to water problems, in particular scarcity and quality; evidence of sequential 
rationalities; the understanding of actor roles, behaviour, and self-interest; the role and 
influence of supranational governance; the importance of factors such as economic status and 
culture; as well as the role of politics in decision-making. Figure 4.6 outlines the key themes 
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associated with Dryzek’s (2013) discourse analysis and rationalities, while the research themes 
developed as a result of expanding this knowledge, through exploratory and interpretative 
themes applied in terms of the data collection process, are also shown. 
 
Figure 4.6: General research themes for data analysis (adapted from Dryzek, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Research Themes  
Key Themes associated with Dryzek’s Rationalities 
 
1. Recognised or constructed entities 
2. Assumed natural relationships 
3. Key agents and their motives / behaviour 
4. Metaphors or rhetorical devices 
Policy-maker attitudes to 
legislation / regulation 
Interpretation of policy 
by individual actors 
Policy-maker attitudes to 
the EU directives / WFD 
The relationships and 
interactions between 
actors [or actor groups] 
 
The role of politics in 
decision-making 
The perceived role and 
impact of EU directives 
 
The evolution of the 
decision-making / policy 
process over time 
Historical management 
and organisational issues 
The role of finance in 
policy formation and 
implementation 
 
Concepts and attitudes 
relating to water 
management problems 
The existence of 
sequential rationalities 
Actor roles, behaviour, 
motives, and self-interest 
The influence of external 
factors such as economic 
status and culture 
The role and influence of 
supranational governance 
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The use of codes and categories reflected a core attribute of data analysis in terms of a 
grounded theory approach (Denscombe, 2010). The pre-defined themes were formed in a 
deductive way based on the discourse analysis themes identified and used by Dryzek’s (2013) 
rationalities, with the pre-defined themes further expanded and developed through an 
interpretative and exploratory approach. The themes outlined by Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities 
included; the recognised or constructed entities that are central to each response; the 
assumptions made within a given rationality regarding natural relationships; the key agents and 
their motives and behaviour that influence decision-making; as well as important metaphors or 
rhetorical devices used as part of a given response, which dictate the overall message and 
potentially influence those who oppose certain responses (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Although a range of guidance and advice exists in relation to the transformation of qualitative 
data [gained from interviews] into real-world findings, this process is not bound by a rigid set 
of rules and remains somewhat flexible (Robinson, 1998; Patton, 2002; Seidman, 2013; Robson 
& McCartan, 2016; Bell, 2017). Therefore, for this study, an interpretative, exploratory, and 
deductive approach was used to develop general research themes, thus making it possible to 
identify patterns and associations within the data. A deductive approach is relevant based on the 
presence of themes associated with Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities and discourse analysis, which 
act as a starting point for assessing the existence and potential utility of the rationalities. 
Furthermore, interpretative and exploratory approaches were used to identify and account for 
emerging themes that became apparent during the data collection process and as a result of 
primary and secondary data findings. 
 
Content analysis 
A content analysis was undertaken to assess and highlight the research themes represented 
within the primary interview data and secondary forms of data. This process sought to organise 
and collate important material relating to pre-defined themes, with a view to identifying salient 
interview quotes and highlighting links between interviewee comments and the representation 
of topics by secondary sources (Seidman, 2013; Neuendorf, 2017). The content analysis 
technique offered a variety of advantages that were particularly relevant in the context of this 
research, such as; unobtrusiveness; being generally inexpensive to conduct; enabling a vast 
amount of data to be dealt with; as well as allowing the ‘mining’ of these data within a variety 
of sources according to pre-defined themes (Potter, 1996; Royse, 2008; Adler & Clark, 2011; 
Robson & McCartan, 2016). 
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The content analysis procedure involved the selective reduction of text and sound which was 
categorised to identify pre-defined words or phrases deemed to be indicative of the research 
themes [shown in figure 4.6], and generally in terms of topics such as; water policy and 
legislation; water management problems such as scarcity and quality; as well as EU governance 
influences (Weber, 1990; Krippendorff, 2013; Neuendorf, 2017). The aim of the analysis was to 
produce a measured count of the research theme categories and consider the representation of 
these by other relevant sources (Krippendorff & Bock, 2008; Adler & Clark, 2011). This form 
of analysis provided a qualitative summary of meaning (Potter, 1996), and aided the 
triangulation process to increase the robustness and integrity of the data (Flick, 2017).  
 
The analysis of the interviews and other secondary sources was conducted using conventional 
methods and procedures, namely an integrative model (Weber, 1990; Krippendorff & Bock, 
2008; Royse, 2008; Krippendorff, 2013; Neuendorf, 2017). Initially, all text was coded by the 
primary coder [researcher] in accordance with the general research themes and content 
variables that were pre-defined [by the researcher]. Each of the themes were highlighted within 
the given source and cumulated to provide an outcome of the characteristics of each source. 
This process was then performed and checked by a secondary coder [researcher’s assistant] to 
verify the given outcome. 
 
Applicability analysis 
An applicability analysis was developed and performed to give a detailed comparison between 
the theoretical expectations of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities and the practical findings in 
Cyprus. This is shown in full within appendix 6, while being summarised in chapter nine as part 
of the thesis findings and conclusion. The analysis involved a direct comparison of expected 
characteristics and their existence or non-existence in Cyprus, with a scoring system used to 
evaluate the applicability of given categories. Ultimately, the applicability analysis underpins 
the discussion chapters that highlight the findings in Cyprus, while the technique also shares 
some similarities with the concept of multi-criteria analysis, which has been used to evaluate 
different variables and support decision-making (Belton & Stewart, 2002; Mateo, 2012). In this 
case, similarities include bringing different aspects together and comparing multiple attributes. 
 
The importance of anonymity 
As part of the data analysis process a system of anonymity was employed to comply with the 
confidential nature of the research, as agreed with all interviewees, and maintain the anonymity 
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of the individual actors. Specific respondents and attributed statements have only been 
indicated through the given individual’s respondent number - for example listed as ‘Respondent 
1’ [for comments/quotes] or ‘Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013’ [for in text references]. This 
technique has been applied so that the comments given by an individual, used in the analysis 
and discussion sections, cannot be related or attributed to specific interviewees (listed in 
appendix 2), thus ensuring complete anonymity and maintaining the integrity of the researcher. 
This also complies with the ethics protocol of the study. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the methodology used to explore the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) 
rationalities and investigate government responses to water problems in Cyprus. This has been 
carried out through the selection of a case study focused on Cyprus, which represents a small, 
Mediterranean, and peripheral EU nation. An approach based on grounded theory, with 
deductive and exploratory elements, has been applied to this research, while a qualitative semi-
structured interview was selected as the most appropriate method for data collection to offer 
insights into the specifics of problem-solving through actor behaviour. 
 
The chapters following this methodology seek to improve understanding of government 
responses to water problems in Cyprus, as generated through the collection, analysis, and 
representation of primary interview data and secondary resources. This discussion is formulated 
and expressed using the research themes identified in figure 4.6, which have been expanded and 
developed from the discourse analysis themes within Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities. As a result, 
the discussion has been separated into five chapters, with the research themes and discourse 
format being a part of these. Chapter five sets the scene by considering the historical 
management of water problems in Cyprus and associated organisational issues that have shaped 
government responses. Then, chapter six, chapter seven, and chapter eight explore the existence 
of administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic rationalism in practice, 
through evidence of characteristics associated with each of the rationalities. In turn, chapter 
nine builds on this discussion by considering the applicability of the rationalities and 
recognising important emerging themes that have been generated by the research. 
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Chapter 5: Water Management in Cyprus 
 
 
5.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter seeks to develop understanding of how government in Cyprus has managed water 
and how responses have changed over time. This is explored in three sections following a 
format of; identifying the water management problems in Cyprus; considering the approaches 
used by government when responding to these problems and how these have evolved over time 
during phases of management; as well as highlighting the organisational structures of the water 
sector that have helped to facilitate the identified responses. 
 
The first section explores the water problems observed in Cyprus. These have been categorised 
in terms of availability and quality, which reflect the main categories of water management as 
identified in chapter two. In Cyprus, a range of inherent and imposed problems have been 
evident according to the findings, namely; scarcity; the threat of drought; groundwater over-
consumption; illegal boreholes; and quality issues such as saline intrusion of coastal aquifers. 
 
The second section considers the approaches used by government when managing and tackling 
water management problems. In this case, water management responses [since independence in 
1960] can be viewed in terms of three key phases based on the findings. These phases are 
separated according to important periods that form a timeline. The first phase [from 1960 to 
1990] involves the management responses after independence and focuses on the expansion of 
supply through the development of infrastructure and the emergence of demand management 
specifically through metering. This phase has been selected as it allows for a sufficient period 
before and after the 1974 occupation [14 years from 1960 to 1974 and 16 years from 1974 to 
1990] to analyse management changes and policy development, while also giving a suitable 
period after occupation for the socio-political situation to stabilise. The second phase [from 
1990 to 2004] considers the period during which government sought to further develop demand 
management, while applying alternative infrastructure technologies such as desalination and 
water recycling. The third phase [from 2004 to 2014] focuses on approaches that have involved 
a mix of supply and demand management, and have included; the development of water-saving 
campaigns; tackling long-term issues such as drought, groundwater over-abstraction, and illegal 
boreholes; as well as adjusting to changes that have resulted from EU accession such as the 
development and use of participatory approaches and more integrated water management. 
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The third section outlines the organisational structure of the water sector in Cyprus and 
identifies the key responsibilities of management. This identifies the different departments, 
bodies, and actor groups that have been responsible for the provision of services. Three levels 
of organisation and responsibility are discussed, namely; policy; executive; and consumer 
levels. These have been defined by government according to the groups involved at each level. 
 
 
5.2 Water management problems 
Water management problems in Cyprus have reflected the key aspects of availability and 
quality as considered in chapter two. In terms of availability, a range of problems have been 
identified, namely; limited resources and scarcity; the major threat of drought; a dependence on 
rainfall and groundwater; a stepped drop in precipitation in the 1970s; as well as unlicensed 
boreholes and the over-pumping of aquifers. In terms of quality, problems have been 
highlighted such as; groundwater deterioration; saline intrusion of coastal aquifers; as well as 
point-source and diffuse pollution pressures caused by municipal wastewater, industrial and 
livestock waste, mining, rainwater runoff, desalination, and agricultural activities. These 
problems have been noted in Cyprus by previous research (see Demetriou & Georgiou, 2004; 
Aletraris, 2010; Iacovides, 2011b; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014), while also being highlighted in 
small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU nations, for example in the case of; scarcity in the 
Mediterranean and EU (Holst-Warhaft, 2016; Garrote, Iglesias, & Granados, 2018), drought 
issues in Italy (Di Matteo et al., 2017), groundwater over-abstraction and agricultural water 
management in Malta (Hallett et al., 2017), as well as point, non-point, and groundwater 
pollution issues in Greece (Stamatis et al., 2011; Gikas, 2017). 
 
More specifically, Cyprus is argued to have limited water resources that must be managed 
carefully in terms of existing and emerging pressures, such as population growth, climate 
change, and the increasing demands of agricultural, domestic, and tourism sectors (Iacovides, 
2011a; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014; Naukkarinen, 2015). Research on water problems, policy, 
and management has focused on a range of topics. These include; agricultural water use and 
associated impacts; water scarcity; groundwater and drought management; the analysis of 
supply infrastructure; the feasibility of desalination; water ecosystem management; consumer 
attitudes and demand; water pricing and subsidies; potential impacts of climate change; as well 
as the implementation of EU legislation (see Charalambous et al., 2001; Iacovides, 2011a; 
Koundouri & Birol, 2011; Socratous, 2011a; Tsiourtis, 2001; Demetriou & Georgiou, 2004; 
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Stedman, 2012; Polycarpou & Zachariadis, 2013; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014; Kossida et al., 
2015; Loucaides & Koutsakos, 2015; Zachariadis, 2016; Hoffmann, 2018). 
 
The water management problems facing Cyprus can be further separated in terms of inherent 
and imposed issues, which sit within the categories of availability and quality. In this case, it is 
argued that the different water management problems can be categorised. This has been 
achieved through the definition of issues argued to be ‘inherent’ to the given setting based on 
variables that cannot be realistically changed, and issues that are deemed to be ‘imposed’ due to 
having an existence that is changeable but dependent on human activities and behaviour. For 
example, inherent issues exist such as an arid/semi-arid climate, geographical location, and the 
spatial separation of supply and demand (Iacovides, 2011a). These variables cannot be feasibly 
changed or controlled, and thus they are inherent based on their permanent existence (Pereira, 
Cordery & Iacovides, 2009). In turn, imposed issues are evident and include variables such as; 
increasing domestic and agricultural demand; the overuse of groundwater; a decline in water 
quality; a limited supply capacity; as well as the increasing burden of irrigation for agriculture 
(Iacovides, 2011b). These are dependent on human practices and thus remain changeable. 
 
5.2.1 Water scarcity and quality 
Water problems in Cyprus have been fundamentally based on availability and quality. Water 
scarcity [availability] is considered an inherent problem and vulnerability as a result of factors 
such as limited precipitation inputs, drought, and spatial disparity between supply and demand 
(Iacovides, 2011a). Although geographical location is a key variable that is inherent, scarcity 
remains a complex management problem that may be intensified or diminished as a result of 
many other variables, such as human behaviour, demand, and a limited supply system capacity; 
thus, it is not merely dependent on location (Pereira et al., 2009; Cook, 2017). 
 
Water quality is deemed to be an issue of less concern in Cyprus based on a more limited 
history of polluting activities such as high intensity agriculture or heavy industry (Iacovides, 
2011b). There is an interpretation regarding semi-arid countries that questions whether water 
quality can be considered a problem, because of the often over-dominant issue of scarcity (Seth, 
2003; Karousakis & Koundouri, 2006; UNESCO, 2009). This is evident in Cyprus, as when 
quality is compared directly with scarcity, it is typically deemed to be a secondary issue. 
Nevertheless, with increasing pressures on water resources, quality has emerged as an important 
challenge based on aspects such as groundwater exploitation, quality decline resulting from the 
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saline intrusion of coastal aquifers, as well as the concept of quality-scarcity (Pereira et al., 
2009; Cech, 2010; Iacovides, 2011a; Gregor, 2013; Boyd, 2015). 
 
The problem of drought 
Many respondents claimed that Cyprus had often experienced drought alongside the long-term 
situation of scarcity. This agreed with research based on historical annual rainfall data [gained 
between 1916 and 1974], showing that dry years [390-470mm of annual rainfall] and very dry 
years [390mm of annual rainfall or less] were expected once every four or five years (Iacovides, 
2011a). Since a stepped drop in rainfall, observed during the late 1970s, more frequent and 
long-lasting droughts have adversely impacted water resources primarily in terms of acute 
scarcity (WDD, 2009; Myronidis et al., 2018). 
 
All respondents identified the management problems posed by drought events. These were 
understood in terms of social, economic, and environmental impacts. Social impacts were noted 
through negative implications for both public health and quality of life (Respondent 16, pers. 
comm., 2013). Economic impacts were highlighted through the emerging financial costs of 
management and the effects of drought on general practices and the economy (Respondent 8, 
pers. comm., 2013; Hoffmann, 2018). Environmental impacts were considered in terms of; 
limited quantities of available water for ecosystem requirements; as well as the over-abstraction 
of groundwater that exacerbated the problem of saline intrusion in coastal aquifers (WDD, 
2009; Iacovides, 2011a; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014; Papadaskalopoulou et al., 2015a). 
 
Groundwater scarcity and quality issues 
Groundwater was noted as the primary resource for agriculture and a significant component of 
domestic water supply (table 5.1). It has been an over-exploited resource and constitutes 
approximately 48% of the demand value for overall water use, thus causing protection of 
groundwater to emerge as a vital aspect of water management for government and the economy 
because of the requirements for agricultural, domestic, and services sectors (Iacovides, 2011a). 
Alongside changes in weather, climate, and infrastructure, user activities were noted to have 
affected groundwater. For example, increased demand by the tourism industry has had an 
adverse effect on consumption, while the agricultural sector has been responsible for pollution 
outputs as well as the abstraction of large quantities of groundwater that have exceeded the 
amount required for natural aquifer recharge and sustainable usage (Demetriou & Georgiou, 
2004; Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). 
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Table 5.1: Water demand by sector and sources of supply (Iacovides, 2011b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many respondents identified groundwater over-abstraction as a major problem in Cyprus. This 
was related to unlicensed [illegal] boreholes as well as more generally to scarcity and quality 
issues (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). It was argued that groundwater over-abstraction had 
become more prominent as the WDD sought to gain greater control of boreholes by monitoring 
all types of abstraction through a permit and license scheme. The scheme was first developed 
through the Wells Law (Cap. 351) in 1961, however enforcement was very limited thus causing 
the law to be further developed in 2002 and more strongly enforced since 2010 because of the 
Integrated Water Management Law [79(I)/2010] (Georgiou & Dörflinger, 2002; Demetriou & 
Georgiou, 2004; Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014). 
 
The unlicensed abstraction of groundwater has had a significant impact on both water scarcity 
and quality (Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014). In terms of scarcity, ongoing unmonitored abstraction 
has led to substantial overuse and exploitation of resources (FAO, 1997; WDD, 2002; 
Iacovides, 2011a; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). In terms of quality, long-term 
exploitation and over-abstraction has led to the saline intrusion of coastal aquifers, thus causing 
a decline in quality that is difficult to remediate (FAO, 1997; Iacovides, 2011c; Milnes, 2011; 
Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). The following quote recognises the significance of this 
issue, the extent of over-abstraction, as well as the challenges caused by a decrease in quantity 
and a decline in quality because of saline intrusion. 
 
“The groundwater resources of Cyprus are over-pumped every year by 40% over the 
allowable safe yield. This results in a continuous decline of the groundwater level, the 
depletion of reserves and the rapid and continuous expansion of the areas of the aquifer 
that are destroyed by sea intrusion.” (Efthimiou, 2003) 
 
Furthermore, it was also argued that water quality issues in Cyprus have emerged primarily in 
terms of groundwater, with a decline in quality occurring as a result of point-source and diffuse 
pollution pressures, as well as the increasing problem of saline intrusion in coastal aquifers 
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(Demetriou & Georgiou, 2004; INECO, 2009; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013; Sofroniou & 
Bishop, 2014). Inadequate precipitation inputs and seasonal river flows have meant that 
surface-water pollution has been limited and less of an issue for government (Respondent 14, 
pers. comm., 2013). This does not suggest that controls for surface-water pollution problems 
have not been undertaken, indeed they have for the control of agricultural outputs (WDD, 
2013). However, the prioritisation of groundwater as an important supply input has caused the 
resource to experience greater pressure, while becoming a focus in terms of water management 
(Iacovides, 2011a; Papadaskalopoulou et al., 2015b). As noted by the following comment, the 
type of serious water pollution observed in other European nations, which has been associated 
with surface-waters and often caused by heavy industry, has not been experienced in Cyprus. 
 
“We don’t have serious river pollution such as other northern European nations.... what 
we have here is seawater intrusion and groundwater problems. That is our big issue. 
Some pollution problems arise from the use of nitrates in agriculture [pig farms and use 
of fertilizers] ...so okay nitrates are there.... but these can be managed....and you cannot 
compare any of these to the scarcity problem.” (Respondent 1) 
 
The quality-scarcity issue 
The concept of quality-scarcity was identified by respondents and related to groundwater. This 
has involved a decline in water quality that has in turn caused a decrease in quantity, thus 
invoking greater scarcity (INECO, 2009). The problem develops in a cyclic format, with a 
greater ongoing decline in quality further driving a decrease in the availability of good quality 
water, and thus causing a greater risk of increased scarcity (Zeng, Liu, & Savenije, 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, it was argued that scarcity, over-abstraction, increased demand, and more frequent 
drought events have reduced the replenishment of groundwater, while the widespread 
construction of reservoirs also impacted the recharge of downstream aquifers (INECO, 2009; 
Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013). These variables, alongside changes in usage patterns, have 
led to the decline of groundwater resources both in terms of quantity and quality. In turn, this 
has led to the depletion of inland aquifers, the deterioration of large coastal aquifers, and 
ultimately the issue of quality-scarcity (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). The following 
comment highlights the concept of quality-scarcity in Cyprus by noting that sea-water intrusion 
in coastal aquifers has instigated a greater risk of scarcity due to an ongoing decline in quality, 
which in turn has reduced the amount of good quality groundwater available for supply or 
environmental requirements. 
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“Over-exploitation of our groundwater aquifers....and for coastal aquifers the seawater 
intrusion......which actually can cause more scarcity because of lower quality. For this.... 
the more salinity you have the less good quality and usable water you have in the 
aquifer....so it is like slowly poisoning and polluting it by changing the natural 
balance...[...]...so for quality.... the main issue is groundwater.” (Respondent 6) 
 
 
5.3 Water management responses 
As discussed in chapter two, water resources in general have often been managed through 
approaches based on availability and quality (Gleick, 2000; Biswas, 2008; Anisfield, 2010). 
Water management in Cyprus can be fundamentally categorised according to these two aspects, 
and a timeline of activity is used to reflect how water problems relating to scarcity, drought, and 
groundwater quality have been tackled. The timeline has been distinguished in terms of three 
broad phases, which have emerged in succession and have been separated according to 
important time periods, namely; phase one from 1960 to 1990; phase two from 1990 to 2004; 
and phase three from 2004 to 2014. This interpretation is also useful when understanding how 
responses evolve, and ultimately when considering Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of how the 
problem-solving rationalities change over time [explored in chapter nine]. 
 
5.3.1 Phase one of water management [1960-1990] 
The first phase of management from 1960 to 1990 involved the responses that emerged soon 
after independence. This was primarily focused on the expansion of supply through the 
development of infrastructure, particularly dams and reservoirs, as well as the emergence of 
demand management approaches through metering (Hoffmann, 2018). As noted, the period was 
selected as it allows for sufficient time before and after the 1974 occupation, while also giving a 
suitable period after occupation for the socio-political situation to stabilise. 
 
The expansion of supply 
Many respondents claimed that the expansion of supply had been a long-standing objective of 
government, with the legacy of this approach evident through the vast number of dams and 
reservoirs that have been built on the island (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). This was 
validated by previous research, as Cyprus has had one of the highest levels of dam development 
relative to land area (see Stefanou & Kyrou, 2006; Koundouri & Birol, 2011). 
 
After gaining independence in 1960, the newly formed government [a centre group led by 
president Makarios] sought to develop water supply infrastructure such as dams, reservoirs, 
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pipelines, and conveyance facilities [see figure 5.1 and figure 5.2]. This aimed to encourage 
socio-economic development and address the problems of scarcity, supply shortages, and 
interval drought periods (Christophorou, 2009; WDD, 2009; Iacovides, 2011a). Water meters 
were also introduced during this phase as part of infrastructure development based on plans 
formed by the British who ruled prior to 1960 (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). This 
represented an approach of supply and demand management in tandem. The existence and 
procedure of supply management after independence was typified by the following comment. 
 
“The Republic was formed in 1960 and the first priority was to gather water....to build 
dams and reservoirs to have enough quantity.... [...]...From the 1960s to early 1990s the 
focus was on supply approaches.... pipes, dams and these things.” (Respondent 5) 
 
Figure 5.1: Map showing the dams of Cyprus alongside photographs of the two largest 
capacity dams/reservoirs - the Kouris [115,000,000m3] and Asprokremmos [52,375,000m3] 
(Kyrou, 2005; WDD, 2009; WDD, 2015) 
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Figure 5.2: The southern conveyor water transfer and distribution project; Phase I [1984-
1994] involved main dam and conveyor construction, plus the development of irrigation 
systems. Phase II [1988-2002] involved the construction of diversions, water treatment 
plants, and further expansion of irrigation systems (WDD, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the first phase of management, the government rhetoric used offered an insight into the 
administrative response during this period. The campaign of ‘not a drop of water to the sea’ was 
made prevalent, through booklets and media, and was linked directly to the extensive 
construction of dams and reservoirs (WDD, 2009; Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Sofroniou 
& Bishop, 2014). This slogan represented a philosophy of trying to maximise the capture of 
run-off and gaining as much water as possible from rainfall to store in the dams/reservoirs, thus 
literally not allowing a drop to reach the sea (IBP, 2012). As illustrated by the following quote, 
maximising supply capacity was the primary objective for government and the WDD during the 
period after independence, with this based on the collection and storage of water gained during 
seasonal rainfall periods (Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
 “In the past we tried to construct many dams and reservoirs. The policy we had then 
was ‘no drop of water to the sea’.... that was the philosophy....to take advantage of 
seasonal rainfall. This was the main axis of policy for the WDD....and it represented the 
idea of really maximising the supply component....” (Respondent 3) 
 
The majority of respondents suggested that although dam/reservoir construction was beneficial 
for increasing supply capacity, the actual size, number, and in some cases location of these had 
been problematic (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). The development of the dams/reservoirs 
was argued to have been optimistic, with respondents suggesting these were far too widespread 
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and over-sized relative to rainfall inputs observed at the time (Respondent 18, pers. comm., 
2013). The dams/reservoirs [and the ‘not a drop to the sea’ policy] were subsequently claimed 
to have failed when attempting to solve the scarcity issue, as ongoing scarcity was still a major 
issue and primary management challenge (Iacovides, 2011b; Hoffmann, 2018), while these 
approaches have also been unsuccessful in stopping the exploitation of groundwater especially 
by the agricultural sector (Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014; Papadaskalopoulou et al., 2015a). 
 
The perceived limitations of the dam/reservoir expansion programme have also been closely 
linked to decreases in precipitation, which were observed since the 1970s (Donta & Lange, 
2008; Iacovides, 2011a; Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). A stepped reduction had meant that 
many of the reservoirs were built with an expected capacity much greater than the quantities of 
water received (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). As a result, the changes in precipitation 
inputs meant that the reservoirs have been less effective than originally anticipated, while the 
exploitation of groundwater has continued partly because of these limitations and the 
insufficient water supply relative to demand (Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
A disparity between scarcity and quality 
The focus on supply expansion also meant that issues related to water quality were poorly 
represented during the first management phase (Iacovides, 2011a; Respondent 1, pers. comm., 
2013). A disparity between scarcity and quality was identified as an important aspect of 
management by respondents. It was argued that despite the importance of both issues, scarcity 
has been the primary concern for government, while the need for a response to water quality 
issues had emerged since the recognition of groundwater quality decline, the completion of 
water treatment plants, and EU accession (WDD 2002; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 20, pers. comm., 2013; EuroStat, 2016). In this case, three factors were argued to 
have contributed to the disparity between scarcity and quality.  
 
Firstly, the need to establish sufficient availability for socio-economic development has 
historically been the primary water problem for government, with this being intensified by 
socio-political changes caused by occupation of the northern region (Brouma & Ezel, 2011; 
Iacovides, 2011a; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). In this case, a complex socio-political 
setting exists because the administration of the island has been divided, and political issues 
influenced the management of shared resources (Faustmann, 2009). This relates to the dispute 
between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey regarding the occupied northern region of the 
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island, which resulted from Turkish invasion in 1974 (Ker-Lindsay & Faustmann, 2011). 
According to many respondents, these dynamics have had a bearing on water problems, namely 
in terms of; increased demand in the southern region; changes in population density, water 
usage patterns, and agricultural land use; as well as the limited management of scarcity and 
pollution in the occupied northern region, which has impacted shared and cross-border 
groundwater resources (Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 17, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Secondly, the public, political, and management focus on scarcity has increased as a 
consequence of drought events, which have greatly affected domestic supply and impacted the 
economy through water shortages for agriculture and industry (Koundouri, Birol, & Ezel, 2011; 
Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014). 
 
Thirdly, issues specifically related to water quality have been limited due to a lack of heavily 
polluting industries or agricultural activities (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). As a result, 
the management of this type of pollution has been less of a focus (Charalambous et al., 2011; 
Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014). For example, the following comment highlights how government 
has primarily dealt with the issue of scarcity, which contrasts with the response of central and 
northern European countries that have instead needed to focus on quality (Albiac, Mema, & 
Calvo, 2009; Tanik, 2010). 
 
“In the modern and northern European countries....their basic problem is quality and 
water pollution....heavy metals and all sorts of things....[....].....In Cyprus we don’t have 
such issues really. Our problem is the quantity which is very well known.....our scarcity 
issue is much more serious.” (Respondent 1) 
 
5.3.2 Phase two of water management [1990-2004] 
The second phase of management from 1990 to 2004 considers the period during which the 
government sought to develop demand management and further expand supply approaches, to 
respond to ongoing scarcity and emerging water quality issues. This has involved a range of 
approaches. Firstly, the development of demand management through; water-saving measures, 
public awareness campaigns, further expansion of metering, subsidies, and also drought 
rationing. Secondly, the development and expansion of existing infrastructure for supply, 
namely dams and conveyance facilities, as well as the application of improved irrigation 
systems focused on greater efficiency. Thirdly, the implementation and use of alternative 
infrastructure technologies, such as desalination and wastewater reuse/recycling. These 
approaches are explored in the following sections. 
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The development of demand management approaches 
As noted in chapter two, demand management often emerges as a response to the limitations of 
supply-based management (Gleick, 2000). In Cyprus, this process has been evident during a 
period in which the WDD, and associated service providers such as the water boards, 
consciously sought to develop demand-side techniques (Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). 
This follows on from initial metering efforts during phase one of management, and has 
involved water-saving measures, public awareness campaigns, further expansion of metering, 
subsidies for saving water, and rationing in times of drought (Aletraris, 2010; Sofroniou & 
Bishop, 2014; Kossida et al., 2015). According to respondents, these techniques have been 
applied to reduce demand for water and ease the issue of scarcity (Respondent 18, pers. comm., 
2013). As typified by the following comment, a shift in approach and policy was observed from 
a focus mainly on supply expansion towards one that was based on demand-side management. 
 
“In the past our policy was to satisfy demand through increasing and expanding supply. 
In other words.... demand was increasing so we tried to find more water to satisfy that 
growing demand. But then.... our policy changed and we tried to minimise demand by 
using more efficient ways...... for example water saving measures.” (Respondent 6) 
 
Demand management techniques have been evident through a range of examples, notably the 
use of different awareness campaigns by the WDD and the town water boards [see figure 5.3]. 
These have been communicated through events, leaflets, posters, and advertisements, which 
have sought to offer general advice on more efficient practices and encourage greater education 
in schools and more widely within communities and municipalities (WDD 2002; LWB, 2015). 
This also represents a sign of democratisation, in which public participation, education, and the 
integration of methods at community level have been evident when trying to manage demand. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Water-saving awareness campaigns (WDD, 2002; LWB, 2015) 
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Alongside the use of water-saving measures and awareness campaigns, the expansion and 
development of water metering for both residential users and the agricultural sector [the two 
highest water-consuming sectors in Cyprus] has been a key component of the demand-side 
response (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). It has been claimed that metering enabled the 
WDD and water boards to more effectively monitor usage, manage unaccounted water losses 
resulting from leakage within the distribution network, and mitigate increasing demands 
(Aletraris, 2010; Respondent 7, per. comm., 2013). Although metering was evident during 
phase one of management, the following comment exemplifies the further development and 
expansion of the method as part of a response to the limitations of supply-side responses. 
 
“When we realised that building dams was not enough.... then we looked into the issue of 
economising water.... metering etc.....and I have to say that in this respect we have done 
a lot of work and that is one of our success stories. It has developed over time from 
initial metering schemes to widespread application” (Respondent 1) 
 
Domestic subsidies were also applied as part of the development of demand management 
approaches. These focused on preserving good quality potable water and included subsidies for; 
the installation of water recirculation systems; the development of boreholes for garden water 
usage; the connection of boreholes with toilet cisterns; as well as residential grey-water 
recycling systems (Charalambous et al., 2011; Kossida et al., 2015). In particular, respondents 
noted that the development of domestic boreholes for household water supply occurred despite 
growing concerns of aquifer depletion, quality decline caused by sea-water intrusion, and the 
effects of drought conditions (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 
2013). As shown by the following quote, subsidies were used by government and the WDD to 
reduce demand for good quality potable water and encourage household users to develop and 
gain water from localised boreholes. However, this further exacerbated the issue of 
groundwater over-abstraction, while the idea also opposed the rhetoric communicated by the 
WDD, which claimed that groundwater depletion and saline intrusion remained serious 
problems that were worsened by using boreholes. 
 
“The Water Development Department defended its decision to increase subsidies for 
drilling boreholes despite the drought, arguing that using borehole water to supply 
gardens, swimming pools and toilets saved valuable drinking water. Paradoxically, 
however, the Department confirmed that the drying up of underground water reserves 
and the dangerous infiltration of sea water remained a grave reality in Cyprus and that 
the problem was exacerbated by boreholes.” (Hassapi, 2009) 
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The development of existing infrastructure and improved irrigation systems 
As the problem of scarcity was not solved after the first phase of management the government 
sought to expand on previous supply-side responses. In this case, respondents noted that in 
addition to demand-side responses, the government turned to the development of existing 
infrastructure to further increase supply capacity and manage increasing demand for 
agricultural activities, residential use, and a growing tourism industry (Respondent 3, pers. 
comm., 2013). This was evident through the ongoing construction and development of 
dams/reservoirs, treatment plants, and conveyance facilities (Aletraris, 2010; Iacovides, 2011a). 
 
The need for improved irrigation systems also became evident based on the large and increasing 
demand for water generated by the agricultural sector and the expansion of irrigated crops 
(Respondent 4, pers. comm., 2013). According to some respondents, the greater pressures for 
water caused by agricultural demand could be attributed to the arrival of many farmers from the 
north after the Turkish invasion and subsequent partition of the island in 1974 (Respondent 1, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). Furthermore, it was argued that 
improvements in irrigation systems were facilitated by the southern conveyor project [figure 
5.4]. This was the first major inter-basin distribution system implemented to transfer water from 
the western dams and reservoirs of the Troodos region to the eastern Kokkinohoria area of the 
island (Respondent 17, pers. comm., 2013). The southern conveyor provided more water for 
residential usage in the capital city of Nicosia and other large urban areas such as Limassol and 
Larnaca, while also distributing water to the primary agricultural and irrigation areas (Hunt, 
2004; Iacovides, 2011a; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013 Smith, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: The southern conveyor network and irrigation areas (WDD, 2000) 
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The development of alternative infrastructure technologies 
Alongside demand management approaches and the development of both existing infrastructure 
and irrigation systems, respondents argued that the government and WDD had also utilised non-
conventional water resources in response to ongoing scarcity and continuous drought years 
(Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). Alternative infrastructure technologies were developed, 
with wastewater reuse/recycling and sea water desalination both emerging as important 
management techniques from the mid-1990s onwards (Hunt, 2004; Iacovides, 2011a). 
 
Firstly, wastewater reuse/recycling was introduced in 1995. The scheme was based on 
compliance with the EU urban wastewater directive (91/271/EEC) and focused on the 
[eventual] widespread acceptance of recycled water within the agricultural sector (Papaiacovou, 
2001; Papaiacovou & Papatheodoulou, 2013). According to respondents, the reuse of treated 
wastewater generated a range of benefits and challenges in Cyprus. Benefits included; water 
savings that have allowed reallocation and usage for needs in other sectors; a positive 
contribution to the water balance; as well as improvements in quality and the protection of the 
environment through compliance with the EU urban wastewater directive (Respondent 3, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013). In turn, challenges have also been apparent, 
particularly; the need for appropriate application in the water system; high financial costs; and 
the need to gain acceptance by politicians and users (Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). The 
following comment identifies the uses of recycled wastewater, including the perceived benefits 
for irrigation supply, aquifer recharge, and freshwater re-allocation for domestic usage. 
 
“We are trying to use and develop the treated water, which is a very reliable supply of 
water.... which can be used for agriculture....[....].... and already we use it either for 
direct irrigation or for recharging aquifers. This is good quality water, and that is our 
focus. If we can use that amount of water, we can substitute our fresh water, which we 
can instead give to the cities for domestic supply” (Respondent 1) 
 
Secondly, sea water desalination was introduced in 1997, initially through the operation of the 
Dhekelia plant that was constructed to supply the area of Famagusta as well as partly serving 
the needs of both Nicosia and Larnaca (Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013). The approach has 
been a direct government response to water shortages and drought events that occurred during 
the 1990s, which negatively affected the domestic and tourism sectors (Tsiourtis, 2001; WDD, 
2002; Iacovides, 2011a; Papadaskalopoulou et al., 2015a). As noted by the following comment, 
respondents argued that policy encouraging the use of desalination became evident in response 
to water shortages, drought, climate change, tourism demand, and lifestyle changes. 
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“The previous years we had water cuts for potable water....so we changed our policy 
and said we have to build some more desalination plants because the standard of living 
in Cyprus is higher....and we don’t want our people to have water cuts. And there is the 
constant water issue with tourism as well.... always needing enough.” (Respondent 3) 
 
5.3.3 Phase three of water management [2004 to 2014] 
The third phase of management from 2004 to 2014 focuses on approaches and changes that 
have been observed since accession to the EU in 2004 [with a ten-year period to account for 
potential outcomes of policy]. These aspects are explored in the following sections, and have 
included; the continued development of water-saving and awareness campaigns, which have 
highlighted the ongoing use of demand-side approaches; the response to the issue of drought; 
changes in management relating to the long-term issue of groundwater abstraction and illegal 
boreholes; as well as changes in management that have resulted from EU accession and the 
influence of legislation such as the WFD (2000/60/EC). 
 
The continued development of water-saving and awareness campaigns 
Evidence of water-saving and awareness campaigns in this phase of management has 
highlighted the ongoing development and use of demand-side approaches. The government 
rhetoric for water management shifted from the idea of ‘not a drop to the sea’, which was 
indicative of an approach based on increasing supply and collecting as much water as possible, 
instead towards a rhetoric and philosophy focused on saving water and managing demand 
(Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013). A notable awareness campaign was implemented in 2008 
and again in 2011 by the WDD and MANRE, with the aim of improving the efficiency of 
residential usage, generating a water consciousness, and offering water-saving education and 
advice (WDD, 2011a; Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). This campaign, illustrated in figure 
5.5, adopted the slogan ‘Water: drops of life - every drop counts’ (WDD, 2008; WDD, 2011a). 
 
Respondents argued that water-saving campaigns have been generally successful when 
increasing awareness and perception regarding the challenges of water scarcity (Respondent 1, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). It was also noted that campaigns, such 
as the ‘every drop counts’ programme, emerged more strongly in response to drought events, 
while these periods had often seen water scarcity come to the forefront of discussion in society, 
media, and politics (Evripidou, 2008; Cyprus Mail, 2009a). The following comment highlights 
the increase in these campaigns, specifically in response to drought events. 
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“The public awareness campaigns for water saving had an effect. They increased the 
level of awareness and sensitivity. They had an impact especially from 2008 during the 
drought period.....[...]....they had to be done as part of the response to the severe drought 
we had at that time.....” (Respondent 8) 
 
 
Figure 5.5: The ‘every drop counts’ water-saving campaign (WDD, 2008; WDD, 2011a) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the perceived advantages of water-saving and awareness campaigns, the potential 
limitations of these responses have been documented by the media (Cyprus Mail, 2009c). This 
often contradicted the publicly communicated claims of success made by some respondents 
positioned within government departments (Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; Sofroniou & 
Bishop, 2014). For example, the next quote highlights the perceived failure of attempts to save 
water through awareness campaigns. In this case, short-term campaigns adopted by government 
became more obvious during the drought period and were widely criticised. 
 
“Despite having to deal with an extremely serious water crisis, the government has been 
as short-sighted as its predecessors with regard to saving water. It ran advertising 
campaigns urging people not to waste water for a just couple of months last year and 
then stopped them, as if it had had cultivated a water-saving conscience in everyone!” 
(Cyprus Mail; 14th February 2009b) 
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Responding to the issue of drought 
The threat of drought has been an ongoing problem in Cyprus and it has had a significant 
influence on water management. Since independence, different responses and policy agendas 
have been set according to the experience of drought at any given time. This was noted in terms 
of; supply expansion [‘not a drop to the sea’], through which scarcity and drought encouraged 
the need to maximise supply capacity; demand management that sought to reduce consumption 
and control water during drought periods; as well as the development of desalination and water 
reuse, which have attempted to ‘avoid the vagaries and influences of the weather and climate’ 
[as described by the WDD] (WDD, 2009; Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 3, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). Regulations and supply expansion were 
a requirement because of drought, while the observed decline in precipitation and the greater 
risk of more frequent and severe droughts also caused management approaches to evolve 
accordingly to mitigate these challenges (Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
The drought event of 2008 was considered by all respondents to be a driver for shaping changes 
in management. It was claimed that responses to the drought emerged in a variety of ways, and 
involved; the rapid implementation of costly desalination infrastructure; the expansion of 
supply through the development of new groundwater boreholes; drastic restrictions on water 
supply and usage; as well as the formation of a more comprehensive drought management plan 
(Pashiardis & Michaelides, 2009; MANRE, 2010; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
The drought was also interpreted by respondents to have caused changes in management, in 
particular; the development of drought indices and a drought management plan; the reactive 
decision to import potable water; as well as the construction of multiple desalination plants to 
supply water during emergency periods of drought (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). 
Notably, the drought management plan emerged in response to the drought and requirements of 
EU legislation. This involved a number of emergency measures, such as; the widespread 
restriction on the supply of water to the agricultural sector; water rationing and restrictions on 
household supply; the expansion of desalination plants and installation of mobile desalination 
units; the use of new boreholes and the purchasing of water from private boreholes to augment 
domestic supply; the treatment of raw water from aquifers for use as potable water; the transfer 
of potable water from Greece via tanker; as well as the strengthening of water-saving 
campaigns and financial incentive schemes for saving water and achieving greater efficiency 
(Aletraris, 2010; Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013).  
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Furthermore, the drought was also considered by many respondents to be political and 
management failure, with this in agreement with other research and media sources (see 
Evripidou, 2008; Cyprus Mail, 2009c; INECO, 2009; Aletraris, 2010; Charalambous et al., 
2011; Iacovides, 2011a; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014). This was highlighted by issues associated 
with existing management procedures, such as the lack of a coordinated response [a drought 
plan], as well as emergency conditions caused by severe water shortages that prompted 
reactive, expensive, and problematic responses from government, particularly the importing of 
potable water from Greece (Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 11, pers. comm., 
2013). The following quote summarises the perceived failure to respond effectively at the time 
of the drought, which developed into a widely criticised management failure and political [even 
national] embarrassment (Charalambous, 2008). 
 
“Now, in the face of catastrophic drought, we are scrambling from one short-term patch 
up to the next. And these are expensive solutions. The cost of bringing water from Greece 
was exorbitant, as is the cost of building temporary emergency desalination plants. For 
now, the cost was absorbed by the government dipping into its fiscal surplus” (Cyprus 
Mail, 2009c) 
 
The response to groundwater over-abstraction and unlicensed boreholes 
Before the government took steps to address the issue of groundwater over-abstraction, through 
the introduction of permitting and licensing as outlined by the IWM Law (2010), groundwater 
abstraction through boreholes was an unrestricted process (Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). 
This has had severe implications on the quantity and quality of groundwater resources 
(Demetriou & Georgiou, 2004; Iacovides, 2011c; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). The 
following quote highlights the problem of unlicensed boreholes and the lack of monitoring in 
place. As claimed by some respondents, the situation had facilitated users [such as farmers or 
landowners] to drill and operate boreholes, while over-abstracting large quantities of water 
without fear of punishment (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). The impending EU legislation 
at the time necessitated a response, which led to an abstraction licensing scheme used to 
legalise the uncontrolled boreholes (Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013; WDD, 2013). 
 
“Many illegal and uncontrolled boreholes are allowed to operate without any 
consequences. As these units are illegal, authorities cannot check the amount of water 
they pump. There are presently many thousands of illegal boreholes operating in Cyprus 
and admittedly no effort has been made yet to control them. EU legislation obliges us to 
close them and one day we must face this problem.” (Hassapi, 2009) 
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As a result of the WFD (2000/60/EC) and the subsequent translation of these requirements into 
national law, evident through the Water Protection Management Law (2004) and the Integrated 
Water Management Law (2010), the WDD and government formed a borehole permitting 
scheme (WDD, 2013). Through the IWM Law (2010), the WDD gained extensive regulatory 
powers over all groundwater resources, thus allowing the enforcement of the license and permit 
scheme, a vastly improved system of abstraction monitoring, as well as the steady eradication 
of the illegal boreholes (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). 
All respondents claimed that this only strengthened the position of the WDD and government 
when managing groundwater and responding to over-abstraction issues caused by unlicensed 
boreholes that were often dug by farmers or other land-owners without suitable permits. 
 
Changes in management and responses that have resulted from EU accession 
Respondents argued that EU accession had encouraged management changes in terms of 
responses to water problems such as increased demand and ongoing scarcity. In this case, 
public involvement and more integrated management approaches emerged as a result. 
 
Firstly, it was argued that public involvement and greater participation in decision-making for 
water management occurred in a more forceful and dynamic way since EU accession and the 
transposition of the WFD (Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). Public involvement was achieved 
through consultation procedures associated with the requirements of EU legislation. For 
example, Article 14 of the WFD encourages public consultation in terms of directive 
implementation as well as the production and review of river basin management plans (Gullón, 
2005). The WFD was identified by all respondents as having caused greater participation and 
public involvement. It was widely claimed that participation, as defined and encouraged by the 
directive, was the first time a measured form of this approach had been carried-out based on 
guidelines, objectives, and formal methods (MacDonald & Makuch, 2006; Respondent 15, pers. 
comm., 2013). The following comment notes the importance of the WFD in forming ‘proper’ 
procedures for participation and encouraging public involvement in decision-making. 
 
“For Cyprus...[...]...and our responses to water problems like demand...[..]...the 
implementation of the Water Framework Directive was the first time we had to deal 
properly with different groups. It was the first time we had proper participation and 
discussions and meetings with NGO’s and other people.... the citizens and so on. This 
was to listen to their problems and proposed solutions...and to be inclusive. 
Previously....we just had the politicians and bureaucrats [laughs]....and they [would] 
decide for the people they never see and never listen to!” (Respondent 6) 
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Secondly, the application of the integrated water resources management concept has been 
evident in Cyprus, particularly as a result of the formation and implementation of the IWM Law 
(Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). This national law contains aspects that seek to advance the 
objectives of more integrated management, namely; greater efficiency; equitable allocation 
across different socio-economic groups; and environmental sustainability to protect resources 
(IWM Law, 2010; Iacovides, 2011c; Socratous, 2011a; Guardiola-Claramonte et al., 2012). 
Respondents noted that the WFD encouraged a shift towards more integrated management, 
which had not been evident in the past and prior to EU accession (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 
2013). Furthermore, the IWM Law (2010) provided the national legislation and powers to 
implement the WFD as well as the concept of integrated management (Respondent 1, pers. 
comm., 2013). The next comment exemplifies the importance of the directive, and how it 
compelled the application of a more integrated approach. 
 
“The most important new concept has been the integrated approach. I can say the Water 
Framework Directive has been beneficial in this case....it is a key milestone for us along 
with the Integrated Water Management Law....both of these together. The WFD forced 
the development of our national law. This has led to the aim of implementing more 
integrated water management” (Respondent 6) 
 
An attention shift towards water quality 
Most respondents claimed that the decline of groundwater aquifers, the problems of saline 
intrusion, as well as EU accession and the influence of the WFD helped to cause a shift in 
responses and policy towards the inclusion of water quality as an important management topic 
for government and the WDD (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). During the first two phases 
of management, water quality was a neglected topic, and respondents claimed this was due to 
quality being of lesser importance when compared to scarcity and supply (Respondent 1, pers. 
comm., 2013). It was also argued that a disparity had been the result of polluting activities, such 
as heavy industry and intensive agriculture, not being evident in Cyprus, thus giving quality a 
secondary position on the management agenda (Iacovides, 2011a; Respondent 1, pers. comm., 
2013; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014). The following comment typifies this view, showing the 
position of quality as a topic that was historically less important when compared to scarcity. 
 
“In Cyprus we haven’t really had the heavy industry to cause major pollution.....we 
don’t have the same issues as other countries from that type of pollution. I think that is 
maybe why quality has not been as important in the past....and over the years........but 
that has changed...the directive [WFD] has increased attention and made us consider 
quality more.” (Respondent 18) 
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Prior to EU accession, water quality was not considered to be a management problem, as the 
main long-term focus of government was to ensure sufficient quantity and an appropriate 
response to scarcity and drought (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). However, according to 
many respondents, the WFD served to draw attention to the management of quality, with the 
focus of the directive [such as article 1, article 4, article 16, and article 17] relating to ecological 
protection, chemical status, and addressing pollution for surface and groundwater resources 
(WFD, 2000). The following comment notes the increased focus on quality issues since EU 
accession and as a result of the directive. 
 
“First we had the dams, then the desalination and proper sewage treatment, and now in 
terms of the WFD we have not only the ‘quantity’ issues....because at that time it was all 
we looked at....but after the EU and directive onwards we have looked at the ‘quality’ 
issues as well...they have become much more important.” (Respondent 3) 
 
The attention shift towards the increased importance of water quality was also shown to be 
relevant based on European statistical data. This illustrated the development of water treatment 
infrastructure, which to some degree has shown the increasing awareness and importance of 
water quality (Eurostat, 2016). Historical investment in dam building and supply infrastructure 
was substantial and extensive since independence, whereas this was not the case for water 
treatment infrastructure (Iacovides, 2011a). However, this situation changed, notably being 
driven by EU accession, with greater importance and investment attributed to water quality and 
treatment infrastructure. For example, in 2015 there were 35 water treatment plants on the 
island. Approximately 17 plants were constructed from 1970 to 1997, while between 1998 and 
2015 a further 18 plants were constructed (Eurostat, 2016). However, between 2000 and 2005, a 
time during which initial implementation of the WFD was occurring together with the process 
of full EU accession, approximately 16 plants were constructed (Eurostat, 2016). 
 
Alongside increased investment and attention for treatment infrastructure, the general attention 
shift towards quality was also made apparent through a changing focus in government reports 
and research (Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). This was observed through the increasing 
amount of research published on saline intrusion and aquifer quality decline (Demetriou & 
Georgiou, 2004; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014; Papadaskalopoulou et al., 2015b), as well as 
reports required for the WFD regarding quality, such as a river basin management plan (Birol, 
Koundouri, & Remoundou, 2011; Groom & Koundouri, 2011; MANRE, 2011). As exemplified 
by the next comment, a change in mindset for management was evident and driven by problems 
of saline intrusion, aquifer decline, and the requirements of EU legislation and the WFD. 
 CHAPTER 5: Water Management in Cyprus 
 
134 
 
“[On quality] ....It was mostly neglected because our main problem was scarcity and the 
aim was always to find water. To make sure the supply was good. But more recently we 
have faced the issue of quality. It has become much more important due to things like 
saline intrusion and the decline of our aquifers. So there was a change...and this was 
shown by the attention on the issue by the WDD and other bodies. Also since the 
European directives we had to look more at quality...it became a requirement. So all of 
these things together increased the importance of quality....it is not at the level of 
scarcity but it is definitely important.” (Respondent 6) 
 
 
5.4 Water sector responsibilities and organisational structure 
After identifying and considering the three main phases of water management evident in 
Cyprus, it is also important to link these with the organisational structures and responsibilities 
that have been associated with these phases and changes over time. Notably, this provides 
further detail on how the management phases have been applied, for example through national 
laws and EU legislation, as well as how certain groups within the organisational structure of the 
water sector have influenced this management. 
 
For this discussion, responsibilities are defined as the functions, duties, and obligations that are 
attributed to a given actor group [such as technical departments, boards, or organisations] in 
relation to water management. When considering responsibility in terms of water management 
in Cyprus two aspects can be distinguished, namely; the responsibilities for water management 
defined by government and legislation; as well as the different organisational structures and 
responsibilities that are observed or perceived to exist, and the actors or groups these have been 
attributed to. In turn, these can also be related to the management phases previously identified. 
 
5.4.1 Responsibilities defined by national water laws and legislation 
In Cyprus, responsibilities for water have been fundamentally defined by the water laws formed 
by government. This reflects command-and-control regulation that is characteristic of the 
mandatory approach. A few laws were developed early after independence during the first 
phase of management, with these emerging as a result of the preceding laws and structures 
formed under British colonial rule. Between 1968 and 1990 five core water laws were passed, 
relating to the management topics of; irrigation; municipal water; supply systems; and sewerage 
(see appendix 3). These were related to the methods used during the first phase of water 
management, which were narrow in scope and primarily focused on supply expansion and 
infrastructure development. In contrast, during the period from 1990 to 2017 approximately 
thirty-five laws were developed, while since EU accession in 2004 twenty-seven laws have 
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been implemented (WDD, 2017). Notably, this increase in regulation coincides with the second 
and third phases of management, which involved a greater variety of management methods and 
the need to implement legislation as a result of supranational EU governance.  
 
In the time preceding the laws formed since EU accession in 2004, responsibilities for water 
management were argued to have been somewhat fragmented. According to respondents in 
government, powers had been separated between different ministries and this situation was a 
result of management based on existing legislation as well as methods gained from remnant 
laws formed during colonial rule prior to independence in 1960 (Respondent 2, pers. comm., 
2013; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). Subsequently, in response to the challenges of 
fragmented management, divided authority, and European legislative influences, water policy 
was shaped accordingly by government to tackle ongoing water problems such as scarcity, 
drought, and groundwater over-abstraction. This was noted by respondents in government and 
those who had historically held positions in government departments and water boards 
(Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). As a result, three key 
pieces of legislation were identified, namely; the Water and Soil Pollution Control Law of 2002 
[WSPC Law]; the Water Protection and Management Law of 2004 [WPM Law]; and the 
Integrated Water Management Law of 2010 [IWM Law] (WSPC Law, 2002; WPM Law, 2004; 
IWM Law, 2010). The laws were noted by all respondents, especially those in government, as 
having re-defined authority and responsibility for water management (Respondent 1, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
5.4.2 The organisational structure of the water sector 
Understanding the structure of the water sector in Cyprus provides context for how water 
problems have been tackled through the management phases discussed. The structure of the 
water sector relates to the previous section, as the responsibilities defined by law have shaped 
the setting in which government bodies, departments, and other actor groups have been able to 
manage water problems. 
 
Water management, policy, and planning in Cyprus has been achieved through a range of 
government ministries, technical departments, semi-governmental boards, and other groups or 
organisations. The water laws identified in the previous section have played a role in assigning 
authority and defining responsibilities for actor groups that are part of the water sector. In 
theoretical terms, essentially what is expected according to government literature and 
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legislation [but which may not be the case in reality], this system is based on a hierarchical and 
vertical power structure (Iacovides, 2011c). For policy and problem-solving, greatest power and 
authority is afforded to the uppermost groups, while the implementation of policy is achieved 
by the mid-level departments and ground-level actors at the base of the hierarchy (Respondent 
1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). Notably, this idea of hierarchy and 
top-down decision-making reflects characteristics associated with the mandatory approach. 
 
According to government, the WDD, and most respondents [especially those positioned within 
government departments and boards], the water sector in Cyprus is structured in terms of three 
levels, namely; policy, executive, and consumer levels. These are considered in the following 
sections to understand the structure of organisation, as well as to explore the expected and 
perceived responsibilities of the groups involved and how these relate to the phases of 
management discussed earlier. 
 
The policy level 
The ‘policy’ level is the first and highest tier of the water management and organisational 
system. It includes the groups and individuals that hold the greatest power and responsibility in 
terms of policy and decision-making when responding to water problems. The Council of 
Ministers, positioned within central government and made-up of all the heads of each Ministry, 
has ultimate responsibility for proposed water policy, as also noted by respondents positioned 
[or previously positioned] in government departments (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013). This council reports to the Parliament and thus influences 
decision-making in central government. Specific responsibilities are assigned to different 
ministries, which each play a role in policy-making and in helping to shape the final decisions 
made by the Council of Ministers [and the Parliament above this council] (Iacovides, 2011c; 
Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). Notably, this level of organisation also reflects 
characteristics of the mandatory approach such as a top-down structure and format of control, 
procedural styles of negotiation, the idea of command, and interaction based on bureaucracy 
and hierarchy (Wurzel et al., 2013; Cubbage et al., 2017). The groups and individuals at this 
level have been involved in all phases of water management, particularly during the first phase 
of infrastructure development and supply expansion. The policy level of organisation is 
highlighted in figure 5.6. Each of the ministries and their main responsibilities, which are 
directly linked to the Council of Ministers, are also shown. 
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Figure 5.6: The ‘policy’ level of the water sector in Cyprus (INECO, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the majority of respondents a hierarchy of management exists in Cyprus in the 
case of water. Fundamentally, it is the government [administrative state] that has the most 
power and responsibility, based on water resources being state owned and controlled through 
the WDD, while policy decisions are ultimately made by Parliament [cabinet] and the Council 
of Ministers (Iacovides, 2011c; Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 
2013). The following quote highlights the major importance of the state, and how the system in 
place lends itself to this type of state-driven management. 
 
“The state authorities are the most important.... they are the real force behind things. 
You must take into account that there are no private providers for water.... either they 
[providers] are the [water] boards.... or overall the WDD.” (Respondent 9) 
 
Respondents also noted that an Advisory Committee on Water Management operated in 
conjunction with the Council of Ministers and the ministries (Respondent 20, pers. comm., 
2013). This committee offers guidance for the overall water policy of government. For 
example, notable guidance topics have included; the allocation of water in terms of usage and 
by region or municipality; water pricing changes and cost recovery; the use of recycled water; 
as well as guidelines for water boards, sewerage boards, local authorities, and municipalities 
(IWM Law, 2010; Respondent 19, pers. comm., 2013). Subsequent recommendations are 
submitted to the Council of Ministers for consideration (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
At the policy level, the ministries, groups, and individuals have been involved with all three 
phases of management, especially; guiding regulation in the first phase with regard to 
infrastructure development and supply expansion; developing water recycling and desalination 
in the second phase; and responding to drought in the third phase (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 
2013). The influence of the groups at this level was noted to be consistent throughout the three 
↑         EXECUTIVE LEVEL         ↑ 
↑         CONSUMER LEVEL          ↑ 
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management phases, with government departments being particularly strong during the first and 
second phases that came before changes caused by supranational governance resulting from EU 
accession (Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). The government departments and groups at the 
policy level were also noted to have adapted over time in response to management challenges 
such as ongoing scarcity, drought, increased demand, and socio-political changes. For example, 
this was evident through the consolidation of responsibilities for the MANRE, an increase in 
water regulations, attempts to increase expertise through new or reformed departments, and the 
need to manage requirements that emerged in the third phase of management relating to water 
quality and public involvement in decision-making (Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
The executive level 
The second tier of the water management and organisational system is defined as the executive 
level (figure 5.7). This involves the actors and groups that operate in a technical and 
management capacity for the ministries at the policy level (WDD, 2014; INECO, 2015). The 
groups at the executive level have had different roles in terms of the identified management 
phases and responses to scarcity, drought, groundwater over-abstraction, and quality decline 
primarily because of the saline intrusion of coastal aquifers. This level of organisation reflects 
characteristics of; the mandatory approach through regulation and hierarchy; the economic 
approach through the application of market-based instruments; as well as the power approach of 
technocracy based on the important role of experts (Wurzel et al., 2013; Radaelli, 2017). The 
departments at this level have been involved in all phases of water management, notably in 
relation to the development of infrastructure for supply, groundwater monitoring and control, 
and developing regulations to implement EU legislation such as the WFD (Respondent 1, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Figure 5.7: The ‘executive’ level of the water sector in Cyprus (INECO, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
↓              POLICY LEVEL              ↓ 
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At the executive level, the departments and groups identified have been involved with all three 
phases of management, for example; helping to implement regulation in the first phase with 
regard to infrastructure development and supply expansion; attempting to manage demand 
through awareness campaigns and also diversifying supply through wastewater recycling and 
desalination in the second phase; as well as responding to drought and also monitoring and 
controlling groundwater in the third phase (GSD, 2012; Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013; DofE, 2017). Notably, during these phases, the WDD has 
been the central technical agency for water, bringing together expertise from other departments 
and groups at the executive level and having responsibilities defined by regulation [the 
structure, responsibilities, and divisions of the WDD are summarised in appendix 4] (WDD, 
2005; Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; WDD, 2014). The government departments and 
groups at the executive level were also noted to have adapted in response to variables such as 
ongoing scarcity, drought, increased demand, and changes caused by EU accession and 
legislation. This was evident through; greater powers gained by the WDD in the second and 
third phases of management, and particularly after the implementation of the IWM Law; 
attempts to facilitate interaction between different departments; and the application of voluntary 
approaches such as stakeholder involvement by the WDD as a result of EU legislation 
(Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
The consumer level 
The final and lowest tier of the water management and organisational system is defined as the 
consumer level. This consists of the groups or actors that hold responsibility for implementation 
at regional, municipal, or village level, essentially influencing policy and responses to water 
problems on the ground (Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013). There are five main groups that 
provide the link between the consumers and the higher policy and executive levels. These 
include; town water boards; sewerage boards; municipal authorities and community boards; 
irrigation associations or divisions; as well as farmer unions (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 
2013). Notably, ‘consumers’ in this case have often been defined as the public and private 
water users that encompass groups such as residents and farmers (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 
2013). This level of organisation reflects the characteristics of; bottom-up perspectives through 
a focus on those responsible for implementation; voluntary approaches through public 
consultations; and economic approaches through pricing structures and subsidies. The groups at 
this level have been involved in all phases of water management, with a greater role in the 
second and third phases being evident in terms of board and municipal authority involvement in 
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water-saving campaigns and the application of pricing changes and public involvement in 
decision-making as a result of EU accession (Respondent 5, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 12, 
pers. comm., 2013). The consumer level of organisation for the water sector is shown in figure 
5.8. The departments, boards, authorities, and associations are linked to the groups positioned in 
the executive level, while responsibilities tend to be focused on water supply or irrigation. 
 
Figure 5.8: The ‘consumer’ level of the water sector in Cyprus (INECO, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the consumer level, the departments, boards, authorities, and associations identified have 
been involved with all three phases of management, for example; implementing regulation, 
pricing, and metering in the first phase to expand supply and manage demand; attempting to 
manage demand in the second phase through water-saving and awareness campaigns; as well as 
groundwater monitoring and control in the third phase (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 17, pers. comm., 2013).  
 
Notably, during these phases, the boards have been important in ground-level policy 
implementation and have provided the main link to the executive level (Respondent 7, pers. 
comm., 2013; NWB, 2014; NSB, 2015), while the farmer unions have played the role of 
pressure group (Respondent 19, pers. comm., 2013). Indeed, a range of unions exist, namely; 
the Cypriot Farmers Union; the Agrotiki Farmers Union; Panagrotikos Farmers Union; and the 
Pan-Cyprian Farmers Union (Aletraris, 2010; Charalambous & Christophorou, 2016; Ioannou, 
2016; Katsourides, 2016; Protopapas, 2016;). Despite their claimed independence, each of these 
was found to have a strong affiliation with a specific political party, which in turn had an 
influence on decision-making (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). For instance, the Cypriot 
Farmers Union was closely linked to the AKEL Party, which is a left socialist political party, 
while the Panagrotikos Farmers Union was affiliated with the DISY Party, which is a centre-
right conservative and pro-Europeanism political party (Christophorou, 2009; Panagrotikos, 
↓              POLICY LEVEL              ↓ 
↓           EXECUTIVE LEVEL          ↓ 
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2013; AKEL, 2014; DISY, 2014). As a result, the demands and actions of a union often 
represented the agenda of their associated political party, while the pressures applied on 
government responses were also aligned with the relationships and motives reflected by party 
politics (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). This has been translated as a major influence on 
responses to water problems such as scarcity, drought, demand, and groundwater over-
abstraction. For example, water usage patterns have influenced regional supply balances; the 
adoption of irrigation networks has increased water efficiency; while the use of greywater for 
irrigation has helped in the reallocation of good quality potable water (Respondent 1, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 5, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
The departments, boards, and groups at the consumer level also adapted over time in response 
to variables such as ongoing scarcity, increased demand, groundwater over-abstraction and 
associated quality issues, as well as changes in policy caused by EU accession. For example, 
this has been evident through; changes in rights as a result of the issuing of borehole permits 
and abstraction licenses by the WDD in the third phase of management; as well as changes in 
board pricing structures to account for cost recovery required by EU legislation (Respondent 7, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
The organisational structure and three parts of the water sector discussed in terms of policy, 
executive, and consumer levels are illustrated as one system in figure 5.9. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to develop understanding of water management in Cyprus by exploring 
three areas. Firstly, by identifying water problems; secondly, by considering the management 
responses to these problems; and thirdly, by highlighting the responsibilities and organisational 
structures of the water sector and how these relate to the phases of management. 
 
The first section has outlined the water problems observed in Cyprus, and these have been 
categorised in terms of availability and quality, which are the main aspects of water 
management noted in chapter two. A range of inherent and imposed problems were highlighted, 
including; scarcity; groundwater over-consumption and illegal/unlicensed boreholes; quality 
issues such as saline intrusion of coastal aquifers; as well as the ongoing threat of drought. 
 
The second section has focused on management responses to water problems. This has been 
separated into three parts according to phases of management identified as a result of the 
findings. In this case, a timeline was formed that has highlighted how management responses 
have developed. Indeed, these findings are relevant for the discussion in subsequent chapters 
and when exploring Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of how problem-solving changes over time. 
 
The first management phase from 1960 to 1990 involved the responses to water problems such 
as scarcity, drought, and the need for sufficient supply to facilitate socio-economic 
development. This phase emerged after independence, and certain responses were highlighted, 
including; expansion of supply infrastructure in response to scarcity and drought; the 
implementation of metering in response to scarcity through demand management; as well as a 
disparity between scarcity and quality as a result of a focus on supply-side approaches. 
 
The second management phase from 1990 to 2004 focused on the period during which 
government sought to develop demand management, existing infrastructure, and alternative 
technologies in an attempt to respond to ongoing scarcity and emerging water quality issues. 
Certain management responses were highlighted in this phase, including; the development of 
demand-side approaches, such as the continued expansion of metering as well as use of water-
saving awareness campaigns and domestic subsidies, in response to scarcity and the ongoing 
risk of drought; the development of existing supply infrastructure in response to scarcity; and 
also the development of alternative infrastructure technologies through wastewater recycling 
and desalination, in response to scarcity, increasing demand, and groundwater quality decline. 
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The third management phase from 2004 to 2014 has focused on approaches observed since 
accession to the EU, and responses to scarcity, severe drought events, and groundwater quality 
decline. Certain management responses were highlighted in this phase, including; the continued 
development of water-saving awareness campaigns in response to scarcity and demand; the 
rapid expansion of desalination, the development of groundwater resources, supply restrictions, 
management plans, and emergency measures such as importing water, in response to severe 
drought and acute scarcity; an extensive borehole permit and abstraction license scheme in 
response to groundwater over-consumption and illegal boreholes; changes caused by EU 
accession, such as greater public involvement in decisions when responding to demand and the 
use of integrated resources management in response to scarcity; as well as an attention shift 
towards quality in response to the decline of groundwater aquifers and saline intrusion. 
 
The third and final section has considered the responsibilities and organisational structures of 
the water sector. In this case, the responsibilities defined by legislation have been considered, 
with these found to provide guiding principles relative to the phases of management. The 
structure of the water sector was explored according to the three organisational levels defined 
by the government, namely; policy, executive, and consumer levels of organisation. This helped 
to position the different departments, bodies, and actor groups that have been responsible for 
the provision of services, while also considering their role as part of responses to water 
problems. For example; the role of government departments such as the WDD in developing 
responses to scarcity through supply expansion and drought plans; the role of water boards in 
managing demand through metering and water-saving awareness campaigns; as well as the role 
of farmer unions in limiting responses by government to control groundwater over-abstraction 
and quality decline due to saline intrusion of coastal aquifers. 
 
Ultimately, an understanding of water problems, phases of management, and organisational 
structures contributes to the discussion exploring Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities in subsequent 
chapters. Firstly, by outlining the water problems it is possible to contextualise the responses 
and approaches used in terms of the problem-solving rationalities. Secondly, by identifying the 
phases of management it is apparent that changes in responses have occurred, and these can be 
related and explored in relation to Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of how problem-solving 
changes over time. Thirdly, by considering the organisational structure and responsibilities for 
management in terms of responses to water problems, it is possible to highlight the actor groups 
and characteristics that are central to each of the problem-solving rationalities. 
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Chapter 6: Administrative Rationalism in Cyprus 
 
 
6.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter explores how government has responded to water problems by considering the 
evidence of administrative rationalism in Cyprus. The expected characteristics of the rationality 
are compared with government responses in Cyprus. The roles, motives, and behaviours of key 
governing agents are examined, with these being important in terms of the processes through 
which institutions and practices associated with a given response interact as a result of policy 
actor behaviour. Understanding the justifications for adopting a given approach is central to 
understanding the behaviour of those involved in decision-making and why policy has been 
implemented in a certain way (Lowe & Ward, 1998; Dryzek, 2013; Kraft, 2017; Vohnsen, 
2017). This can provide insight into the way problems have been tackled by government, thus 
helping to develop understanding of the specifics of problem-solving while moving beyond 
single-theory interpretations and building on mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches. 
 
The main section of the chapter discusses administrative rationalism and the topics of Dryzek’s 
(2013) discourse analysis in comparison to the findings identified in Cyprus. These topics 
consider; expected institutions and practices; the existence of basic entities that are recognised 
or constructed; assumptions about natural relationships; agents and their motives; as well as the 
type and role of metaphors and rhetorical devices. In this case, the existence of administrative 
rationalism is explored, while practical observations and the characteristics of the rationality are 
compared with other understandings such as public choice theory, power approaches, and the 
top-down perspective. The discussion is also positioned more broadly to the conceptualisation 
of how governments have tackled problems, namely through the mandatory approach, which is 
reflected in administrative rationalism. 
 
The final section explores the practical challenges of administrative rationalism, which are 
discussed according to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation and their existence in Cyprus. Challenges 
such as implementation gaps, problem displacement, shifts in locus of control, and dispersed or 
limited expertise, exist as perceived and observed limitations. A conclusion also provides a link 
to the next chapter, which is developed through the existence of the practical management 
challenges, as these fit with Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of other problem-solving discourses 
being developed as remedies for the failures of administrative rationalism. 
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6.2 Administrative rationalism in Cyprus 
As discussed in chapter three, administrative rationalism emerges as the first of Dryzek’s 
(2013) problem-solving rationalities. It prioritises the role and influence of the expert, while 
emphasising social relationships based on hierarchical structures (Dryzek, 2013). In this case, 
administrative rationalism broadly corresponds to the mandatory approach. As part of Dryzek’s 
(2013) discourse analysis five themes that signal the existence of a given problem-solving 
rationality are considered. These are; institutions and practices; basic entities recognised or 
constructed; assumptions about natural relationships; agents and their motives; as well as key 
metaphors and rhetorical devices. The chapter is structured to reflect these themes, with 
relevant findings discussed in terms of the expected characteristics for these according to 
administrative rationalism. 
 
6.2.1 Institutions and practices 
Dryzek (2013) highlights a range of institutions and practices that signal the existence of 
administrative rationalism in practice. These include; professional resource-management 
bureaucracies; pollution control agencies; regulatory policy instruments; the use of 
environmental impact assessment; expert advisory commissions; top-down planning; as well as 
rationalistic policy analysis techniques. The following sections consider each of these in turn. 
 
Professional resource-management bureaucracies 
Professional resource-management bureaucracies are an important feature of administrative 
rationalism. They have emerged as national governments seek to manage natural resources and 
the economic activities associated with resource sectors (Dryzek, 2013). In Cyprus, the 
MANRE has existed as the central resource-management bureaucracy. The ministry also 
consisted of other resource management departments, such as; the WDD; the Department of 
Forests; the Geological Survey Department; the Department of Fisheries and Marine Research; 
as well as the Mines Service (MANRE, 2016). All of these provide evidence of professional 
resource-management bureaucracies existing and operating in Cyprus. Specifically, in terms of 
water management, the WDD is the most influential resource-management bureaucracy and 
consists of experts [defined as technical officers] including; civil engineers, hydrologists, 
geologists, topographers, chemists, irrigation engineers, sanitary engineers, as well as electrical 
and mechanical engineers (WDD, 2016). The presence and importance of both the MANRE 
and the WDD as resource-management agencies is highlighted by the following comment. 
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“The main governmental bodies for managing and controlling water resources are two 
in Cyprus. Overall it is the MANRE and the water development department. These are 
the most important and they have the most responsibilities.” (Respondent 5) 
 
Some respondents argued that the MANRE and WDD had generally been effective when 
managing water. In this case, it was noted that significant progress had been made regarding 
groundwater management through a permit scheme, demand control, water reuse/recycling, and 
pricing changes, while this progress was particularly evident in the most recent third phase of 
management since EU accession in 2004 (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13, 
pers. comm., 2013). However, many water problems such as ongoing scarcity and groundwater 
over-consumption have continued to pose challenges, with some respondents suggesting that 
the MANRE had not been so effective in managing these and when dealing with related 
decision-making politics (Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 
2013). For example, this was highlighted in terms of difficulties in managing agricultural water 
demand (INECO, 2009), water waste and network inefficiency (Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014), as 
well as politics and the application of reactive or short-term responses (Cyprus Mail, 2009c). 
 
Pollution control agencies 
Pollution control agencies are identified as key institutions that exist as part of administrative 
rationalism. They provide evidence of a direct response for tackling and managing pollution 
issues, while their existence is argued to signal a form of authority based on scientific and 
professional expertise, which is indicative of administrative rationalism and mandatory 
approaches. In Cyprus, the existence of a pollution control agency was observed through the 
Department of Environment, which was a part of the MANRE. The department consists of 
thematic units that have been defined according to expertise, with these units being responsible 
for aspects such as; pollution control, urban wastewater treatment, waste management, and 
general inspection (DofE, 2016). In terms of water, the Department of Environment, WDD, and 
the State General Laboratory [department] have worked together to monitor, manage, and 
respond to water pollution and quality issues [see figure 6.1 for the logo evidence of these 
agencies]. For example, this was evident through groundwater monitoring in response to quality 
decline and the saline intrusion of coastal aquifers. 
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Figure 6.1: Logos of pollution control agencies in Cyprus (DofE, 2018; SGL, 2018; WDD, 2018) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory policy instruments 
Dryzek (2013) identifies regulatory policy instruments as being central to administrative 
rationalism, with these policies historically being formed by government through the resource-
management bureaucracies and pollution control agencies. In Cyprus, a wide range of 
regulations have been developed for water management, particularly in relation to protection, 
integrated management, pricing, and in response to the problems of scarcity, increasing 
demand, and groundwater quality [see appendix 3 on water legislation] (WDD, 2015). In 
agreement with administrative rationalism, the foundations of regulation have been formed 
through the main resource-management bureaucracies and pollution control agencies, 
specifically the MANRE and the WDD. The existence of regulation in Cyprus is typified by the 
following comment, and many respondents noted the vital role and influence regulation has had 
in shaping the government response to water problems. 
 
Regulation has been the king....in the past and still now. It is the basis for all our 
approaches to water management....and it is needed to tackle the issues we have. I think 
that in a water-scarce country like Cyprus the regulatory approach is the only way 
out....and it has been quite successful overall.” (Respondent 1) 
 
In relation to policy, administrative rationalism in Cyprus has been evident through the 
regulatory approaches centred on laws that have given the administration power and authority 
when managing water. These have included laws concerned with; ensuring sufficient municipal 
supply; managing irrigation practices; as well as establishing organisational systems that define 
responsibility and control (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 
2013). For example, the Water Supply (Special Measures) Law has empowered the Council of 
Ministers to deal with serious water scarcity, while laws such as the Water Supply (municipal 
and other areas) Law, the Irrigation Divisions (villages) Law, and the Irrigation Association 
Department of 
Environment 
Water Development 
Department 
State General 
Laboratory 
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Law have provided regulatory powers for the structuring of management through organisational 
boards and regional irrigation divisions (Iacovides, 2011c; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
The IWM Law (2010) has also encouraged a shift towards more integrated management. In this 
sense, regulation operates through the law and certain parameters are introduced or re-defined, 
namely; the simplification of complicated procedures; the introduction of management tools 
and a permit scheme; as well as more clearly defined responsibilities (IWM Law, 2010). These 
changes signal the use of regulatory policy instruments and the development of administrative 
rationalism, which have been necessary in response to existing and emerging water problems as 
well as the requirements of supranational governance from the EU. Respondents recognised this 
based on changes to policy caused by the WFD, which influenced national policy through the 
IWM Law (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). The 
following comment highlights the importance of regulation, and how this has been primary tool 
and driving force for water management and policy implementation achieved by government 
[and by proxy, direct management by the WDD and indirect management through other 
technical departments]. In this case, the findings relate to Dryzek’s (2013) understanding in 
terms of; the central role of regulation as a characteristic signalling the existence of 
administrative rationalism; and the realisation that bureaucracy, through regulation, forms the 
foundation of problem-solving. This also shares similarities with policy instrument types that 
are based on administrative regulations, and their perceived importance to mandatory 
approaches (Bevir, 2012; Wurzel et al., 2013). 
 
“Regulation is the law....and you have to obey the law! It is the main driver for the 
government and the WDD....this is the result of a bureaucratic approach that we have 
always had, and then you take into consideration the other factors for 
management.....but always everything is in terms of regulation....” (Respondent 4) 
 
Environmental impact assessment 
The technique of environmental impact assessment is highlighted by Dryzek (2013) as a signal 
of administrative rationalism in practice. This involves a process of systematic assessment 
designed to evaluate the potential [or likely] environmental damage expected to be caused by a 
given project. In Cyprus, the main evidence of environmental impact assessment [and strategic 
environmental assessment] in terms of water, was observed through its use for infrastructure 
projects, emerging historically in 1991 at the start of the second phase of management 
identified in chapter five (Andreou & Jones, 2001). Respondents noted evidence of the 
technique for; dams and reservoirs (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013); water treatment 
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facilities such as those developed in Nicosia (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013); as well as 
desalination plants (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). These findings have been recognised 
by other research (Tsiourtis, 2001; IACO, 2012), while the evidence of the technique has also 
been validated by a strategic environmental assessment report associated with WFD 
implementation and in relation to river basin area (Kaimaki, 2011). 
 
Expert advisory commissions 
Expert advisory commissions are identified by Dryzek (2013) as a visible component of 
administrative rationalism. These are formed to bring together relevant scientific expertise and 
offer advice to government. According to Dryzek (2013), expert commissions have been 
formed in response to general or specific issues and to give advice on environmental topics, 
while also being validated through policy and their high level of perceived expertise. 
 
In Cyprus, an expert advisory committee [Water Management Advisory Committee] was found 
to exist and operate in conjunction with the Council of Ministers and the MANRE, as well as 
the various ministries that have responsibilities in the water sector (IWM Law, 2010; 
Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). The committee was an outcome of the IWM Law (2010) 
and has the role of advising the MANRE on matters relating to water management and the 
formulation of water policy. This reflects the expected position of an advisory commission 
according to administrative rationalism, based on the committee existing between parliament 
and other government departments. The following quote highlights the existence of the 
advisory committee in Cyprus, and the influence it has had on decision-making. 
 
“We are involved in a number of different advisory committees....national and local. 
These target certain aspects of quantity and quality....and the environment.....so a lot of 
money was given for research on water related issues. The main water management 
advisory committee plays an important role in helping provide information to the 
ministries and government....so it can help with decisions” (Respondent 8) 
 
Planning 
The aspect of planning, and more specifically a form of planning structured according to the 
top-down perspective, is identified by Dryzek (2013) as an important component of 
administrative rationalism. This is based on centrally-established plans and targets that are set 
by government, with specific objectives to achieve these targets being defined and 
communicated from the top of the organisational structure towards the bottom ground-level 
actors and consumers (Birkland, 2011). In this case, plans and decisions are made by those 
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positioned at the top of the system, involving actors and groups such as parliament, ministers, 
and politicians. The planning characteristic described by Dryzek (2013) also reflect aspects of 
the mandatory approach, namely in terms of governance based on hierarchy as well as decision-
making in a vertical and top-down format (Wurzel et al., 2013; Keast, 2016). 
 
In Cyprus, this form of planning has been observed through planning structures and more 
generally through policy implementation (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). Attributes such 
as the key role played by top-level actors, through parliament and the Council of Ministers, as 
well as an overall technocratic outlook based on control through technical bodies, was noted by 
many respondents (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). More 
specifically, in terms of the top-down planning identified by Dryzek (2013), the government 
ownership of resources and centralised control of water has facilitated this form of planning to 
exist and operate in Cyprus. For example, water planning has been carried-out by the MANRE 
and the WDD, with approval being required from the Council of Ministers which sits at the top 
of the organisational structure of the water sector (Iacovides, 2011c). This hierarchy of planning 
was identified by respondents, especially for decisions regarding water pricing and drought 
management (Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013). The 
existence and influence of a top-down approach to decision-making, planning, and policy 
implementation was typified by the following comment, as respondents highlighted the control 
and influence of politicians and ministers. 
 
“Historically......Cyprus has been very bureaucratic and based on a top-down format 
and implementation. This has not really changed....it is the ministers and politicians that 
have most control. Really....I would say that decision-making is still ultimately up to the 
politicians.” (Respondent 1) 
 
Rationalistic policy analysis techniques 
Dryzek (2013) draws attention to rationalistic policy analysis techniques as institutional 
practices that show the existence of administrative rationalism. In this case, the central role 
played by expertise legitimises this type of problem-solving. Rationalistic policy analysis 
techniques are mainly concerned with identifying the best possible form of policy to be applied 
in a given situation (Dryzek, 2013). These include a wide range of techniques, particularly; 
cost-benefit analysis; risk analysis; technology assessments; decision analysis; and forecasting.  
 
In Cyprus, these analysis techniques were identified by respondents through various examples, 
including; cost-benefit analysis for infrastructure projects, water services, and pricing structures 
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(Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013); risk analysis and assessments for management options such 
as water recycling and reuse (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013); as well as forecasting and risk 
analysis for understanding the effects of drought and climate change (Respondent 18, pers. 
comm., 2013). These findings have also been validated by other research, for example in the 
case of cost-benefit analysis (WDD, 2010; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014) as well as for recycled 
water (Birol, Koundouri, & Kountouris, 2007). The following comment highlights the use of 
cost-benefit analysis and forecasting in practice. It was noted that the development of these 
techniques had been based on national policy, while also being influenced by EU legislation. 
 
“We use things like cost-benefit....and we do forecasts and try to analyse risks. These 
have come from the laws and also some influences from Europe. I mean cost-benefit 
ratios are used for everything. For example...it is needed when you have to develop big 
projects.... like for treatment or desalination.... or waste-water collection systems and 
treatment for communities and so on. If you don’t have enough money to cover 
everybody then you must decide what is going to be first...what is going to be 
second….and so on.” (Respondent 17) 
 
6.2.2 Basic entities recognised or constructed 
In terms of administrative rationalism, Dryzek (2013) has proposed that certain basic entities 
are recognised or constructed as part of problem-solving. These include; the importance of the 
administrative state; as well as the type of role held by experts and managers. As noted in 
chapter one and three, the structural setting of liberal capitalism is assumed to be a prerequisite 
for administrative rationalism, and this setting is also confirmed to exist in Cyprus. 
 
Administrative state 
The need for the control of resources, organised through the state which has existed as a 
fundamental grouping of people, has enabled the state to gain power and emerge as the basis of 
coordination in response to issues that face society (Dryzek, 2013). This has provided a 
foundation for the existence of administrative rationalism, which emerges as the initial response 
to resource management and environmental problems. The administrative state is deemed to be 
the most important and established basic entity in terms of administrative rationalism (Dryzek, 
2013). In this case, government is the administrative state in unitary terms, while the process of 
governing is non-participatory and based on rational management that is guided by expertise 
(Dryzek, 2013). Government is considered to exist as a system of political organisation that 
operates with a central government having authority over and making decisions for subordinate 
local government offices or bodies (Dryzek, 2013; Hague, Harrop, & McCormick, 2016). This 
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also reflects the mandatory approach, particularly through the characteristics of hierarchy and 
top-down authority (Bradach & Eccles, 1991; Keast, 2016). 
 
Administrative rationalism considers the organisation of technical expertise, in terms of a 
bureaucratic hierarchy and unitary government, to be central in serving the nation state. 
Evidence of this was observed in Cyprus regarding water. Since independence in 1960, and in 
the first phase of management, the government was the established and controlling entity in 
terms of water management and when shaping the response to problems of scarcity and quality 
(Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). The majority of respondents identified the administration 
as an important organisational component that helps to; distribute power, assign responsibility 
and authority, arrange basic relationships, as well as direct policy implementation (Respondent 
1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). Further building on this 
interpretation, respondents also stressed that the state through government has been an 
important construct based on the socio-political and organisational structure of Cyprus. This 
was noted to be based on factors such as; a highly political system; a closed community and 
society; a distinct culture; as well as strong hierarchal levels of organisation, as identified in 
chapter five through policy, executive, and consumer levels (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). 
In some cases, this has been found to be true of other Mediterranean, peripheral, and southern 
European countries (Magone, 2003; Sapelli, 2014). 
 
All water resources have been controlled, developed, managed, and allocated by the state 
through national government, before being given to water boards, municipal authorities, district 
offices, and regional or village boards for distribution to users (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 
2013). Water regulation has been fundamentally driven by the state through government and the 
bodies that sit within this, particularly the MANRE and WDD (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 
2013). This is representative of a unitary government system of organisation, thus reflecting a 
key characteristic of administrative rationalism (Dryzek, 2013). As noted by some respondents, 
this has been the expected process of water service provision, although it does not account for 
the abstraction of groundwater that involves the allocation of water without government 
knowledge (Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). In this case, the government has had limited 
control on these resources, thus contrasting with the complete control expected under 
administrative rationalism (Dryzek, 2013). Nevertheless, the following comment typifies the 
vital role of the state in Cyprus, by emphasising that state control in a centralised system has 
been prevalent as a result of all water resources and legal rights being owned by government. 
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“Water management and organisation is still based on centralised control by the state. 
First of all let me say that practically all water....now and according to the law....belongs 
to the state and the government. Nobody has water rights anymore. We try to respect 
some old-fashioned water rights....we tried to be more flexible and political...but the law 
says that all water belongs to the government...it’s as simple as that” (Respondent 1) 
 
The importance of the state in Cyprus was also argued to be a reflection of a colonial past. 
Some respondents claimed this had greatly influenced governance and management prior to 
independence, being noted through historical evidence of resource exploitation, a district level 
organisational structure for reporting to a central controlling body, as well as water laws formed 
that served the colonial system in place at the time, particularly for groundwater (Respondent 2, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). The most recent form of colonial rule 
under the British attributed great importance to state power and control in all matters, especially 
water management, with this highlighted through district office authority and control 
(Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). As a result, post-
colonial Cyprus has shown evidence of the organisational structures and management practices 
from these past influences. The characteristics associated with colonialism and state control are 
reflected through a system based on; hierarchy; strong regulation; top-down perspectives of 
institutional and policy responses; as well as state expertise in matters exerted through 
government departments. This hierarchy was observed in the case of policy, executive, and 
consumer levels of organisation, while in practice it has also been evident in terms of decisions 
for regional water allocation (Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013). Furthermore, the importance 
of the state as a reflection of a colonial past generates an alternative interpretation for the 
development of state control as the basis for problem-solving responses. This contrasts with 
administrative rationalism, which Dryzek (2013: pg76) notes as being ‘simply taken for granted 
that this was how issues should be handled’. The following comment illustrates the influence of 
colonial rule for maintaining state control when managing water problems in Cyprus. 
 
“If you look at the regulations....the colonial rule and the laws that we had in the 
past....everything was set up for exploiting the natural resources on the island...and that 
includes the water....and groundwater...for whatever activities.....[....]....So these past 
systems and controlling structures....like the district office powers.....have had an 
influence.....and are still very much a part of the structures in place” (Respondent 2) 
 
Experts and managers 
Administrative rationalism proposes that experts and managers have a controlling role in 
decision-making, essentially adopting dominant positions in the state hierarchy (Dryzek, 2013). 
In this case, experts are defined as those that have scientific and technical expertise that are 
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organised into bureaucratic hierarchy and motivated by the public interest (Dryzek, 2013). 
Managers are defined as those that have a professional capacity to manage the response to a 
problem, being positioned to coordinate efforts. Dryzek (2013) emphasises the expert and 
manager, rather than the citizen, producer, or consumer in relation to problem-solving. 
 
Experts and managers have played a key role in decision-making and problem-solving in 
Cyprus. This has been noted through examples such as expert guidance provided by the WDD 
to help the Council of Ministers and Parliament develop water policy; as well as in relation to 
managers that operate at ground-level within the water boards and municipalities or villages 
(Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). As typified by the 
following comment, many respondents [including those positioned in government departments, 
water boards, and non-governmental organisations] recognised the role of experts and managers 
in responses to water problems, particularly at executive and consumer levels of organisation. 
 
“So...there are the experts....and these are mostly in the government departments like the 
water development department or the environment department. They give the help to 
ministers, politicians, and the parliament for achieving effective policy....[...]...you have 
managers as well.....who maybe have less power but are responsible for managing water 
when it comes to the users....for example the water managers at the boards or in the 
district offices...these are still important people...” (Respondent 20) 
 
In Cyprus, experts were defined according to scientific or professional knowledge, specific 
skills, as well as roles in terms of research, policy guidance, and interaction with the advisory 
committee or ministers (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). This also agrees with definitions of 
experts given by understandings such as technocracy (Parsons, 1995; Radaelli, 2017). Managers 
were seen to operate closer to water users, having a balance of multiple skills, working through 
groups, and implementing expert guidance given on different topics (Respondent 8, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). Experts, such as hydrologists, water officers, 
and district engineers, were more prominently situated at the policy and executive levels of 
organisation, namely within the advisory commission, ministries, and technical departments 
that help to develop policy and give direction to the government [Council of Ministers and 
Parliament] on matters relating to water (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, 
pers. comm., 2013). In contrast, managers, such as board managers and district officers, played 
a greater role at the executive and consumer levels of organisation, for instance within water 
and sewerage boards, municipal authorities, irrigation divisions, and some sections of the WDD 
(Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013). The following comment notes the importance of experts 
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and managers in Cyprus, particularly highlighting their roles in guiding policy, as well as 
implementing policy and managing water at ground-level. 
 
“I would say the experts play a key role in Cyprus.....at the first stages they help to 
develop policy or guide EU policy such as the Water Framework Directive [and its 
implementation in Cyprus]. Experts also helped government and organisations to make 
the proper studies [achieve proper research]...so they are important....[....]....The 
managers are helping in the water boards and so on.....they are important for managing 
the water and activities...and at the ground level” (Respondent 6) 
 
The experts and managers identified in Cyprus compare favourably with the experts and 
managers envisaged by Dryzek (2013), based on the representation of characteristics such as; 
an important standing; the advocacy of rational management, noted through the existence of 
analysts for technical procedures; as well as policy being informed by expertise. It is worth 
noting, however, that a difference was also evident as respondents identified some actors as 
having roles as both experts and managers. In Cyprus, the dual-role status of actors was noted 
in the case of some experts within the MANRE and WDD, who exhibited responsibilities that 
were representative of both roles, as well as certain managers in water and sewerage boards 
who exhibited expertise or previous positions in expert roles (Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). This concept was also further developed by some 
respondents in relation to the roles of ministers. It was argued that minsters within government 
often exhibited a dualistic role as both politicians and experts, with many ministers having 
previously held positions as experts within government departments (Respondent 1, pers. 
comm., 2013). The understanding of certain actors having changeable roles and motivations, as 
politicians, experts, or managers, has not been considered by exponents of administrative 
rationalism. Indeed, the findings contrast with Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation, as although 
technical experts and managers are assumed to have a greater role in problem-solving than any 
other actors; they are still considered to be separate entities according to administrative 
rationalism. This is based on the way scientific and technical expertise is interpreted as being 
organised into bureaucratic hierarchy (Dryzek, 2013). The interpretations and definitions of 
technocracy also agree with Dryzek’s (2013) view by implying that experts and managers are 
separate entities, based on technocrats having greatest responsibility and authority for decision-
making (Parsons, 1995; Peters, 2010; Radaelli, 2017). Ultimately, the findings in Cyprus that 
identified changeable roles contrasted with the perceived understandings of technocracy and 
administrative rationalism. 
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6.2.3 Assumptions about natural relationships 
In the context of administrative rationalism, Dryzek (2013) assumes that certain natural 
relationships exist and operate in problem-solving. These are recognised in terms of the 
dynamic relationships between; nature and human problem-solving; society and the nation 
state; as well as expert interaction with the nation state. 
 
Nature and human problem-solving 
The first assumed relationship represented by administrative rationalism involves the dynamic 
between nature and human problem-solving solving. In this case, nature is deemed to be 
subordinate to human activities and problem-solving responses, thus implying that problem-
solving gains priority above all else (Dryzek, 2013). This interpretation partly reflects the 
assumption put forward by the promethean response, which recognises a hierarchy of humans 
above all other variables (see Murphy, 1967; Simon, 1996). Dryzek (2013) however differs by 
specifically identifying human problem-solving as the key variable in this case. 
 
In Cyprus, the relationship described has been evident through historical water management 
approaches described in chapter five, and specifically the first and second phases of 
management. For instance, the vast number of dams/reservoirs constructed, the Southern 
Conveyor water transfer system, the exploitation of groundwater, and the expansion of 
desalination, provide examples that suggest nature has assumed a subordinate position in 
comparison to human problem-solving, which has focused on ensuring sufficient water for 
domestic and agricultural demand (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). Notably, the extensive 
use of groundwater resources in response to increasing demand and the need to protect good 
quality potable water ultimately contributed to the issue of saline intrusion in coastal aquifers. 
In this case, nature was deemed subordinate to human activities and problem-solving, as the 
need to solve problems of increasing demand took priority over environmental protection. 
Some respondents positioned in the Environment Department and non-governmental 
organisations also highlighted evidence of this relationship as a result of extensive 
dam/reservoir construction used to increase supply for irrigation, despite environmental impacts 
such as ecosystem destruction and greenhouse gas emissions (Respondent 2, pers. comm., 
2013; Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). This type of 
relationship evident in Cyprus can also be referred to as a Malthusian narrative and a form of 
development, which relates to the growth of infrastructure due to impending water scarcity and 
potential for conflict (Hoffmann, 2018). 
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Society and the state 
The second relationship assumed by administrative rationalism within the context of natural 
relationships, involves the subordination of society to the administrative state (Dryzek, 2013). 
In this case, the state is deemed to be the controlling force in comparison to the people, while it 
is noted that in this relationship the position of the state can also be potentially held by a 
transnational authority (Dryzek, 2013). This partly reflects the mandatory approach, through 
top-down and elitist perspectives, based on the existence of hierarchal management and a 
vertical format of authority involving groups being subordinate to those at the top of the 
organisational hierarchy (Parsons, 1995; Miller, 2002). Indeed, the relationship expected by 
administrative rationalism also reflects other characteristics of the mandatory approach, 
including; a state mode of governance (Powell, 1990; Keast, 2016); the potential for coercive 
relationships (Etzioni, 1961); and the idea of command (Rigby, 1990). 
 
In Cyprus, evidence of society being subordinate to the state, as well as society and the state 
being subordinate to a supranational authority has been observed. Respondents highlighted this 
relationship through state control and the limited role of society [in the form of post-industrial 
society and an organised community or group of people] regarding decisions made for supply 
expansion and desalination (Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). Furthermore, the EU was 
widely claimed to be a strong influence and controlling force on state and society, through 
direct policy, economic requirements, and even socio-cultural influences (Sepos, 2008; Ker-
Lindsay, Faustmann & Mullen, 2011; Ioannou & Kentas, 2011; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 
2013). As typified by the following comment, many politicians, civil servants, and experts in 
Cyprus considered the public to be subordinate to the state, government, and associated 
technical departments when it came to decision-making. 
 
“First [most important] is the state.....which works through the government really.....and 
then it is the departments like the WDD which provide the technical expertise. As for the 
public...they are not so involved...and too much freedom for public decision-making is 
sometimes counter-productive. There are certain situations where you would rather have 
the WDD decide....based on the expertise and the whole picture....[...]...Sometimes 
democracy is not the best form of rule [laughs].” (Respondent 8) 
 
Experts and the state 
The third relationship assumed to exist as part of administrative rationalism involves the 
dynamic between experts and the state. According to Dryzek (2013), experts and managers are 
positioned in dominant roles within the state’s hierarchy, with this position being justified 
through expertise, and thus are argued to control the state in terms of problem-solving. This 
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also reflects the power approach of technocracy, which recognises the key role of technical 
experts and scientific knowledge in decision-making (Burris, 1993; Parsons, 1995). 
 
In Cyprus, although experts did have an important role, respondents from government 
departments, boards, and non-governmental organisations claimed that higher level actors 
positioned above the experts and managers, namely ministers and politicians, actually held the 
most power in decision-making (Iacovides, 2011c; Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013). In this 
case, the ability of politicians and ministers to control the direction of government and the state 
was observed in terms of water pricing, irrigation water allowances, and drought responses 
(Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). This contrasts with the 
expectations of administrative rationalism, which instead considers the state to be primarily 
controlled by the experts (Dryzek, 2013).  
 
The findings were more closely aligned with the power approach of elitism. This assumes 
power within the decision-making process is centralised and controlled by certain non-expert 
groups or individuals [in this case the politicians] that ultimately shape and determine a given 
policy direction or decision outcome (Parsons, 1995; Parry, 2005). For example, although the 
following comment recognises the importance of experts and managers, it also highlights the 
key role of the non-expert politicians and the influence they have as ‘gate-keepers’ of decision-
making. This typified the view of many respondents, who often reiterated the importance of the 
state and politicians in shaping decisions. 
 
“The state is primary in the case of Cyprus...everything is done through the state and 
government. Experts and managers have some control......but ultimately they must still 
get past the politicians. The politicians are the gatekeepers.” (Respondent 7) 
 
Alongside the concept of elitism, these findings also reflected characteristics of the top-down 
perspective, namely through increasing authority in a vertical format within government and 
associated bodies, as well as recognition of the key role of high-level politicians and senior 
officials. In this case, many respondents noted that high-level bureaucrats and politicians had 
been central to decision-making and policy implementation, with this further intensifying 
during drought periods (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). 
The top-down perspective was also shown by the direction of guidance for water management 
following a pathway [from top to bottom] through the policy to executive and then consumer 
levels (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). These findings 
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contrasted with the expectations of administrative rationalism and technocracy, which prioritise 
experts in problem-solving and decision-making (Fischer, 1990; Parsons, 1995; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In terms of responses to water problems and the dynamic between experts and the state, policy 
and laws were used to give authority and define responsibilities, as also noted in chapter five. 
Respondents observed that water resources in Cyprus were primarily allocated by the WDD, 
but important decisions were made by the Council of Ministers and Parliament, which were not 
experts but ministers and politicians respectively (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). Furthermore, the majority of respondents identified the 
issue of politicians and ministers not following the advice provided by experts and managers, 
and this reiterated the idea that experts did not have primary control of the state. Indeed, the 
diminished role of the experts in terms of state control was found through a range of examples, 
particularly the development of the Southern Conveyor transfer project and the drought event of 
2008 (Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). As shown by the 
following comment, in relation to irrigation networks, respondents argued that certain decisions 
made were not based on expert guidance but rather shaped by politicians. 
 
“A lot of changes happen because of political pressures. For the southern conveyor 
irrigation networks everybody wanted to be included....so we built a network to irrigate 
9000...whilst the water available was only for 4000. So you can see the kind of problems 
we have. Here the decisions were not technically founded.....it was all political. The 
politicians changed the recommendations given from the experts and technocrats.” 
(Respondent 14) 
 
The experience of drought was also interpreted by respondents to be important in terms of 
highlighting the dynamic between experts and the state. This was observed in terms of how the 
drought experience caused changes in decision-making. Many respondents identified the use of 
selective and top-down approaches during the drought event, which opposed the idea of experts 
controlling the state (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). In 
this case, responsibility for decision-making and drought management was allocated to the 
highest levels of government, with decisions subsequently communicated through the MANRE 
and WDD to all ground-level groups, such as the town water boards, municipal authorities, and 
village bodies (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). As a result, in contrast to the understanding 
of administrative rationalism, the experts did not have control over the state as higher-level 
actors had the ability to make final decisions in relation to management, such as supply cuts and 
the importing of freshwater (Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). The following comment 
exemplifies how the highest levels of government [Parliament, politicians, and the Council of 
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Ministers] often exhibited the greatest power and control during the drought. This contrasted 
with administrative rationalism, based on the limited control and influence exerted by experts 
who are expected to be dominant and have control according to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation. 
 
“When the problem was very intense during the drought period.....the decisions were all 
coming from the top of the government....this being above the experts like in the WDD. In 
those times they [highest level actors] have the ultimate power and control.....because it 
was a very strange situation and there was no water to drink...it was a crisis!” 
(Respondent 9) 
 
6.2.4 Agents and their motives 
Administrative rationalism attributes the variable of agency to both collective and individual 
actors (Dryzek, 2013). This was observed in Cyprus, as agency has been recognised through 
collective groups such as the government, water boards, unions, and advisory committees, 
while individuals such as experts, managers, ministers, and politicians were also acknowledged 
(Iacovides, 2011c; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014). 
 
Administrative rationalism considers the government to be the primary agent, although not all 
individuals within government are viewed to have the equal ability to act in a given problem-
solving scenario (Dryzek, 2013). This was true in Cyprus, as the government was argued to be 
the primary decision-making authority regarding water, while the capacity to act varied 
according to ministry, position, control, and relative authority. For example, respondents 
identified the primary authority of government through control for the direction of water 
management, the development of approaches through policy, and in relation to specific projects 
such as the Southern Conveyor transfer network and desalination plants (Respondent 3, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013). Furthermore, other respondents noted how the 
capacity to act for those in government was variable. For instance, those in the MANRE and 
WDD had greater authority and capacity to act when compared to those in other ministries such 
as the Ministry of Interior or municipal authorities and district offices (Respondent 6, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013).  
 
Expert and manager types identified in Cyprus 
In contrast to the expectations of administrative rationalism, decisions in Cyprus were often 
heavily influenced and shaped by politicians, ministers, and parliament, thus meaning that 
experts and managers did not have a greater capacity to act in comparison to these other agents. 
For example, this was highlighted by respondents in terms of water pricing policy and drought 
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management, as those interviewed noted that politicians delayed and changed the policy 
recommendations and management plans put forward by experts in the MANRE and WDD 
(Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
More specifically, when exploring the role of experts and their motivations, different types of 
expert were identified by respondents and found to exist in Cyprus. In this case, experts were 
found to include; those focused on departmental duties and staying within the confines of the 
technical department; those holding a more political role and moving between technical 
department and also the political arena; as well as those working directly with ground-level 
actor groups and moving between technical department and the ground-level. Based on the 
findings, these roles and characteristics have given rise to specific expert types, which can be 
defined as; departmental experts; political experts; and ground-level experts. 
 
Firstly, departmental experts had a role focused on duties and operations within their 
department. Respondents noted that these actors exhibited motivations that favoured both the 
public interest as well as their department through being positioned towards validating or 
strengthening their group (Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). This reflected the idea of public 
interest by Dryzek (2013) and also bureau-shaping by Dunleavy (1991), based on these experts 
attempting to maximise policy control and benefits gained by their department. For example, 
these departmental experts were identified by respondents in the case of supply management 
and responses to drought (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Secondly, political experts had a more flexible role based on moving between their technical 
department and the political arena, where interaction with politicians, ministers, pressure 
groups, unions, and citizens was expected. Respondents identified political experts in the case 
of individuals within the WDD [and other government departments] that were fundamentally 
experts [as defined by Dryzek] but also had the appropriate skills and were required to liaise 
with other groups, such as farmer unions, operating predominantly within the political arena 
(Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). Respondents often 
noted that these actors exhibited motivations based on self-interest as well as the group interests 
of their given department represented within the political and public arena. 
 
Thirdly, ground-level experts were identified through individuals that were expected to liaise 
with municipal or village boards and district offices, essentially operating at ground-level and 
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helping these boards with additional expertise, guidance, and implementation (Respondent 7, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013). Some respondents noted that these 
actors exhibited motivations based on the public interest, while others also identified attempts 
to prioritise their department to maintain control of the policy implementation process and to try 
and direct problem-solving responses at ground level. For example, this was noted in the case 
of WDD representatives being permanently positioned within water boards and having an 
influence on the direction of board activities in relation to aspects such as demand management, 
pricing, and irrigation supply control (Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Notably, these expert types contrasted with Dryzek’s (2013) definition of the expert, which 
focuses on individuals with scientific or professional expertise that are organised into 
bureaucratic hierarchy and motivated by the public interest to solve problems. As a result, the 
findings build on Dryzek’s (2013) simplistic definition, as in practice experts were found to 
represent multiple characteristics, with these reflected through roles, behaviours, and 
motivations relative to their type as well as their positioning within government and in the 
problem-solving process. This interpretation identifies certain nuances in expert type based on 
their roles in practice, thus offering an additional layer to the understanding of experts as 
defined by administrative rationalism. 
 
Exploring agent motives 
According to administrative rationalism the motives of actors are orientated towards the interest 
of society, thus meaning that controlling agents such as experts and managers seek to act in the 
public interest (Dryzek, 2013). In Cyprus, the majority of respondents suggested that civil 
servants, experts, and managers often did try to act in the public interest, while exceptions to 
this rule were also noted when self or group-interests were the main motives. This was 
suggested by a range of respondents from government departments, boards, non-governmental 
organisations, and independent positions (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 8, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). As 
a result, these identified agents and their motives shared similarities but also differences, with 
administrative rationalism and Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of motivation. 
 
The desire to serve the public interest was identified in practice, and this was related to the 
expected agent motives embraced by administrative rationalism. If adopting Dryzek’s (2013) 
generalised interpretation and definition of these agents, it was primarily the experts and some 
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managers who were perceived as having a desire to serve the public in Cyprus, particularly 
those positioned in the MANRE, the WDD, and water boards (Respondent 7 pers. comm., 
2013). More specifically, for those in the technical departments [or departmental experts] there 
was found to be a true desire to serve the public, as indirect benefits and self-interests for these 
actors were limited. In contrast, the motives for serving the public were less clear for politicians 
and water board representatives, as well as political and ground-level experts. Respondents 
noted that these actors were aware of potentially achieving personal or group interests by 
satisfying the public interest, and political interaction was seen as an influencing factor 
(Respondent 8 pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16 pers. comm., 2013). This adds a layer to the 
expectations of administrative rationalism, as by acting in the public interest many actors were 
aware of the positive implications this could have for their own personal or group interests, and 
as such they were prompted to act in this way. 
 
A range of respondents from government departments, boards, and non-governmental 
organisations also claimed that individual or collective actors, such as politicians, municipal 
representatives, district offices, or unions, as well as some experts and managers, did not always 
act in the public interest (Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). This was identified through experts that sought to ensure 
job security, evident in departments such as the WDD and the Department of Agriculture, 
alongside certain managers in municipal boards and at village level that represented allegiance 
with political parties and sought to satisfy personal or group interests associated with these. For 
example, this was identified in the case of water allocation in the Paphos region during the 
drought of 2008, as well as irrigation network supply (Cyprus Mail, 2009d; Respondent 10, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). Furthermore, self-interest was 
observed in the case of politicians attempting to secure votes, and farmer unions applying 
pressure on government in accordance with political agendas (Cyprus Mail, 2013; Respondent 
8, pers. comm., 2013). The following quote illustrates how some experts sought to act in the 
public interest, even though these actions or decisions were often restricted by factors such as a 
lack of authority, limited control, and decision-making politics. 
 
“Unfortunately, the final decision is not down to the experts. They often try to do their 
best, in the position they are in and with the power they have, to make correct 
decisions.....and in the best interests of the public. But this is not always possible....as the 
final decision is not down to them” (Respondent 3) 
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The fact that not all agents acted in the public interest contrasts with what is proposed by 
Dryzek (2013) through administrative rationalism, and instead more closely related to theories 
of public choice and self-interest, involving; bureaucrat types and behaviour (Downs, 1967), 
budget-maximising (Niskanen, 1971), bureau-shaping (Dunleavy, 1986), and economic models 
of understanding (Tullock, 1965 & 1987). This was applicable for a range of individual and 
collective agents in Cyprus, namely; civil servants, experts and managers, as well as politicians, 
ministers, municipal offices or representatives, and farmer unions (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 
2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). Indeed, this also involved the departmental, political, 
and ground-level expert types. As highlighted by the following comment, despite many civil 
servants and experts trying to act in the public interest there were still exceptions, with self-
interest in these cases being determined by factors such as a desire for votes, career promotions, 
financial gains, as well as collective group benefits (Cyprus Mail, 2013). 
 
“Most try to...but of course not all actually serve the public....as anywhere you can find 
public servants that are not serving the public but they are serving their own personal or 
group interests. Their motives....votes or promotions maybe....well promotions come with 
more money....or even a benefit for a situation or group. I don’t really want to expand on 
this topic too much. But thankfully this is not the general condition...” (Respondent 5) 
 
The understandings of public choice theory and human relations motivation theory assume that 
actors mainly perform to satisfy self or group interests (Parsons, 1995). Work by; Downs 
(1967) on bureaucrat types; Niskanen (1971) on budget-maximising and the pursuit of financial 
gains; Dunleavy (1986) on shaping departments and budgets to maximise personal interests; 
and Tullock (1987) on economic modes of self-interest, were found to be relevant in Cyprus. 
Evidence of public choice theory in practice contrasted with the view proposed by 
administrative rationalism, which assumes that experts and managers are primarily motivated 
by the public interest (Dryzek, 2013). In Cyprus, different types of public choice theory could 
be identified, and these are subsequently discussed. 
 
Some aspects of the form of public choice theory developed by Downs (1967; 1993) were 
observed in Cyprus. These were related to laws of organisational function, bureaucrat type, and 
motive drivers [concepts described by Downs (1967) and noted previously in chapter three]. 
Firstly, the law of hierarchy was represented as a function by the MANRE and WDD, based on 
these being large central bodies that have required hierarchical authority for coordination 
(Respondent 5 pers. comm., 2013). This also reflects the format of hierarchy expected by 
Dryzek (2013) in the case of administrative rationalism. 
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Secondly, actor types were also identified in Cyprus, with some experts, managers, politicians, 
and others, such as municipal representatives and union members, reflecting the roles of; 
climbers, zealots, and conservers respectively (Downs, 1967 & 1998). Climbers were observed 
in the case of politicians who had been concerned with power, shown in terms of drought 
management and infrastructure development (Respondent 1 pers. comm., 2013), while 
municipal or village representatives showed this at a local level when controlling resources and 
allocating water (Respondent 9 pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18 pers. comm., 2013). Zealots 
who pushed for certain policies were evident in the case of experts within technical departments 
as well as some politicians and water board representatives (Respondent 16 pers. comm., 2013), 
while union members often sought to align with their political party agenda and this involved 
advocating certain policies or schemes, especially in relation to pricing and irrigation water 
allocation (Respondent 8 pers. comm., 2013). Conservers were primarily represented by 
politicians and ministers who were concerned with minimising change (Respondent 8 pers. 
comm., 2013). This was noted by respondents as a result of decision-making conflict and 
evidence of certain politicians and board representatives attempting to minimise pricing policy 
changes, while also upholding the use of subsidies in the face of recommended changes from 
the EU (Respondent 18 pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Furthermore, certain scenarios in Cyprus also reflected the advocate and statesmen actor types 
defined by Downs (1967; 1993), as well as the idea of bureau-shaping put forward by Dunleavy 
(1986) which considers the shaping of a given agency to maximise self-interests. This 
challenges Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of actors in the context of administrative rationalism, 
as experts and managers are deemed to be motivated by the public interest. In Cyprus, advocate 
actor types were identified based on loyalty and a desire to maximise the role of the department, 
with this observed in the case of the MANRE and WDD through demands for improved 
departmental expertise and greater control over policy, water allocation, and management 
during drought periods (Respondent 2 pers. comm., 2013). Statesmen actor types were also 
represented mainly by politicians as well as some experts found within the MANRE and WDD, 
with these scenarios appearing in the case of water allocation for both the public and farmers 
(Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). In turn, bureau-shaping was seen within the MANRE and 
associated departments, as well as the town boards and municipal bodies, through which 
shaping characteristics were identified. These were evident for; internal reorganisation of the 
MANRE and WDD (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013); the transformation of work practices 
partly as a result of external influences such as EU policy and economic restraints (Respondent 
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15, pers. comm., 2013); competition between departments, especially when responsibilities for 
management were redefined and rearranged giving more authority to the WDD (Respondent 8, 
pers. comm., 2013); as well as the transfer of functions and contracting-out of activities noted 
through the management of desalination plants (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Thirdly, in the case of actor motives, public choice theory work by Downs (1967; 1998) 
considers these to be categorised according to pure self-interest and forms of mixed self-
interest. In Cyprus, motives from both categories were identified, particularly; power and job 
security for pure self-interest, as well as loyalty and a desire to serve the public for mixed self-
interest. The motive of power was represented by all actors and existed in the case of political 
dynamics and conflict observed for aspects such as water allocation, pricing, and irrigation 
management (Respondent 7 pers. comm., 2013). In terms of job security, this motive was 
represented primarily by the politicians through their populist positions, while the examples of 
water allocation decisions and management choices during the drought of 2008 showed how 
these actors favoured certain groups to try and secure votes and maintain or advance their 
political positions (Respondent 1 pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13 pers. comm., 2013). In 
relation to loyalty, a range of actors such as experts, politicians, ministers, and most notably the 
farmer unions, represented this, with the motive often being manifest through departmental 
loyalty and political party allegiance (Cyprus Mail, 2013; Respondent 18 pers. comm., 2013). 
For example, respondents highlighted the issue of political allegiance represented by politicians 
and the farmer unions in the case of irrigation water allocation and pricing (Respondent 19 pers. 
comm., 2013). These findings contrast with the actor motives described by Dryzek (2013), 
which for administrative rationalism are based on experts and managers being motivated to act 
in the public interest and described as ‘entirely public spirited’ (Dryzek, 2013: pg89). 
 
Alongside the motives considered by Downs (1967), the findings in Cyprus also represented 
work on motivation by Tullock (1987), who interprets a type of public choice theory suggesting 
that actors are driven primarily by economics and interested in maximising their self-interests. 
This was represented in practice both directly and indirectly. In terms of direct representation, 
farmer unions were noted to have sought economic gains for their sector through political 
pressure and by lobbying government decisions on pricing and the allocation of irrigation water 
(Socratous, 2011a; Respondent 3 pers. comm., 2013; Halbe et al., 2015). Respondents claimed 
that decisions in this sense were often highly political and focused on union interests and 
political agendas (Respondent 8 pers. comm., 2013). In turn, forms of indirect representation 
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were identified through regional management conflicts. Respondents noted how municipal and 
village representatives had actively sought to maximise regional interests and make gains for 
their local economies by utilising authority at this jurisdiction and organisational level to 
influence decisions. Evidence of this was based on decisions relating to water allocation that 
favoured municipal or village users, as well as the lack of enforcement and, at times, disregard 
for WDD guidance, especially during drought periods (Respondent 1 pers. comm., 2013). 
Indirectly, this benefitted these communities, as other areas had to deal with severe restrictions 
and intermittent supply (Respondent 10 pers. comm., 2013). Notably, Dryzek’s (2013) 
interpretation of actor motives does not account for the role of self-interest in causing conflict 
between levels of government. 
 
In the case of politicians, municipal or village representatives, and farmer unions, these actors 
often exhibited decision-making choices that were motivated by self-interest and influenced by 
politics and the potential for collective economic gains (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). 
According to many respondents, the most common motivations of self-interest for these actors 
were found through attempts to ensure job security or to conform to party politics (Respondent 
1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). This was related to the type of 
public choice theory put forward by Niskanen (1971), which focuses on maximising self-
interest, particularly through individual and collective financial gains. The motives of 
politicians, municipal or village representatives, and farmer unions are subsequently explored. 
 
Politicians, such as certain mayors, parliamentary representatives, and local or regional 
councillors showed signs of acting in their own interests. This was often observed through 
indirect actions and decisions that aimed to satisfy the demands of certain actor groups, with a 
view to securing votes and in turn ensuring job security or financial benefits (Respondent 1, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). For example, satisfying the water 
demands of farmers or the tourism sector was cited to ensure job security or benefits for the 
local economy, thus allowing politicians to; gain recognition; avoid conflict; and have 
advantageous positions according to political allegiance (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). As highlighted by the following comment, many 
respondents considered self-interest to exist as a motive for actors, especially those at the policy 
level such as ministers and politicians. Self-interest was focused on gaining votes, ensuring job 
security, and providing economic benefits, with these aspects serving to shape decisions. 
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“I would say that the level above [the WDD]....the highest level actors.....they are 
politically driven and see things differently. They take additional aspects into 
account......voting....job security....economics....and so on....they will take other factors 
into consideration before they take their final decision. I mean they may decide to stop 
the construction of a desalination plant because there is public pressure. In this case 
indirectly they would want to secure their seat and votes....because they may say there 
will be political unrest and it will be against our government so we will lose 
popularity.....things like that” (Respondent 13) 
 
In relation to municipal or village representatives [and offices], self-interest was observed 
through decisions that benefited groups or aligned with regional strategies. For instance, this 
was identified in terms of decisions made to benefit the Paphos region during the 2008 drought, 
with these going against the advice and guidance given by the WDD at the time (Cyprus Mail. 
(2009d; Respondent 11, pers. comm., 2013). In this case, self-interest emerged through gaining 
a financial advantage for the regional economy, satisfying the demands of local farmers, and 
again attempting to secure votes by satisfying the demands of the public [essentially no water 
restrictions during a drought period, despite island-wide restrictions] (Respondent 8, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). Other examples of decisions at local, 
municipal, or regional level being motivated by self-interest were highlighted by respondents in 
terms of the district offices and village boards, which had the capacity to allocate financial 
income gained from water services to other activities or projects (Respondent 17, pers. comm., 
2013). These findings are at odds with Dryzek’s (2013) concept of actor motivation, as 
managers, such as those found at municipal or village level in Cyprus, are not expected to act 
according to individual or group self-interests. In reality, political allegiances and regional 
demands make the situation more complex than envisaged by Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation. 
 
The issue of self-interest was also highlighted by respondents in terms of other specific actor 
groups, namely the farmer unions and the significant influence of party politics (Respondent 7, 
pers. comm., 2013). For administrative rationalism, Dryzek (2013) gives a limited description 
of politics within the discourse and in terms of agent motives, whereas many respondents 
identified its important role and influence on all actors in Cyprus (Respondent 19, pers. comm., 
2013). In the case of politics and agent motives, essentially all respondents identified the 
importance of farmer unions and their desire to satisfy their personal and collective interests 
(Cyprus Mail, 2010; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). Each farmer union in Cyprus was 
affiliated with a specific political party, and it was argued that motives often aligned with the 
prevailing viewpoint and agenda of these parties (Charalambous & Christophorou, 2016; 
Ioannou, 2016; Katsourides, 2016; Protopapas, 2016). For example, motives focused on aspects 
such as; politics and political allegiances; collective benefits for individual farmers and specific 
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unions; financial gains; as well as having greater power to influence decisions (Respondent 18, 
pers. comm., 2013). As illustrated by the following quote, certain actors and groups closely 
associated with political parties often failed to act in the public interest. 
 
“Some actors and groups have their own interests. I mean the different unions and local 
representatives are affiliated with different parties....and these guys along with many 
politicians are laikistis [populist]. Their decision-making is not in the interest of the 
public...instead they focus on their own interests such as politics, financial gains, control 
or status. I also want to say that for agriculture....it is carrying a lot more weight 
[politically] than its size and contribution [as a sector] to the economy” (Respondent 1) 
 
6.2.5 Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
According to administrative rationalism, the main metaphor and rhetorical device assumed to 
exist involves the concept of a unitary administrative mind, which guides and navigates the 
state in all aspects of problem-solving (Dryzek, 2013). Although this is a difficult concept to 
identify in tangible terms, the findings of this study supported the interpretation that this 
administrative mind existed in Cyprus based on the role and control of the state, which operated 
through government and administrative bodies that have long held authority for water 
management and problem-solving (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. 
comm., 2013). Indeed, this has been the case since independence, as the government has sought 
to guide problem-solving in specific directions according to the perceived water problems, with 
responses to these identified through the management phases discussed in chapter five. For 
example, respondents highlighted the period of supply expansion, which was deemed necessary 
when responding to the ongoing issues of scarcity and more frequent and severe droughts 
(Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). Indeed, as another layer 
to this metaphor, this period of expansion was interpreted through a Malthusian narrative and 
form of development that links infrastructure growth to water scarcity and potential for conflict 
(Hoffmann, 2018). The following comment highlights the idea of an administrative mind 
controlling the state, based on characteristics of government such as authority, reasoning, 
knowledge, and state guidance, when responding to water problems. 
 
“The guiding force in Cyprus is from a central command. It is like a captain of a 
ship.....the government is guiding everything.....mostly for the good but sometimes not 
when we have mistakes [laughs]. With this.....you have one body that controls, that gives 
direction on all water matters for the state, and that enforces. Of course there are many 
other influences......but overall the government tries to influence to move along a good 
path for water management” (Respondent 8) 
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The presence of an administrative mind was interpreted to have been made weaker because of 
reduced control and authority held by the state and government in matters related to water. This 
was evident in the third phase of water management and according to many respondents it 
occurred as a result of the increasing influence of the EU in terms of new concepts, 
management approaches, and legislation (Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013). For example, 
through approaches such as stakeholder participation, integrated management, cost recovery 
pricing, and specific legislation such as the WFD, it was noted that some power and control had 
been taken away from national government (Agathocleous, 2010; Ioannou & Kentas, 2011; 
Mullen, 2011; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
As a result of this weakening, and the control and authority exerted by high-level actors such as 
politicians, an argument was made for an alternative understanding of metaphors and rhetorical 
devices associated with administrative rationalism in Cyprus. In this case, the existence and 
understanding of a ‘political or supranational mind’ that seeks to control an ‘administrative 
body’ could be developed, accounting for the wider influences of politics and supranational 
governance that have altered the characteristics associated with the administrative mind 
described by Dryzek (2013). For example, according to some respondents, the characteristics of 
reasoning, perceived knowledge, unquestionable authority, power, and state guidance were seen 
to be variable in Cyprus because of the influences of politics and EU governance (Respondent 
1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). The following quote highlights the 
influence of politicians regarding decision-making, as well as the role EU governance has had 
in shaping approaches to water management and problem-solving. 
 
“Politicians can have the power to change or make decisions at the final 
moment.....because they will approve it in the end so they can change things or adjust it 
to their own agenda or policies. They often guide things...but are at mercy to the EU 
still...[....]...Also I could say through the EU we have observed a shift in approaches and 
doing things.....membership to the EU has forced things to change quickly...and it has 
since guided our ways” (Respondent 6) 
 
6.2.6 Practical challenges of administrative rationalism 
An important aspect of Dryzek’s (2013) understanding relates to how problem-solving 
responses change over time. In this case, practical challenges are expected and act as drivers of 
change while also signalling the existence of discourses. These challenges are explored in the 
following section as they provide a link to the next chapter, while being understood by Dryzek 
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(2013) to encourage the development of other problem-solving rationalities, namely democratic 
pragmatism and economic rationalism that are explored in chapter seven and eight respectively. 
 
Dryzek (2013) considers five management challenges to be expected outcomes of 
administrative rationalism. These include; implementation deficits related to issues of policy 
compliance; problem displacement; questions related to locus of control, governance, and 
decentralisation; dispersed or limited expertise; as well as political factors that serve to confuse 
organisational structures and procedures. According to Dryzek (2013), the challenges are 
perceived to be limitations that provide reasons for the emergence of other problem-solving 
approaches and rationalities, which follow on from administrative rationalism. As a result, it is 
argued that subsequent approaches and rationalities have been developed to remedy these 
failures, and so they are an important part of the evolutionary process of problem-solving. 
 
In the following sections, the management challenges highlighted by Dryzek (2013) have been 
explored within the context of Cyprus. These challenges have been identified by respondents in 
terms of practical management. The findings further point towards the existence of 
administrative rationalism in Cyprus, while validating the idea that these challenges encourage 
the emergence of other approaches, namely democratic pragmatism and economic rationalism. 
Notably, the issue of politics has been analysed in chapter nine, as this was found to be a key 
emerging theme of the study and has had limited representation in Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities. 
 
Implementation gaps or deficits 
In theoretical terms, the issue of an implementation gap emerges when a given regulation, 
policy, or law is passed but actual implementation is severely limited at ground-level (Weale, 
1992; Lenschow, 2005; Dickinson, 2011). This gap involves the difference between declared 
policies [intentions] and actual practices [execution], and may occur due to a variety of 
organisational factors. These have often been considered from top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives, as well as in terms of contextual factors (Milio, 2010; Wu, Ramesh, Howlett, & 
Fritzen, 2017). For example, a top-down perspective recognises problematic aspects such as; 
policy clarity and articulation; communication; as well as the standards enforced during 
implementation (Lane, 2005; Dickinson, 2011). In contrast, a bottom-up perspective considers 
the view of implementation from ground-level actors and draws attention to aspects including; 
policy ambiguity; limited financial and operational resources; as well as time constraints (Lane, 
2005; Wu et al., 2017). Furthermore, contextual factors relate to the wider setting in which 
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implementation occurs and involve influences such as; political stability; the extent of political 
support for a given policy; the transparency or openness of the policy process; and the extent to 
which the public sector is decentralised (Wu et al., 2017). 
 
In Cyprus, implementation gaps were observed for national and international levels, involving 
national policy such as the IWM Law (2010) as well as international EU directives such as the 
WFD (2000/60/EC). Firstly, in terms of national water policy, a gap was observed where 
departments, boards, or municipalities had failed to fully implement policy as expected and 
formed by the Council of Ministers, Parliament, and central government (Respondent 2, pers. 
comm., 2013). Some respondents identified this in relation to objectives and outcomes for; 
allocation; groundwater and illegal boreholes; infrastructure expansion; as well as pricing and 
cost recovery (Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 19, pers. comm., 2013). Respondents also claimed that these gaps were caused by 
factors such as; economic constraints; a lack of expertise; political pressures; variable 
management by boards and municipal or village authorities at local level; as well as social 
barriers to change, especially in villages (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). The following 
comment notes how a gap has existed for water laws due to non-implementation. 
 
“It is usual that we issue a regulation or law.....you see what the law says....but you don’t 
implement it...[...]..Another failure of the system is implementing the laws that we 
have....the environmental laws including water are notorious for non-implementation. 
What is produced in the laws is not always what actually happens” (Respondent 2) 
 
Secondly, an implementation gap was also highlighted for international policy, caused by 
government and associated departments being limited in their attempts to fully implement EU 
water policy, and namely the WFD (2000/60/EC). Respondents identified this in terms of 
difficulties when implementing full cost recovery and attempting to reduce the use of subsidies, 
as well as in the case of restrictions on financial ability or limited expertise for the application 
of more integrated water resources management (Respondent 5, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 
15, pers. comm., 2013). Most respondents also highlighted factors that have encouraged non-
compliance. For example, these included; a lack of cohesion and poor fit between EU policy 
and national governments or institutions; EU-level limitations; as well as domestic constraints 
(Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). Notably, domestic 
constraints were based on a range of variables, such as; political pressures; culture and the 
understanding of a given problem; socio-cultural differences with regard to the acceptance of 
EU policies; the desire to minimise or avoid costs; economic ability; communication or 
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language translation issues; as well as the limited availability of resources or expertise 
(Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). The following 
comment identifies the implementation gaps that were argued to have occurred because of 
difficulties in meeting certain aspects of EU policy. 
 
“Sometimes a gap for implementation can happen. For European policy the economics 
are very different and the culture is very different in Cyprus.....but the directive is one 
and the legal obligation is the same for all.....so this is somewhat unfair....there needs to 
be more flexibility.....[...].....At the moment there are difficulties with water pricing policy 
and also the groundwater permitting....there is a gap between the requirements and the 
outcomes so far” (Respondent 18) 
 
Problem displacement 
Problem displacement is acknowledged as a potential challenge of administrative rationalism, 
with this relating to complex problems that can result in less coordinated disaggregation of 
topics and subsequent interactions that dilute a response. This can cause the unintended shift of 
a problem from one management area to another, for example; an air pollution problem being 
solved that in turn causes a water pollution issue (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, the fragmented organisational system was argued to have generated many 
interactions, being highlighted by respondents in government departments (Respondent 1, pers. 
comm., 2013), non-governmental bodies (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013), boards 
(Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013), and by other research (Iacovides, 2011c). These 
interactions were found to have encouraged a less coordinated disaggregation of water 
problems, in turn causing problem displacement. In practice, displacement was highlighted 
through two examples. Firstly, the problem of insufficient supply was responded to using 
groundwater, thus helping to mitigate scarcity. However, the overuse of groundwater in turn led 
to the depletion of this resource and the subsequent problems of saline intrusion in coastal 
aquifers and quality-scarcity (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 
2013). Secondly, changes in water prices were applied to respond to over-consumption, manage 
scarcity, and help satisfy demand management objectives. However, this also led to the over-
use of groundwater and the development of illegal boreholes, which have contributed to the 
problems of groundwater over-abstraction and saline intrusion of coastal aquifers (Respondent 
7, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). 
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Locus of control 
Dryzek (2013) identifies locus of control as a challenge for administrative rationalism. This 
emerges through a potential shift from government to governance, which is based on change 
from a centralised to decentralised organisational and management system (Dryzek, 2013). By 
developing a more open and decentralised structure, administrative control is diminished, and 
the likelihood of an implementation gap increases (Dryzek, 2013). Too much openness and 
extensive decentralisation can also signal a shift towards democratic pragmatism, and thus a 
weakening of administrative rationalism. 
 
Respondents identified a shift in locus of control through a process of decentralisation as well 
as a subsequent move back towards a more centralised structure. These shifts were argued to 
have occurred during the second and third phases of water management, with ongoing changes 
still happening. Many respondents noted that prior to independence a centralised system had 
been prevalent in Cyprus. This was based on responsibility for water and management being 
primarily held by central government (Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. 
comm., 2013). However, after independence, decentralisation occurred, with this being evident 
as a result of greater responsibility and control being given to municipalities, district offices, 
and villages (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). The following comment typifies the apparent 
shift from a centralised to a decentralised system. The perceived failure of decentralisation was 
also mentioned in some cases, for example, due to; disjointed implementation; poor regulation 
and enforcement of policy; disregard for WDD recommendations; and strong political 
influences on decisions in smaller municipalities or villages (Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 11, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
“Our experience in Cyprus is that from a central command type of control structure they 
went to a decentralised command system that did not really work out....and they have 
been bringing it back to a more central command structure again...[...]...They 
[government] realised that things the way they were did not work. For years the idea 
was that you needed to decentralise management and take authority away from the 
government and give it to the municipalities. But in the municipalities…everybody knows 
everybody…so nobody enforces the law [laughs]. This is a problem!” (Respondent 8) 
 
The notion of moving back towards a centralised system was also claimed by many respondents 
to be an evident organisational shift. This was based on decisions made by government, during 
the second and third phases of water management, towards; creating a single water entity; 
implementing integrated forms of management through central government, the MANRE, and 
the WDD; as well as proposed operational changes that would see the merging of water and 
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sewerage boards into larger more centralised entities (Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Dispersed or limited expertise 
Dryzek (2013) considers dispersed or limited expertise to be a challenge for administrative 
rationalism. It is assumed that problems often have a complexity that opposes the centralised 
approach of bureaucratic hierarchy, as no individual experts can have enough knowledge about 
all aspects of a given issue (Dryzek, 2013). As a result, the hierarchy of expertise represented in 
administrative rationalism has difficulties in bringing together all required information, and so, 
knowledge can be dispersed (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, respondents argued that technical expertise was found to be variable in some cases, 
and thus the influence on problem-solving was noted to be inconsistent or changeable 
depending on topic area, availability of knowledge, or economic resources (Respondent 8, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). For example, limited expertise was 
highlighted by respondents in the case of; monitoring and collecting data; water recycling; 
desalination; and the application of integrated resources management (Respondent 1, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). The following comment typifies this 
situation, as many respondents highlighted the need for experts in correct positions when 
tackling problems such as drought and the saline intrusion of coastal aquifers. 
 
“We need better experts and scientists in the right places. Well maybe not better 
[laughs] but definitely experts in the right situations and places.....so it is better when we 
implement laws or tackle management problems like the droughts or groundwater issues. 
I think we are improving though. One of our challenges is that everybody thinks the 
higher you are the wiser you are. This is not necessarily true...” (Respondent 6) 
 
The issue of limited expertise was represented by the actors identified as having a role in 
Cyprus, namely; experts in government departments; politicians and ministers; as well as 
managers in boards and municipal or village authorities. Firstly, limited expertise represented 
by government experts emerged as a result of the requirements of EU legislation. This was 
noted in the case of the WFD, as greater expertise was required when implementing new 
concepts [for Cyprus] such as; integrated resources management; alternative approaches such as 
structured consultation (Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013); and when improving data 
collection, monitoring, and analysis techniques (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). As 
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highlighted by the following comment, respondents argued that certain areas of expertise 
required improvement because of the demands of EU policy. 
 
“On some of the new areas and measures of the WFD it is more a technocratic thing....a 
difference in outlook maybe and need for improvement. For some factors such as data 
collection and analysis etc...I couldn’t say we have the strongest situation in terms of the 
expertise and knowledge. That is why sometimes the government experts may get help 
with these things.” (Respondent 9) 
 
Secondly, politicians and ministers exhibited severely limited expertise despite having an 
important role in the final outcomes of decision-making. This was identified by respondents in 
terms of; water allocation and supply control (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013); drought 
management (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 19, pers. comm., 2013); as well as 
the acceptance of new concepts or alternative approaches required by EU policy (Respondent 
15, pers. comm., 2013). The next comment typifies this lack of expertise through poor decision-
making and outcomes associated with responses to the drought of 2008. In this case, 
management choices were widely criticised, and controversial decisions made by government 
were noted to conflict with the recommendations of technical departments (Respondent 7, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
“I would say that not all politicians or ministers know the water sector well. When I say 
politicians I’m talking about the representatives of the parliament......most of our 
politicians don’t have a clue about the discussion going on now....[....].....For 
ministers....they come in and stay a couple of years and they try to impose their own 
policies...[...]... But lots of mistakes have been made because some of the ministers don’t 
understand the water issue.....or how the whole system works. I would say that in 2008 
when we had to import water from Greece some of the political decisions were definitely 
not the right ones.....and the results were clear” (Respondent 1) 
 
Thirdly, certain managers and ground-level actors also exhibited a lack of expertise despite 
guidance from technical departments, while still having significant authority for decisions at 
local level and when shaping policy implementation (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). 
Respondents identified this primarily in terms of water allocation, demand management, and 
control of groundwater over-abstraction (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). The following 
comment reiterates how managers influenced the development and implementation of 
regulation despite their lack of expertise, while this was also related to the control of water in an 
attempt to satisfy personal or group interests. 
 
“It’s not always so good to regulate by law....a regulation made or implemented by 
politicians is not always technical or based on expertise.....[....]......I mean it doesn’t 
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make sense to have a person elected in a village who is the president of the local 
community to decide not to have water rates.....to sell freely all the water to the people in 
his village who vote for him. They have no expertise in terms of water or understanding 
the issues.....they don’t care about the leakage and to them water is votes. This can be a 
major problem.” (Respondent 12) 
 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter has established that water management and responses to 
problems in Cyprus have been greatly influenced by administrative rationalism. Many expected 
characteristics in terms of Dryzek’s (2013) discourse analysis topics were identified in practice. 
Firstly, institutions and practices were evident through; the MANRE, WDD, and Department of 
Environment; extensive use of regulations; environmental impact assessment, cost-benefit 
analysis, and risk assessment primarily used for infrastructure projects; an expert advisory 
commission; as well as top-down formats of planning based on most power at the policy level 
and filtering down to executive and consumer levels. Secondly, basic entities were evident, 
such as; the administrative state being central to water management, with all resources owned 
by the state and managed through government and technical departments; as well as experts and 
managers having an important role. Thirdly, natural relationships were evident, and involved; 
nature being subordinate to human activities and problem-solving; people being subordinate to 
the state; while other understandings based on mandatory approaches were applicable, 
particularly the top-down perspective and power approaches such as elitism and technocracy. 
Fourthly, agency and motivations were highlighted, and included; collective and individual 
actors recognised through groups such as the government departments, boards, farmer unions, 
and the advisory committee, as well as individuals such as experts, managers, ministers, or 
politicians; while many civil servants, experts, and managers were noted to be acting in the 
public interest [or at least trying] thus reflecting Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of actor 
motivation and comparing favourably to the expectations of administrative rationalism. Finally, 
in terms of metaphors and rhetorical devices, the concept of a unitary administrative mind and 
the idea of the state being guided in all aspects of problem-solving was evident. This was based 
on the dominant role and control of government and administrative bodies, which had long held 
authority for water management.  
 
Differences and additional layers of understanding that build on Dryzek’s (2013) understanding 
of administrative rationalism also emerged as a result of the findings. For example, these 
included; more detailed actor definitions through departmental, political, and ground-level 
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types; the role of experts and managers not being as prominent or controlling in practice, with 
higher-level actors such as politicians and ministers actually having the most power for 
decision-making and when controlling the direction of the state; as well as different motivations 
being evident for actors. More specifically, a range of individual and collective actors in 
Cyprus, including civil servants, experts, managers, politicians, farmer unions, municipal 
authorities, and village groups, were found to be driven by individual or group interests rather 
than the public interest. This contrasted with Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of actor 
motivation, and more closely resembled forms of public choice theory that interpret self-interest 
as a primary motivation, according to; economic models of understanding (Tullock, 1965 & 
1987); organisational function, bureaucrat type, and motive drivers (Downs, 1967); budget-
maximising (Niskanen, 1971); or institutional roles and bureau-shaping (Dunleavy, 1986).  
 
Practical management challenges were also identified in Cyprus, and these signalled the 
existence of the rationalities. The five challenges expected by Dryzek (2013) were evident, 
namely; policy implementation deficits; problem displacement issues; questions related to locus 
of control, governance, and decentralisation; limited expertise; as well as political factors that 
served to confuse organisational structures and procedures. Furthermore, the findings in this 
chapter also relate back to objectives one, three, and four noted in chapter one. In this case, the 
understanding of the mandatory approach has been advanced through the interpretation of 
administrative rationalism in Cyprus; empirical understanding has been developed through the 
documented experiences in Cyprus; while actor roles, behaviours, and motivations have been 
examined and developed, for example through the emergence of different expert sub-types. 
 
6.3.1 A link to other responses 
The characteristics of administrative rationalism identified in Cyprus relate to the mandatory 
approach discussed in chapter three and the phases of water management highlighted in chapter 
five. In the case of the mandatory approach, certain aspects were reflected by the form of 
administrative rationalism evident in Cyprus. These included; control of resources by the state 
through national government; hierarchy observed through the importance of government 
departments in managing water and the application of rationalistic policy analysis techniques; 
dependent relationships between policy and executive levels of organisation, for instance 
between the MANRE, WDD, and pollution control agencies; as well as vertical and top-down 
decision-making evident through planning and regulations. Notably, these aspects and the form 
of administrative rationalism identified in Cyprus also linked to all three phases of water 
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management identified in Cyprus. For example, supply expansion through infrastructure 
development, top-down regulation, and the development of water recycling and desalination 
during the first and second phases is indicative of the central role of the administrative state as 
well as nature being subordinate to problem-solving. Furthermore, regulations such as the IWM 
Law alongside decisions on drought made by parliament and the Council of Ministers that 
emerged during the third phase of management relate to the development of an advisory 
committee as well as top-down administrative control in problem-solving. 
 
As a result of the findings in this chapter it is possible to argue that in many cases 
administrative rationalism has been evident in Cyprus. This is based on the existence of 
characteristics associated with the discourses that are identified by Dryzek (2013) as being 
central to this type of problem-solving. However, in some cases, the real-world structures, 
actions, and relationships found in Cyprus also contrasted with the expected characteristics and 
constructs of administrative rationalism. This was shown by; evidence of alternative roles and 
motives for actors; not all agents acting in the public interest, and experts and managers not 
always being motivated by the public interest; not all assumed natural relationships being 
represented in practice; as well as experts not controlling the state and government. Therefore, 
the outcomes of the discourse were not fully reflected in practice. 
 
Practical management challenges associated with administrative rationalism were evident in 
Cyprus. These were expected and necessary according to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation, being 
particularly important as they are assumed to provide the reason for the development of other 
rationalities such as democratic pragmatism and economic rationalism. This is also true for the 
progression from mandatory to voluntary and economic approaches. Ultimately, it is the 
challenges associated with a given rationality that are expected to prompt the development of 
other approaches. For Dryzek (2013: pg98), looking to democratic pragmatism and economic 
rationalism is important as they “are presented by their adherents as containing effective 
remedies for the contemporary ills of administrative rationalism.” Based on these findings it is 
possible to move on and discuss the applicability of democratic pragmatism in Cyprus. This is 
the second problem-solving rationality put forward by Dryzek (2013), and it is assumed to 
emerge as a response to the practical challenges and limitations of administrative rationalism, in 
particular; implementation gaps and issues of centralisation. 
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Chapter 7: Democratic Pragmatism in Cyprus 
 
 
7.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter explores how government has responded to water problems of scarcity and quality 
by considering the evidence of democratic pragmatism in Cyprus. Dryzek (2013) considers 
democratic pragmatism to be an alternative problem-solving discourse that emerges as a 
remedy to the failures of administrative rationalism, particularly implementation gaps and 
centralisation. The expected characteristics of the rationality are compared with real-world 
government responses. The roles, behaviours, and motivations of key governing agents are also 
examined, with these being important in terms of the processes in which institutions, 
approaches, and practices associated with a response interact because of actor behaviour. 
Understanding the behaviour of those involved in decision-making and the justifications for 
adopting an approach can provide insight into the way problems have been tackled (Dryzek, 
2013; Kraft, 2017). In turn, this can develop understanding of the specifics of problem-solving 
while moving beyond single-theory interpretations and conceptions of mandatory, voluntary, 
and economic approaches. 
 
The main section of the chapter discusses democratic pragmatism and the key topics of 
Dryzek’s (2013) discourse analysis in comparison to the findings identified in Cyprus. These 
topics consider; expected approaches and practices; the existence of basic entities that are 
recognised or constructed; assumptions about natural relationships; agents and their motives; as 
well as metaphors and rhetorical devices. In this case, the existence of democratic pragmatism 
is explored, while practical observations and the characteristics of the rationality are compared 
with other understandings such as pluralism, policy networks, and the bottom-up perspective. 
The discussion is also positioned more broadly to the conceptualisation of how governments 
have tackled problems, namely through the voluntary approach, which is reflected in 
democratic pragmatism. 
 
The final section explores the practical challenges of democratic pragmatism, which are 
discussed according to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation and their existence in Cyprus. Challenges 
such as the existence and influence of political power, conceptions of reasoned debate and 
public interest, as well as the privileged position of business and its influence on public opinion, 
exist as perceived and observed limitations. These are important for the evolution of problem-
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solving, and Dryzek (2013) notes how economic rationalism emerges as a remedy to the 
challenges of democratic pragmatism [and also administrative rationalism]. A conclusion also 
provides a link to the next chapter, which is developed through the existence of the practical 
challenges, as these fit with Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of other problem-solving discourses 
emerging as remedies for the potential failures of preceding responses. 
 
 
7.2 Democratic pragmatism in Cyprus 
Democratic pragmatism is the second problem-solving discourse conceptualised by Dryzek 
(2013), with this emerging as a response to the challenges of administrative rationalism 
discussed in chapter six, particularly implementation gaps and issues of centralisation. In 
contrast to administrative rationalism, which prioritises the expert in problem-solving, 
democratic pragmatism instead emphasises the role of the citizen (Dryzek, 2013). Furthermore, 
in this case, democracy is understood “not as a set of institutions, but rather as a way of 
approaching problems.” (Dryzek, 2013: pg99). This shares similarities with the voluntary 
approach which considers problem-solving to be focused on; relationships of interaction, policy 
networks, and inclusive decision-making open to all groups or individuals (Keast, 2016). 
 
Democratic pragmatism is bound by the institutional structure of a liberal capitalist democracy. 
It moves away from the idea of a controlling administrative state with experts and a top-down 
perspective being central to problem-solving, towards an inclusive approach that is more 
bottom-up in character and recognises the importance of ground-level actors and the public 
(Dryzek, 2013). In this case, government oversees problem-solving, however government and 
governance is defined in terms of multiple decision processes that often attribute a key role to 
the citizen. Dryzek (2013) also argues that by including citizens in decision-making it is 
possible to; increase engagement with the issues at hand, encourage commitment to 
environmental protection, as well as enhance the authority and validity of policy decisions. 
Notably, by involving the citizen in decisions and embracing pluralism, there is an attempt to 
address implementation gaps and centralisation issues that have been evident as the 
management challenges and failings of administrative rationalism (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Democratic pragmatism reflects the voluntary approach through aspects such as; pluralism 
being part of decision-making; interaction between governing actors and those being governed; 
governance without government; the concept of participation; tools and mechanisms of 
 CHAPTER 7: Democratic Pragmatism in Cyprus 
 
183 
 
integration; as well as dynamics of persuasion (Lindblom, 1977; Bevir, 2012; Wurzel et al., 
2013; Keast, 2016). As part of Dryzek’s (2013) discourse analysis, he considers five themes 
that signal the existence of the rationality. These are defined as; approaches and practices; basic 
entities recognised or constructed; assumptions about natural relationships; agents and their 
motives; as well as key metaphors and rhetorical devices. The chapter is structured to reflect 
these themes, with the findings in Cyprus discussed in terms of these expected characteristics. 
 
7.2.1 Approaches and practices 
According to Dryzek (2013), democratic pragmatism should utilise and show evidence of 
certain approaches and operational practices. These are explored in the following sections and 
include; public consultation; alternative dispute resolution; policy dialogue; lay citizen 
deliberation; public inquiries; as well as right-to-know legislation (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Public consultation 
Dryzek (2013) considers consultation to be a primary tool of democratic pragmatism, as it 
attempts to legitimise decisions through involvement of the public in decision-making. The 
technique is assumed to occur independently or as part of specific impact statements and 
procedures such as environmental impact assessment (Lawrence, 2003; Dryzek, 2013; Norton 
& Hughes, 2018). It has been part of developments by government to make the administrative 
process more responsive and flexible (Fiorino, 2004), in this case evolving because of 
challenges associated with administrative rationalism such as implementation gaps and issues 
of centralisation (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, public consultation has been evident through independent procedures and as part of 
specific techniques such as environmental impact assessment, which have encouraged 
stakeholder involvement in decisions. Respondents claimed the technique [in a more structured 
form] occurred mainly as a result of EU legislation and article 14 of the WFD (Respondent 15, 
pers. comm., 2013). Therefore, although consultation was observed in Cyprus, it did not occur 
for the reasons expected by democratic pragmatism, such as efforts by national government to 
develop inclusive processes or provide opportunities for public comment as part of assessment 
procedures (Dryzek, 2013). Instead, many respondents noted that changes in policy resulting 
from supranational [EU] influences helped to drive changes in behaviour, which resulted in the 
adoption and implementation of more structured consultation procedures (Respondent 8, pers. 
comm., 2013). This relates to work by Jordan (1995) on EU policy implementation, which 
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considers the process of evolution and policy enforcement to occur through bargaining and 
negotiation. In this case, the influence of the EU is recognised, as found in Cyprus, while 
implementation gaps for public consultation, as identified by some respondents (Respondent 9, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 17, pers. comm., 2013), can be expected when maintaining the 
balance between governmental and supranational elements (Jordan, 1999; Beierle, 2010). 
 
More specifically, change was found to be driven from outside the nation state, while the 
relationship between the EU and individual nations shared similarities with [and was 
comparable to] the dynamics of federal systems, as found in the United States and Australia. In 
this case, Dryzek (2013) recognises central government control delegated through federal 
components, and this relates to the EU and member state dynamics interpreted by respondents, 
which were based on the format of control being delegated from supranational to national level. 
Notably, this comparison is also considered in work by Verdun (2016), which suggests the EU 
supranational level can be compared to the federal level in Canada [with EU member states 
being comparable to Canadian provinces and territories]. The following comment notes the 
emergence of public involvement, participation, and structured consultation in Cyprus resulting 
from the influence of the EU, while procedures prior to accession were widely claimed to have 
been severely limited in extent and effectiveness (Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
“I would say public consultation, interaction, and participation in the decision-making 
has been through the WDD and water boards....and I would say it has been more 
prominent after 2004.....which is when Cyprus joined the EU…..[…]….That is basically 
when the voice of the people was introduced into the system in a more organised way. 
Before this....the procedures were quite poor and not organised in an efficient way.....or 
they didn’t even exist [laughs].” (Respondent 8) 
 
The majority of respondents identified public consultation as being limited prior to EU 
accession, with the technique becoming more prominent due to the implementation of EU 
legislation. For example, this has included the WFD (2000/60/EC); as well as directives on; 
strategic environmental assessment (2001/42/EC); public participation in environmental 
decision-making (2003/35/EC); and environmental impact assessment (2011/92/EC), which 
have encouraged the use of participatory approaches (MacDonald & Makuch, 2006; Van 
Hooydonk, 2006; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). As shown by the following comment, 
EU legislation, and particularly the WFD, was recognised as the catalyst for the expansion of 
consultation in Cyprus, to facilitate greater involvement of the public and non-governmental 
organisations. Previously, these groups had often been overlooked in terms of decision-making. 
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“The WFD expanded things...the people responded well as they were given the 
opportunity to express their opinion...whereas before these systems were closed with 
only the leaders of the farmer groups or certain stakeholders being involved. Now it was 
widely used for the public and NGOs which were very active and happy with the 
procedure because otherwise they didn’t have the chance to express their views. We had 
some measures coming from those organisations...this made them very happy. These 
were only soft measures...but it allows us to build on it and progress.” (Respondent 3) 
 
Dryzek (2013) suggests that criticisms of the public consultation technique can emerge based 
on aspects such as; uninformed participants; misrepresentative activists; the influence of special 
interests; framing of the consultation by policy makers; as well as the technique having a 
limited effect on policy (Smith, 2009). Some of these concerns were observed in Cyprus. For 
example, respondents highlighted issues such as; counter-productive discussions; limited public 
and stakeholder knowledge; and problems arising from actors seeking to satisfy individual or 
group interests (Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). 
Notably, some respondents claimed that consultations were still seen as a formality that had to 
be carried-out by government, actually having a very limited influence on the final outcome of 
decisions (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). Therefore, 
even if consultation is seen in practice it does not mean it has an effect. Dryzek (2013) briefly 
considers this by noting that the technique can have a limited effect on policy, and this is also 
related to the idea of consultation being vulnerable to policy-maker framing (Smith, 2009). As 
highlighted by the following quote, respondents noted how consultations were done as a matter 
of course, being shaped by policy-makers, and remained limited in terms of final outcome. 
 
“There is a big argument as to how much attention they [government departments] pay 
to the approach.....whether they do the consultations as a matter of just doing it or if they 
really pay attention and alter their policies accordingly. The answer is usually they don’t 
pay attention and they very rarely alter their policies.....[....]....When the government 
departments do consultations the end result [in terms of decisions and policy] is not 
influenced much by what was discussed. They do it because they have to do it....usually 
just as a procedure.....for show.” (Respondent 2) 
 
Despite the perceived challenges of consultation, the technique provided practical evidence of 
democratic pragmatism regarding water-related projects in Cyprus. Consultation was carried 
out by government and the MANRE, with consultations on water being the responsibility of the 
WDD since the formation of the department (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). Prior to EU 
accession and the development of more structured procedures, consultation had taken the form 
of interaction between government and certain stakeholder groups such as farmers, industrial 
users, and hotel owners (Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). These interactions occurred 
through organised discussions, panel and group meetings, debates, as well as industry forums 
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(Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). Respondents noted that these were often limited in extent 
and small in scale, while conflict often occurred, particularly in the case of discussions between 
farmer unions and government departments regarding water allocation and pricing (Respondent 
1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). The following quote highlights 
conflict generated during consultations, while the issues of water allocation, pricing, and 
groundwater regulation emerged relative to different sectors and user groups. The potential 
issue of conflict was not represented as part of consultation and democratic pragmatism 
(Dryzek, 2013), whereas other work (OECD, 2001; Norton & Hughes, 2018) recognises some 
of the risks identified in Cyprus, particularly lack of engagement, negativity, resistance to 
change, and political motives. In this case, Dryzek’s (2013) description of consultation is 
simplistic, and does not account for the socio-cultural setting in which these voluntary 
approaches and associated participatory techniques operate. 
 
“The number one conflict that we had....and they were very heated debates....was in the 
public consultations when we were looking at the pricing of water. And in the past the 
allocation [of water] in terms of how much goes to farming and how much goes to the 
population. I know that there are a lot of discussions and a lot of arguments with the 
farmers when the government is trying to regulate the boreholes” (Respondent 2) 
 
Alternative dispute resolution 
The practice of alternative dispute resolution builds on the technique of consultation by 
providing a more formal procedure with defined roles for non-governmental actors that take 
part (Dryzek, 2013). Indeed, it is often utilised in legalistic systems to avoid a legal impasse and 
attempts to bring together disputing actor groups to resolve issues under the authority and 
guidance of a neutral third party, such as a professional mediator (Dzurik, 2003).  
 
In Cyprus, little evidence was found for the existence of alternative dispute resolution. 
According to respondents, the closest examples of this type of mediation were related to joint 
projects in Nicosia regarding water supply and sanitation, as well as shared water treatment 
facilities (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). These caused 
conflicting groups to come together to produce a decision and infrastructure outcome (Priscoli 
& Wolf, 2009; Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Policy dialogue 
Although case or site-specific mediation through alternative dispute resolution has had limited 
use in Cyprus, a similar practice defined as policy dialogue was more apparent and used in 
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certain cases for water. Policy dialogue seeks to provide a more flexible style of mediation 
based on discussions that include relevant actors. 
 
In Cyprus, policy dialogue has involved actors such as experts in government departments, 
board representatives, municipal or village officials, environmental non-governmental 
organisations, industry representatives, farmer unions, as well as community groups 
(Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). This process was noted 
through dialogue between the WDD, boards, and municipal or village authorities regarding 
water allocation, as well as discussions and mediation between the WDD and farmer unions 
relating to irrigation water allocation and pricing (Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 19, pers. comm., 2013). Specific cases of a policy dialogue style of mediation were 
identified in relation to the projects of; desalination plant construction and discussions 
regarding project locations; the Southern Conveyor water transfer system and irrigation 
networks; as well as water treatment and sewerage infrastructure shared by both Greek-Cypriot 
and Turkish-Cypriot communities in Nicosia (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 4, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013). Some examples relating to forms of 
dialogue, such as improved supply security through transfer systems or desalination, and the 
reuse of treated effluent, have been recognised by other research (see Brouma & Ezel, 2011; 
Blair, Rossmiller, Abu-Awwad, & Meserlian, 2012; Zikos, Sorman, & Lau, 2015).  
 
Furthermore, respondents also noted how dialogue and discussions were developed as a result 
of EU accession based on greater awareness and use of participatory approaches that have 
emerged through EU legislation (Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). This highlights the 
potential for alternative problem-solving approaches to develop because of influences such as 
supranational governance, subsequently contrasting with Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of 
evolution as a result of certain failures of other problem-solving discourses. 
 
Lay citizen deliberation 
Lay citizen deliberation focuses on the inclusion and the role played by lay citizens in decision-
making, rather than supporters of certain groups [defined as partisans by Dryzek, and 
essentially actors that are focused on representing and arguing for the interests of their group] 
such as developers, environmentalists, farmers, or government experts (Dryzek, 2013). Lay 
citizen deliberation is a softer form of participation that is centred on ordinary citizens and 
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utilises situations, such as; discussions, consensus conferences, planning cells, as well as town 
meetings (Hendriks, 2011; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, types of lay citizen deliberation were observed mainly through village meetings, 
municipal and town planning talks, as well as community discussions. These were found to be 
related to topics such as water allocation, infrastructure projects, irrigation networks, 
distribution, and pricing (Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 17, pers. comm., 
2013). The following comment illustrates the presence of discussions with citizens, and the 
inclusion of these actors in decision-making, in relation to the development of proposed 
infrastructure based on a specific irrigation project. 
 
“For example with a big irrigation scheme.....during that time we had meetings with the 
locals and discussed many things......like who will be involved in the project.....who will 
not be.....how much water would be allocated.....how much the price would be.....we 
discussed these things and the normal people were included and involved in the initial 
decisions.” (Respondent 3) 
 
Public inquiries 
Public inquiries signal the existence of democratic pragmatism and encourage arguments to be 
put forward by both advocates and opponents of a given project (Meadowcroft, 2004; Dryzek, 
2013). Although the practice is noted to share similarities with environmental impact 
assessment, based on their formation as part of project proposals, inquiries are also assumed to 
enable a more visible forum for discussion (Dryzek, 2013). According to Carter (2007), public 
inquiries are useful democratic mechanisms, especially when projects are controversial or cause 
significant conflict between competing interest groups and different actors. 
 
In Cyprus, little evidence was found for the existence of public inquiries in terms of water 
management and responses to scarcity and quality issues. The lack of this practice also 
illustrated the weaker presence of democratic pragmatism and the more limited use of voluntary 
approaches involving participation, when compared to mandatory approaches based on 
centralised top-down control. Indeed, despite the evidence of similar techniques such as 
environmental [and strategic] impact assessment, some respondents noted that the full use of 
practices characteristic of democratic pragmatism, such as inquiries, were severely lacking. 
These were only evident in the case of water supply in villages as well as infrastructure projects 
focused on desalination (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013). 
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Right-to-know legislation 
Right-to-know legislation is developed by government and encourages public access to relevant 
information. This process can often be enabled by freedom of information laws (Dryzek, 2013). 
Specifically, in terms of environmental problem-solving, right-to-know legislation focuses on 
the need for actors, in particular industry groups, to disclose information regarding the impact 
[or potential impact] of activities (Dryzek, 2013). For instance, in terms of water this can 
involve; declared risks to resources; an accessible registry of pollutants; activities of certain 
sectors regarding quality; and documented levels of compliance by polluters (Harding, 1998; 
Ashford & Caldart, 2008; Stauffer, 2013). 
 
Right-to-know legislation was severely limited in Cyprus, as a law ensuring public access to 
information was not evident. In practice, access to specific information regarding water was 
limited for the public, with the government only providing some information through reports, 
articles, and gazette journals or proceedings (Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, 
pers. comm., 2013). Indeed, access to this information only emerged more prominently in the 
third phase of water management. Furthermore, requests for environmental information could 
also be filed by individuals to specific governmental departments, and for water these were 
primarily directed to the WDD. However, the level, amount, and type of information disclosed 
was noted by respondents to be highly variable and inconsistent (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 
2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 20, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
7.2.2 Basic entities recognised or constructed 
Dryzek (2013) assumes that two basic entities are recognised or constructed as part of 
democratic pragmatism. These are; the structural setting of liberal capitalism [which is a given 
for all three rationalities]; as well as the construct of the citizen, which is a distinguishing 
characteristic of the rationality and is subsequently explored. 
 
Citizens as basic entities 
The conceptualisation of government and the role of governance according to democratic 
pragmatism are very different from the discourses of administrative rationalism and economic 
rationalism. In this case, government provides a framework and setting for a form of 
governance based on interaction. This definition only partly reflects the voluntary approach, 
which agrees that governance is based on networks and a relationship of interaction between 
governing actors and those being governed, but also considers the idea of governance without 
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government (Bevir, 2012; Wurzel et al., 2013). Thus, democratic pragmatism builds on the 
voluntary approach by recognising the framing role of government in terms of governance. 
 
For democratic pragmatism, governance does not focus on large single entities that have full 
control and authority over decisions, but instead the network replaces the hierarchy, any central 
locus of authority is downplayed, and responses are considered in terms of multiple decision-
making processes that are made-up of and directed by many different actors with a primary 
focus on citizens (Castells, 1996; Dryzek, 2013). As a result, the idea of Homo-civicus [power 
and organisation with the citizens, through public debate and being capable of taking into 
account the public good] is assumed to be the most important variable in decision-making, 
while Homo-bureaucratis [power and organisation with the bureaucracy] that is presumed to be 
at the heart of administrative rationalism hardly features as a part of the discourse (Dryzek, 
1995; Cruikshank, 1999; Dryzek; 2013). This understanding reflects the voluntary approach, 
through aspects such as decision-making in a more horizontal format, pluralism through the 
involvement of multiple actors, as well as the organisation of multiple groups structured in a 
non-hierarchy format (Hill & Varone, 2017). More specifically, democratic pragmatism also 
reflects policy networks and communities as a result of a focus on relationships, interactions, 
and the informal aspects of policy-making (Goverde & Tatenhove, 2000). 
 
In Cyprus, it was found that citizens did not play a major role in decision-making. This 
contrasted with the expectations of democratic pragmatism and the idea that Homo-civicus is 
the main underlying force that drives government, governance, and problem-solving. Despite 
evidence of certain practices that have signalled the existence of democratic pragmatism, such 
as public consultation and some forms of deliberation, it has been highlighted previously that 
these provided very limited involvement for citizens. For example, respondents noted that 
citizens and relevant actors were often not a part of certain decisions, especially relating to; the 
construction of dams/reservoirs; as well as the pricing and allocation of water for specific uses 
such as irrigation or the tourism industry (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). The following quote illustrates the 
emergence of public participation in Cyprus, but also notes the weak influence of this, as many 
respondents suggested the citizens were not truly involved in decisions. 
 
“Regulation has been dominant and still is. But things have also changed.....with public 
participation and these sorts of methods. It is an influence on things.....but it still is not 
very powerful.....the government still decides matters anyway. It is sometimes even just 
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for show I think. Also...the effectiveness of these is attributed to the experiences of the 
time....the problem is that people have short memories [laughs].” (Respondent 7) 
 
7.2.3 Assumptions about natural relationships 
Dryzek (2013) argues that certain natural relationships exist as part of democratic pragmatism. 
He identifies these through dynamic characteristics and relationships, namely; equality among 
citizens; as well as interactive political relationships that involve a combination of competition 
and cooperation (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Equality among citizens and actors 
Democratic pragmatism contrasts with the other problem-solving rationalities, the mandatory 
approach, and perspectives such as elitism and technocracy, as it fundamentally recognises the 
role of the citizen, while particularly emphasising equality among citizens and actors in 
problem-solving. According to Dryzek (2013), all actors, such as experts, elected officials, 
politicians, civil servants, pressure group representatives, and citizens [public], are assumed to 
have the right to exert political pressure. The concept of equality through multiple actor groups 
and individuals being involved in decision-making, as proposed by democratic pragmatism, 
also reflects other understandings such as pluralism and policy networks and communities. This 
is based on certain characteristics being recognised, namely; participation in decision-making 
being open to all groups or individuals; the features of networks, community, and 
interdependence; as well as a focus on relationships and interactions in policy-making (Roelofs, 
2003; Keast, 2016; Hill & Varone, 2017). 
 
Pluralism focuses on the way in which power is distributed (Parsons, 1995; Lassman, 2011; 
Clemons & McBeth, 2017). The understanding considers power to be shared among a variety of 
groups and recognises participation in decision-making to be open to all groups and individuals, 
thus relating to democratic pragmatism through the idea of inclusive decision-making (Smith, 
1990; Connolly, 2010). Indeed, pluralism further reflects the discourse when explaining the 
development of policy dialogue, the involvement of various groups, and the behaviour of policy 
actors, which are considered to appreciate the idea of citizenship and also act in the public 
interest at key points in the problem-solving process (Dryzek, 2013). In turn, the policy 
networks and communities perspective is concerned with the relationships, interactions, and 
informal aspects of decision-making (Rhodes, 1988; Metz, 2017). This responds to theoretical 
limitations involving the incomplete conceptualisations of actor interactions as well as the 
failure to specify where in the policy process these interactions take place (Rhodes & Marsh, 
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1992; Brouwer, 2015). In contrast to top-down and bottom-up perspectives, policy networks 
also recognise the existence and significance of different policy actors and levels of decision-
making (Goverde & Tatenhove, 2000). This understanding shares similarities with democratic 
pragmatism based on the presumed inclusive nature of problem-solving and the importance of 
all actors. Furthermore, this builds on the voluntary approach by developing understanding of 
the framing role of government in decision-making that is inclusive and involves a variety of 
actor groups and individuals. 
 
In Cyprus, a certain level of equality was highlighted by the major actor groups such as farmer 
unions, politicians, and elected officials, which debate alongside scientists, experts, and the 
public, while exerting pressure on the decision-making process (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 
2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). The relationships, interactions, and informal aspects 
of policy-making, which are central to pluralist and network understandings, have been evident 
in some cases. For example, respondents noted the role of networks in terms of bi-communal 
water treatment projects and irrigation water allocation involving government, the WDD, and 
farmer unions (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 19, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
The situation of equality in Cyprus was observed as being more uneven in practice, with the 
roles and influences of actor groups varying in their intensity. Respondents noted that evidence 
of inconsistent and varying equality was often dependent on the problem or topic being 
discussed and the actors involved at any given time. For example, in relation to irrigation water 
allocation and pricing, the farmer unions, municipal authorities, and village boards were 
involved in decisions as well as applying pressure on government, while in the case of domestic 
water allocation and pricing the public and consumer groups had a minimal role and influence 
(Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 17, pers. comm., 2013). The following quote 
highlights the variable influences on decision-making, particularly the weaker role of the citizen 
[public], and in contrast the stronger role of politicians and farmer unions [pressure groups]. 
 
“The citizens have not been so relevant in the past.....but are becoming more 
relevant....especially as public participation is becoming more and more important in all 
the decisions being taken. Integrating the normal citizen in decision-making....basically 
the general public....has been more effective after entering into Europe. But 
nonetheless....I think these are some way from having the influences of the government, 
politicians, and the farmers unions for example...which are strong” (Respondent 14) 
 
It was also noted that although there was evidence of different actors having the opportunity to 
exert pressure on decision-making, the citizens [public] that are deemed to be central to 
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democratic pragmatism had a less prominent role in Cyprus [but still a role nonetheless] 
(Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). This did not represent the expected role and influence of 
citizens, as assumed by democratic pragmatism, which suggests they are central to problem-
solving just as experts are deemed central to administrative rationalism (Dryzek, 2013). 
Notably, some respondents identified the important role of high-level actors such as politicians 
or ministers, which instead had a greater influence on decisions. This reflects the concept of 
elitism based on the ability of high-level individuals or groups to shape problem-solving. For 
example, this was observed through changes made by high-level politicians to decisions on 
drought responses, despite guidance and recommendations from technical departments such as 
the WDD (Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Interactive political relationships 
Alongside the idea of greater equality, the political relationships that exist as part of democratic 
pragmatism are more complex and interactive when compared to those observed in other 
discourses, particularly administrative rationalism (Dryzek, 2013). As a result, democratic 
pragmatism expects decision-making interactions to involve a mixture of cooperation and 
competition, with cooperative problem-solving occurring as well as conflict taking place 
between different actors that hold competing interests (Dryzek, 2013). This partly reflects the 
voluntary approach through pluralist understandings that recognise participation and interaction 
(Hill & Varone, 2017), while also contrasting with mandatory approaches and concepts such as 
elitism and technocracy that consider interactions to be limited and decision-making to be 
primarily shaped by select groups (Kersey, 2016; Radaelli, 2017). 
 
In Cyprus, both the aspects of cooperative problem-solving as well as conflict resulting from 
competing interests were evident, thus reflecting the expectations of democratic pragmatism. 
For cooperative problem-solving, consultations and community discussions that involved 
various stakeholders were observed (Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). In turn, conflict was 
evident through examples including; delayed decisions and disagreements between government 
bodies, water boards, district offices, and farmer unions, especially relating to water pricing; 
conflict between government, water boards, farmer unions, and municipalities with regard to 
water allocation, in particular for changes and restrictions during drought periods; as well as 
regional conflict between town water boards, municipalities, and community or village boards 
in relation to drought management and restrictions on water usage (Iacovides, 2011b; 
Respondent 4, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. 
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comm., 2013; Stedman, 2012; Hoffmann, 2018). The following quote illustrates how 
relationships have become more interactive over time, particularly since EU accession, while 
also highlighting the issue of conflict in decision-making. The topics of water allocation, 
availability, and pricing were noted to be constant and ongoing points of conflict in Cyprus 
 
“Interaction was less in the past but it is there all the time now....experts report to the 
politicians plus you have others involving themselves like the boards, the farmers, and 
the people. Things also improved after going into the EU....it encouraged more 
interaction....[....]….There is always conflict....some will want yes…others no....because 
of their own interests. So I think one has to move forward with the least damaging 
solutions....[...]...Basically the problems and the conflicts that emerged in the past and 
are in existence now are in two categories. One is the availability of the source for each 
sector and the allocation.....and the second is price.” (Respondent 13) 
 
7.2.4 Agents and their motives 
Democratic pragmatism assumes that agency in problem-solving is for all, and many different 
individual or collective actors are recognised, such as; citizens, experts, politicians, government 
agencies, unions, non-governmental organisations, as well as community or environmental 
groups (Dryzek, 2013). In this case, the citizen [which has a definition focused on the public 
and lay citizens] is considered to have a central role in decision-making. Furthermore, Dryzek 
(2013) interprets actor motives to be based on self-interests, while at key points in decision-
making these actors can be motivated by the public interest (Williams & Matheny, 1995; de-
Shalit, 2000; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Agency 
In Cyprus, many agents were observed to exist and operate as part of problem-solving and 
decision-making. These included; government bodies; experts; civil servants; politicians; 
boards; municipal and community representatives; as well as farmer unions and other non-
governmental organisations (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 
2013). However, in contrast to the expectations of democratic pragmatism, agents were often 
observed to have varying roles and extent of influence, thus implying that in reality agency was 
complex, changeable, and not always for everyone. This was noted in terms of irrigation water 
allocation and groundwater control, as politicians and unions had a greater role and influence 
on decisions when compared to the public (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
In terms of agency, responsibility for participation, consultation, and dialogue, were primarily 
attributed to the WDD, while other government departments were also involved in management 
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processes based on the given project or topic being considered. For example, stakeholder 
consultation for irrigation projects was managed by the WDD and the Department of 
Agriculture, while consultation for the environmental impact assessment of infrastructure, or 
associated projects such as desalination plants, were managed by the Environment Department 
alongside the WDD (Respondent 5, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Citizens in Cyprus were often not central to decision-making, while the importance and 
inclusion of the public was primarily seen to have become more prominent through joining the 
EU and as a result of the implementation of legislation such as the WFD (Respondent 7, pers. 
comm., 2013). For example, article 14 of the WFD (2000/60/EC) encouraged public 
involvement and the inclusion of all users in decision-making, while other legislation such as 
public participation in environmental decision-making (2003/35/EC) also caused the 
implementation of participatory approaches. In the context of democratic pragmatism, this once 
again raises an issue, as the potential importance of supranational [EU] governance is poorly 
recognised as part of the discourse, while national administrative practices are also shown to be 
severely limited in their capacity to include all actors in decision-making. 
 
Motivation 
The motivation of actors is an important aspect of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, and democratic 
pragmatism develops understanding of voluntary approaches by considering the specifics of 
problem-solving through these motives as they signal potential reasons for a given response. In 
terms of agent motives in Cyprus, respondents claimed that there was evidence of certain 
individuals and groups pursuing self-interests, as well as those acting in the public interest. This 
agrees with the expectations of democratic pragmatism, namely that motives for both public 
and self-interest exist and operate (Dryzek, 2013). For example, these two variables were 
observed in Cyprus through experts [such as those in the WDD] trying to act in the public 
interest, alongside politicians, elected officials, and high level decision-makers that were noted 
to act according to their own [individual or group] interests (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). As typified by the following comment, it was assumed that 
certain actors could exhibit either public or self-interest to varying degrees. Politicians and 
farmer unions were found to pursue self [or group] interests to a greater extent when compared 
to civil servants or experts (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). This self-interest involved 
aspects such as; gaining public votes, representing political allegiance, ensuring job security, as 
well as seeking individual or collective and direct or indirect financial benefits. 
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“It is the experts that are acting more for the public....and the politicians that are for 
self-interests. But still there is a mixture of public and self-interests between and even 
within different groups. More or less things are in the public interest.....but also we can 
find self-interests as well.....with individuals maybe acting to secure their job....or climb 
in their career....or for say politicians to secure public votes and so their position.” 
(Respondent 15) 
 
The majority of respondents suggested that to varying degrees all agents in Cyprus exhibited 
forms of self-interest. For instance, this was evident for; politicians and ministers in terms of 
water allocation and job security; experts in the case of serving their departments; managers 
when securing positions in boards or district offices; district, municipal, or village 
representatives when securing positions and ensuring socio-economic benefits for a given area; 
as well as farmer unions when aligning with political agendas and increasing irrigation water 
allocation for economic benefits (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. 
comm., 2013). The idea that actors could be motivated by the public-interest at key moments in 
decision-making was difficult to quantify in practice. Nevertheless, certain agents, namely 
politicians and farmer unions, had more power to shape decisions through the use of politics, 
often causing decisions to be driven by self-interest (Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 17, pers. comm., 2013). At key moments in decision-making it was these powerful 
agents who had the greatest influence on proceedings. This was acknowledged by respondents 
through the two examples of drought events and water pricing. 
 
Firstly, in terms of the management problems associated with the drought of 2008, many 
respondents claimed that politicians and high-level actors had shaped decisions made at key 
moments. For example, it was noted that these actors had ignored the warnings given by experts 
in technical departments [primarily from the WDD] with regard to; water allocation and 
management issues caused by the excessive distribution of water for agriculture; the impending 
drought and the problems with implementing measures to avoid an emergency situation; as well 
as the management issues associated with the drought response, namely the political 
embarrassment of importing water and the problems resulting from this decision and procedure 
(Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. 
comm., 2013). The following quote highlights the influence of certain actors on decision-
making, namely the pressure applied by farmer unions on politicians. 
 
“The water shortage is an island-wide problem and should be dealt with as 
such....[...]....past experience has shown that the government is incapable of exercising 
effective control once the irrigation taps have been turned on. Farmers apply pressure 
through the political parties for more water and invariably get their way. The main 
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reason for the acute shortage of the last year, apart from the low rainfall, was generosity 
with which water was given for irrigation.” (Cyprus Mail, 2009a) 
 
Secondly, in terms of water pricing, respondents highlighted the pressures applied by different 
actors that had delayed and hampered decision-making. This was related to pricing changes 
required to adhere to the WFD guidance on full cost recovery. During the period of policy 
development and parliamentary discussions on pricing, changes were initially withdrawn and 
delayed for two years [although this was later reduced] because of pressure from politicians, 
farmer unions, industry, and consumer groups (Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 
11, pers. comm., 2013). The parliamentary representatives and politicians sought to delay 
considerable price increases to appease certain groups that exert strong influence in terms of 
politics, such as the farmer unions, while also securing votes and serving political party agendas 
(Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013). The following comment notes how decisions were 
delayed or adjusted by the parliament, politicians, or as a result of wider pressures. 
 
“For the water pricing...from January 2012 the WDD was revising the charge to the 
boards. But by May 2013 they had done nothing.....because of the pressure from the 
farmers and the House of Representatives....and pressure from the political parties. This 
is a problem that changes decisions...[....]...Even the application for the revision of 
tariffs in 1992...it was only approved in 2001. So what policy are you expecting to carry-
out with long delays like this? Before the tariffs were approved by the House of 
Representatives...every time there was a meeting of the committee responsible...there 
were always elections and they never approved anything....” (Respondent 11) 
 
These given examples have also highlighted the issue of certain groups and individuals being 
more powerful than others. This contrasts with the idea of equality assumed by democratic 
pragmatism, as the findings signalled inequality within decision-making. According to Dryzek 
(2013), inequality can occur due to powerful interests [individuals or groups] with large 
financial resources that seek to influence and manipulate decisions according to the direction of 
their own interests. Notably, this interpretation reflects the concepts of elitism and corporatism. 
Elitist models consider power within decision-making to be centralised and controlled by 
certain select groups or individuals, with this represented by high-level politicians and ministers 
in Cyprus and noted by respondents through pricing policy delays and changes (Respondent 3, 
pers. comm., 2013). In turn, corporatism accounts for powerful interest groups and recognises 
the involvement of these groups in the policy-making process (Parsons, 1995; Christiansen et 
al., 2017). This understanding contrasts with democratic pragmatism, based on the way the 
control of government by large interest groups is considered to exist as a system of interest 
representation that causes certain preferred [powerful] groups to have priority in decision-
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making (Schmitter, 1974; Wiarda, 2016). In Cyprus, corporatism was observed in the case of 
the control and pressure exerted by powerful groups such as the farmer unions and the tourism 
sector in relation to water allocation, abstraction permits, and pricing (Respondent 7, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 19, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
7.2.5 Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
Dryzek (2013) identifies certain key metaphors and rhetorical devices that are important to 
democratic pragmatism. These include; public policy as a result of forces; the idea of a 
thermostat scale of intervention; as well as the concept of networks through which governance 
and responses proceed without any central controlling actor, but instead through a combination 
of actors and coordinated efforts (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Policy as a result of forces 
Democratic pragmatism considers public policy to be a result of forces acting on it. Dryzek 
(2013) describes these forces as the influences that act on and pull public policy in a given 
direction. This involves attempts to shape a given response, with the direction of policy 
changing according to the actor groups applying these forces. 
 
In Cyprus, respondents identified these types of forces in the case of pressure groups or boards 
exerting their influence on decisions to shift policy or responses to favour their own interests. 
For example, forces were evident in terms of; farmer unions applying pressure on government 
and politicians for increased water supply allocation; as well as the pressures applied on 
government by municipal, community, and village boards in an attempt to keep prices as low as 
possible and increase allocation to benefit local users (Respondent 4, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). More specifically, in the 
case of farmer unions and the agricultural sector, despite experiencing a period of limited 
rainfall and impending drought, respondents noted that farmer unions applied significant 
pressure on government to increase their allowance of irrigation water (Respondent 9, pers. 
comm., 2013). As a result, policy, decisions, and political dynamics were shaped by forces 
applied by the unions, which ultimately resulted in an outcome that benefitted the farmers 
rather than the public interest of water security during the period of drought (Respondent 7, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). 
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Thermostat concept 
A ‘thermostat’ metaphor suggests that problem-solving interventions and management 
responses are triggered based on the extent, type, and importance of environmental problems 
(Dryzek, 2013). This analogy considers problem-solving interventions to occur as soon as the 
‘temperature’ of an issue moves outside a desired range, with heating and cooling temperatures 
reflecting a wide range of political, economic, or environmental variables (Dryzek, 2013). This 
is unique to democratic pragmatism as fundamentally it is based on; multiple actor groups or 
individuals being involved in decision-making and having an awareness of and generating a 
response to variation in ‘temperature’; as well as actor groups such as citizens and non-
governmental organisations having the ability to put pressure on political interaction in 
response to an environmental problem [for example, through lobbies or protests], in turn 
forcing the government to react (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, evidence of this metaphor was found to have occurred during the drought of 2008, 
and the subsequent need to import freshwater from Greece. As a result of severe drought 
conditions, which affected residents and the agricultural and tourism sectors, and as a response 
to scarcity [thermostat heating and temperature rising], the emergency intervention of importing 
water was prompted because of political, media, and public pressures (Evripidou, 2008; 
Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). In this case, the thermostat increased past a given trigger or 
tipping point [temperature] at which political, media, and public pressure had departed from a 
desirable range. Thus, emergency measures were taken to mitigate the situation and ensure 
sufficient water provisions (Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). The following comment 
illustrates the thermostat metaphor [described as a tipping point], with interventions highlighted 
through the importing of freshwater and the rapid development of desalination projects at the 
time. These interventions occurred in response to the severe scarcity caused by the drought, and 
as a result of public pressure on government to ensure sufficient supply, which reflected 
changes in ‘temperature’ that forced a response. 
 
“When there was drought we imported water. The price was expensive and it was a 
political disaster.....but what else could the government do. The tourists required all the 
water supply.....farmers needed water as well and you couldn’t take it away from 
them....plus at the same time you were suffocating the locals by not giving them water. 
The government had no choice at the time. All of the pressures from the politicians, these 
groups, and the public meant the government had to find water......so it was kind of a 
tipping point that forced actions. These actions came to quickly building desalination 
plants, very strict water cuts, and the emergency importing of water.” (Respondent 18) 
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Networks 
Democratic pragmatism considers networks to exist as a type of metaphor, particularly by 
actors who embrace the information society, communication, and technology (Dryzek, 2013). 
In this case, networked governance emerges as an important variable through which responses 
proceed without any central controlling actor, but instead through a combination of different 
actors as well as coordinated efforts and forms of decision-making (Borzel, 1998; Dryzek, 
2013). This understanding can be linked to pluralism and the policy networks approach 
discussed in chapter three [see figure 3.1] and section 7.2.3 of this chapter. 
 
Policy networks consider interactions between actors to exist as a fundamental part of policy 
design, development, and implementation, while these networks act as mechanisms for 
transferring information, enabling communication, and facilitating an exchange of resources 
between actors (Rhodes, 1988, Rhodes & Marsh, 1992; Keast, 2016; Metz, 2017). Work by 
authors such as Rhodes (1985; 1988; 2017) and Wilks and Wright (1987) has helped to define 
network types through a spectrum of understanding. These have been defined as; issue, 
producer, intergovernmental, professional, and territorial/policy community networks (Parsons, 
1995; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Brouwer, 2015; Rhodes, 2017). 
 
In terms of the network concept, Dryzek (2013) recognises relevant aspects such as; greater 
interaction and communication [which can be formal and informal]; a move away from strict 
hierarchy found in administrative rationalism; collaborative initiatives; greater equality in 
decision-making; as well as the potential for ‘para-governmental’ outcomes. There are also 
differences between the policy network approach and the understanding of networks in 
democratic pragmatism. For example, Dryzek (2013) differs by considering networks to be 
metaphors [rather than methods] that emphasise the information society, while also noting how 
these governance networks remain subordinate to the governments that establish and influence 
them. He also directs attention to the importance of actor roles and behaviour within these 
networks, noted through voluntary agreements and climate change governance, which provides 
a specific focus in comparison to generalities of the policy network approach (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, evidence of the type of networks interpreted by Dryzek (2013) through democratic 
pragmatism has been limited. The most notable example was apparent in the case of the Nicosia 
water treatment plant and the strategy on bi-communal cooperation for water resource 
management and supply. Historically, cooperation between the two communities was formally 
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started in the 1980s through the construction of a common sewerage system, while the new 
treatment plant and sustainability strategy was developed from 2010 onwards (Respondent 3, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 17, pers. comm., 2013; UNDP Cyprus, 2014). The project 
exhibited a landmark use of policy networks in Cyprus, with these being utilised to improve 
services and solve issues relating to potable water and sewage treatment within complex and 
fragmented communities (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). 
Respondents noted how networks were experienced through interaction, communication, and 
trust-building between communities that were opposed because of the wider context of 
geographical and political division (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 10, pers. 
comm., 2013). This partly reflects the idea of networks, or networked governance, put forward 
by democratic pragmatism, although Dryzek (2013) recognises and focuses on this as a 
metaphor rather than the practical method observed. 
 
More specifically, in terms of water treatment, coordination for plant operation was observed 
alongside the cooperation of both municipalities and the ongoing joint management of the 
project by the boards and communities involved (Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 19, pers. comm., 2013). For potable water, cooperation between representatives of 
the two municipalities and communities was noted, with direct ongoing communication 
between boards also observed (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). Indeed, supply to the bi-
communal village of Pyla was claimed to be a success-story showing the effectiveness of the 
network approach in practice (Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 
2013). According to some respondents, the framework of networks evident in Nicosia provided 
an alternative and much-needed form of governance, as formal pathways of management 
[through government] would have been essentially impossible due to the political 
circumstances (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Furthermore, many respondents suggested that the Nicosia example represented characteristics 
that were indicative of policy networks. These were based on; interaction between public and 
private actors; horizontal and informal interaction; communication and trust between groups; 
interdependence; as well as non-hierarchical coordination and relatively stable relationships 
(Brouma & Ezel, 2011; Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 11, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 20, pers. comm., 2013; UNDP Cyprus, 2014). As typified by the following 
comment, respondents focused attention on the network approach used in relation to water 
supply and sewage treatment in Nicosia. It was noted that this process involved; cooperation 
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between many different groups; communication between actors; as well as coordinated 
management and decision-making. 
 
“The project was the construction of a big bi-communal waste treatment plant....which is 
on the northern side of Nicosia.....and certainly it is interesting. It serves both 
communities....with a very large capacity. There has been significant cooperation on 
both sides for this to be achieved......and networks have been important for there to be 
coordinated water management.” (Respondent 10) 
 
Community structure and a closed system 
Expanding on the idea of policy networks and communities, the interpretation and perceived 
existence of a ‘closed system’ was also highlighted by many respondents. This was used to 
describe the type of organisational structure prevalent in Cyprus, within which management 
occurred, while also relating to policy communities through aspects such as network types, 
relative member interests, as well as the informal procedures of policy-making (Rhodes, 1988; 
Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Brouwer, 2015; Metz, 2017). Some respondents further developed their 
interpretation by using the concept to characterise the socio-political, economic, decision-
making, and community setting that was perceived to exist (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). 
This involved the idea that the operational characteristics of society, decision-making, and the 
governance system as a whole, were complex, limited in scale, and influenced within a closed 
setting by factors such as; socio-economic and political relationships; bureaucracy [defined as a 
convoluted procedural construct]; community dynamics; and specific cultural norms 
(Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013). As a result, 
respondents suggested that decision-making and the capabilities of certain actors were restricted 
based on these underlying features of a more closed system. 
 
In accordance with other research, the ‘closed’ interpretation can be related to the theoretical 
understanding of a closed system perspective, which focuses on the internal dynamics and 
design of organisations (Daft, 2007; Jones, 2013). In essence, a closed system is considered to 
be independent from its external environment, while remaining autonomous, stable, predictable, 
and efficient (Clark, 2000; Thompson, 2003; Daft, 2007). 
 
Although a truly closed system did not exist in Cyprus, certain characteristics were identified 
and represented a system that was more closed in nature. The variables of management, 
leadership, and organisation can exhibit closed system characteristics. In Cyprus these were 
apparent for responses to water problems of scarcity, groundwater over-abstraction, and quality 
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decline. For example, the variables were particularly evident as a result of; an emphasis on 
internal operations and rationalistic approaches; the desire of politicians to limit change and 
maintain a given political environment; the use of hierarchal operational structures; as well as 
the presence of barriers for certain actors or groups in decision-making, namely experts in the 
political arena and citizens more generally (Hassard, 1995; Daft, 2007; Respondent 5, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 11, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 17, pers. comm., 2013). 
Evidence of these characteristics contrasted with democratic pragmatism, and ideas of 
interaction and a horizontal format of decision-making. Instead, the more closed system and 
networks of problem-solving reflected administrative rationalism, through internalised 
procedures and hierarchy. The following quote highlights the obstructions caused by a small 
community and restricted socio-political setting, based on a more closed system that limits the 
implementation of decisions. This adds another layer of understanding as a result of social and 
community structures and their influences on problem-solving. Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities 
have been limited in describing aspects such as culture and systems that are more closed in 
nature, as evidence of these have been poorly represented in the discourses. 
 
[When asked if any aspects of decision-making have been problematic - ‘as you 
have stated there are many recommendations from the experts....but when it comes 
down to the actual decision-making there is a block or barrier?’]  
“Yes.......certain ideas are not implemented......it [the issue] is the politics and the 
politicians. Everything ends....at the end of the day...with the politicians...unfortunately. 
Okay....we are a small country and this probably happens in other countries as 
well......but I would say it is more distinct in our case based on the very small community 
and such a closed structure that we have...[...]...This causes many restrictions and also 
barriers for many groups for getting involved....” (Respondent 11) 
 
7.2.6 Practical challenges of democratic pragmatism 
An important aspect of Dryzek’s (2013) understanding relates to how problem-solving 
responses change over time. In this case, practical challenges are expected and act as drivers of 
change while also signalling the existence of discourses. These challenges are explored in the 
following section, as they provide a link to the next chapter, being understood by Dryzek 
(2013) to encourage the development of other problem-solving rationalities and responses, 
namely economic rationalism in chapter eight. 
 
Dryzek (2013) considers four practical management challenges to be expected outcomes of 
democratic pragmatism. These include; the existence and influence of political power; the 
influence of business on public opinion; the privileged position of business in terms of decision-
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making; as well as the variable conceptions of reasoned debate and public interest (Dryzek, 
2013). According to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation, these are perceived to be limitations that 
provide reasons for the emergence of other problem-solving rationalities and approaches. As a 
result, it is argued that subsequent approaches have been developed to remedy these failures, 
and so they are an important part of the evolutionary process of problem-solving. 
 
The existence and influence of political power 
Dryzek (2013) argues that the main challenge of democratic pragmatism occurs because of the 
existence and influence of political power within decision-making. In this case, individuals or 
groups with significant financial resources and powerful interests seek to influence the 
outcomes of policy discussions and decisions (Dryzek, 2013). This also partly reflects other 
understandings such as elitism, based on control held by select groups; as well as economic 
institutionalism based on market approaches and self-interest being embedded in political 
procedures (Parry, 2005; Kersey, 2016; Jaeger, 2017). 
 
In Cyprus, the existence of political power was observed as a result of the role and influences of 
powerful actor groups, in particular the farmers unions and the tourism sector. For example, 
many respondents suggested that certain decisions, especially those relating to water allocation, 
pricing, and drought restrictions, were delayed or changed because of the political power held 
by these groups (Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). Some 
respondents also argued that these powerful groups were closely aligned with political parties, 
and thus their allegiances, agendas, and interests tended to reflect the objectives of these groups 
(Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). The following comment highlights the influence certain 
actor groups had on the decision-making process because of their political power and desire to 
shape decisions or policy outcomes according to their interests. 
 
“You must understand that we are a small community and a small country......and many 
decisions are being influenced by pressures from different groups.....[...]....Some groups 
are more powerful than others when it comes to water. I mean this was shown with the 
agricultural and tourism sectors with their water allocation......and the water pricing 
changes.....and also for restrictions during the drought. These groups can apply pressure 
and influence decisions......and this is usually because of politics and them looking to 
shape things to suit their interests....” (Respondent 1) 
 
The influence of business on public opinion 
According to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of democratic pragmatism, public opinion should 
have a major influence on policy and decision-making. However, it is understood that business 
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can generate a potential challenge by influencing discussions, consultations, or dialogue, thus 
shaping public opinion (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, evidence of business influences on public opinion was somewhat limited. 
Respondents argued that businesses seemed to focus their efforts on influencing government 
and politicians directly more so than the public, as found in the case of water allocation and 
pricing (Respondent 11, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). This focus 
was also related to the limited power held by the public in terms of decision-making, which 
meant that influencing them was less important for powerful actor groups due to their 
diminished role (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). Alternatively, many respondents noted that 
it was actor groups such as the farmer unions, tourism sector, and the media, rather than the 
business sector, which had the greater influence on decision-making (Respondent 9, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). This was also the case when it came to 
influencing the public. For example, actor groups achieved this by exploiting party politics and 
political allegiances, which were found to have a major role in the more closed community 
structure evident in Cyprus (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 19, pers. comm., 
2013). The role and influence of politics is explored further in chapter nine. 
 
The privileged position of business 
Dryzek (2013) also identifies the privileged position of business as being a challenge for 
democratic pragmatism. In this case, the structural setting of a capitalist market is argued to 
encourage the prioritisation of business, as this actor group is able to influence policy-making 
because of their central role in the economy (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, the privileged position of business was less apparent regarding water. However, 
some respondents noted the existence of this issue through certain businesses, particularly those 
in the tourism sector such as hotels and leisure activity businesses like golf clubs/courses 
(Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). These groups, alongside 
the farmer unions, were observed by respondents as being able to shape decisions by forcing 
delays of policy change for water pricing, as well as influencing allocation in general and 
gaining exemptions from usage restrictions, even during severe drought periods (Respondent 9, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). 
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Conceptions of reasoned debate and public interest 
Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of democratic pragmatism assumes that citizens are central to 
decision-making, while a natural relationship exists based on equality for citizens and all actors. 
Reasoned debate is expected to be a key component of decision-making and this context. 
However, Dryzek (2013) also notes that in practice, the idea of equality and reasoned debate 
can be distorted by the influence of power, as well as government needing to satisfy the 
interests of other powerful actors, often to ensure economic confidence. In Cyprus, this was 
observed by respondents based on the limited existence of equality and public debate in 
practice, while certain actor groups with political power, such as the farmer unions, were 
identified as having the ability to greatly influence debate (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Theoretically, democratic pragmatism suggests that views on policy come from many actor 
groups, with these often representing the public interest (Dryzek, 2013). However, in practice, 
Dryzek (2013) also recognises that conceptions of public interest can vary, and some of these 
represent the true public interest while others may not. This involves both individual and 
collective views of how to define public interest, and these ideas can also vary greatly in reality. 
For instance, the idea of public interest can be related to different conceptions that focus on 
characteristics such as economic efficiency, social equity and equality, or environmental 
protection (Dryzek, 2013). In Cyprus, different conceptions of public interest were evident in 
certain cases. Firstly, government actors, such as some experts and managers, observed public 
interest as ensuring sufficient supply for all users and doing so using the most efficient 
available methods (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). 
Secondly, water board actors considered public interest as providing water to customers at a 
reasonable price and operating in a cost-effective way for their board (Respondent 7, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 11, pers. comm., 2013). Lastly, farmer union actors viewed public 
interest in terms of allocating sufficient water to the important sectors of the economy, with the 
most relevant of these being the agricultural sector (Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter has established that water management and responses to 
problems in Cyprus have been influenced by democratic pragmatism. Many expected 
characteristics in terms of Dryzek’s (2013) discourse analysis topics were identified in practice. 
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Firstly, approaches and practices were evident through; public consultation as part of specific 
techniques such as environmental impact assessment; forms of mediation for management of 
supply and shared treatment facilities; policy dialogue used for infrastructure projects such as 
transfer systems, irrigation networks, and desalination plants; as well as lay citizen deliberations 
for village and municipal meetings relating to allocation and pricing. Secondly, basic entities 
were found to partly exist through; citizens playing a role in decision-making, especially since 
EU accession and the development of legislation to encourage public involvement. Thirdly, 
natural relationships were evident through; equality based on the influences of different agents 
such as farmer unions and politicians, which debated alongside scientists, experts, and the 
public, while exerting pressure on the decision-making process. Fourthly, a range of agents 
were evident such as government bodies, experts, politicians, boards, municipal and community 
representatives, citizens, as well as farmer unions and other non-governmental organisations. In 
this case, agent motives involved multiple conceptions of public interest, as there was evidence 
of certain individuals and groups pursuing self-interests as well as those acting in the public 
interest. Finally, metaphors and rhetorical devices were evident through; forces acting on policy 
in the case of pressure groups exerting their influence on decision-making and shifting 
responses to favour specific interests; the thermostat metaphor occurring for events such as the 
drought of 2008; as well as the network metaphor partly evident in the case of water treatment 
and a strategy on bi-communal cooperation for supply and management. 
 
Differences and additional layers of understanding that build on Dryzek’s (2013) understanding 
of democratic pragmatism also emerged as a result of the findings. For example, these included; 
the limited evidence of certain approaches and practices such as alternative dispute resolution, 
public inquiries, and right-to-know legislation; relationships being more uneven in practice, 
with the roles and influences of actor groups varying in their intensity as a result of factors such 
as political dynamics and economic importance [both explored further in chapter nine]; as well 
as a role for citizens that was less prominent than expected by democratic pragmatism. More 
specifically, citizens did not adopt the central role in problem-solving and this was found to be 
a result of; the existence of more powerful actor groups such as politicians, experts, and farmer 
unions; the limited use of consultation as a method of involving citizens; as well as the 
existence of a highly political and closed community structure. Indeed, the prominent role and 
control of more powerful actors involved high-level politicians that reflected elitist concepts, as 
well as powerful interest groups like farmer unions and the tourist sector that represented 
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corporatism. Agents were often found to have varying roles and levels of influence, thus 
implying that agency was more complex, changeable, and not always for everyone. 
 
Practical management challenges were also identified in Cyprus, and these signalled the 
existence of the rationalities. The four challenges expected by Dryzek (2013) were evident, 
namely; the existence and influence of political power [discussed further within chapter nine in 
terms of politics]; the influence of business on public opinion, which was partly evident due to 
the diminished role of the public in decision-making; the privileged position of business, which 
was more strongly reflected by other groups such as the farmer unions and tourism sector; as 
well as variable conceptions of reasoned debate and public interest. Furthermore, the findings in 
this chapter also relate back to objectives one, three, and four noted in chapter one. In this case, 
the understanding of the voluntary approach has been advanced through the interpretation of 
democratic pragmatism; empirical understanding has been developed through the findings in 
Cyprus, with a focus on dynamics of public participation; while actor roles, behaviours, and 
motivations have been developed, for example through different conceptions of public interest. 
 
7.3.1 A link to other responses 
The characteristics of democratic pragmatism identified in Cyprus relate to the voluntary 
approach discussed in chapter three and the phases of water management highlighted in chapter 
five. In the case of the voluntary approach, certain aspects were reflected by the form of 
democratic pragmatism evident in Cyprus. Firstly, relationships based on interaction were 
evident through cooperative problem-solving that involved consultations and community 
discussions, especially at municipal and village level, as well as conflict in terms of delayed 
decisions and disagreements between government bodies, water boards, and farmer unions. 
Secondly, interest-based negotiation was evident through motives for both public and self-
interest, as well as the thermostat analogy. Thirdly, a horizontal format of decision-making was 
noted through the integration of stakeholders in decision-making, especially after EU accession, 
and also the presence of networks in the case of bi-communal water supply and treatment 
projects. Furthermore, these aspects and the form of democratic pragmatism identified in 
Cyprus also reflected characteristics of the second and third phase of water management. For 
example, the continued development of water-saving awareness campaigns alongside public 
consultation relates to the recognition of citizens as having a more important role in decision-
making when compared to the first phase of management. This was likewise noted in the case 
of a concerted effort for greater stakeholder participation and more formal public involvement 
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in decisions as a result of EU accession and the transposition of the WFD. In turn, the drought 
event of 2008 also reflected the thermostat analogy described by democratic pragmatism, as 
changes in management [during and after the event] were the result of pressure being applied 
on government for a more effective response to this issue. 
 
As a result of the findings in this chapter, it is possible to argue that in many cases democratic 
pragmatism has been evident in Cyprus. This is based on the existence of techniques and 
characteristics associated with the discourse that are identified by Dryzek (2013) as being 
central to this type of problem-solving, including; consultation, interaction, pluralism, and 
policy networks. However, in many cases, the approaches, practices, and relationships found in 
Cyprus also contrasted with the expectations of democratic pragmatism. This was true in the 
case of natural relationships, agency, and motives, with concepts such as elitism, corporatism, 
and public choice being reflected instead. 
 
Democratic pragmatism was more variable and less independent in practice, as shown by a 
reliance on administrative rationalism based on the need for regulation to manage associated 
techniques and procedures. More specifically, the findings in Cyprus contrasted with 
democratic pragmatism because of; poorly represented approaches and practices, such as 
limited forms of dispute resolution, public inquiries, and right-to-know legislation; the less 
prominent role of Homo-civicus and the citizen in decision-making; the existence of inequality, 
with citizens having less of a role in decisions when compared to politicians, boards, unions, 
and municipal or village authorities; as well as agency being complex, variable, and not always 
for everyone in practice. 
 
Practical management challenges associated with democratic pragmatism were also evident in 
Cyprus. These were expected and necessary according to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation, being 
particularly important as they are assumed to provide the reason for the development of 
economic rationalism. Based on these findings it is possible to move on and consider the 
existence of economic rationalism. This is the third problem-solving rationality put forward by 
Dryzek (2013) and is assumed to emerge as a response to the practical challenges and 
limitations of both administrative rationalism, as a result of implementation gaps and issues of 
centralisation, as well as democratic pragmatism, due to the influence of business [or other 
groups], political power, and different conceptions of public interest. 
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Chapter 8: Economic Rationalism in Cyprus 
 
 
8.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter explores how government has responded to water problems by considering the 
evidence of economic rationalism in Cyprus. The expected characteristics of the rationality are 
compared with real-world government responses in Cyprus. The roles, motives, and behaviours 
of key governing agents are also examined, with these being important in terms of the processes 
through which institutions, approaches, and practices associated with a given response interact 
as a result of policy actor behaviour. Understanding the justifications for adopting a given 
approach is central to understanding the behaviour of those involved in decision-making and 
why policy has been implemented in a certain way (Lowe & Ward, 1998; Dryzek, 2013; Kraft, 
2017). This can provide insight into the way problems have been tackled by government, thus 
helping to develop understanding of the specifics of problem-solving while moving beyond 
single-theory interpretations and building on mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches. 
 
The main section of the chapter discusses economic rationalism and the topics of Dryzek’s 
(2013) discourse analysis in comparison to the findings identified in Cyprus. These topics 
consider; expected approaches and practices; the existence of basic entities that are recognised 
or constructed; assumptions about natural relationships; agents and their motives; as well as the 
type and role of metaphors and rhetorical devices used. In this case, the existence of economic 
rationalism is explored, while practical observations and the characteristics of the rationality are 
compared with other understandings, such as; economic institutionalism, elitism, top-down 
perspectives, as well as economic models of understanding including budget-maximising and 
bureau-shaping. The discussion is also positioned more broadly to the conceptualisation of how 
governments have tackled problems, namely through the economic approach, which is reflected 
in economic rationalism. 
 
The final section explores the practical challenges of economic rationalism, which are discussed 
according to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation and their existence in Cyprus. Challenges such as 
slow diffusion of economic approaches, limited institutional change, resistance of established 
norms, political influences, implementation gaps, as well as the limited recognition of certain 
agents, exist as the perceived and observed limitations of the rationality. These are important 
and expected to cause the evolution of problem-solving (Dryzek, 2013). A conclusion also 
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provides a link to the next chapter, which considers the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) 
framework and certain themes that have emerged as a result of the discussion and findings in 
Cyprus. This link is also developed through the existence of the practical management 
challenges, as these fit with Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of evolutionary problem-solving 
that considers the potential for subsequent development of other responses.  
 
 
8.2 Economic rationalism in Cyprus 
Economic rationalism is the third and final problem-solving response to be conceptualised by 
Dryzek (2013). It seeks to address the challenges and failings of administrative rationalism and 
democratic pragmatism by tackling environmental problems through the application of 
economic principles. These focus on market instruments and pricing mechanisms that seek to 
alter the behaviour of producers and consumers by ensuring the costs associated with 
responding to environmental problems are accounted for (Dryzek, 2013). As a result, economic 
rationalism positions market economics ahead of the administration and public or stakeholder 
involvement, which have been the focus of administrative rationalism and democratic 
pragmatism respectively (Jacobs, 1995; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
8.2.1 Markets and incentives 
Dryzek (2013) highlights two main characteristics that signal the existence and operation of 
economic rationalism in practice. These are; privatisation; and the use of market instruments, 
such as private rights, pricing structures, subsidies, permits or licenses, as well as cost recovery. 
 
Privatisation 
Privatisation is deemed to be central to economic rationalism, with this involving the 
application of economic principles and private property rights (Dryzek, 2013). Economic 
principles include the use of market mechanisms, such as pricing, subsidies, taxes, or charges, 
while private property rights relate to the ownership of resources. Economic rationalists note 
that ownership is important and necessary to encourage the use of markets for environmental 
goods. It is through this ownership that the appropriate value of resources can be defined, thus 
encouraging protection and efficient use to maintain value (Dryzek, 2013). Ultimately this 
encourages problem-solving to protect the environmental resource that has economic value. 
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For economic rationalism, environmental problems such as water scarcity and pollution occur 
as a result of government failing to privatise resources and attach property rights or ownership 
to given environmental variables, such as surface or groundwater resources (Yandle, 1993; 
Mitchell & Simmons, 1994; Dryzek, 2013). In this case, privatisation adopts a definition that is 
centred on the sale of resource assets to the private sector, and the private ownership of water 
resources and related infrastructure (Mansfield, 2008; Bakker, 2010; Dryzek, 2013). Advocates 
of economic rationalism claim that this form of privatisation, through the private sector 
ownership of water [property or resource] rights, can in turn give the owner of these rights an 
incentive to protect their resource and investment, thus limiting damage such as 
overconsumption or pollution (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, privatisation was only partly evident in practice through public-private partnerships 
for water-related infrastructure, while water resources were owned by the state and providers 
were controlled by government (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 
2013). As a result, property rights for water in Cyprus were held by the state, and managed 
through government, the MANRE, and the WDD. This meant that a system of extensive 
privatisation, as seen in countries such as England and Wales in terms of full privatisation as 
well as France through widespread public-private partnership, was not evident (Feldman, 2007; 
Paddon, 2013; Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013). The following quote highlights how a fully 
privatised system for water was not developed in Cyprus, despite failings in other approaches as 
made evident by; groundwater over-abstraction and aquifer quality decline; problems associated 
with drought; as well as evidence of challenges associated with administrative rationalism and 
democratic pragmatism, based on implementation gaps, lack of citizen involvement, the role of 
political power, and business sector influences on decision-making (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
“There is not really a proper markets approach.....I mean as a full scale approach and 
as privatisation of the whole [water] sector. We have always had state control of 
water....even though there are some issues it has stayed [like this]. For example we don’t 
have the situation with water rights where you can sell it to somebody else like a 
different sector in the economy. These types of things don’t happen in Cyprus. And we 
have not got privatisation for water like the UK for instance.....as the resources are of 
the state.” (Respondent 1) 
 
More specifically, privatisation in Cyprus was identified through public-private partnerships 
that focused on the management of water-related infrastructure and the operation of 
desalination plants. Respondents stated that these plants were managed by private sector 
companies, with the government having the right to buy the plants or renew contracts after a set 
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period of ten years, while also being obligated to purchase desalinated water under contract 
(Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). The funding and 
development of the desalination plants in Cyprus was based on an economic model of public 
private participation [or public-private partnerships], which essentially involved a government 
service being funded and operated through a contractual partnership between the government 
and private sector companies (Tsiourtis, 2004; PwC, 2013). This scenario shared similarities 
with forms of service-specific privatisation in Australia, where involvement of the private 
sector had occurred through the subcontract of services by urban water utilities (see Paddon, 
2013). Notably, Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of economic rationalism considers a form of 
extensive privatisation that focuses on property rights and ownership of these rights by private 
sector entities. As a result, the form of privatisation evident in Cyprus based on public-private 
partnerships contrasts with this understanding, and while representing a form of privatisation it 
was not the extensive type expected. This highlights the potential to adapt Dryzek’s (2013) 
interpretation to be inclusive of nuanced forms of privatisation. The following comment notes 
the private management and operation of desalination plants in Cyprus. This partly represented 
the existence of economic rationalism through a type of service-specific privatisation. 
 
“The desalination plants are managed by private corporations that send water to the 
government. They [desalination plants] sell under contract to the government. So it is a 
type of privatised set up.....but only for the desalination services.” (Respondent 8) 
 
Market instruments 
Even though economic rationalists argue that private property rights need to be established and 
enforced to effectively manage resources such as water, the difficulties and complexities of 
privatising are also recognised (Dryzek, 2013). As a result, economic rationalism identifies the 
application of market instruments as being important to problem-solving and resource 
management. In this case, market instruments are defined as management tools that attempt to 
internalise environmental costs. These take shape through; incentives; pricing structures; 
subsidies; trading schemes; green taxes; and pollution rights or permits (Huber, Ruitenbeek, & 
da Motta, 1998; Dryzek, 2013; Callan & Thomas, 2013). 
 
Market instruments and quasi-market incentives were evident in Cyprus. In this case, the most 
prominent examples included; government subsidies for irrigation water, the uptake of treated 
wastewater, and domestic supply schemes; metering for domestic and agricultural supply; direct 
payments for water; as well as permits and licenses for groundwater boreholes and abstraction 
(Socratous, 2011b; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 19, pers. comm., 2013).  
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Government subsidies 
According to many respondents, and recognised by other research, subsidies were primarily 
used by government in Cyprus to manage water resources and activities in the domestic and 
agricultural sectors (WDD, 2005; Kambanellas, 2007; INECO, 2009; Charalambous et al., 
2011; Kossida, Tekidou & Mimikou, 2015). Respondents identified government subsidies as 
direct and indirect types based on their application. For example, direct forms were related to 
influences on water resources, such as pricing subsidies for irrigation water, while indirect 
forms were related to influences on water-using activities, the adoption of new technology, or 
infrastructure development (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 7, pers. comm., 
2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). This distinction has been partly reflected by 
Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of economic rationalism through the consideration of quasi-
market incentives, such as direct green taxes, in comparison to subsidised investment in 
technology that can indirectly influence pollution control. 
 
Firstly, direct subsidies were evident in terms of water pricing for allocation and supply to the 
agricultural sector. This was primarily applied to irrigation water, thus giving agricultural sector 
users access to water at a price lower than the cost of production, treatment, and supply. More 
specifically, the WDD gained water from government facilities, including reservoirs, 
groundwater aquifers, or desalination plants, and sold this to farmers and the agricultural sector 
at a price that was less than the cost incurred by the WDD to supply this water (Respondent 4, 
pers. comm., 2013). According to respondents, changes and reductions in these subsidies have 
occurred since EU accession in 2004 (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. 
comm., 2013). These changes were the result of cost recovery requirements associated with the 
WFD, with the process aiming to address the problem of scarcity by valuing water by its true 
cost [of supply]. This adds a layer of understanding to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of 
problem-solving, as external requirements, in this case the economic tools of EU legislation, 
have shaped responses and the rationale for tackling a given problem. The following quote 
typifies how subsidies have existed and directly influenced the price of water used for 
agriculture. It was often noted that the government charged farmers much less than the actual 
cost of providing water. 
 
“For the farmers and agriculture......yes there is a subsidisation.....because they charge 
them much less than the cost to provide [the water].....but for the domestic user there is 
no subsidisation.” (Respondent 11) 
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The impact and role of direct water subsidies within the agricultural sector was further 
demonstrated through incentives that have been applied to tertiary treated resources supplied to 
farmers. In this case, a direct subsidy was applied to the price of treated water to encourage 
acceptance and use of this resource (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). The tertiary process 
involved wastewater being treated by town sewerage boards to produce treated water that was 
subsequently purchased by the WDD (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). The WDD then sold 
this treated water to the farmers at a low price that was much less than the cost incurred by the 
WDD to buy the treated water from the sewerage boards (Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013). 
As a result, the WDD would buy the treated water at a higher price and sell it to the farmers at a 
much lower price to encourage its wider acceptance and usage in the agricultural sector. The 
subsidy applied in this case is explained in the comment below, which notes how the 
government was bearing the costs and price differences to supply the resource and ultimately 
preserve freshwater resources and tackle the ongoing problem of scarcity. 
 
“So...with the sludge/sewage....the residents pay for this to be taken away [by sewage 
boards etc].....this is treated...and then the WDD buy back the tertiary treated water 
only, which is then resold to the farmers. Now to be clear...the WDD buy the treated 
water from the board at a very high price.....but sell it at a very low price....only 50cents 
per cubic metre....just because the WDD want to make them [the farmers] use this water 
and accept this water. Because...for example....ten years ago there was much resistance 
to using this water because the farmers didn’t trust it....[...]...So it’s actually a subsidy, 
because the WDD are bearing the costs in order to push it through...” (Respondent 3) 
 
Respondents also noted that prior to EU accession in 2004, the subsidies to maintain irrigation 
water supply were very high, with approximately 70% of cost subsidised by government. 
However, a decision by the Council of Ministers in 2003, in anticipation of EU membership, 
resulted in water tariffs being increased. This prompted a reduction in certain direct subsidies, 
while in contrast the price of recycled water was decreased [in effect being subsidised] to 
encourage acceptance and use by the farmers (Socratous, 2011b; Respondent 4, pers. comm., 
2013). This sought to tackle the ongoing problem of scarcity. According to respondents, pricing 
changes applied in 2003 meant that domestic water was being covered at full cost, while the 
agricultural sector had also seen price increases (Respondent 20, pers. comm., 2013). This was 
recognised by other research, which noted that prices increased to 38% of full cost [implying 
that the water provided to the agricultural sector cost just 38% of the real cost incurred by 
government to supply, thus giving much cheaper water to the agricultural sector and primarily 
to the farmers for irrigation] (Socratous, 2011a). These findings have implications for Dryzek’s 
(2013) interpretation of economic rationalism and specifically market incentives. This is based 
on; a limited understanding of the role and influence of supranational governance on subsidies, 
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which were found to shape the type and application of market incentives in Cyprus; as well as 
the potential for government to essentially bypass supranational requirements by subsidising 
indirectly. As a result, relationships were found to be more complex in practice, with 
supranational governance playing a role in economic responses and political dynamics at times 
having greater power than expertise. 
 
Secondly, indirect subsidies and incentives were also evident in Cyprus, and were often used in 
an attempt to tackle problems of water scarcity and groundwater over-abstraction. These 
indirect subsidies emerged in conjunction with the management of the agricultural sector and 
development of infrastructure, particularly through the expansion and improvement of irrigation 
networks (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). According to respondents, agricultural subsidies 
were formed and developed by government, while application was primarily carried-out by the 
WDD and the Department of Agriculture (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). In this case, 
subsidies were established for; the installation and operation of more advanced and efficient 
irrigation networks, using low pressure and drip systems; the installation of rain water 
collection systems; promoting the use of treated wastewater and convincing farmers to use this 
resource; as well as for encouraging rural development and limiting the abandonment of 
villages (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, 
pers. comm., 2013). These were found to have influenced management responses in different 
ways, namely; by shaping water usage and increasing efficiency; by being used to maintain 
infrastructure and encourage the population to stay in rural areas and communities; as well as 
greatly influencing the agricultural economy based on crop patterns and types used during a 
given growing period (Socratous, 2011a). As typified by the following quote, the government 
achieved widespread implementation of irrigation systems through subsidies, that were 
developed to reduce consumption, tackle ongoing scarcity, and respond to the decline in 
groundwater quality. The subsidies ensured quick application, while providing a response to 
scarcity and over-consumption through increased efficiency in a high water-usage sector. 
 
“Advanced irrigation systems were installed by the farmers on their land....and these 
were financed up to 70-90% by the government. Yes it was a major subsidy...that was 
very apotelesmatiko [efficient/effective]. Efficient for the farmers...because they had to 
pay less for water....and efficient for the government as they can have better management 
and utilisation of water...[...]...Irrigation water is not so expensive for farmers and it is 
supplied at a price that is cheaper than the cost..” (Respondent 4) 
 
Indirect subsidies were also observed within the domestic sector. Although many respondents 
claimed domestic supply had not been subsidised directly in terms of price, as the government 
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and WDD was argued to be achieving full cost recovery, a range of indirect subsidies and 
incentives were still identified in practice. These included subsidies for; the installation of water 
recirculation systems; the development of boreholes for garden water usage; the connection of 
boreholes with toilet cisterns; as well as residential grey-water recycling systems 
(Charalambous et al., 2011; Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 7, pers. comm., 
2013). Furthermore, many respondents suggested that despite the savings in freshwater gained 
as a result of these schemes, the indirect subsidies were still limited in practice due to their 
impacts on water consumption as well as the issues they caused by encouraging further 
exploitation of groundwater (Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 
2013). For Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of economic rationalism, different subsidy types are 
not recognised. This lack of detail means that certain economic influences on problem-solving 
can go unnoticed, as identified in the case of indirect subsidies encouraging the development of 
domestic boreholes that have undermined responses to groundwater over-abstraction. The 
following comment illustrates how indirect subsidies were applied to conserve good quality 
water used for drinking supply and to substitute this resource with groundwater and greywater 
that could be used for non-essential domestic activities. 
 
“We had the subsidies to help with the conservation of water. Basically to keep this for 
drinking water...as it was good quality...and use the boreholes or the recycled water for 
other things. These were subsidies for the domestic sector...constructing boreholes and 
having the facility for recycling for example....[...]....But they [subsidies] gave some 
issues because.....overall and for groundwater...there was too much consumption and the 
feeling was this just added to our problems.” (Respondent 18) 
 
Overall, evidence suggests that indirect subsidies had an influence on water-saving activities in 
the domestic sector. The following quote highlights the application of these incentives, which 
were used to increase residential water efficiency, while also drawing attention to the use of 
disincentives. These disincentives or penalties reflect the green taxes identified by Dryzek 
(2013) in terms of economic rationalism. They were applied in an attempt to reduce over-
consumption, despite being found to be limited in terms of real-world enforcement. 
 
“They [subsidies] have been effective to a point. The government gave incentives to save 
water....[...]...they were also providing disincentives....a bit like taxes....disincentives for 
the overuse of water by paying more....penalties for using hoses and washing cars during 
drought. These approaches come and go.....the incentives for recycling water and so 
on....those were in effect from 2004. The disincentives and the penalties...are in effect but 
not really enforced....only during the drought period.” (Respondent 8) 
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Water metering and the polluter-pays principle 
Metering was found to exist as an economic tool for water management in Cyprus, with the 
approach based on the polluter-pays principle and driven by a preference to recover the full cost 
directly from the consumer (Westerlund, 2003; Baumol & Blinder, 2015). Metering is argued to 
be a key component of demand management, while also being considered an important 
economic tool in terms of more integrated water management approaches (Staddon, 2010). 
Metering can be considered a form of technology that facilitates the application of quasi-market 
incentives, such as pricing structures and charges, as well as demand control through tariff 
policy tools (Westerlund, 2003; Hoffman, 2010; Staddon, 2010). This reflects the polluter-pays 
principle, pollution abatement technology, and taxes described by Dryzek (2013) that are 
expected as part of economic rationalism. 
 
In Cyprus, water used for domestic supply was metered extensively, especially in town water 
board jurisdictions, while management issues and less dutiful implementation was evident in 
villages, communities, and rural areas (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; Charalambous et al., 
2011; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014). For example, the number of household water meters in 
municipalities and communities was estimated to be 223,113 [according to 2008-2009 data]; 
while the town water boards had extensive metering in place with a total of 206,199 household 
meters and 1,401 industrial meters (see Charalambous et al., 2011; WDD, 2011b). Comparing 
this data to population census data from 2011, in which the number of households in Cyprus 
totalled 303,242 (MoF Cystat, 2013), it was possible to estimate the extent of domestic meter 
coverage. As a result, the percentage of households metered was calculated to be approximately 
74%. Metering for agricultural water was also prevalent, with this involving the irrigation 
systems and abstraction permits used to manage resources (Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). The following quote highlights the extent and role of 
metering within domestic and agricultural sectors in Cyprus. 
 
“...average water savings resulting from the installation of water meters are in the range 
of 10-25% of the usual consumption. Water meters are religiously installed in 
households in Water Boards’ jurisdiction areas but not as dutifully at community water 
boards’ jurisdiction areas, while water meters for irrigation monitoring purposes are 
only installed in areas that are supplied water by the Government Water Works or have 
boreholes that pump water from certain aquifers....” (Charalambous et al., 2011) 
 
Pollution control - groundwater permits and abstraction licenses 
Permit schemes for emissions and pollution control were interpreted by Dryzek (2013) to be 
part of economic rationalism. This reflects the charges and marketable permits considered by 
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Hahn (1995), as well as the economic tools identified by respondents in Cyprus which involved 
the implementation of a groundwater [borehole] permitting and abstraction licensing scheme. 
 
In Cyprus, the permit and licensing scheme was implemented to monitor and manage legal and 
illegal boreholes, as well as to deal with groundwater depletion and water quality issues caused 
by saline intrusion that had resulted from coastal aquifer over-abstraction (Respondent 4, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). In this case, a permit was required for drilling 
a borehole and then a license was necessary to abstract groundwater from the given borehole 
(Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). The stricter permitting and licensing scheme was noted to 
be a significant emerging management response, while also showing the general policy 
direction of the WDD in terms of responses to groundwater problems (Zoumides & 
Zachariadis, 2009; WDD, 2013). This emerged in phase two and three of management 
[identified in chapter two], while the findings also related to; concepts and processes of 
exchange defined through the economic approach (Lindblom, 1977; Boulding, 1990); as well as 
licensing for resource allocation (Grafton & Horne, 2014). The following comment highlights 
evidence of the permitting and licensing scheme, which was applied through the IWM Law 
(2010). This signalled the existence of a market instrument, which is an expected characteristic 
of economic rationalism, while partly reflecting Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of quotas and 
permits despite the limited practical evidence of ‘trading’ in Cyprus. 
 
“The borehole permits and pumping licensing has been important. Most of the boreholes 
are illegal...at least in the sense that they are allowed to pump but nobody controls how 
much is taken. So now the government is trying to get a hold on these. It was controlled 
by the municipalities before...but they wanted to bring it under government control and 
monitor every borehole....to have a quota on the quantities of groundwater abstracted. 
This has come from the IWM Law and is being done by the WDD.” (Respondent 8) 
 
8.2.2 Basic entities recognised or constructed 
Dryzek (2013) identifies certain basic entities that have a recognised or constructed existence as 
part of economic rationalism. These include; the structural features of markets, prices, and 
property rights; the role of government rather than citizens; as well as the construct of Homo-
economicus [a term used by Dryzek (2013) to describe consumers or producers that are only 
concerned with their own self-interests. This also contrasts with the concepts of Homo-
bureaucratis, based on power and organisation with the bureaucracy, and Homo-civicus, based 
on power and organisation with the citizens, which are defined for administrative rationalism 
and democratic pragmatism respectively]. 
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Markets 
For economic rationalism, markets provide context and the systems within which transactions 
can take place and property rights can be allocated. Pricing can be used to dictate these 
transactions, while private rights can allow markets to operate and are assumed to encourage 
environmental protection as a result of ownership (Dryzek, 2013). In Cyprus, the existence and 
use of market approaches was observed by respondents. For example, this included the use of 
metering, pricing, and government subsidies, as well as certain forms of privatisation. 
 
Pricing 
Prices are assumed to be a necessary tool of control for government and the market in terms of 
economic rationalism (Dryzek, 2013). This also has similarities with the economic approach, 
which has a basis of pricing and encourages mechanisms of integration that are based on price 
structures (Powell, 1990; Bradach & Eccles, 1991; Keast, 2016). In Cyprus, water pricing was 
identified by all respondents as being an important economic management tool. In many cases 
however pricing was also a topic of conflict both within government and between certain actor 
groups. For example, conflict occurred between government departments, water boards, and 
municipal or village authorities, while also being found to have occurred between WDD experts 
and farmer union representatives (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. 
comm., 2013). These findings contrast with Dryzek’s (2013) more simplistic understanding of 
market instruments such as pricing, as the idea of conflict is not recognised as an issue, being 
highlighted instead through the definitions of rights or the way economic rationalists 
conceptualise the environment. 
 
Water prices and tariff structures in Cyprus have been the responsibility of the MANRE and 
WDD. These were also approved by the Council of Ministers as required by law, while new 
tariffs proposed by the largest town water boards of Nicosia, Larnaca, and Limassol were also 
required to be approved by the House of Representatives in central government (Socratous, 
2011a; Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013). Respondents claimed that the town water boards 
were required to follow pricing structures approved by the Council of Ministers, whereas 
municipal authorities had greater flexibility in setting their own tariffs (Respondent 14, pers. 
comm., 2013). Differences in prices existed in practice, particularly for different sectors and 
water types. This also caused the unit tariffs given by government to be limited when covering 
the costs incurred by water boards, in turn leading to the build-up of debt for the town boards as 
noted by some respondents and other research (Socratous, 2011a; Respondent 7, pers. comm., 
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2013; Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013; Naukkarinen, 2015). Notably, in terms of economic 
rationalism, the findings contrast with Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of pricing, as an 
interpretation of different levels of government or providers being able to set prices was not 
forthcoming. Indeed, this complexity in economic tools is noted by work on models of pricing 
structures and charges (see Webb, 2006; Reznik et al., 2016), while the findings also draw 
attention to the influence and dynamics of politics.  
 
Respondents identified three tariffs in Cyprus, for domestic, irrigation, and other water 
provisions, that were defined historically and set for resources supplied from government water 
works. These were variable according to the sector being supplied. The water tariffs4 applied in 
Cyprus are shown in appendix 5. The information has been assimilated using primary 
interviewee data and cross-referencing this with government reports, other research, as well as 
secondary data. The evidence of water pricing structures and tariffs highlights an expected 
characteristic of economic rationalism and more specifically a market tool (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Firstly, the domestic price was set for potable water provided by government works to the three 
main town water boards, as well as the numerous municipalities, development boards, and 
village authorities. This water was supplied to a range of users, particularly; residents and 
households, industry, commercial users, and the tourism sector. The price also accounted for 
the averaged cost of desalinated water which had a higher supply cost (Respondent 7, pers. 
comm., 2013). The domestic water tariff in 2004 was set at CYP£ 0.45/m3 or approximately 
€0.77/m3, with this being the price of water as sold to water boards and other users (MANRE, 
2010). The most recent domestic water tariff was defined in 2017, being set at approximately 
€0.82/m3 [for water supplied from the Southern Conveyor network], while tariffs varied for 
other sources or supply areas [appendix 5]. As identified by respondents, the Paphos region was 
assigned a lower tariff for water from government works, based on regional supply, projects, 
and geographical location, with this being set at approximately CYP£ 0.33/m3 or €0.56/m3 in 
2004, and subsequently set to €0.64/m3 in 2017 (MANRE, 2010; Respondent 1, pers. comm., 
2013). The water provided by boards to households, commercial, tourist, or industrial 
consumers, had a block tariff structure applied based on usage quantities, while prices were also 
further variable based on the values defined by boards or municipal providers (MANRE, 2010; 
Socratous, 2011a; Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013). 
                                                          
4 In Cyprus, available data for water prices is somewhat limited, when relying on data produced by the WDD or water boards 
up to given years for each sector or pathway of use. Although electricity and gas utility price statistics by country are available 
through the Eurostat EU statistics database, this was not the case for water. Supplying data for water as part of the EU 
database has been voluntary for providers, thus meaning data sets are incomplete to varying degrees (Eurostat, 2016) 
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Secondly, irrigation water prices were initially proposed by the WDD, with this discussed and 
agreed on by the MANRE, while the final proposal was required to be approved by the Council 
of Ministers (MANRE, 2010; Socratous, 2011a). This process applied to the agricultural sector 
as a whole, with the price of water being set at a lower level when compared to the domestic 
sector. As noted by nearly all respondents, a government subsidy was found to exist for 
irrigation water (Respondent 4, pers. comm., 2013). The irrigation tariff for water from 
government works was confirmed as of 2007 and set at CYP£ 0.11/m3 or approximately 
€0.19/m3. In 2017 this price was re-defined and set at €0.17/m3, although a range of categories 
were evident with various tariffs depending on specific usage type [appendix 5]. The irrigation 
tariff was a uniform price applicable in all regions (Socratous, 2011a; MANRE, 2010). 
 
Thirdly, the other-uses water tariff followed a price generally between the higher domestic and 
lower irrigation tariffs, with this water being used for a variety of activities including; animal 
husbandry, some industrial uses, as well as watering of parks, sports facilities, golf courses, 
hotel gardens, and other green areas (Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013). The tariffs for these 
activities were noted to be variable as they were often dependent on charges imposed by 
municipal authorities. For example, large consumers such as hotels within the tourism sector 
were heavily charged (Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013; Naukkarinen, 2015). 
 
These findings for the domestic, irrigation, and other water use tariffs reflect the concept of 
pricing in terms of economic rationalism based on the existence and application of market tools. 
However, these findings also contrast with Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation as; the influence of 
politics; the authority to change tools at different governance levels; as well as a high level of 
variability have not been recognised. Furthermore, while Dryzek (2013) suggests these market 
tools are applied within the context of a hierarchy based on expertise; in Cyprus this was not 
found to be the case. Instead, hierarchy for the application of pricing was based on political 
authority that was found to also be variable according to regional and municipal influence. 
 
Rights 
In Cyprus, water ownership and rights were historically in the control of the state, remaining 
this way at the time of writing (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 6, pers. comm., 
2013). Some respondents noted that very limited private water rights did exist at local level and 
on a more individual basis, with examples in rural areas found for groundwater and borehole 
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use that caused management challenges for the WDD, water boards, and municipal authorities 
(Respondent 12, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). Despite these few 
examples, the types of extensive private rights expected by economic rationalism were not 
identified in practice. In this case, private sector property rights were found to be poorly 
established in Cyprus because the state held the rights to all water resources, through 
government, municipal authorities, and the WDD (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). This was 
also validated by other research that claimed the government waterworks law attributed the 
property rights of almost all water, surface and groundwater, to government (Tsiourtis, 2004). 
These findings contrasted with Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of rights as part of economic 
rationalism, as well as the idea of private rights being an important characteristic of the 
economic approach through understandings such as competition, transactions, and self-interest 
(Powell, 1990; Keast, 2016); and also, the notion of contract (Rigby, 1990). 
 
The role of government 
In terms of the recognised entity of government, Dryzek (2013) considers this to be central to 
establishing the conditions and markets required for economic rationalism to exist. Essentially, 
some level of government is presumed to exist as an entity that is more than just a collection of 
economic individuals (Dryzek, 2013). This role of government contrasts with the idea of the 
citizen being central to problem-solving as assumed by democratic pragmatism. For example, 
Dryzek (2013: pg134) comments that ‘notably missing from economic rationalism are citizens 
of the sort populating democratic pragmatism’. Instead, consumers that operate as part of the 
market and the producer-consumer dynamic are assumed to exist as part of economic 
rationalism, with these reflecting the economic approach through mechanisms of supply and 
demand, consumption, as well as the context of the market (Wurzel et al., 2013; Keast, 2016). 
 
In Cyprus, the entities of government and citizen were evident. However, despite agreeing with 
economic rationalism regarding the importance and key role played by government, the idea 
that citizens did not exist or play a role in problem-solving was not true in practice (Respondent 
8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 17, pers. comm., 2013). The citizen, as an active participant 
in problem-solving, is missing from economic rationalism and only represented as a consumer. 
This does not agree with the findings in Cyprus, as citizens were considered to have a role in 
problem-solving, albeit not in the most prominent format expected by democratic pragmatism. 
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Further expanding on the role of government, the aspect of policy was recognised as an 
important management tool by respondents. In Cyprus, the most important legislation, policies, 
and laws were interpreted by respondents as being; the WFD (2000/60/EC); the WPM Law of 
2004; as well as the IWM Law of 2010 (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 3, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). In addition to this, historical water laws had 
helped to shape certain economic approaches, such as general pricing, tariff structures, and the 
application of metering, although it was suggested that more visible influences had only been 
observed as a result of legislation applied since EU accession in 2004. According to 
respondents, national legislation such as the WPM Law (2004) and IWM Law (2010) played a 
role in maintaining the polluter-pays principle that was represented through metering in phase 
one of management, while also ensuring that the government [primarily through the WDD] still 
had the capacity to implement water subsidies (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 
8, pers. comm., 2013). Indeed, these subsidies were viewed as being important to the successful 
implementation of different policies and management agendas, as they were used to encourage 
efficiency in both domestic and agricultural sectors (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
The economic approaches evident in Cyprus were also greatly influenced by European 
governance. In particular, respondents noted that the WFD had introduced and encouraged 
economic management concepts such as; full cost recovery of drinking water; incentivised and 
appropriate pricing structures; as well as the polluter-pays principle, which was represented in 
article 9 of the directive (Chave, 2001; Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 15, pers. 
comm., 2013). These findings reflect Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of the role of the European 
Union in promoting market-type policy instruments. As exemplified by the following comment, 
several respondents noted how EU governance through the WFD prompted the development of 
an alternative pricing structure, which was based on cost recovery and the polluter-pays 
principle (Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013).  
 
“The directive forced the WDD to come up with more rational water pricing...[...]...The 
first attempts got rejected [by the politicians in parliament and the cabinet]....but the 
WDD called in experts to help them with the pricing policy....and they have a more 
reasonable proposed policy now...[...]...This has been caused by influences of European 
governance and legislation...and so yes it has played an important role in causing 
changes...especially for the ideas of user pays and cost recovery...” (Respondent 8) 
 
Homo-economicus 
Economic rationalism recognises the constructed entity of Homo-economicus, which assumes 
that actors are driven by self-interest and seek to satisfy their own subjective goals, while 
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exploiting the public for personal benefit (Dryzek, 2013). This understanding is at odds with the 
constructed entity of Homo-bureaucratis associated with administrative rationalism, and Homo-
civicus which is defined as part of democratic pragmatism (Jacobs, 1995; Dryzek, 2013). 
Furthermore, the Homo-economicus entity also reflects certain aspects of the economic 
approach, in particular; negotiation styles focused on self-interest (Keast, 2016); as well as 
economic models of understanding focused on the role of actors and self-interest, such as 
budget-maximising (Niskanen, 1971) and bureau-shaping (Dunleavy, 1986). 
 
In Cyprus, the existence of Homo-economicus was identified in certain cases by respondents, 
mainly observed through government actors and politicians who acted to satisfy their own 
interests, for example to achieve job security, gain financial benefits through promotion, or to 
demonstrate political allegiance (Respondent 5, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. 
comm., 2013). Self-interest was also represented through individual or group benefits, for 
instance through; individual politicians seeking to gain financial benefits; or groups such as the 
farmer unions making decisions in agreement with their associated political parties (Respondent 
8, pers. comm., 2013). The following comment highlights the idea of Homo-economicus and 
the presence of self-interest, with evidence of this mainly being related to politicians but also 
some experts within government and managers at municipal level. 
 
“Unfortunately the politicians prefer to secure votes....help their party or 
organisations....and then try to achieve the people’s needs....[...]...The experts try to act 
for the people and as best they can.....but still there are some that act to help their 
situations.....like having a secure position or putting their organisation to be stronger in 
certain decisions. It is a balance I think and there is both people acting for self-interests 
or to help with the public interest....” (Respondent 19) 
 
8.2.3 Assumptions about natural relationships 
Dryzek (2013) assumes that certain natural relationships exist and operate as part of economic 
rationalism. These can be identified through the aspects of; competition; hierarchy based on 
expertise; and the subordination of nature (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Competition 
For economic rationalism, a basic relationship of competition exists for all actors and this fits 
with the central theme of economic markets which encourage competitive interaction (Dryzek, 
2013). Indeed, the aspect of competition is also reflected by the economic approach through a 
negotiation style focused on competition (Powell, 1990; Keast, 2016), as well as a relationship 
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of interaction between governing actors and those being governed based on competition (Bevir, 
2012; Wurzel et al., 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, the existence of competition in this sense was limited, as a result of the government 
ownership of water and prices being set by sector according to the Council of Ministers 
(Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). However, some competition was still identified in the 
context of water allocation, with this occurring between sectors and for actors or groups within 
sectors (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013). For example, farmer unions or actors associated 
with the tourism sector, such as hotel owners, often attempted to gain as much water as 
possible, while competing with other sectors and groups by applying pressure on government 
and trying to influence decisions through politics and lobbying (Respondent 9, pers. comm., 
2013; Respondent 16, pers. comm., 2013). The following comment highlights the existence of 
competition and conflict in decision-making, particularly competition for water allocation as 
well as conflict within and between government, town water boards, and pressure groups. 
 
“We have competition and conflict. Competition in terms of water allocation directing 
decisions....because there is no point in giving water to groups that don’t produce or 
when the benefit to the community is not much. Some groups compete with each other 
and try to put pressure or influence decisions so they can get more water. Also we have 
conflict…yes in government for decisions...I mean we had a delay for years when having 
the changes to price...[...]...There were conflicts between government and boards...and 
they built up debts because they could not agree on prices....plus conflict with groups 
like the farmers who always want more....more water...more subsidies...” (Respondent 6) 
 
Hierarchy based on expertise 
Economic rationalism assumes that a government hierarchy based on expertise exists in 
practice, as experts must be able to assign and manage property rights, while forming and 
implementing market tools such as pricing structures, permits, and subsidies (Dryzek, 2013). 
This partly reflects the concept of technocracy, which recognises the importance of technical 
experts in the hierarchy of decision-making (Bucchi, 2009; Radaelli, 2017). 
 
In Cyprus, this type of hierarchy was mainly evident due to the position and influence of 
experts in government, and as a result the existence of economic rationalism was partly 
confirmed. According to respondents, the structure of the water sector was partly based on a 
hierarchy of technical expertise, as within this setting the experts and managers had a 
significant role in water management (Respondent 11, pers. comm., 2013). Many respondents 
however also argued that experts often did not have full decision-making control in practice, 
and instead it was the higher-level politicians and ministers that actually had the power to shape 
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final decisions (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 19, pers. comm., 2013). 
Therefore, while a hierarchy based on expertise did partly exist in Cyprus, the highest level of 
this hierarchy involved actors such as politicians and some ministers that were deemed to be 
non-experts (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). It was these actors who influenced final 
decisions according to their own individual or group interests (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 
2013). Notably, this reflects other theoretical understandings such as elitism and the top-down 
perspective, based on the power and prominent role of higher level actors, such as politicians, 
ministers, and senior officials that had the capacity to shape decisions, as well as the increasing 
authority that was found to exist in a vertical format within government (Parry, 2005; Kersey, 
2016). The following comment notes the influence high-level non-expert actors had on 
decision-making, despite the existence of a government and hierarchy with a focus on expertise. 
 
“The government is made up of experts and they have importance and help to make some 
decisions. They always want and try to give opinion at least....and put this in writing 
most of the time....but unfortunately the final decision is not down to them....so this is not 
the case always. There are political pressures. I give you one example....in the 
Kokkinohoria region when we built the southern conveyor and we were making the 
irrigation network....we aimed to irrigate 4000 based on the available water....but that 
became 9000 because of the pressures. Everybody wanted to be included. So here the 
decisions were not technically founded. The politicians changed the recommendations of 
the experts and technocrats. This is not the only example.” (Respondent 14) 
 
By having government actors and experts that acted in the public interest as well as according 
to self-interests, the situation in Cyprus both agreed with and contrasted the expectations of 
economic rationalism. Experts were found to be either ‘economic rationalists’ [experts in a 
position of authority that were motivated to act in the public interest] or ‘economic actors’ 
[experts motivated by their own personal or group interests] (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 
2013). This is significant, as it reflects Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of potential actor types in 
the context of economic rationalism. Indeed, according to the accepted role of the expert in 
terms of economic rationalism, ‘economic actors’ are not favoured (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
Subordination of nature 
The third assumed relationship of economic rationalism involves the dynamic between humans 
and nature. In this case, Dryzek (2013) considers nature to be subordinate to humans, the 
market, and problem-solving. As a result, economic rationalism is anthropocentric and requires 
suitable expertise to ensure that rights, incentives, and market instruments are developed and 
implemented accordingly (Dryzek, 2013). 
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In Cyprus, this type of relationship was argued to partly exist. Some respondents claimed this 
based on the extensive development of infrastructure and the exploitation of groundwater 
resources, where human needs had taken priority over the environment (Respondent 3, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). Human needs for increasing amounts of water 
were shown to outweigh the associated environmental costs of these activities, for instance 
without the vast and long-term exploitation of groundwater the problem of saline intrusion 
could have been avoided (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). Further examples of this 
relationship were identified by respondents, and validated by other research, particularly in the 
cases of; the agricultural sector growing water-intensive crops for greater economic gains; as 
well as the tourism sector being allowed to use unrestricted amounts of water, even during 
emergency drought periods, and develop golf courses that have been highly water intensive 
(Socratous, 2011b; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013; 
Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014). These findings represent Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of 
expected relationships in terms of economic rationalism, as nature was deemed to be 
subordinate to human needs and the economy in Cyprus. 
 
8.2.4 Agents and their motives 
Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of economic rationalism argues that agency in problem-solving 
is primarily attributed to those who take on the role of Homo-economicus, essentially being 
motivated by self-interest. For example, this involves self-interest through financial gains, job 
security, or providing individual or group benefits. However, it is also conceded that to allow 
the problem-solving process to develop and be effective, some agents within government must 
be motivated by acting in the public interest, with these individuals being required to carry-out 
the arrangement of rights and the implementation of market instruments (Dryzek, 2013). This is 
somewhat paradoxical, as economic rationalism relies on the existence of administrative 
rationalism and the understanding that agents can and do act in the public interest. 
 
In Cyprus, agency and motivation was not observed in the format expected by economic 
rationalism, instead being similar to aspects of elitism (Parry, 2005; Birkland, 2015; Kersey, 
2016). For example, nearly all respondents claimed that the majority of experts generally 
sought to act in the public interest, while it was the politicians, ministers, and non-experts, as 
well as a minority of experts, managers, and civil servants, who acted according to their 
personal or group interests (Respondent 6, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 
2013). This relates to the expectations of economic rationalism, which considers the majority of 
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agents to be motivated by self-interest, and only a few agents within government to act in the 
interests of the public in order to implement appropriate rights and policy. The following quote 
highlights the idea that government experts and civil servants primarily sought to act in the 
public interest, with a minority choosing to act for their own self-interests at certain times. In 
contrast, agents such as politicians were argued to have primarily acted to satisfy their 
individual or group interests, while attempting to achieve political objectives.  
 
“The government experts in Cyprus....they try to serve the public. Of course not all of 
them completely...as the same as anywhere you will find some public servants that are 
satisfying their own interests.....but this is not the general condition.....this is the 
exception....[...]....Most of the politicians do not have a clue. It is not their role to be 
experts but they pretend they are....especially to the people. The actions of the politicians 
are for their own interests....securing votes or getting promotions.....or for the benefits of 
their political party.” (Respondent 5) 
 
In terms of recognised agents, the concept of citizenship is not acknowledged as part of 
economic rationalism. In Cyprus, however, citizens were recognised as part of decision-
making, albeit not in the primary role expected by democratic pragmatism. For example, the 
citizen as an agent was observed in practice, with evidence found through public consultations, 
water board group meetings, village board meetings, as well as public forums for interaction 
(Respondent 7, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). As a result, this 
contrasted with the expectations of economic rationalism, reflecting Dryzek’s (2013: pg136) 
understanding which claims that ‘missing from economic rationalism is any notion of active 
citizenship; economic rationalism abolishes citizenship’. In reality this was not the case. 
 
8.2.5 Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of economic rationalism adopts a range of metaphors and 
rhetorical devices that represent techniques used to validate the approach and advance its efforts 
in problem-solving. These include; a mechanistic interpretation of the social world; rhetoric 
used to weaken other approaches; and stories used to describe governmental actions or failures. 
 
Mechanistic interpretation of the social world 
Economic rationalism considers the social world to be a machine that meets human needs and is 
made up of components with functions. The idea that the machine may need to be reassembled 
at some point is recognised, with this being achieved through the rearrangement of property 
rights (Dryzek, 2013). In Cyprus, two scenarios were linked to this concept, namely; the 
changes in pricing that were a result of cost recovery; as well as the widespread [and ongoing] 
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rearrangement of groundwater borehole permits and abstraction licenses (Respondent 6, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013). These situations involved changes in 
management, a rearrangement of organisational systems, and the changing of ‘components’ 
associated with pricing and groundwater control (Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
Rhetoric used to weaken other approaches 
Economic rationalism uses rhetoric that aims to weaken other approaches, and particularly 
administrative rationalism. In this case, regulations are defined as forms of ‘command and 
control’, thus giving a negative meaning to this response (Dryzek, 2013). Some respondents 
identified this rhetoric in Cyprus, mainly based on the interpretation and blame attached to 
government and regulation by certain actor groups such as water boards, farmer unions, and the 
media (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 2013). The following 
quote typifies the negative attitude towards government and regulation in Cyprus, which was 
represented by certain groups. This relates to a style of rhetoric perpetuated by economic 
rationalism and signals its existence in practice. 
 
“In terms of the government, policies, and also the European policy coming from 
outside...it is really a system of command and control. The farmers unions are trying to 
publicly challenge these decisions...as often they are not fair. They sometimes 
demonstrate against decisions....and demonstrating is by any means...by causing issues 
or blocking roads...so literally taking action. I mean especially with the pricing policy 
and the evaluation of the water costs....this is transferred to the end user because we are 
functioning as a free market. This is not always fair...and not everything the government 
does is good....that is seen from our economic crisis [laughs]...” (Respondent 16) 
 
The use of stories to describe governmental actions or failures 
Economic rationalism is also assumed to use stories and form rhetoric to describe governmental 
actions (Dryzek, 2013). In this case, stories are created and defined as ‘horror stories’ based on 
the overly negative representation of government, while associated decisions and actions are 
deemed to give inefficient or expensive outcomes (Stroup & Shaw, 1993; Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In Cyprus, negative stories [often found to be expressed through individual narratives, the 
official views of certain groups, or also media sources] were identified by respondents through 
a range of examples. Firstly, the drought of 2008 and regional government conflict associated 
with water allocation and supply restrictions (Respondent 11, pers. comm., 2013). Secondly, the 
self-interest of politicians being negatively portrayed in the media, and predominantly the 
newspaper media (Cyprus Mail, 2013; Respondent 19, pers. comm., 2013). Thirdly, negative 
connotations associated with water intensive activities, related to; certain crop types being 
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grown, a lack of supply restrictions for tourists during drought periods, and the development of 
water-consuming golf courses (Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 13, pers. comm., 
2013). The following media quote illustrates the use of negative rhetoric in relation to 
government policies and actions for decision-making in response to the drought of 2008, the 
subsequent importing of freshwater, and the general failure of politicians. This typified 
apportion of blame for drought management and gave an example of a ‘horror’ story, thus 
reflecting Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of rhetorical devices as part of economic rationalism. 
 
“All of us who are unhappy with this unprecedented state of affairs - ministers running 
around begging other countries for water to bring to Cyprus so that we can carry on 
washing in the summer months - should bear in mind that we will also be footing a huge 
bill for the imported water....[...]....we should not forget who is to blame for the fact that 
the mother of three at the refugee estate is spending all her disposable income so her 
kids can have water to drink and to wash.” (Charalambous, 2008) 
 
8.2.6 Practical challenges of economic rationalism 
An important aspect of Dryzek’s (2013) understanding relates to how problem-solving 
responses evolve or change over time. In this case, practical challenges are expected and act as 
drivers of change while also signalling the existence of discourses in practice. These challenges 
are explored in the following section, as they provide a link to the next chapter, while being 
understood by Dryzek (2013) to encourage the development of other responses. 
 
Dryzek (2013) considers five management challenges to be the expected outcomes of economic 
rationalism. These include; the multi-dimensional issue of slow diffusion, limited institutional 
change, and inertia; a dependence on political forces and political-economic context; an 
implementation gap/deficit; the limited recognition of certain agents; as well as the limited 
conceptualisation of government (Dryzek, 2013). According to Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation, 
these are perceived to be limitations that provide reasons for the emergence of other alternative 
discourses that build on the rationalities. It is argued that subsequent understandings [beyond 
the scope of this study] have been developed to respond to these failures [and also the failures 
of the other rationalities]. As a result, they are an important part of the evolutionary process of 
problem-solving beyond the rationalities and towards concepts such as sustainable 
development, ecological modernisation, and green radicalism or politics (Dryzek, 2013). 
 
In the following sections, the management challenges highlighted by Dryzek (2013) have been 
explored within the context of Cyprus. These challenges have been identified by respondents in 
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terms of practical management. Thus, the findings point towards the existence and operation of 
economic rationalism in Cyprus, while validating the potential for evolutionary progression. 
 
Slow diffusion, limited institutional change, and inertia 
Dryzek (2013) identifies challenges for the relationship between economic rationalism and 
regulatory approaches. In this case, three important management variables are highlighted, 
namely; the slow diffusion of economic rationalism in practice; limited institutional change that 
has restricted the response; as well as the limited progress of economic rationalism as a result of 
inertia and the resistance of established norms (Dryzek, 2013).  
 
Firstly, the diffusion of economic rationalism is considered to be a slow process, while 
regulatory instruments that are rooted in administrative rationalism have still dominated policy 
and decision-making (Dryzek, 2013). This was partly evident in Cyprus, based on the limited 
use of market mechanisms, as well as the past and ongoing dominance of regulation. However, 
the implementation of market instruments such as pricing changes, cost recovery, and 
groundwater permits occurred more quickly over a period since EU accession in 2004. These 
were found to be driven by EU legislation and drought events, while being evident in the third 
phase of management (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013). In this case, respondents also noted 
that important characteristics associated with economic rationalism, such as private water rights 
and extensive privatisation, were limited in Cyprus, while more visible techniques of pricing, 
subsidies, and service-specific privatisation had often been slower to emerge when compared to 
regulatory instruments (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). 
Indeed, many respondents argued that major changes in water pricing had only occurred as a 
result of EU accession and the need for cost recovery in accordance with the WFD (Respondent 
3, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 2013). These findings reflect work on the 
use of economic instruments in water policy, considering aspects such as; supranational 
governance and legislation as a variable of diffusion; development according to the need to 
increase economic efficiency of government action; as well as reasons for slower diffusion in 
water policy based on uncertainty, path dependency, and transaction costs (Lago et al., 2015). 
 
Secondly, Dryzek (2013) argues that the tools of economic rationalism end up being controlled 
and managed by regulatory policies and administrative rationalism, thus resulting in limited 
institutional change. Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of this dynamic was true in Cyprus, and 
according to respondents it was represented by the need for and use of regulations when 
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administering market instruments such as subsidies, pricing, groundwater permits, and 
abstraction licenses (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 17, pers. comm., 2013). 
The majority of respondents claimed that subsidies and pricing changes for cost recovery were 
reliant on regulatory frameworks for implementation and enforcement (Respondent 2, pers. 
comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). This reflected Dryzek’s (2013) understanding 
that presumes administrative rationalism comes before economic rationalism, and that it is 
needed for economic rationalism to develop as a remedy to challenges. Indeed, these findings 
were also related to work on the weakness of institutional capacity, and the need for 
institutional change, through expertise, monitoring, and tax or penalty collection, when 
implementing economic instruments (da Motta, 2004). As shown by the following quote, some 
respondents identified the slow application of market instruments, while many others noted the 
dominance of regulation and how it was often a guiding force for other methods or approaches. 
 
“Regulation has been dominant....water resources are considered to be a state issue. 
More recently there has been community approaches using public consultation and 
participation....mainly since the EU. The market-based approaches are not so 
evident....only really subsidies are obvious....and these type of methods have usually been 
slower to come to the action let’s say [laughs]. So I think it is true that all the other 
approaches still need regulation...so that has been the dominant way” (Respondent 9) 
 
Thirdly, Dryzek (2013) also suggests that the limited progress of economic rationalism can be 
partly attributed to inaction and the tendency for decision-making to suffer from bureaucratic 
inertia. This situation is perceived to exist alongside the resistance of established norms 
(Dryzek, 2013). In this case, approaches, decision-making procedures, and structures within 
government can be inclined to remain unchanged, with the resistance of established norms 
being assumed by Dryzek (2013) to exist as a result of some actors seeking to maintain a given 
form of decision-making. In Cyprus, evidence of inertia and a resistance to change was 
identified by many respondents, especially in relation to pricing and subsidies for irrigation 
water (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). Inertia was evident through variables such as; a small 
community and somewhat closed system of decision-making; limited change within 
government departments; politicians being less open to change; as well as organisational 
structures, primarily at municipal, district, and village level, that were focused on regulation 
and based on laws formed prior to independence (Respondent 2, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). Resistance to change 
was noted to be a challenge based on the attitudes and actions of politicians, ministers, 
municipal representatives, and some experts and managers. This was evident through delays 
and conflict in decisions on pricing as well as the ongoing use and validation of subsidies 
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despite the need to establish full cost recovery as a requirement of the WFD (Respondent 15, 
pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 20, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
The findings on diffusion, institutional change, and a resistance of established norms also relate 
to work on policy development, influences on economic instruments, and design variability that 
can encourage or hinder implementation of these instruments. For example, a range of variables 
are considered in this case, including; the need for suitable baseline conditions such as 
economic and institutional capabilities; the role of politics and the need to reach political 
agreement; the vital role of monitoring and enforcement; time taken for integration into fiscal 
policy; uncertainty; as well as path dependency of administrative structures (OECD, 1997; 
Panayotou, 1998; da Motta, 2004; UNEP, 2004; Krozer, 2008; Lago et al., 2015). 
 
Dependence on political forces and political-economic context 
Dryzek (2013) notes the challenges of; politics; the dependence on and arrangement of political 
forces; and the wider political-economic setting. These involve the variable dynamic between 
politics, individual or group actors and their influence on the decision-making process, as well 
as contextual factors. The role and influence of politics is further explored in chapter nine, as it 
is identified to be an emerging theme that is not fully accounted for by the rationalities. 
 
Firstly, in terms of a dependence on political forces, respondents suggested that market 
instruments had limitations in Cyprus based on their capacity to be manipulated or shaped by 
internal and external politics as well as strong pressure groups (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 
2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). This was identified through the influence of 
politicians on decisions relating to water allocation, as well as political pressure applied by the 
agricultural and tourism sector with regard to pricing and allocation (Respondent 7, pers. 
comm., 2013). Many respondents noted that politics and the dynamics of political allegiance 
operated in this case, essentially acting as a policy bypass and helping certain groups, such as 
high-level politicians, municipal or village councillors, and the farmer unions, to greatly 
influence implementation, decisions, and management (Respondent 1, pers. comm., 2013; 
Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013; Conca, & Weinthal, 2018). 
 
Secondly, in terms of the political-economic setting, respondents claimed this dynamic was 
apparent in Cyprus through market instruments, such as subsidies and pricing, which were often 
limited by the structures they relied on (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). This was observed 
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as a result of the economic crisis [2012-2013]. As illustrated by the following comment, a range 
of characteristics associated with economic rationalism were impacted in this case. For 
example, this meant that; the uptake of subsidies became more limited; pricing changes were 
more difficult to pass and implement in these conditions; while financial resources available to 
government departments, water boards, and municipal or village authorities were also greatly 
impacted through reductions (Respondent 10, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 17, pers. comm., 
2013). Water management issues associated with the economic crisis were also highlighted by 
the reduced uptake of domestic water subsidies (Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014). 
 
[When asked about the impact of the economic crisis on water management] “Oh 
definitely....if there is no money many aspects are affected. I mean projects which were 
planned.....they are now mostly delayed or postponed....and some completely scrapped. 
The subsidies struggle....changing things like pricing becomes even harder....and of 
course the positions of departments is weaker....having to deal with more....with less. It is 
to do with priorities and there is a cost-benefit ratio for everything. If you don’t have 
enough money to cover everybody....then you must decide which factor is going to be 
first....and second...and so on...in terms of time and money. So the surrounding situations 
have an effect on things...” (Respondent 6) 
 
Thirdly, expanding on the idea of political forces and setting, respondents noted how the 
violation of boundaries and authority were not accounted for by economic approaches and 
associated market-based instruments (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013). In Cyprus, this was 
considered through fragmented management, which caused variable implementation processes 
and control. For example, controlling borehole permits and monitoring groundwater abstraction 
in areas under village or community jurisdiction was difficult (Respondent 19, pers. comm., 
2013). Without strict regulation, given by administrative rationalism, as well as an 
understanding of different levels of authority, the market instruments used were found to be 
severely limited (Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 17, pers. comm., 2013). 
Furthermore, political context was also noted to be complex and difficult in the case of water 
resources management and pollution control in the occupied northern region of the island. In 
this case, lack of authority, control, and regulation posed major challenges for management in 
general and also the implementation of economic tools such as pricing, metering, penalties, or 
permits and licenses (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013). 
 
These findings also reflect work on policy formation and the role of politics [discussed further 
as an emerging theme in chapter nine]. The idea of economic instruments being manipulated or 
shaped by political forces and pressure groups, as well as the political-economic setting causing 
market instruments to be limited by the structures they rely on, relates to certain aspects of 
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comparative policy analysis, public choice, and elitism (Lester, 1995; Heinelt, 2007; Birkland, 
2015). Historic-geographic conditions serve to shape socio-economic structures and political 
setting, thus promoting or inhibiting aspects of environmental policy (Hofferbert, 1974; Kraft, 
2017). Indeed, socio-economic composition, in terms of relationships within government or 
between government and other bodies or groups, can encourage or restrict the capacity for 
pressure groups to exert their influence on decisions (Ethridge & Handelman, 2015). This is 
also closely related to the idea of mass political behaviour, which considers how public opinion, 
interest groups, and political parties may [or may not] put pressure on institutions or elites to 
promote or inhibit given policies (Kamieniecki, 1995; Miller, 2001). In Cyprus, this is a 
relevant variable that has been observed through political party influences on actors and groups, 
especially in the case of water pricing and groundwater control, as well as the intertwined 
relationship between farmer unions and political parties that ultimately exert their power and 
influence on decision-making procedures (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 17, 
pers. comm., 2013). In terms of Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of economic rationalism, 
politics is understood through liberal and communitarian views with features expected such as 
conflict and resolution, sets of individuals or groups, as well as individuals in pursuit of the 
common good or public interest (Ethridge & Handelman, 2015; Bhat, 2017). However, politics 
is also represented as a simplistic and underdeveloped theme, with limited understanding of 
how it influences agents and their motives or behaviour as a component of problem-solving. 
 
Implementation gap or deficit 
An implementation gap between theory and practice can often be evident for economic 
rationalism (Dryzek, 2013). This challenge can arise due to the influence of a prevailing socio-
political context, as well as the control exerted by administrative rationalism, mandatory 
approaches, and regulations at policy-making and implementation levels (Dryzek, 2013). This 
is also comparable to the implementation gap suffered by administrative rationalism. 
 
In Cyprus, respondents noted that the expected outcomes of market-based mechanisms did not 
always fully materialise in practice. An implementation gap was identified through two 
examples. Firstly, in terms of groundwater and borehole permitting, despite a scheme being in 
place illegal boreholes and over-abstraction were still major issues (Respondent 8, pers. comm., 
2013; Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014). The absence of strict monitoring and regulation to enforce 
permitting also meant that the economic approach was severely limited in practice (Respondent 
3, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 9, pers. comm., 2013). Secondly, in terms of domestic water 
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subsidies, despite encouragement for uptake the wider economic issues experienced by the 
public, such as the financial crisis, had limited the effectiveness of these schemes (Respondent 
12, pers. comm., 2013). This gap was also recognised by other research and particularly in 
terms of the subsidies for water conservation (Sofroniou & Bishop, 2014; Kossida et al., 2015).  
 
In the case of Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation of economic rationalism, these findings can be 
linked to the theoretical expectations for agents and motives, as Homo-economicus consumers 
and producers are assumed to exist while citizens are not (Dryzek, 2013). Economic incentives 
alone however are claimed to be limited when attempting to change the attitudes and behaviour 
of society, and the citizens that form this group, which as basic components are not recognised 
by economic rationalism. It has been argued that many different variables converge to form a 
given behaviour, and so incentives often rely on other socio-demographic and contextual 
factors (Steg & Vlek, 2009; Jenkins & Pericli, 2014). For example, these can involve; 
education; political affiliation; physical infrastructure; appropriate services; receptivity based 
on concerns; as well as availability of technology (Gilg & Barr, 2006; Steg & Vlek, 2009; Ward 
et al., 2011; Jenkins & Pericli, 2014). As a result, an implementation gap is to be expected if 
key components for the application of incentives are not recognised by the discourse; namely in 
this case, the citizen and the concept of citizenship that are important for changing behaviour as 
part of economic approaches (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Barr, 2007). 
 
Recognition of agents 
A major challenge of economic rationalism emerges as a result of the agents and motives that 
are recognised (Dryzek, 2013). In this case, agents are defined as being Homo-economicus 
consumers and producers, while citizens are not recognised or considered to be part of problem-
solving (Dryzek, 2013). This was an issue, as in reality individuals often have more complex 
motivations and roles of agency. For example, in contrast to economic rationalism, individuals 
often exhibit both consumer and citizen preferences (Sagoff, 2008). In Cyprus, this was 
observed by respondents based on citizens being recognised as part of decision-making. Even 
though the role of the citizen in decision-making was found to be quite limited, it was apparent 
nonetheless through consultations, public forums, and discussions on drought, water saving 
measures, and pricing (Respondent 3, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 8, pers. comm., 2013). 
Some respondents also identified the emergence of the citizen as being a result of European 
legislation [Aarhus convention of 1998] and particularly article 14 of the WFD, which has 
focused on encouraging public consultation and stakeholder involvement as part of decision-
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making in relation to basin management plans (Howarth, 2009; Respondent 15, pers. comm., 
2013; Voulvoulis et al., 2017). 
 
Conceptualisation of government 
The final challenge associated with economic rationalism involves the ambiguous way 
government is conceptualised (Dryzek, 2013). In this case, a conflicting definition emerges. 
Government is seen as being made up of actors driven by self-interest and a desire for financial 
gain, while at the same time actors that are motivated by the public interest are needed to apply 
market mechanisms in policy and institutional practices (Dryzek, 2013). In Cyprus, this was 
identified by respondents through market instruments such as pricing, metering tariffs, and 
subsidies, which fundamentally relied on regulatory frameworks to define and control their 
application (Respondent 14, pers. comm., 2013; Respondent 18, pers. comm., 2013). As 
typified by the following quote, some respondents noted the way economic approaches had 
often been dependent on regulation and the administration when it came to developing and 
implementing policies to define market instruments and facilitate their use in practice. 
 
“The economic methods are good......but they always still need the regulation. Things 
like the indirect subsidies and new pricings.....they need regulations to work 
properly.....and the government departments to control them. Also now.....it’s fair to say 
they [regulatory, democratic, and economic approaches] all need each other....it is a 
balance.” (Respondent 18) 
 
 
8.3 Conclusion 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter has established that responses to water management 
problems in Cyprus have been influenced by economic rationalism. Many expected 
characteristics in terms of Dryzek’s (2013) discourse analysis topics were identified in practice. 
Firstly, market tools and incentives were evident through; a form of privatisation in terms of 
public-private partnerships focused on the management and operation of desalination plants; 
extensive use of pricing, metering, and subsidies found for both domestic and agricultural 
sectors; as well as a groundwater permitting and abstraction licensing scheme to tackle 
overconsumption and quality issues caused by saline intrusion of coastal aquifers. Secondly, 
basic entities were evident, such as; pricing applied to control water consumption, with this 
gaining further importance as a result of EU governance, the WFD, and the application of cost 
recovery; as well as the importance and role of government in applying market instruments. 
Thirdly, natural relationships were evident and involved; competition in terms of water 
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allocation, occurring and existing between sectors and for actors and groups within sectors; a 
hierarchy partly based on technical expertise; as well as the subordination of nature based on 
the extensive development of infrastructure and the exploitation of resources, particularly noted 
in the case of groundwater over-abstraction and saline intrusion, the production of water-
intensive crops, and the tourism sector being allocated unrestricted amounts of water to sustain 
growth. Fourthly, agency and motivations were highlighted, and involved; a range of actors 
including politicians, ministers, non-experts, municipal representatives, board and union 
members, as well as a minority of experts taking on the role of Homo-economicus and being 
motivated by personal or group interests; as well as agents within government being motivated 
by the public interest to arrange rights and implement the market mechanisms. Finally, 
metaphors and rhetorical devices were evident through; mechanistic interpretation based on 
changes in pricing due to the need to implement cost recovery and the rearrangement of 
groundwater borehole and abstraction licensing; negative connotations and blame attached to 
government and regulation by actor groups such as the town water boards, farmer unions, and 
media, especially in relation to management failures associated with drought; as well as the use 
of negative stories regarding poor drought management, regional government conflict, self-
interests of politicians, and the water intensive activities of the agricultural and tourism sectors.  
 
Differences and additional layers of understanding that build on Dryzek’s (2013) understanding 
of economic rationalism also emerged as a result of the findings. For example, these included; 
private property rights not being well established, as the state, through government, municipal 
authorities, and the WDD, held rights to all water resources; the citizen existing and having a 
role in decision-making, and also being found to be more than just a consumer; limited 
competition because of state and government ownership of water, and prices being set by sector 
according to the Council of Ministers; as well as alternative forms of agency and motivation, 
with Homo-economicus being less prominent than expected and higher-level politicians and 
ministers having the most power to shape final decisions, thus reflecting elitist concepts. 
 
Practical management challenges were also identified in Cyprus, and these signalled the 
existence of the rationalities. The five challenges expected by Dryzek (2013) were evident, 
namely; the issue of slow diffusion, limited institutional change, and inertia; a dependence on 
political forces and political-economic context [discussed further in chapter nine through the 
concept of politics]; implementation gaps; the limited recognition of certain agents, such as the 
citizen; as well as the limited conceptualisation of government. Furthermore, the findings in this 
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chapter also relate back to objectives one, three, and four noted in chapter one. In this case, the 
understanding of the economic approach has been advanced through the interpretation of 
economic rationalism; empirical understanding has been developed through the findings in 
Cyprus, with the reflection of elitist concepts and forms of more nuanced privatisation; while 
actor roles, behaviours, and motivations have been examined and developed, for example 
through mixed motivations and the recognition of citizenship in decision-making. 
 
8.3.1 A link to other responses and building on the findings 
The characteristics of economic rationalism identified in Cyprus relate to the economic 
approach discussed in chapter three and the phases of water management highlighted in chapter 
five. In the case of the economic approach, certain aspects were reflected by the form of 
economic rationalism evident in Cyprus. These included; market-based instruments such as 
government subsidies for irrigation water, metering for domestic and agricultural supply, and 
permits for groundwater; pricing structures controlled by the MANRE, WDD, and water 
boards; the idea of competition evident through forms of privatisation involving public-private 
partnerships for water-related infrastructure and the operation of desalination plants; as well as 
horizontal and internal decision-making evident through interactions between government 
departments and water boards. Notably, these aspects and the form of economic rationalism 
identified in Cyprus also linked to the three phases of water management identified in Cyprus. 
For example, supply expansion, pricing, and metering developed during the first and second 
phases reflect the subordination of nature as well as the role of government in establishing the 
conditions for economic approaches. In turn, the development of desalination plants during the 
second phase reflects a form of privatisation, while the use of direct and indirect subsidies for 
agricultural and domestic supply relates to market instruments and incentives. Furthermore, a 
change in pricing structures and the idea of full cost recovery that emerged during the third 
phase as a result of EU accession relates to market instruments and greater integration of 
economic principles in decision-making. 
 
As a result of the findings in this chapter it is possible to argue that in many cases economic 
rationalism has been evident in Cyprus. This is based on the existence of characteristics 
associated with the discourse that are identified by Dryzek (2013) as being central to this type 
of problem-solving, namely market instruments and mechanisms. In some cases however, the 
approaches, practices, and relationships found in Cyprus also contrasted with the expected 
characteristics and constructs of economic rationalism. This was shown by; the lack of an 
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extensive system of privatisation; poorly established private property rights for water; limited 
recognition of the citizen as an agent with motives or the concept of citizenship; as well as 
agency and motivation not being observed in the format expected, as the majority [rather than 
the minority] of experts and civil servants sought to act in the public interest, instead of 
extensively representing the Homo-economicus construct. Therefore, the outcomes of the 
discourse were not fully reflected in practice. 
 
Developing understanding 
Practical management challenges associated with economic rationalism [as well as the other 
rationalities] were evident in Cyprus. These were expected and necessary according to Dryzek’s 
(2013) interpretation, being particularly important as they are assumed to provide the reason for 
the development of other discourses beyond the three rationalities. For example, in this case 
Dryzek (2013) highlights sustainable development, ecological modernisation, and green 
radicalism as subsequent alternatives. Ultimately, it is the challenges associated with a given 
rationality that are expected to prompt the development of other approaches and discourses. 
This is also true for progression and change between mandatory, voluntary, and economic 
approaches. The following quote from Dryzek (2013) draws attention to the evolutionary nature 
of problem-solving and how challenges [difficulties] act as drivers of change. 
 
“Partisans of each one of these three discourses often make their case through reference 
to the deficiencies of the other two, while remaining within the basic parameters of 
problem-solving within the political-economic status quo of liberal capitalism. But the 
manifest difficulties of all three discourses lead others to be a bit more creative in 
looking for alternatives.” (Dryzek, 2013: pg 144) 
 
The findings of this chapter as well as those of chapter six and seven are relevant and have 
wider significance when understanding problem-solving. This is a result of characteristics 
observed in practice, evidence of expected challenges that drive and validate alternative 
responses, as well as new empirical findings from the work in Cyprus. As a result, having 
applied all three of Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities and explored their existence 
in Cyprus through the three discussion chapters, it is possible to move on and consider how the 
study findings can be used to further understanding of problem-solving in Cyprus. The next 
chapter aims to achieve this by; summarising the overall applicability of the rationalities; 
recognising the existence, role, and influence of emerging themes found in Cyprus; as well as 
ultimately developing insights through the outcomes of the study that seek to further 
understanding of government problem-solving responses. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
 
9.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter concludes the thesis by reflecting on the findings and recognising key outcomes. 
The chapter consists of three sections. The first section considers the overall applicability of 
Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities in Cyprus as well as how the rationalities and findings link back to 
mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches. The second section explores the existence, 
role, and influence of certain emerging themes, which in the context of Cyprus were found in 
relation to responses to water problems such as scarcity, drought, groundwater over-abstraction, 
and quality decline. The final section summarises and considers the findings of the prior 
discussion and the study as a whole. In this case, the relative applicability of the rationalities, 
their practical limitations, as well as the emerging themes found in Cyprus help to form a 
unique interpretation that is relevant in terms of a small, Mediterranean, and peripheral EU 
nation perspective through Cyprus. Furthermore, a final conclusion reflects on the outcomes 
and key points of the thesis, while also offering scope for further research. 
 
 
9.2 Applicability of the problem-solving rationalities in Cyprus 
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, each of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities were 
identified in Cyprus, however, there were also differences between the expected characteristics 
of the rationalities when compared to the practical findings. For example, this involved; the 
existence or non-existence of certain methods, tools, constructs, or practices; differences in 
some natural relationships; and differences in actor type, role, behaviour, and motivation. As a 
result, the findings have been used to consider the applicability of the rationalities in Cyprus, 
with this defined according to the existence or non-existence of characteristics associated with 
each of the rationalities. An applicability analysis was developed, as noted in chapter four, with 
this summarised in the following sections, table 9.1, and given in full within appendix 6. 
 
9.2.1 Administrative rationalism 
Administrative rationalism had a good level of applicability in Cyprus [see appendix 6 for a full 
comparison and table 9.1 for a summary of applicability]. This was highlighted through the 
strong practical representation of variables, such as; institutions and practices, which were 
deemed by Dryzek (2013) to include management bureaucracies, rationalistic analysis, top-
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down planning, and the use of regulatory instruments; as well as the presence of constructs and 
relationships, such as society being subordinate to the state and this administrative state being 
the main controlling force. Indeed, similarities between theoretical expectations and findings in 
Cyprus were noted as a result of; resource management agencies being evident through the 
MANRE and WDD; the extensive use of regulatory instruments such as the IWM Law; the 
application of rationalistic analysis techniques such as cost-benefit analysis for dam/reservoir, 
transfer, and desalination infrastructure projects; as well as nature being subordinate to 
problem-solving and people being subordinate to the state, noted in the case of extensive 
dam/reservoir development, groundwater over-abstraction used to tackle scarcity, and the 
limited role of the public in decision-making. 
 
In contrast, limitations were also evident in the understanding of actor roles, behaviour, and 
motivation, as these did not fully reflect the expectations of administrative rationalism. For 
example, actor roles and behaviour in practice failed to demonstrate the dominant role and 
status of experts, which were expected to control the decision-making process. Indeed, the idea 
of departmental, political, and ground-level expert types was developed based on the findings, 
highlighting how motivations could be variable because of different adopted roles. In reality, it 
was the state, government, and highest-level politicians that had most control, while the idea of 
relevant actors, such as experts, managers, civil servants, and politicians, being primarily 
motivated by the public interest was only partly evident in practice. Furthermore, differences 
between theoretical expectations and practical findings in Cyprus were identified as a result of; 
experts not having the primary role in decision-making shown by the ability of politicians and 
ministers to by-pass guidance from the MANRE and WDD; experts and managers not 
controlling the state, as found through the control held by politicians especially for decisions 
made during the drought of 2008; as well as a range of actors including politicians, ministers, 
experts, and managers being motivated by self-interest, as identified in the case of water pricing 
or conceding to demands of the farmer unions and tourism sector. 
 
Links to the mandatory approach and other understandings 
Administrative rationalism reflects and builds on the mandatory approach as a result of 
governance based on hierarchy; regulations; content that involves government intervention in a 
top-down format; as well as interactions between actors that emerge based on coercion in the 
form of governance by government (Bevir, 2012; Wurzel et al., 2013). These characteristics 
were evident in Cyprus through a hierarchy of control for water and decisions emerging in a 
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top-down format; with this based on Parliament and the Council of Ministers at the top level, 
government authorities and experts such as those within the WDD at the second level, as well 
as municipal or village representatives and citizens at the lowest level. Indeed, these reflect the 
policy, executive, and consumer levels of organisation identified in chapter five. Notably, the 
insights offered by Dryzek (2013) through administrative rationalism further the understanding 
of mandatory approaches through aspects such as motivation based on public and self-interest, 
as well as the recognised importance of experts. The findings in Cyprus partly agreed with these 
aspects, however, motivation was observed to be more variable in realtiy, while experts were 
not the primary actors and their influence was found to be shaped by politicians. 
 
In terms of the limitations of administrative rationalism and its applicability in Cyprus, a range 
of other theories help to better explain certain aspects of problem-solving. For example, elitism 
is applicable when interpreting the role and influence of high-level actors, such as certain 
politicians and ministers, which had the ability to shape decisions. The influences of these 
actors are overlooked by Dryzek’s (2013) understanding of administrative rationalism, as he 
focuses on experts having the primary role in problem-solving, whereas in Cyprus this was not 
the case. In turn, public choice theory, as considered by Downs (1967; 1998) is also particularly 
useful when interpreting actor type and motivation, as in many cases these were closely aligned 
with the theories focused on explaining actions from the perspective of group and self-interest. 
Furthermore, variable motivations were shown by actors such as; those who sought financial 
income or job security, as found through municipal or village representatives; those who sought 
to prioritise their department or organisation, shown by some ministers and experts, village 
representatives, and farmer unions; those who wanted to minimise organisational change, which 
were often situated in government departments, boards, or municipal and village bodies; as well 
as those who forced certain decisions and policies, noted through politicians, experts, and 
managers with allegiances to political parties, sector interests, or farmer unions. 
 
9.2.2 Democratic pragmatism 
Democratic pragmatism had a more limited applicability in Cyprus [see table 9.1 and appendix 
6], as a result of more differences and less of a practical application when compared to 
administrative rationalism and economic rationalism. In terms of the strengths of applicability, 
this was a result of the existence and representation of certain variables, which were expected 
by Dryzek’s (2013) understanding, such as; the use of public consultation, policy dialogue, and 
networks; interactive political relationships; as well as different agents demonstrating a mix of 
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motivations. In terms of actor behaviour and motivations for decision-making, the different 
individuals and groups had acted both in the public interest and according to self-interests, 
which validated the expectations of democratic pragmatism. Notably, similarities with the 
theoretical expectations of democratic pragmatism were found in Cyprus regarding; the use of 
approaches and practices such as consultation and deliberation, as found in the case of 
environmental impact assessment; the involvement of citizens in decisions, as found at village 
level and through the requirements of the WFD; as well as motivation based on a mixture of 
self-interest and public interest, represented by those in government departments and boards.  
 
In contrast, the weaker aspects of applicability could be attributed to practical differences. 
These involved; the lack of public inquiries and right-to-know legislation that resulted in 
reduced transparency; limited evidence of networks; limited equality in practice, with this being 
uneven and changeable, while also restricting the role of the citizen. Furthermore, an important 
difference emerged as a result of the limited representation of the Homo-civicus construct and 
the role played by the citizen in Cyprus. In this case, the role and behaviour of the citizen failed 
to reflect the expectations of Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation, as citizens did not have the 
primary role in terms of problem-solving. 
 
Links to the voluntary approach and other understandings 
Democratic pragmatism reflects and builds on the voluntary approach, and in Cyprus this was 
central to understanding; suasive policy instrument types, such as those based on consultations 
for application of the WFD; as well as relationships of interaction between governing actors and 
those being governed, for example found through discussions at village level (Wurzel et al., 
2013). The insights offered by Dryzek (2013) through democratic pragmatism further the 
understanding of voluntary approaches, particularly through the recognised central role of the 
citizen. The findings in Cyprus partly reflected this, and although the citizen was recognised as 
having a role in practice, this was not central and often secondary to other actors or groups such 
as politicians, experts, or farmer unions. 
 
In terms of the limitations of democratic pragmatism and its applicability in Cyprus, other 
theories help to better understand certain aspects of problem-solving. Firstly, policy networks 
are applicable when interpreting the presence of networks, for example in the case of bi-
communal water supply and treatment projects. Secondly, pluralism is useful when considering 
power and participation in decision-making, and this relates to power being shared by a variety 
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of actors and pressure groups, as similarly expected by democratic pragmatism through the 
concept of equality. The findings in Cyprus however contrast with pluralist approaches, as 
decision-making was often not open to all actors despite some level of inclusion for public and 
stakeholder consultations as part of EU governance and the WFD. In other cases, environmental 
impact assessments and consultations were bypassed by higher-level actors, as shown by the 
rapid development of desalination plants during drought periods and in response to acute 
scarcity, thus signalling the limited role and involvement of the citizen in reality. 
 
9.2.3 Economic rationalism 
Economic rationalism had a good level of applicability in Cyprus [see table 9.1 and appendix 
6]. The strength of practical application was as a result of the existence of certain variables, 
which were deemed to be important by Dryzek (2013), including; the use of market 
instruments; the formation of metaphors and rhetoric when defining regulation and analysing 
government actions; as well as evidence of the Homo-economicus construct and motivations 
based on self-interest. For example, similarities between theoretical expectations and practical 
findings in Cyprus were found in relation to; the use of market instruments such as pricing, 
metering to manage scarcity and demand, groundwater permits to control over-abstraction, and 
subsidies; some evidence of privatisation through service-specific application for the 
management of desalination plants; and evidence of actor motivations based on self-interest, 
represented by politicians, ministers, some experts, farmer unions, and tourism sector groups. 
 
In contrast, the weaker aspects of applicability in Cyprus were attributed to practical 
differences. These included; the lack of private property rights, as a result of state ownership 
and government control of water; a limited [rather than extensive] form of privatisation, with 
evidence of this being service-specific for desalination infrastructure; the recognition of citizens 
and the concept of citizenship in decision-making, evident through consultations and village 
discussions; as well as many experts being driven by the public interest, which is in contrast to 
the concept of Homo-economicus. In terms of actor behaviour and motivations, the format of 
self-interest did not fully reflect the expectations of economic rationalism, as generally it was a 
minority of government officials and experts that sought to satisfy individual or group interests. 
Thus, actors motivated by self-interest and representative of Homo-economicus were less 
prominent when compared to those motivated by the public interest. The types of actor 
involved in this dynamic were also relevant, as it was those with most power and control in 
decision-making, specifically high-level politicians and ministers, which were often motivated 
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by personal or group interests. Furthermore, in each of these cases the actor groups had their 
own definition of what the problem was, as well as different perceptions of what the public 
interest meant. For example, experts and managers in government departments considered the 
public interest as ensuring sufficient supply for users and doing so in the most efficient way; 
those in boards observed public interest as providing water to customers at a reasonable price 
and operating in the interests of their board; while farmer union representatives viewed public 
interest as the need to allocate water to important sectors of the economy, with the most 
important being perceived to be the agricultural sector. 
 
Links to the economic approach and other understandings 
Economic rationalism reflects and builds on the economic approach, and in Cyprus this was 
relevant when understanding the use of market-based principles and policy instrument types, as 
found through pricing structures, metering, permits, subsidies, and privatisation. The insights 
offered by Dryzek (2013) through economic rationalism develop the understanding of 
economic approaches particularly through the concept of motivation. This relates to self-interest 
being expected but also some agents acting in the public interest. The findings in Cyprus partly 
reflected this, although the mix of motivations based on public and self-interest were found to 
be more complex and variable, while also being related to given conceptions and definitions of 
what the public interest actually is. 
 
In terms of the limitations of economic rationalism and applicability in Cyprus, other theories 
help to better understand certain aspects of problem-solving. For example, economic 
institutionalism is useful when explaining the role of institutions and the actors who are a part 
of them, while economic models of public choice theory, such as work on budget-maximising 
and bureau-shaping, are particularly relevant when understanding motivation (Niskanen, 1971; 
Dunleavy, 1986). In these cases, actors are deemed to be motivated by forms of self-interest, 
with this relating to different conceptions of self-interest found in Cyprus, as shown by; 
politicians focused on securing votes and maintaining their positions; experts seeking to 
strengthen their departments; as well as farmer unions acting according to group interests and 
political party allegiances or agendas. Furthermore, in relation to actor behaviour, evidence of 
self-interest and Homo-economicus in Cyprus compared favourably to public choice theory and 
human relations motivation theory. As such, the findings reflected different aspects of work by 
Downs (1967), Niskanen (1971), Dunleavy (1986), and Tullock (1987), based on; individual, 
collective, and bureaucratic forms of self-interest; as well as motive drivers such as power, job 
security, financial gain, securing votes, career progression, political allegiance, and collective 
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group or political party benefits. Ultimately, these findings advance understanding of actor 
motivation by highlighting the prominence of self-interest in Cyprus, while also relating this to 
conceptions of elitism based on the types of actors that exhibited this behaviour [primarily 
politicians, ministers, and non-experts]. When framing how economic approaches operate, it 
was evident that the findings in terms of economic rationalism developed understanding by 
recognising that those acting according to self-interests operated alongside those acting in the 
public interest. 
 
9.2.4 Summary of applicability 
The full applicability analysis of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities in Cyprus is given in appendix 6, 
which compares the similarities and differences between theoretical expectations and practical 
findings in Cyprus. A summary of the applicability analysis is shown in table 9.1. This uses a 
symbol and colour-coding format to highlight the applicability for given categories, namely; 
green and a  symbol to signal good evidence of a characteristic or variable in practice and a 
good match with theoretical expectations; orange and a  symbol to show a characteristic or 
variable being partly evident in practice, with some aspects found and other aspects being 
evident that disagree with the theoretical expectations; as well as red and a  symbol to signal 
limited evidence of a characteristic or variable in practice and a lack of agreement with the 
theoretical expectations. 
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Key 
   Good evidence and representation  
   Partial evidence and representation 
   Limited evidence and representation 
Table 9.1: A summary of the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities 
ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALISM:  Applicability based on findings in Cyprus 
Institutions and practices 
▪ Professional management bureaucracies   
▪ Pollution control agencies   
▪ Regulatory policy instruments   
▪ Environmental impact assessment   
▪ Expert advisory commissions   
▪ Planning   
▪ Rationalistic policy analysis   
 
Basic entities recognised or constructed 
▪ Liberal capitalism   
▪ Administrative state   
▪ Experts and managers   
Assumed natural relationships 
▪ Nature subordinate to humans   
▪ People subordinate to state   
▪ Experts and managers control state   
 
Agents and their motives 
▪ Experts and managers   
▪ Motivated by public interest   
 
Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
▪ Administrative mind   
▪ Navigating and steering   
DEMOCRATIC PRAGMATISM:  Applicability based on findings in Cyprus 
Approaches and practices 
▪ Public consultation   
▪ Alternative dispute resolution   
▪ Policy dialogue   
▪ Lay citizen deliberation   
▪ Public inquiries   
▪ Right-to-know legislation   
 
Basic entities recognised or constructed 
▪ Liberal capitalism   
▪ Citizens   
Assumed natural relationships 
▪ Equality among citizens   
▪ Interactive political relationships   
▪ Mix of competition and cooperation   
 
Agents and their motives 
▪ Many different agents but citizens central   
▪ Motivation a mix of material self-interest and 
multiple conceptions of public interest  
 
Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
▪ Public policy as a result of forces   
▪ Thermostat description   
▪ Network system    
ECONOMIC RATIONALISM:  Applicability based on findings in Cyprus 
Markets and incentives 
▪ Privatisation   
▪ Market instruments   
 
Basic entities recognised or constructed 
▪ Liberal capitalism   
▪ Markets, prices, and property rights   
▪ Governments not citizens   
▪ Homo-economicus     
Assumed natural relationships 
▪ Competition   
▪ Hierarchy based on expertise   
▪ Subordination of nature   
 
Agents and their motives 
▪ Homo-economicus and self interest   
▪ Some government officials must be motivated by 
the public interest   
 
Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
▪ Mechanistic   
▪ Regulation as ‘command and control’   
▪ The use of horror stories   
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9.2.5 The utility of the rationalities 
The similarities observed and the relative strength of applicability for each of the rationalities 
serves to validate the utility of Dryzek’s (2013) framework when understanding government 
problem-solving in Cyprus. The difficulty of concisely framing countless multi-dimensional 
and transitional variables and influences cannot be overlooked, and the good strength shown by 
each of the rationalities when compared to a real-world system demonstrates the usefulness of 
Dryzek’s (2013) framework. 
 
A significant advantage of Dryzek’s (2013) framework is based on the way he considers the 
specifics of problem-solving, through behaviour, motivation, and rhetoric, while also bringing 
together the complexities of problem-solving and accounting for many different variables as 
one whole. For example, this is evident through the integration of the top-down perspective and 
technocracy in terms of administrative rationalism, based on implied hierarchy and the 
prominent role of experts, as well as the concept of pluralism as part of democratic pragmatism, 
in terms of the idea of equality and various actors having power. This contrasts with other 
approaches used to understand decision-making and actor behaviour, such as forms of public 
choice theory (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Dunleavy, 1986; Tullock, 1987; Holcombe, 
2016) as well as elitism, technocracy, and also top-down or bottom-up perspectives (Sabatier, 
1986; Lipsky, 2010; Kersey, 2016). These essentially consider variables in relative isolation. 
For example; models of public choice theory focus on bureaucratic or economic aspects of 
motivation, being limited in terms of considering other influences such as networks; elitism and 
technocracy focus on the role of specific groups; while top-down and bottom-up perspectives 
consider a format of decision-making or analysis, and thus have a limited understanding of 
other actor types, motivations, or institutional variables. Here in lies a vital difference between 
Dryzek’s (2013) work and other understandings or perspectives of analysis, namely that the 
rationalities build on the mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches, as well as the way 
multiple theories are used to understand problem-solving. Indeed, conceptualisation through 
discourse analysis and the attempt to frame multiple variables together, rather than in isolation, 
is more reflective of real-world behaviour, relationships, and dynamics of problem-solving. 
 
Although similarities between Dryzek’s (2013) work and the findings in Cyprus highlight the 
usefulness of his discourses, it is the differences that allow development of this understanding 
and the formation of new ideas. These differences have helped to identify certain emerging 
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themes that can further shape and improve understanding of problem-solving in Cyprus [and in 
a wider context]. These themes are subsequently explored. 
 
 
9.3 Emerging themes 
The findings have demonstrated that Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities have been a 
useful choice for furthering understanding of government responses to water problems in 
Cyprus. As a result of the differences between expected and observed characteristics, the 
rationalities have also been useful in identifying a range of emerging themes. These have been 
touched upon in the previous discussion chapters based on findings in Cyprus, while also being 
important when developing understanding of problem-solving and building on Dryzek’s (2013) 
rationalities. The themes include; the concept of sequentiality and the evolution of problem-
solving; the role and influence of supranational governance; the importance of external factors 
such as culture and economic status; as well as the role and influence of politics. These are 
explored in the following sections. 
 
9.3.1 Sequentiality and the evolution of problem-solving 
The concept of sequentiality can be defined in relation to the format of problem-solving. This 
considers how a response emerges and then shifts to another as part of an evolutionary process. 
In the case of Dryzek’s (2013) framework, problem-solving responses are expected to evolve in 
a sequential format based on the three rationalities developing over time in a successive and 
structured manner. These follow a linear order with administrative rationalism emerging first; 
democratic pragmatism emerging second; and economic rationalism third. This is of great 
importance to the framework structure and the expected interpretations of actor behaviour that 
shift according to positionality along this timeline. For example, economic rationalism utilises 
the preceding model of administrative rationalism when accepting hierarchy based on expertise 
as well as the need for some actors to be motivated by the public interest. 
 
In terms of the timeline of problem-solving, Dryzek (2013) suggests that administrative 
rationalism exists as the first government response to the onset of environmental problems. In 
turn, democratic pragmatism emerges as a corrective to administrative rationalism, to give a 
voice to citizens and address challenges such as implementation gaps, problem displacement, 
and issues of centralisation (Dryzek, 2013). Economic rationalism then emerges last as an 
answer to the challenges of both previous rationalities, such as implementation gaps, political 
CHAPTER 9: Conclusion 
252 
 
power, and business sector influences on decision-making (Dryzek, 2013). The sequential and 
linear format of problem-solving expected in theoretical terms is illustrated in figure 9.1. 
 
 
 
 
In the case of water management and problem-solving in Cyprus, the sequentiality of the 
rationalities was not observed to follow the evolutionary and successive format assumed by 
Dryzek (2013). Instead, problem-solving appeared more variable and was non-linear, as 
represented by the timeline illustrated in figure 9.2. In this case, after the first response of 
administrative rationalism, different components of democratic pragmatism and economic 
rationalism emerged at different rates. This was evident through the three phases of 
management discussed in chapter five. For example, metering and pricing were applied after 
independence in the 1960s, whereas structured forms of consultation were implemented after 
EU accession from 2004 onwards. In other cases, certain components of democratic 
pragmatism were evident first, such as public interaction at local-level in villages prior to 
economic mechanisms such as service-specific privatisation in the 1990s and pricing structures 
involving cost recovery after EU accession in 2004. 
 
The characteristics and components of the rationalities were also found to emerge in a more 
uneven format when compared to theoretical expectations, and as a result of a diverse range of 
influences, including; responses to the practical challenges of regulation; changes in approach 
prompted by emerging socio-economic problems; organisational and policy changes resulting 
from EU governance; cultural adaptation and social progression; as well as natural driver events 
such as drought, which necessitated shifts in management and, at times, emergency responses. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: The expected linear format and evolution of problem-solving 
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This understanding contrasts with the way Dryzek (2013) conceptualises the successive and 
linear development of problem-solving. It can be argued that the findings highlight the way it is 
possible for problem-solving rationalities to emerge, intensify, or also diminish in a variable 
way because of diverse influences, and not only develop as a result of the challenges or failures 
of preceding rationalities. The more variable format of problem-solving observed in practice as 
a result of the findings is conceptualised and illustrated in figure 9.3. 
 
 
 
 
The variable development of problem-solving in Cyprus was further evident through the 
concept of re-emergence. Aspects such as environmental impact assessment and expert 
advisory committees, which were expected as part of the first response of administrative 
rationalism, were instead evident after the emergence of characteristics associated with 
democratic pragmatism and economic rationalism, for example consultation, pricing, and cost 
recovery. In this case, the ongoing effect or re-emergence of administrative rationalism after 
other rationalities was apparent. This idea of re-emergence is poorly represented by Dryzek’s 
(2013) framework, as the successive evolution of the rationalities implies a limited recognition 
of their ongoing influence or potential re-emergence with greater strength at a later time. 
 
9.3.2 The role and influence of supranational governance 
A notable emerging theme of the findings has involved the impact of supranational governance. 
In Cyprus this was related to the role and influence of EU governance on state and government, 
which was found to be important for decision-making and policy implementation. This emerged 
as a key variable, as Dryzek’s (2013) framework was limited when considering this theme. 
Figure 9.3: The observed variable format and evolution of problem-solving 
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Indeed, this is despite the supranational relationship sharing similarities with state and federal 
relationships in countries such as the United States and Australia, which have been used as 
examples by Dryzek (2013) to explain the controlling role of federal agencies in relation to 
lower levels of government and policy implementation. 
 
Practical existence and influence 
Supranational governance was evident in Cyprus as a result of EU level governance exerting a 
strong influence on the state, government, and national policy. This primarily emerged in the 
third phase of management after Cyprus gained EU accession in 2004, with EU legislation 
being subsequently transposed through national laws. In practice, the role and influence of EU 
governance has been strong, being responsible for major changes in approaches, techniques, 
and forms of management. This also had an impact on which rationalities have come to be 
embraced. For example, with democratic pragmatism evident based on the need for formal 
consultation as part of the WFD, as well as economic rationalism being embraced due to the 
requirements of cost recovery and more extensive use of market instruments being encouraged. 
 
In terms of approaches, changes and influences have involved; the use of the precautionary 
principle through the WFD; pricing structures that have been based on a reduction in subsidies 
and the need to establish cost recovery, with this specifically emerging through article 9 of the 
WFD; as well as the development of integrated water resources management concepts, which 
have been implemented through the IWM Law (2010). This has influenced the emergence or 
re-emergence of administrative rationalism for the implementation of new regulations, and also 
economic rationalism in terms of the application of market instruments. Notably, these findings 
challenge Dryzek’s (2013) understanding, as the influence of supranational governance causing 
change partly undermines the expected format and evolution of problem-solving. Dryzek 
(2013) considers the development of other approaches to be a remedy to the limitations of 
existing rationalities. Supranational governance however was instead the driver of change in 
certain cases, often prompting the emergence of characteristics associated with other 
rationalities. For example, this was found in relation to the development of structured public 
consultation for river basin plans and desalination plants. In this case, formal and structured 
consultation did not emerge through democratic pragmatism because of the failings of 
administrative rationalism, but rather as a result of the requirements of EU governance and 
legislation. This also relates to other research on the development of approaches and techniques 
because of EU governance, namely; application of the polluter-pays principle (Birol et al., 
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2011); integrated resources management (Mylopoulos & Kolokytha, 2008; Moutsopoulos & 
Petalas, 2018); as well as cost recovery (Socratous, 2011b; Reynaud, 2016). 
 
In relation to the introduction of new techniques, the most notable to emerge in Cyprus as a 
result of EU governance and legislation included; formal procedures for public involvement in 
decision-making, and the use of environmental impact assessment. These reflected 
characteristics of both democratic pragmatism and administrative rationalism. An increased 
focus on public involvement emerged through article 14 of the WFD (2000/60/EC) alongside 
guidance given by the directive on public participation in environmental decision-making 
(2003/35/EC). The use of environmental impact assessment was established in Cyprus for 
major projects such as the construction of desalination plants and development of water 
treatment facilities. This emerged as a result of the influence of legislation, namely the directive 
on strategic environmental assessment (2001/42/EC) and the directive on environmental impact 
assessment (2011/92/EC). Consequently, the technique in this structured form was not 
developed by national government as a response to challenges of previous approaches, but as a 
requirement of EU legislation, thus highlighting the strength of the supranational level. 
 
For water management in Cyprus, changes caused by supranational governance have been 
observed through the development of drought and river basin management plans as well as 
evidence of a greater focus on water pollution and groundwater. This relates to the re-
emergence of administrative rationalism based on the development of regulatory policy 
instruments. Drought management plans were developed as a result of EU guidelines and 
requirements of the WFD. River basin management plans have been a result of the WFD and 
guidance under article 13 of the directive, while the plan is a tool of integrated management and 
encourages a more structured form of management according to river basin districts. 
Furthermore, a greater focus on water pollution and groundwater was also apparent in Cyprus 
predominantly as a result of EU governance. This situation emerged as the WFD attached 
importance to pollution control and groundwater protection as a part of integrated management. 
 
The position of supranational governance 
In terms of organisation, two interpretations have emerged that help frame a better 
understanding of supranational governance and its position within Cyprus and as part of 
problem-solving. These are based on; the subordination of the state, government, experts, and 
society, to supranational governance and the EU, which relates to Dryzek’s (2013) 
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interpretation of natural relationships; as well as a reinterpretation of control and power 
relations through supranational governance, which contrasts with Dryzek’s (2013) 
understanding of administrative rationalism that considers people to be subordinate to the state. 
 
Firstly, supranational governance was found to influence the role of the state, government, 
experts, and society. In this case, supranational governance often controlled and directed the 
state and government regarding the agenda for water management and problem-solving. This 
was most evident based on the major influence exerted by the WFD, which resulted in changes 
for approaches used, management, and the formality of procedures. The WFD forced many 
changes in Cyprus despite resistance from certain groups such as the politicians, farmer unions, 
and those at municipal, village, or community levels. For example, this resistance was widely 
noted in relation to pricing changes, due to the need to conform to full cost recovery, with 
delays and conflict being associated with this process. As a result, the need to implement policy 
or face punishment caused the control of the state and government to be partly ceded to the 
supranational EU level. Consequently, the natural relationships expected by administrative 
rationalism can be considered to be more flexible than initially assumed by Dryzek (2013). 
 
In terms of actor roles in Cyprus, supranational governance resulted in some power being taken 
away from certain politicians and high-level actors situated within government; for example, in 
the context of controlling national legislation or influencing decisions, while also forcing the 
adoption and implementation of policy. In many cases, such as for groundwater control, 
pricing, cost recovery, subsidies, drought management, as well as the use of integrated 
management; politicians, ministers, and high-level actors were limited when trying to apply 
pressure and influence decisions. This was because of political parties [such as DISY or AKEL] 
and their representatives [certain politicians and unions] seeking to avoid blame for a failure to 
implement policy or for potential EU punishment. Indeed, the need to implement EU policy or 
otherwise face punishment had reduced the strength of opposition to policy and the influence of 
farmer unions on political parties. This also enabled the experts within the WDD and other 
technical departments to more easily implement required water policies, thus avoiding obstacles 
of individual or group interests that were evident as a result of party politics. 
 
Secondly, a reinterpretation of control and power relations as a result of supranational 
governance was also identified in Cyprus, which involved the subordination of the state to the 
EU. It was argued that, through influences on the state, supranational governance and control 
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had partly reflected a contemporary version of colonial dynamics. In this case, the experience in 
Cyprus was found to have replicated the setting of colonial political control, in which the state 
holds most importance in decision-making, with the influence of EU governance and 
membership serving as a proxy for colonial authority. This relates to the concept of neo-
colonialism through work on; power in Europe and the dynamics of the Eurozone economic 
crisis (Mikelis, 2016), as well as the condition of post-coloniality in Cyprus and influences on 
socio-cultural behaviours (Bryant, 2006). The findings also have implications for understanding 
problem-solving rationalities and their operation, as the role and influence of supranational 
governance was found to be stronger in practice, when compared to Dryzek’s (2013) 
interpretation. As a result, an awareness of this power, and the potential for colonial style 
interactions, needs to be recognised as a potential driver for certain rationalities. Furthermore, 
although this situation is more complex and variable when compared to traditional forms of 
colonial control, similar power relations were observed. Indeed, EU membership has been 
found to have encouraged the diminishment of the state, replacing this with a collective ‘nation 
state’ that exerts its control and authority on a given country in terms of socio-political, 
economic, and regulatory terms (Hansen, 2002; Magone, 2003; McCormick, 2017).  
 
In Cyprus, the EU has fundamentally transformed politics, economics, and society (Sepos, 
2008; Zoumides & Zachariadis, 2009; Ioannou & Kentas, 2011; Ker-Lindsay, Faustmann, & 
Mullen, 2011; Mullen, 2011). This has been observed through a range of examples in practice. 
First, through social changes because of; the perceived ‘Europeanisation’ of society, involving 
legal, technical, and cognitive variables; the encouragement of gender equality and public 
health improvements; as well as a greater awareness of environmental protection and associated 
activities such as protecting water resources. Second, through economic influences based on; 
adoption of the Euro currency [monetary union]; trade changes; tax reforms and a policy of 
greater competition; increased flow of workers and knowledge; sanctions imposed during the 
economic crisis [2012-2013]; changes in GDP and the structure of the economy, with this 
involving an increase in services and a decline in both agriculture and manufacturing; as well as 
liberalisation of capital controls and interest rates. Third, through regulatory, organisational, 
and management changes including; harmonisation of existing legislation with the EU acquis, 
followed by an influx of new legislation relating to water; the introduction of alternative 
approaches such as integrated resources management and greater public involvement in 
decision-making; as well as renewed focus on the re-centralisation of authority and powers. 
These examples found in Cyprus also relate to research on Europeanisation (Kassim, 2003), 
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social effects of membership (Ioannou & Kentas, 2011), and economic impacts of membership 
(Mullen, 2011). In terms of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, the aspects identified can potentially 
influence; the emergence, re-emergence, or strength of a response at a given time; the format of 
natural relationships; the context in which actors are positioned; changes to actor motivations as 
a result of a wider range of influences; as well as the emergence of new metaphors or rhetorical 
devices associated with the EU and supranational politics. 
 
It was also found that the Europeanisation of policy, society, and culture in Cyprus had been an 
important driver of behavioural change in terms of government responses and policies being 
implemented, as well as with regard to the acceptance of consultation by the public. The idea of 
Europeanisation has had multiple definitions based on different understandings. The most 
prominent of these have related to; an incremental process of re-orientating politics and policy-
making (Ladrech, 1994; 2000); the construction, diffusion, and institutionalisation of rules and 
procedures alongside shared beliefs, values, and norms (Radaelli, 2003); the idea of the EU and 
Europe as a reference point for politics and expertise (Post, 2015); as well as changes in 
institutional governance and the adoption of European forms of socio-economic and political 
organisation (Olsen, 2002). 
 
Networked governance 
The position of supranational governance can also be specifically related to Dryzek’s (2013) 
framework. In this case, the existence and operation of supranational governance is partly 
reflected through the existence of networked governance, which can be associated with the EU; 
as well as the description of dynamics between federal and state levels of governance in 
countries such as Australia and the United States. The example of federal and state governance 
compares favourably to the relationship between supranational and state levels identified in 
Cyprus, especially based on the power and authority federal or supranational levels have in 
shaping state level decisions. Dryzek (2013) considers this as part of administrative rationalism 
through pollution control, with federal agencies in the United States being noted to force the 
recognition and regulation of specific pollutants at state level. These findings develop Dryzek’s 
(2013) understanding by recognising the importance of this relationship and the subordination 
of the state level to other higher levels of governance that can exist in different formats 
depending on a given setting. As a result, this has implications for the understanding of natural 
relationships in the context of the rationalities, as supranational governance warrants inclusion. 
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Whilst these examples share similarities, they have not been full representations, and therefore 
an analysis of the potential importance and influence of supranational governance has not been 
forthcoming within the context of the problem-solving rationalities. The failure to specifically 
consider the role and influence of supranational governance thus emerges as a limitation of the 
framework, particularly as significant practical implications have been identified in Cyprus.  
 
9.3.3 The importance of culture and economic status 
External factors were identified in practice and primarily involved the inherent culture of 
society and the economic status of a nation. These have warranted further exploration based on 
their strong existence, role, and influence in Cyprus, as well as their limited representation in 
terms of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities. 
 
Culture 
The concept of culture can be defined as a given ‘way of life’ that consists of the values, norms, 
attitudes, behaviours, and material objects represented by specific individuals or groups (Knox 
& Pinch, 2006; Lane & Wagschal, 2011; Côté & Levine, 2014). These variables can shape 
public or political decisions regarding social-environmental problems, such as water scarcity or 
pollution (Altman & Chemers, 1984; Anderson, 1997; Meister & Japp, 2002; Winter & Koger, 
2014). In this case, culture essentially consists of the values and norms that can be associated 
with a group, society, or setting. These can be of major importance to politics, actor behaviour, 
and motives, while in turn shaping decision-making and resultant policy decisions (Tierney, 
2008; Lane & Wagschal, 2011; Goldfarb, 2012; Eagleton, 2016; Lane & Ersson, 2016). 
 
Culture and associated wider influences and concepts were found to be crucial in Cyprus, with 
respondents identifying aspects such as Cypriot norms, culture, and the concept of 
Europeanisation. However, these cultural aspects have been poorly represented by Dryzek’s 
(2013) rationalities, thus highlighting a difference between theoretical expectations and the 
findings. For example, in terms of administrative rationalism, culture was poorly represented 
and only considered briefly for specific sub-cultures of generalism that were associated with 
some civil servants and their actions or behaviour in decision-making. For democratic 
pragmatism, some cultural aspects were noted and based on government recognising 
environmental counter-culture and seeking to involve the actors operating within this sub-
culture into government and the problem-solving process. Nevertheless, this focuses on a 
specific scenario rather than wider socio-cultural influences and how they can actually affect 
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responses. In turn, for economic rationalism, culture was poorly represented and not recognised 
as an influencing factor. 
 
In Cyprus, the inherent culture was identified as a key component of how society and 
government interpreted and responded to water problems. Culture was noted to have helped 
form the basis of awareness and understanding when attempting to tackle these problems, while 
also dictating relationships between groups and shaping the underlying agenda or position for 
decisions and their outcomes. As a result, the Cypriot culture was assumed to have a significant 
role and influence in shaping decision-making at all organisational and governance levels. This 
meant actors were affected in different ways, whether they were considered a part of 
government, boards, municipal authorities, village and community groups, unions, pressure 
groups, or the public. Notably, similar cultural nuances were demonstrated in other countries, 
such as Italy, regarding issues of transparency and accountability in decision-making, as well as 
Greece, in relation to issues of populism (Magone, 2003; Pappas, 2014; Lane & Ersson, 2016). 
 
The observed culture in Cyprus was complex and multi-faceted, with the full extent of its 
influence being difficult to conceptualise. Nevertheless, the culture was found to represent four 
key aspects that contributed to the positionality of society in relation to water problems, 
influenced actor behaviour and attitudes, and shaped problem-solving and decision-making. 
These aspects were defined as; the concept of a Cypriot mentality; the idea of a closed system 
and community setting; the ongoing socio-political issue; as well as the Europeanisation of 
society since EU accession. 
 
Firstly, the concept of a Cypriot mentality emerged as a key component of culture and was 
identified as the most effective way of describing the different characteristics of actor group 
positionality. In this case, the Cypriot mentality represented notable characteristics such as; a 
very strong reliance on personal connections; a tendency to encourage organisation and power 
through hierarchy and personal relationships; the pursuit of self-interest at a variety of levels; 
variable power relations based on societal status, perceived importance, and community 
standing; opposition to change, especially from drivers such as EU governance; as well as a 
strong sense of political and group allegiance. The Cypriot culture and mentality has also been 
described by other work (see Spilling & Spilling, 2000; Faustmann, 2009; Taki & Officer, 
2009; Charalambous & Christophorou, 2016), with key aspects reflecting some of the study 
findings. For example, these have included; the pursuit of self-interest; political and group 
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allegiances that greatly influence decisions; and issues of power distribution in society. These 
findings contrast with Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, which fail to consider the importance of 
culture and the influence it can have on understanding or defining a given problem. 
 
Secondly, the idea of a closed system and community setting was identified as an important 
component of society and culture in Cyprus. The closeness of the setting, based on tightly knit 
communities and the importance of personal relationships, had implications for decision-
making. The closed setting had worked positively in some cases. For example, by 
understanding the issues at hand, key community actors, such as powerful politicians, 
community leaders, or respected experts, were able to effectively guide proceedings because of 
their standing in the community. In this case, the key actors had the ability to convince the 
public and other actor groups of the importance of certain water problems, such as scarcity, 
drought, and saline intrusion of coastal aquifers. Indeed, this dynamic also helped to avoid 
opposition and mitigate conflict, particularly for; management of the bi-communal water 
treatment project; the acceptance of water conservation as a relevant management topic; as well 
as the need to limit groundwater exploitation and mitigate saline intrusion in coastal aquifers. 
 
The closed system and community setting also had an influence on the power and control of 
certain actors. In some cases, the closed setting meant that powerful politicians and key players 
in the community or specific industries had a disproportionate influence on the public, board or 
community members, and other actors within government. This resulted in conflict between and 
within groups, opposition to decisions, and the capacity for these actors or groups to influence 
rhetoric and decisions. For water management, this resulted in delayed decisions for pricing 
changes, while nurturing a setting for political conflict between actor groups with regard to the 
allocation and distribution of resources, groundwater abstraction, and irrigation practices. 
 
Thirdly, the ongoing issue of socio-political unrest in Cyprus has had a major influence on 
culture, organisational structure, and water management. This relates to the Turkish occupation 
of the northern region, which has been more widely termed the ‘Cyprus problem’ (Dodd, 2010; 
Ker-Lindsay, 2011; Trimikliniotis, 2018). Whilst the complex and highly political dilemma of 
occupation is not the focus of this thesis, its relevance in terms of water was evident. The issue 
was considered to be an important underlying organisational challenge that has shaped society 
and culture, while also influencing how water has been allocated, controlled, and managed. For 
example, this was noted through influences on culture and water management as noted below. 
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In terms of culture, the socio-political issue has had a lasting influence on society. This was 
observed through; changes in the balance of society; the shifting and merging of sub-cultures; 
changes in identity, positionality, and power structures; shifts in demographics; the issue of 
divisive nationalism; as well as the backdrop of conflict and division becoming a part of the 
socio-cultural and ethno-national setting. For example, demographic shifts occurred through the 
separation of communities, while changes in balance emerged through the pressures of a greater 
population and demand for equivalent resources in the Southern region. These factors have also 
been highlighted by other research (see Bryant, 2004; Peristianis, 2006; Ker-Lindsay, 2011; 
Hatay & Papadakis, 2012; Trimikliniotis, 2018). As a result, this complex issue has remained a 
major problem for society and was widely identified as the most important underlying political 
problem for government in relation to all forms of decision-making [and specifically for water]. 
 
The issue of occupation also caused a significant organisational and management dilemma in 
terms of water, based on the government and WDD having no control on usage and 
management in the northern region. This was further exacerbated by the implications of 
increased scarcity and quality decline in the occupied region, which has become more evident 
in the south over time. For example, issues related to groundwater over-abstraction and saline 
intrusion in shared coastal aquifers located in the northern region continued unabated, while 
slowly affecting water resources in the south. This has greatly impacted water quality and 
management for government and the WDD. Indeed, despite progress through a cross-border 
project for a bi-communal water treatment plant in Nicosia (UNDP, 2013), information 
communicated to the WDD regarding water balance, [sector] usage, groundwater status, general 
water quality, and distribution, has been severely limited or non-existent. As a result, additional 
management issues have emerged based on; a lack of available expertise in the occupied 
northern region; poor communication; inadequate monitoring systems; and limited sharing of 
information due to the indeterminate political situation. The problems of pollution and severe 
groundwater exploitation ultimately remain as significant management issues, while the full 
extent of aquifer decline, saline intrusion, and pollution in the north were still not known.  
 
Notably, Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities do not consider the transboundary 
nature of environmental problems, which were highlighted by water management problems 
associated with the occupied northern region in Cyprus. In practice, transboundary problems 
can have implications for the understanding of problem-solving, for example causing 
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difficulties when; defining natural relationships and the role of states that are affected by a 
shared problem; identifying actor roles and motives in multiple settings; as well as considering 
which rationalities exist and who has authority, power, and control to respond. 
 
Finally, the fourth aspect that has influenced problem-solving through culture has involved the 
concept of Europeanisation. Supranational governance has been considered previously in this 
thesis in relation to implications for water management and Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, but in 
this case Europeanisation [or the idea of supra-nationalisation] is specifically focused on the 
influence of culture in Cyprus. 
 
The concept of Europeanisation has been given multiple definitions in the wider research based 
on different understandings. The most prominent of these have been related to; an incremental 
process of re-orientating politics and policy-making (Ladrech, 1994; Radaelli, 2018); the 
construction, diffusion, and institutionalisation of rules and procedures alongside shared beliefs, 
values, and norms (Radaelli, 2003); the existence and idea of the EU and Europe as a reference 
point (Muller, 1995); as well as changes in institutional governance and the adoption of 
European forms of socio-economic and political organisation (Olsen, 2002). 
 
In Cyprus, the socio-cultural implications of Europeanisation were identified through three 
main pathways. These involved; changes in technical approaches, decision-making, and 
politics; major economic changes; as well as increased levels of education and shifts in societal 
expectations. For example, changes in approaches were identified through the introduction of 
integrated water management approaches, while different processes of decision-making were 
evident through the increased importance of public involvement. Shifts in politics were based 
on adaptations that have accounted for a changing operational context and policy content for the 
supranational level. In terms of economic changes, these have been significant and most 
obvious as a result of monetary union [change to the Euro currency] and restrictions caused by 
the financial crisis. Furthermore, in relation to education and societal expectations, the 
knowledge and awareness of water topics had increased through interaction with other 
European countries and institutions. Indeed, social expectations for practices also shifted 
according to the sharing of new ideas and improvements in lifestyle. These pathways of 
Europeanisation represented in Cyprus also reflected other research, which has considered 
variables based on social, legislative, political, and economic changes (see Jerneck, 2000; 
Sepos, 2008; Leontitsis & Ladi, 2018; Radaelli, 2018). 
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Economic status 
The economic status of a nation had a significant impact on decision-making and also affected 
policy responses. This was highlighted by the findings through two examples, namely; the 
economic status and ability of Cyprus when faced with the requirements of EU legislation and 
policy implementation; as well as the economic status of Cyprus within the context of wider 
economic forces and a financial crisis. Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities have not considered the 
influence of economic status on problem-solving. Notably, for economic rationalism, the 
practical implications of economic status on natural relationships and actor behaviour have not 
been considered despite the perceived importance of market-based mechanisms, Homo-
economicus, and economic instruments. 
 
The economic ability of Cyprus was found to be a relevant factor when implementing EU 
policy, with financial constraints noted in many cases, especially when forming new approaches 
or setting up systems in accordance with the requirements of the WFD. This situation has also 
been pertinent for other southern European nations, such as Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, 
based on; financial constraints, limited cooperation at municipal and local levels, financial 
wastage, as well as variable compliance and the idea of these nations lagging behind northern 
European countries (Kousis & Eder, 2001; Redclift, 2001; Magone, 2003). In this case, a given 
EU nation must bear the costs of implementation, and this was found to be a restriction for a 
country such as Cyprus that has an inherently smaller economy. For example, new technical 
divisions, improved expertise, and investment in monitoring systems were required in practice, 
and these have subsequently caused a greater financial burden for government and the WDD. 
 
Other management dilemmas also emerged in Cyprus based on limited economic ability, with 
these highlighted through the perceived fit of legislation and the structure of the economy. First, 
a disparity between the expectation and reality of the WFD was evident as a result of a limited 
focus on water scarcity issues, which were deemed to be most relevant in Cyprus. This caused a 
prevalent assumption that financial resources were wasted in many cases because of such a 
strong focus on quality that was forced by the WFD. Second, the structure of the economy was 
also an important variable that impacted decision-making based on the influence of specific 
sectors on water management. This was primarily evident in terms of the agricultural sector, 
which had significant [disproportionate] control and influence on the economy. More 
specifically, this was identified through the power of farmer unions when applying pressure to 
maintain subsidies, increase water allocation for irrigation, or reduce water prices. 
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The economic status of Cyprus within the context of wider economic forces and a financial 
crisis was also found to be relevant. The potential for external forces to dictate the behaviour 
and decisions of both government and actors involved in water management was highlighted by 
the financial crisis in Cyprus during 2012-2013. In this case, the issue of financial restrictions 
for decision-makers provided another dimension to the choice of problem-solving approach 
being applied, and the capacity to implement a given approach and its policies. Notably, the 
financial crisis resulted in a range of practical management challenges in Cyprus. These 
involved; a reduction in available funds for the MANRE and WDD; changes in administrative 
structures resulting in reduced expertise in some cases; as well as certain management 
responses being limited or downsized as a result of financial constraints applied to 
environmental-based government activities or departments. 
 
9.3.4 The role and influence of politics 
The final emerging theme identified as having shaped responses to water problems in Cyprus 
was the role and influence of politics. Conceptually, politics is complex and holds a range of 
definitions based on different scenarios, settings, and organisational characteristics (Leftwich, 
2015; Wiley, 2016). Some prominent definitions of politics include; dynamic ways in which 
groups seek to make collective decisions; activities and practices associated with forms of 
governance; interaction and debate between political parties and actor groups; the combination 
and representation of specific political values, attitudes, beliefs, and principles; the sharing of 
power and influences on the distribution of this power; as well as relationships within or 
between groups that shape political behaviour, power, and culture (Parsons, 1995; Axford & 
Browning, 1997; Sharma & Sharma, 2007; Birkland, 2015; Leftwich, 2015; Wiley, 2016). 
 
These definitions can be further expanded to consider the aspects of political behaviour and 
political culture, which were found to be particularly relevant to problem-solving in Cyprus. 
Political behaviour reflects and focuses on the actions associated with politics, while also 
representing constructed realities of the different political values, attitudes, identities, and 
beliefs held by specific actors or groups (Lasswell, 1998; Munroe, 2002; Dalton & Klingemann, 
2007; Goncalves-Portelinha, Staerklé, & Elcheroth, 2016). These aspects were identified in 
Cyprus through the different interpretations of public interest defined by certain actors. For 
example, experts and managers observed public interest as ensuring sufficient supply for all 
users and doing so using the most efficient methods; while farmer unions viewed public interest 
in terms of allocating sufficient water to the important sectors of the economy, with the most 
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relevant being the agricultural sector. In turn, political culture relates to the values, attitudes, 
and ideas that different actors or groups have regarding government, relative and perceived 
authority, personal roles and identities within politics and society, as well as the dynamics of 
these variables in the context of a given setting (Munroe, 2002; Goldfarb, 2012; Welch, 2013). 
These aspects can offer an additional layer of understanding in relation to Dryzek’s (2013) 
rationalities and how natural relationships and actor behaviour can be conceptualised, 
particularly as Dryzek’s (2013) recognition of the role of politics is limited. 
 
In Cyprus, the concept of politics was identified as a significant variable that had an influence 
on problem-solving. According to the findings, politics was interpreted through characteristics, 
such as; the dynamic interaction of actors, groups, and contested identities shown in terms of 
different responses to drought management; the relationships between political actor groups and 
interaction between values, attitudes, and beliefs, noted through different views of the WDD, 
boards, and unions in the case of water pricing and groundwater permits; politics as a barrier to 
decision-making, found in terms of delays to pricing changes; as well as politics as a tool to 
achieve self-interests for both individuals or groups, as highlighted in the case of farmer unions 
applying pressure on government for increasing amounts of irrigation water. 
 
Some of these interpretations have also been reflected by other research, particularly; the 
concept of political culture in Cyprus represented through fragmented or contested identities, 
the legacy of colonial rule, and distinct political values (Sepos, 2008; Faustmann, 2009); the 
major influence of party politics on society (Christophorou, 2009; Katsourides, 2016; 
Protopapas, 2016); the role of island communities and small town politics (Sepos, 2008; 
Faustmann, 2009); the influence of EU governance (Sepos, 2008; Karatas, 2011); the dynamics 
of the Cyprus problem (Ker-Lindsay, 2011; Hoffmann, 2018; Trimikliniotis, 2018); as well as 
the idea of ‘clientelism’, which relates to more influential actors dispensing favours such as 
promotions, better access to services, or exemptions from laws, to less influential actors in 
return for political support (Faustmann, 2009; Ioannou, 2016). As a result, politics in Cyprus 
was noted to involve many definitions that served to shape the political setting, primarily 
centred on relationships between political parties, politicians, government actors, experts, 
managers, and citizens, with the variable of self-interest particularly important. Thus, within the 
context of this work, the different definitions and constructs must be recognised when 
considering the role and influence of politics on problem-solving. 
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The role and influence of politics in Cyprus was evident at all levels of decision-making in 
relation to water management. Firstly, politics in the form of conflict between actors was 
identified regarding the development and implementation of new water pricing structures. 
These were based on cost recovery according to the WFD and integrated management 
approaches to control scarcity and demand. Secondly, politics in action during the drought of 
2008, with issues of self-interest observed between politicians, government experts, pressure 
groups, and the public, as well as decisions taken in contrast to WDD advice. Indeed, this 
relates to Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities and the interpretation of self-interest, however in this 
case politics emerges as a driver for actor motives. Thirdly, politics as a barrier for 
relationships, in the form of regional and municipal conflict in decisions noted between Paphos 
and other municipalities during the drought of 2008. Fourthly, regional and local politics that 
impacted the way government and the WDD could implement policies at ground-level and 
within the consumer level of the organisational structure. Fifthly, the politics involved between 
government and farmer unions, with each of these unions representing a political party and 
acting according to their agenda for water. Lastly, the major issue identified in relation to the 
manifestation of political behaviour and principles through populist approaches, which were 
highly influential especially at the local level in communities and villages. 
 
Politics and the problem-solving rationalities 
The findings have highlighted the importance of the role and influence of politics. This was 
poorly represented by the rationalities, with recognition and some analysis only forthcoming 
through Dryzek’s (2013) analysis of democratic pragmatism. For example, as noted in relation 
to administrative rationalism it was claimed that “the discourse pretty much denies the 
existence of politics of any sort” (Dryzek, 2013; pg 89). In the case of economic rationalism, 
the description of politics was severely limited, even though self-interest was recognised and 
assumed to be a key component of political interaction. Democratic pragmatism contrasts with 
administrative rationalism and economic rationalism by recognising political interaction and 
contextualising politics within the capitalist democratic setting (Dryzek, 2013). Indeed, politics 
and political interaction were assumed to involve complex forms of communication, while also 
embracing and utilising political conflict, more flexible formal rules, and non-expert knowledge 
as part of problem-solving (Dryzek, 2013). For democratic pragmatism, politics was also 
assumed to include powerful interests exerting their influence on proceedings and attempting to 
skew the outcomes of debates, consultations, discussions, and decision-making procedures, 
towards satisfying certain individual or group interests (Speth, 2009; Dryzek, 2013). Thus, in 
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this case, politics has been recognised as a relevant variable with a strong influence, even 
though detailed analysis on how it can shape actor behaviour was not as forthcoming. 
 
Top-down models of understanding have also been limited when considering the role, position, 
and influence of politics (Parsons, 1995; Dye, 2002). In terms of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, 
the view that considers policy development and implementation as primarily administrative in 
nature [due to the basic need for administration in all rationalities] has neglected a key 
characteristic of the administration, namely politics, and the fact that political decisions can 
guide, shape, manipulate, or distort policy implementation and decision-making. This has also 
been noted by other research on the political aspects of decision-making (see Lasswell, 1998; 
Child, Elbanna, & Rodrigues, 2010; Bhat, 2017; Conca & Weinthal, 2018). 
 
The limited recognition of politics was found to be a shortfall of the rationalities, especially 
when compared to the findings in Cyprus. In this case, government actors, civil servants, 
experts, board managers, and union representatives were aware of the issues they faced as a 
result of the complexities and dynamics of politics, political culture, and political behaviour. In 
practice, politics existed between levels of decision-making and through the behaviour of 
individuals and groups, with this often reflected most clearly through issues of political conflict. 
 
Whereas Dryzek (2013) neglects the importance of politics in relation to environmental issues 
and problem-solving, other work has identified its role and significance for water management 
and policy (Mollinga, 2008; Conca & Weinthal, 2018). In this case, water is often deeply 
contested in terms of politics because of a wide range of interests converging to claim and 
influence a limited and valuable resource (Conca, 2006). Two ‘axes of contestation’ have been 
defined by Mollinga (2008), with these relating to different ‘domains or levels’ of water 
politics, and the issue-networks that encompass contested political interactions. Four ‘domains’ 
are deemed to operate along these axes, and involve politics associated with; day to day water 
control, national water policy, the inter-state level, and the global arena. These domains were 
evident in Cyprus, as reflected by the study findings, and water politics as a concept was found 
to be transient, dynamic, and a primary influence on management and responses to water 
problems. Water politics can also be defined at one end of the scale through water management 
and hydro-politics as an ‘authoritative allocation of values’ (Turton, 2002), while at the other 
end of the scale as water merely being intrinsically political and manifest in the contestation of 
usage and planning (Mollinga, 2008). Both scales were observed in Cyprus. For example, 
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authoritative values were defined and allocated by government and socio-cultural influences, 
while inherent politics for water were identified and made apparent through issues of contested 
usage, self-interest, and decision-making conflict (Blair et al., 2012; Hoffmann, 2018).  
 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
All three rationalities were identified in Cyprus and considered to be useful for understanding 
responses to water problems. Administrative rationalism had a good level of applicability, 
highlighted through the strong representation of characteristics including; management 
bureaucracies; rationalistic analysis; top-down planning; regulations; society being subordinate 
to the state; and the state being the main controlling force. Democratic pragmatism was more 
limited in Cyprus when compared to administrative rationalism and economic rationalism. The 
relative strength of applicability was still apparent however, as a result of the existence of 
characteristics such as; the use of public consultation, policy dialogue, and networks; interactive 
political relationships; and different agents demonstrating a mix of motivations. Economic 
rationalism showed a good level of applicability in Cyprus, and this strength was due to the 
existence of characteristics such as; the use of market instruments such as pricing, incentives, 
and subsidies; evidence of motivations based on self-interest; as well as the formation of 
metaphors and rhetoric when defining regulation and analysing government action, particularly 
the media representation of failed responses to the drought of 2008.  
 
Notably, whilst each of the rationalities were evident in Cyprus, administrative rationalism and 
economic rationalism had a stronger presence when compared to democratic pragmatism. This 
contrasts with Dryzek’s (2013) interpretation, as he considers economic rationalism to be the 
most under-developed, stating that ‘the real-world achievements of administrative rationalism 
and democratic pragmatism remain more substantial than those of economic rationalism’ 
(Dryzek, 2013: pg144). 
 
Based on the empirical findings from this study and practical challenges associated with the 
rationalities, a range of emerging themes were identified. These were focused on differences 
between theoretical expectations and practical findings, as well as the topics that were not 
recognised by Dryzek’s (2013) understanding. 
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Firstly, the concept of sequentiality was related to how a response emerges and then shifts to 
another as part of an evolutionary process. The sequentiality of the rationalities in Cyprus was 
not observed to follow the evolutionary, successive, and linear format assumed by Dryzek 
(2013). In this case, they are expected to develop over time through an order based on 
administrative rationalism emerging first; democratic pragmatism emerging second; and 
economic rationalism emerging third. In Cyprus, problem-solving appeared more variable and 
was not linear. After the first response of administrative rationalism, different components of 
democratic pragmatism and economic rationalism emerged at different times, as a result of 
aspects including; the failures of other rationalities; socio-economic variables; the influence of 
supranational governance; socio-cultural changes; and natural driver events such as drought. 
 
Secondly, the role and influence of supranational governance was important in Cyprus, being 
evident as a result of EU level governance exerting a strong influence on the state, government, 
and national policy. This has shaped approaches, including; the use of the precautionary 
principle; changes in pricing structures, a reduction in subsidies, and the need to establish cost 
recovery; the development of integrated water management; as well as the introduction of new 
techniques such as formal procedures for public consultation and environmental impact 
assessment. In terms of the problem-solving rationalities, supranational governance has 
influenced the re-emergence of administrative rationalism for the implementation of new 
regulations post EU accession in 2004, while also reflecting economic rationalism in relation to 
the application of market instruments, and democratic pragmatism in the case of consultation 
and greater participation in decision-making. These changes also partly undermined the format 
and evolution of problem-solving expected by Dryzek (2013). Indeed, supranational 
governance was seen to be a driver of characteristics associated with rationalities that were 
developed at different times and in contrast to the expected linear format of problem-solving. 
 
Thirdly, culture and economic status were identified as important factors that influenced 
problem-solving in Cyprus. Culture, norms, attitudes, and the concept of Europeanisation were 
found to be crucial in practice. Furthermore, the economic status of a nation had a significant 
impact on decision-making and affected policy responses. This was evident through two 
examples, namely; the economic status and ability of Cyprus when faced with the requirements 
of EU legislation and policy implementation; as well as the economic status of Cyprus within 
the context of wider economic forces and a financial crisis in 2012-2013. These aspects were 
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poorly represented by Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities, thus highlighting a 
difference between theoretical expectations and the findings. 
 
Fourthly, the role and influence of politics was found to have fundamentally shaped responses 
to water problems in Cyprus. In this case, politics was interpreted through a range of 
characteristics, including; the dynamic interaction of actors, groups, and contested identities 
shown in terms of different responses to drought management; relationships between political 
actor groups and interaction between values, attitudes, and beliefs, noted through different 
views on pricing and groundwater permits; a barrier to decisions, noted in terms of delays to 
pricing changes; as well as a tool to achieve self-interest, highlighted in terms of farmer unions 
applying pressure on government. The concept of politics was poorly represented by Dryzek’s 
(2013) rationalities however, with recognition and some analysis only forthcoming through 
democratic pragmatism. Indeed, other understandings, such as public choice theory, power 
approaches, and top-down or bottom-up perspectives, have also been limited when 
conceptualising politics in relation to actor behaviour or motivation. As a result, the role of 
politics needs to be recognised and explored within this context to further understanding of 
problem-solving responses. 
 
The utility of the rationalities for developing an understanding of problem-solving beyond 
conceptions of mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches was found through their 
applicability in Cyprus and the representation of certain theoretical expectations. A significant 
advantage of Dryzek’s (2013) framework is based on the way he brings together the 
complexities of problem-solving and accounts for many different variables as one whole. For 
example, by integrating the top-down perspective and technocracy in terms of administrative 
rationalism or utilising the concept of pluralism and networks as part of democratic 
pragmatism. This contrasts with other understandings, such as forms of public choice theory, 
elitism, technocracy, and top-down or bottom-up perspectives, as these consider variables in 
relative isolation. As a result, Dryzek’s (2013) conceptualisation through discourse analysis and 
an attempt to frame multiple variables together, rather than in isolation, has been more 
reflective of real-world behaviour, relationships, and dynamics of decision-making. 
 
Ultimately, although many similarities between the theoretical expectations and practical 
findings serve to validate Dryzek’s (2013) work, showing a good fit in Cyprus and highlighting 
the usefulness of his rationalities, the differences and limitations were also found and have been 
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an important outcome of the study. It is these differences that can allow new ideas to be formed 
through future research; to further build on mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches, as 
well as Dryzek’s (2013) understanding. 
 
9.4.1 Outcomes of the thesis 
The study has attempted to understand how government in Cyprus has responded to water 
problems by exploring the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities. This 
has followed a format from the general to the specific, namely; building on mandatory, 
voluntary, and economic approaches through Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities; 
exploring how water problems have been managed in Cyprus; analysing the existence and 
applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities in Cyprus and recognising practical challenges; 
while also identifying emerging themes that have been the result of the study findings. 
 
The thesis has investigated problem-solving responses by developing an understanding of how 
government in Cyprus has tackled water problems, moving beyond simply conceptions of 
mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches. This has been achieved by considering 
different understandings of problem-solving associated with these approaches, while building 
on these by utilising Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities. This has sought to develop understanding 
based on the way Dryzek (2013) has understood the specifics of problem-solving through; actor 
roles, behaviour, and motivation; rhetoric; changes in problem-solving; and by bringing 
together different theories as part of the rationalities. 
 
A range of outcomes emerged as a result of the study, and this highlights how the findings have 
met the objectives noted in chapter one. Firstly, in relation to objectives one, two and three, the 
research in Cyprus helped to ascertain the potential utility and applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) 
problem-solving rationalities, with this also widening empirical understanding based on real-
world case study results. In these terms, the mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches 
were built-on through the rationalities, which were evident and useful in understanding 
responses in a more detailed way, while practical challenges were also identified and helped to 
develop the emerging themes. Secondly, regarding objective four, the interviews and secondary 
data were useful when examining the roles, behaviours, and motivations of actors in Cyprus, 
showing similarities and differences when compared to the rationalities and other theoretical 
perspectives, and thus contributing to empirical findings. Thirdly, in terms of objective one and 
three, the findings related to water management phases and the idea of sequentiality were useful 
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when exploring the changing nature of problem-solving in Cyprus, with differences signalling 
more variable development of approaches as well as the idea of hybridity and emergence or re-
emergence over time. 
 
9.4.2 Reflecting on the findings and key points 
A first response of the mandatory approach and administrative rationalism is agreed, however 
in contrast, the voluntary approach and democratic rationalism as well as the economic 
approach and economic rationalism are assumed to subsequently emerge in more variable ways. 
For example, the approaches and rationalities can develop with different intensities in reply to 
both failures in the system and based on other multi-dimensional factors and drivers, such as 
socio-cultural context, politics, natural events, and supranational governance. As a result, the 
approaches and rationalities were found to have emerged, developed, diminished, or re-emerged 
over time. This format can be visualised as a tree with branches that grow at different times and 
rates as a result of many influences. The main branches reflect the mandatory, voluntary, and 
economic approaches [or administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic 
rationalism], as well as political and socio-cultural constructs, which are at the core of problem-
solving, while components and characteristics of these approaches exist as smaller branches 
that interact within the system whole. 
 
Notably, the idea of interaction and multiple aspects also highlights the need for bringing 
together a range of understandings to represent and explain the complex systems that exist in 
reality. This links closely to the technique of considering practices through different suitable 
concepts that each have their place in understanding problem-solving. Indeed, this is based on 
mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches, with different theories, such as elitism, 
technocracy, top-down or bottom-up perspectives, networks, pluralism, and public choice 
theory, being applicable to varying degrees when analysing features of problem-solving. Again, 
this highlights the relevance of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities, as he brings together different 
theories to explain given responses and actor behaviour. 
 
Actors form a key part of any response. A range of actors have been recognised in practice, 
with the strength, importance, and ability to exert their influence varying at given times. It is 
recognised that Dryzek’s (2013) concepts of Homo-bureaucratis, Homo-civicus, and Homo-
economicus can and do all co-exist, while one prevailing agent and motive construct often does 
not occur in reality. Dominant forms at any given time can essentially vary based on context or 
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politics for instance. Ultimately, an understanding can be developed noting how approaches do 
change, but that specific approaches do not need to yield to others to have an influence. As 
shown by findings in Cyprus, the different approaches often need each other. 
 
A range of underlying functions were identified and operated as part of problem-solving in 
Cyprus. These involved relationships and interaction; transition and evolution; as well as the 
concept of hybridity. Firstly, relationships and interactions within and between problem-solving 
approaches were deemed to be variable, while functions based on actor behaviour and 
motivation signalled a reality in which agents sought to act according to both self-interest and 
the public interest. As a result, it was important to consider the interests of all actors recognised 
in decision-making, as these served to influence problem-solving and components of specific 
responses. Secondly, the transitional nature of problem-solving was noted to be a key aspect of 
functionality, with a more variable and fluid interpretation proposed. In this case, approaches 
were assumed to be able to emerge at different times, while remaining static or exhibiting slow 
development, until re-emerging with certain new management tools, alternative methods, 
changes in system, or new technology. This was observed in Cyprus through transforming 
economic approaches, based on; historical use of metering in the first phase of management 
during the 1960s, then the emergence of subsidies, as well as subsequent changes in water 
pricing and cost recovery in response to EU regulations during the third phase of management 
from 2004 onwards. This reflects an ebb and flow characteristic associated with problem-
solving, in which the extent and rate of development for approaches is variable in a given 
setting. Thirdly, the concept of hybridity recognises that specific approaches emerge, exist, and 
re-emerge at any time, while interaction between these approaches [and their components] is 
frequent and necessary for progress to occur. For example, this function was evident based on 
the need for regulation to provide structure for market-based instruments, as well as the need 
for voluntary approaches and greater public involvement in decisions as a part of administrative 
approaches when prompted by the requirements of supranational [EU] governance.  
 
Ultimately, as a result of the hybrid nature of problem-solving, all approaches were found to 
need each other, and this is especially important and relevant in a modern interconnected world. 
In reality, each approach has a role to play. Mandatory approaches and administrative 
rationalism provide the basis and structure for the existence, implementation, and operation of 
other approaches. Voluntary approaches and democratic pragmatism provide an arena for 
dialogue, while encouraging integration and also being inclusive of citizens and different 
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stakeholders, which has become a necessary variable in contemporary decision-making. 
Furthermore, economic approaches and economic rationalism satisfy the inherent aspects of 
competition, market transactions, and pricing structures, which are vital to contemporary 
governance and societies based on liberal capitalist systems, as well as cultures and societies 
that have come to favour consumption. 
 
9.4.3 Further research 
The overarching aim of the project has been fulfilled as a result of the study objectives being 
met. Based on this outcome, it is possible to explore the potential scope for further research that 
can be continued in the future. A range of pathways have been proposed in this case, to build on 
the study and further develop understanding of government problem-solving. 
 
Firstly, additional work on testing the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving 
rationalities in other water-scarce nations could be useful to further expand the empirical 
foundation of understanding. Indeed, this can also provide a basis for comparative studies 
between evidence of responses in specific nations. 
 
Secondly, there is scope for testing the applicability of Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving 
rationalities in other small, Mediterranean, or peripheral EU nations. The findings have shown 
how decision-making and power at supranational level can be variable and restricted for a 
small, peripheral, and southern European nation such as Cyprus. By exploring environmental 
problem-solving responses in these settings, for example using other cases such as Spain, Italy, 
Malta, or Greece, it could be possible to develop a comparative understanding of the role and 
influence of supranational governance with regard to problem-solving in these nations. 
 
Thirdly, additional research could seek to test the application of Dryzek’s (2013) rationalities 
between two different national case studies. For example, this could involve a northern EU 
nation and a southern EU nation, or even a European nation compared to the United States, 
Australia, or Japan. This type of comparative investigation could yield valuable insights into a 
range of aspects, including; the existence or non-existence of specific characteristics associated 
with administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, and economic rationalism; the 
similarities and differences in actor behaviour and motivation, plus the potential drivers of these 
in different settings; the influence of socio-cultural constructs, context, politics, and 
supranational governance [or equivalents such as federal systems]; as well as an improved 
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understanding of the evolution of problem-solving in different settings, and the potential 
reasons for similarities or differences in these cases. 
 
Lastly, specific aspects of the findings can be focused on and developed further. Primarily, this 
should seek to investigate the specific role and influence of politics on problem-solving, as this 
was found to have limited recognition as part of the rationalities while also being a strong 
emerging theme according to the findings. For example, a case study [or multiple case studies] 
may be utilised to consider if there are common drivers or similarities in political constructs 
that shape mandatory, voluntary, and economic approaches. This may involve looking at the 
political dynamics associated with each approach in terms of relationships between political 
parties, politicians, government actors, and citizens, with the variable of self-interest also being 
investigated within this context. Furthermore, the role and influence of politics can be explored 
according to a range of variables found to be relevant by the findings. These include; politics in 
the form of conflict between actor groups; politics as a barrier or influencing factor in terms of 
behaviour and motives represented by actors in problem-solving; the role of national, regional, 
and local politics in impacting the ability of government to implement policy; the politics 
between government and unions or pressure groups, and how this shapes decisions on 
environmental problems; as well as politics through the manifestation of principles and 
behaviour based on strong populist approaches, which have come to the forefront of 
contemporary decision-making. 
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APPENDIX 1: Summary and comparison of problem-solving perspectives 
 
It is possible to summarise the different problem-solving perspectives used to understand how 
society and governments respond to different social problems [such as environmental and water 
management issues]. The table summarises these perspectives and highlights the key aspects 
and characteristics of each understanding, as well as noting strengths and limitations. In turn, 
the perspectives are set in comparison with Dryzek’s (2013) problem-solving rationalities 
allowing both similarities and differences to be noted. 
 
Table A1: Problem-solving perspectives: a comparison 
(Niskanen, 1971; Dunleavy, 1991; Beetham, 1991; Downs, 1993; Parsons, 1999; Birkland, 2011; Dryzek, 2012) 
PERSPECTIVE KEY THEMES AND CHARACTERISTICS 
DRYZEK’S PROBLEM-
SOLVING 
RATIONALITIES 
Top-down 
Perspective 
▪ The perspective fundamentally exists as a model and 
understanding of policy implementation 
 
▪ Focuses on governing agents and decision-making at the top of 
the policy chain/process 
 
▪ Key actors: senior government officials, high level bureaucrats, 
senior civil servants, and politicians 
 
▪ A hierarchal system of management and implementation 
 
▪ Increasing authority in a vertical format within government or a 
given administrative body 
 
 
Strengths 
+ Focuses on the core policy-makers and policy cycle 
+ Can enable a longer timeframe of policy analysis and evaluation 
+ Importance attached to legislative structure of implementation 
 
Limitations 
– Focus on central decision-makers neglects the perspective and 
action of others in the policy process 
– Does not account for the influence of street-level bureaucrats 
   
- Administrative rationalism 
reflects a top-down 
understanding based on 
managers and experts 
being deemed the most 
important governing actors 
 
- Hierarchal management 
and a vertical format of 
authority reflects the idea 
of administrative 
rationalism that claims 
people are subordinate to 
the state 
Bottom-up 
Perspective 
▪ An understanding and model of policy implementation 
 
▪ A direct response to the top-down perspective 
 
▪ Focuses on the importance of lower level governing actors or so-
called ‘street-level’ bureaucrats 
 
▪ Key actors: civil servants, those responsible for enacting policy 
that have day to day influence and control 
 
 
Strengths 
+ Considers the role and influence of street-level bureaucrats 
+ Identifies the consequences of policy and appreciates discretion 
+ Recognises interaction between actors 
 
- Democratic rationalism is 
the most bottom-up in 
character based on 
recognising the importance 
of ground-level actors and 
in this case also including 
the citizen as a key actor 
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Limitations 
– Can over-emphasise the influence of street-level bureaucrats 
– Failure to recognise how policy is formed prior to ground-level 
  
Bargaining 
and 
Negotiation 
▪ Considers policy implementation and decision-making as a 
complex process that relies upon the interactions and exchanges 
between governing actors at all positions 
 
▪ Decision-making and problem-solving is dependent on bargaining 
and negotiation between various actors at the top and bottom of 
the policy process 
 
▪ Attempts to bridge the gap between the opposing top-down and 
bottom-up perspectives 
 
▪ Introduces the idea of a policy-action continuum 
 
 
Strengths 
+ Appreciates exchange between actors at a variety of positions 
+ Recognises that an interactive bargaining process occurs in 
policy-making 
+ An emphasis is placed on aspects of power and dependence 
 
Limitations 
– Focuses on interaction processes rather than policy  
  
- The idea of bargaining and 
negotiation can be linked 
to democratic pragmatism 
through the notion of 
interaction between 
different actor levels. To a 
certain extent democratic 
pragmatism reflects this 
idea by recognising 
interaction between many 
different actors such as 
civil servants, managers, 
experts, and citizens 
Power 
Approaches 
▪ Decision-making and the policy process shaped and determined 
by power constructs, including; class, wealth, technical 
knowledge, bureaucratic arrangement, and professional status 
 
1. Elitism 
- Policy and decision-making process centralised and controlled by 
certain groups or individuals [so-called elites] 
- Mirrors the top down perspective by suggesting that high level [or 
elite] actors and senior officials hold the most prominent role in 
problem-solving 
- Directly opposes the concept of pluralism 
- Decision outcomes may be influenced by high level actors in 
order to help achieve personal or group advantages, including; 
personal financial gains, increased control and authority, or the 
protection of electoral status to maintain political legitimacy 
 
2. Technocracy 
- Focuses on the role and power of technical experts 
- Experts dominate the decision-making and policy process 
- An evolved concept of rationalisation that integrates a range of 
previously conceived aspects of structural control and power, 
namely; bureaucracy and hierarchy, technical control, and 
professionalism 
 
3. Pluralism 
- Focuses on the way in which power is distributed 
- Participation in the policy process is open to all individuals and 
groups 
- Basis of policy networks and communities approach 
 
 
Strengths 
+ Elitism: identifies the potential for policy control through power  
+ Technocracy: focuses on experts and scientific research 
+ Pluralism: acknowledges different interests 
 
- Administrative rationalism 
reflects elitism by 
suggesting those at the top 
level of the policy process 
[for example the managers 
and senior government 
officials] have a primary 
role in problem-solving 
and decision-making. This 
link is also apparent in 
terms of professionalism, 
which prioritises the role 
and influence of the 
professional 
 
- Administrative rationalism 
reflects the concept of 
technocracy based on the 
importance attributed to 
technical experts. In this 
case, both perspectives 
suggest that experts 
dominate the decision-
making and policy process 
 
- Democratic pragmatism 
recognises that a range of 
actors have the ability to 
facilitate change through 
decision-making, and thus 
shares similarities with the 
concept of pluralism 
 
- The concept of pluralism is 
utilised by Dryzek in the 
context of democratic 
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Limitations 
– Elitism: policy control by one dominant group and the issue of 
limited participation 
– Technocracy: encourages a lack of public participation 
– Pluralism: in practice the state can often be dominant 
 
pragmatism to explain the 
development and 
expansion of policy 
dialogue as well as the 
resultant behaviour of 
policy actors 
Public Choice 
Theory 
▪ Considers how institutional structures or arrangements can affect 
individual actions and patterns of incentives. 
 
▪ Assumes that governing agents act in terms of economic models 
and seek to maximise their personal interests 
 
1. Tullock: market forces and self-interest 
- Bureaucracy and policy-making based on the same assumptions 
used to understand business 
- The idea of economic models applied to policy 
- Market forces are required to combat bureaucratic self-interest 
- Power and self-interest are the key variables of decision-making 
and politics 
 
2. Downs: laws, bureaucrat types, and motives 
- Based on a theory of psychological motivation 
- Governing officials are motivated by self-interest 
- Organisational function, bureaucrat type, and motive drivers 
identified as key categories of self-interest 
- Self-interest can be pure or mixed 
- Different organisational arrangements, bureaucrat types, and 
motivations produce certain self-interest outcomes 
 
3. Niskanen: budget-maximising 
- A model framed by neo-classical economics 
- Governing officials seek to maximise their budgets just as 
businesses would seek to maximise profit 
- It is claimed that individuals seek to increase the budget and size 
of the bureau in order to maximise their personal interests 
 
4. Dunleavy: bureau-shaping 
- An alternative understanding that suggests self-interest is 
expressed through ‘shaping’ rather than increasing the size of a 
bureaucracy 
- Senior bureaucrats/officials are concerned with shaping their 
departments and budgets to advance their interests alongside 
politicians and business 
 
 
Strengths 
+ Recognises the motivations of certain actors 
+ Organisational functions and bureaucrat types are considered  
 
Limitations 
– Focuses on one dimension of actor behaviour and motivation 
– The potential for acting only in the public interest is not 
considered 
 
- Administrative rationalism 
opposes public choice 
theory and the idea that 
governing actors and civil 
servants act only to 
maximise their personal 
interests, by instead 
claiming these actors can 
[and do] act in the public 
interest 
 
- Economic rationalism is 
similar to public choice 
theory in terms of actors 
being motivated by 
personal interests and 
economics 
 
- Economic rationalism also 
differs as it claims that 
some key agents actually 
act in the public interest 
 
- Democratic pragmatism 
identifies multiple 
conceptions of self-interest 
and public interest. To a 
certain extent, this reflects 
the organisational laws, 
bureaucrat types, and 
motives defined by Downs, 
which allow for various 
types and levels of self-
interest to exist 
 
- Democratic pragmatism 
utilises public choice 
theories when explaining 
the development and 
expansion of policy 
dialogue and the resultant 
behaviour of policy actors 
Policy 
Networks 
▪ The perspective offers a wider interpretation of relationships and 
interactions between governing agents 
 
▪ Concerned with the relationships, interactions, and informal 
aspects of the policy-making process 
 
▪ Builds upon the bargaining and negotiation perspective by 
responding to limitations such as the incomplete 
conceptualisations of policy actor interactions and the failure to 
- Democratic rationalism can 
be linked to a policy 
network understanding 
based on the idea that a 
wider range of individuals 
and groups are considered 
to be relevant as part of the 
problem-solving and 
decision-making process. 
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specify where in the policy process actor interactions take place 
 
▪ In contrast to top-down and bottom-up perspectives, the network 
approach recognises the existence and significance of different 
policy actors and levels of decision-making 
 
 
Strengths 
+ A wider scope of understanding on policy-making 
+ Multiple actors and levels are recognised 
 
Limitations 
– Public interest is not clearly considered or positioned in the 
network context 
– The potential ssues of power and conflict are poorly represented 
  
In this case, both 
perspectives appreciate the 
different policy actors and 
levels involved in policy-
making 
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APPENDIX 2: Interviewee information 
 
Table A2: Interviewees and associated interview details 
Interviewee 
name Role[s] and responsibilities 
Interview 
date/duration 
Interview and 
recording format 
Neoklis 
Antoniou 
At time of interview 
- Environment Department; engineer 
and manager, with focus on water 
pollution, chemistry, and quality 
 
Previous 
- Chemist and engineer 
- Water pollution; chemistry, fertilizers, 
fuels, and liquid fuels 
 
January 7th 
2013 
 
1h:23m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Bambos 
Charalambous 
At time of interview 
- Consultant; institutional management 
of water utilities and distribution 
network management 
 
Previous 
- Water Development Department; 
engineer and supply projects 
- Limassol Water Board; head of 
technical services 
 
May 23rd 2013 
 
1h:57m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Symeon 
Christodoulou 
At time of interview 
- NIREAS international water research 
center; member, board of directors 
- Water distribution networks and 
reducing leakage/loss 
 
Previous 
- Risk analysis and construction 
management engineer 
 
May 16th 2013 
 
1h:39m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Sofoclis 
Christoudides 
At time of interview 
- Larnaca Water Board; director/head 
 
Previous 
- Civil engineering background 
- Municipality of Larnaca; design of 
highways, roads, and buildings 
- Larnaca water board; manager 
 
May 16th 2013 
 
1h:17m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Costas 
Constantinou 
At time of interview 
- Geological Survey Department; 
director/head 
- Member of advisory committee 
- Involved in water schemes and 
responsible for village supplies and 
irrigation schemes 
- Involved in groundwater management 
directive and the WFD 
 
 
September 
20th 2013 
 
2h:39m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
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Previous 
- Geology and hydrogeology 
- Consultant 
- Geological Survey Department; role as 
a hydro-geologist 
 
Charalambos 
Demetriou 
At time of interview 
- Water Development Department; head 
division of hydrometry 
- Implementation of WFD 
- Monitoring quality and quantity 
 
Previous 
- Civil engineer and hydrologist 
 
January 8th 
2013 
 
1h:22m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Christos 
Hadjiantonis 
At time of interview 
- Department of Agriculture; land and 
water use section head 
- Monitoring and management of water 
used in agricultural 
 
September 
18th 2013 
 
1h:18m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Panayiota 
Hadjigeorgiou 
At time of interview 
- Water Development Department; 
section head division of planning 
- Planning and implementation for the 
Water Framework Directive, and 
especially article 14 related to public 
participation and involvement 
- Public relations 
 
Previous 
- Design, planning, and construction of 
infrastructure projects; new pipelines 
and irrigation networks 
- First engineer in WDD 
- Executive engineer in WDD 
 
December 21st 
2012 
 
2h:02m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Panicos 
Hadjigeorgiou 
At time of interview 
- Agricultural chemist of the 
Government General Laboratories 
 
Previous 
- Chemist in Pharmaceutical industry 
- Land and water use section head 
 
September 
20th 2013 
 
0h:52m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Costas 
Hadjipanayiotou 
At time of interview 
- Environment Department; director 
- Water pollution 
- Environmental pollution and waste 
management 
 
Previous 
- Applied geology 
- Environmental impact assessment 
- Industrial waste treatment 
 
May 20th 2013 
 
1h:19m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
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Agathi 
Hadjipanteli 
At time of interview 
- Water Development Department; 
executive engineer 
- Division of the operation and 
maintenance of irrigation water works 
- Water management and allocation 
- Irrigation management 
 
Previous 
- Design of water development projects 
- Management, allocation, and pricing 
of water 
- Civil engineer background 
January 4th 
2013 
 
1h:12m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Iacovos 
Iacovides 
At time of interview 
- Water consultant 
- Impact assessment and consultancy 
expertise for government departments 
 
Previous 
- Water Development Department 1966-
2002; hydrologist, senior 
hydrogeologist section head, principle 
water engineer, assistant director 
- Involved in all WDD water works 
 
May 24th 2013 
 
1h:15m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Nektarios 
Karyos 
At time of interview 
- Panagrotikos farmers union; general 
secretary/head 
- Public consultation and representation 
of farmer interests at national and 
international level 
 
Previous 
- Natural Resource Science 
- Forrester 
 
September 
18th 2013 
 
1h:32m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Anna Koupparis At time of interview 
- Department of Agriculture; 
director/head of section of legislation 
- In charge of all sections of the 
department when dealing with the 
enforcement of laws 
 
Previous 
- Pesticide laboratory 
- Head of water laboratories 
- Chief agricultural officer 
 
September 
20th 2013 
 
0h:43m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Kyriacos Kyrou At time of interview 
- Water Development Department; 
Director  
- Responsible for all actions of the 
department and for managing divisions 
- Close liaison with the minister and the 
MANRE as a whole 
 
December 31st 
2012 
 
2h:18m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
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Previous 
- Water Development Department; 
executive engineer, senior water 
engineer, and chief water engineer 
- Water research centre UK; Geo-
technical engineer 
 
Socrates 
Metaxas 
At time of interview 
- Limassol Water Board; head 
- General management of board 
- Liaise with board of directors and 
implement strategies 
- Close cooperation with WDD and 
ensure sufficient quantity and quality 
for consumers 
 
Previous 
- Economist and accountant 
 
May 23rd 2013 
 
1h:37m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Charis 
Omorphos 
At time of interview 
- Water Development Department; 
senior executive/head of EU division 
- Harmonisation of EU directives, 
specifically the WFD 
- Implementation of the European 
acquis; coordination between divisions 
and departments for effective 
implementation of EU regulations 
 
Previous 
- n/a 
 
May 24th 2013 
 
1h:10m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Charalambos 
Palantzis 
At time of interview 
- Nicosia Sewerage Board; senior 
project manager 
- The bi-communal treatment plant 
 
Previous 
- Civil engineer for WDD [1970] 
- Water engineer for WDD [1974] 
- Water supply of Nicosia [1974-1978] 
- Head of Nicosia Water Board [1978-
2000]; supply system development; 
distribution; technology 
 
May 21st 2013 
 
2h:01m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
Charalambos 
Theopemptou 
At time of interview 
- Lecturer at University of Cyprus 
 
Previous 
- Ecological movement head [1990s] 
- Founding member of Cyprus green 
party [1996] 
- Executive secretary of the green party 
- Commission for the Environment 
[2006-2013] 
 
May 15th 2013 
 
1h:21m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
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Nikos 
Zambakides 
At time of interview 
- Nicosia Water Board; director/head 
- General management 
- Application of tariffs, implementation 
of water policy, distribution 
 
Previous 
- Nicosia Water Board; financial 
controller [1992] 
- Nicosia Water Board; acting head 
[2002]; director/head [2004 onwards] 
 
May 22nd 2013 
 
1h:23m 
- Face-to-face interview 
- Hand-written notes 
- Voice recorder used 
- Confidentiality agreed 
[non-attributable] 
 
Angelos 
Agapiou 
 
Larnaca District Office n/a Interview declined /  
No response 
Pannico 
Champas 
 
EKA Farmer Union n/a Interview declined /  
No response 
Nicholas 
Christofides 
 
Ammochostos District Office n/a Interview declined /  
No response 
Consumer 
Association 
 
General contact of Consumer 
Association 
n/a Interview declined /  
No response 
Mixalis Lytra 
 
PEK Farmer Union n/a Interview declined /  
No response 
Georgios 
Moutas 
 
Agrotiki Farmer Union 
 
n/a Interview declined /  
No response 
Pan-Kyprian 
Environmental 
Movement 
Harmonization 
 
Environmental organisation - general 
contact 
n/a Interview declined /  
No response 
Argiros 
Papanastasiou 
 
Nicosia District Office n/a Interview declined /  
No response 
Paphos  
District Office 
 
General contact of District Office n/a Interview declined /  
No response 
Christina 
Rodosthenous 
 
Limassol District Office n/a Interview declined /  
No response 
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APPENDIX 3: Cypriot water legislation 
 
Table A3: Key water legislation in Cyprus translated from Greek to English 
Νομοθεσία Περί Υδάτων και Πλημμυρών Legislation regarding Water and Flooding 
2017 - ΟΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΝΙΑΙΑΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΥΔΑΤΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΙ ΤΟΥ 2010 ΕΩΣ (ΑΡ.2) ΤΟΥ 2016 
ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΙ ΤΕΛΩΝ ΥΔΑΤΟΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙ ΤΩΝ 
ΑΡΘΡΩΝ 130 ΚΑΙ 132 (Κ.Δ.Π. 48/2017) 
2017 - SUMMARY WATER MANAGEMENT LAWS 
OF 2010 TO 2016 WATER RATES REGULATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLES 130 AND 132 (PI 48/2017) 
2016 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΕΝΙΑΙΑΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ 
(ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ) (AP. 2) ΝΟΜΟΣ - Ν. 122(Ι) -
2016 
2016 - THE SINGLE WATER MANAGEMENT 
(AMENDMENT) (NO. 2) LAW – N. 122 (I) -2016 
2016 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΕΝΙΑΙΑΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ 
(ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ) ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ 2016 - N. 2(I) / 
2016 
2016 - THE SINGLE WATER MANAGEMENT 
(AMENDING) LAW OF 2016 - N. 2 (I) / 2016 
2015 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΤΩΝ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ (ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ) ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ 
2015 - Ν. 159(Ι) / 2015 
2015 - WATER PROTECTION AND 
MANAGEMENT (AMENDING) LAW OF 2015 - N 
159 (I) / 2015 
2015 - ΤΟ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΤΩΝ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ (ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ 
ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑΤΩΝ V ΚΑΙ Χ ΤΟΥ ΒΑΣΙΚΟΥ 
ΝΟΜΟΥ) ΔΙΑΤΑΓΜΑ ΤΟΥ 2015 (Κ.Δ.Π 310/2015) 
2015 - WATER PROTECTION AND 
MANAGEMENT (AMENDMENTS TO ANNEXES V 
AND X TO THE BASIC LAW) 2015 (PI 310/2015) 
2015 - ΟΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΕΝΙΑΙΑΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ 
(ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ ΜΕΓΑΛΩΝ ΥΠΕΡΥΨΩΜΕΝΩΝ 
ΤΑΜΙΕΥΤΗΡΩΝ) ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΙ ΤΟΥ 2015 (Κ.Δ.Π. 
64/2015) 
2015 - THE SINGLE [LAW] ON/ABOUT THE 
WATER MANAGEMENT (SAFETY OF LARGE 
ELEVATED RESERVOIRS) REGULATIONS OF 
2015 (PI 64/2015) 
2014 - ΟΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΙΜΟΛΟΓΗΣΗΣ ΚΑΙ 
ΜΗΧΑΝΙΣΜΩΝ ΑΝΑΚΤΗΣΗΣ ΚΟΣΤΟΥΣ ΤΩΝ 
ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΩΝ ΥΔΑΤΟΣ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΙ ΤΟΥ 2014 
(Κ.Δ.Π. 128/2014) 
 
2014 – [LAW] ON/ABOUT THE PRICING AND 
MECHANISMS ON / FOR COST RECOVERY OF 
WATER SERVICES REGULATIONS OF 2014 (PI 
128/2014) 
2013 - ΝΟΜΟΣ ΠΟΥ ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΕΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ 
ΕΝΙΑΙΑΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ 
2010 ΕΩΣ 2013 
2013 - LAW THAT AMENDS THE SINGLE WATER 
MANAGEMENT LAW OF 2010 TO [UP TO] 2013 
2013 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΝΙΑΙΑΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΥΔΑΤΩΝ (ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ) ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ 2013 
 
2013 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT THE SINGLE WATER 
MANAGEMENT (AMMENDMENT) ORDINANCE 
OF 2013 
2012 - ΝΟΜΟΣ ΠΟΥ ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΕΙ ΤΟΝ ΠΕΡΙ 
ΑΞΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΗΣ, ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ ΚΑΙ 
ΑΝΤΙΜΕΤΩΠΙΣΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΚΙΝΔΥΝΩΝ 
ΠΛΗΜΜΥΡΑΣ ΝΟΜΟ  
 
2012 - LAW ON AMENDING [THAT AMMENDS] 
THE ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND 
CONTROL OF [THE] FLOOD RISK ACT 
2012 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΤΩΝ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ 
2012 
2012 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT THE PROTECTION AND 
WATER MANAGEMENT (AMMENDMENT) 
ORDINANCE OF 2012 
2012 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΝΙΑΙΑΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΥΔΑΤΩΝ ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ 2012 
2012 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT THE SINGLE WATER 
MANAGEMENT LAW AMMENDMENT LAW OF 
2012 
2011 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΤΩΝ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ - ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΙ (Κ.Δ.Π. 
296/2011)  
2011 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT THE PROTECTION AND 
WATER MANAGEMENT LAW – RULES (PI 
296/2011) 
2011 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΝΙΑΙΑΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΥΔΑΤΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ (ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΙ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙ ΤΟΥ 
ΑΡΘΡΟΥ 132) Κ.Δ.Π 50/2011 
2011 – [LAW] ON/ABOUT THE SINGLE WATER 
MANAGEMENT LAW (REGULATIONS UNDER 
ARTICLE 132) PI 50/2011 
2011 - ΟΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΥΔΑΤΙΚΟΥ ΕΡΓΟΥ ΚΙΤΙΟΥ 
(ΚΑΤΑΡΓΗΣΗ) ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΙ (Κ.Δ.Π. 92-2011) 
2011 – [LAW] ON/ABOUT THE KITIOU WATER 
PROJECT (REPEAL) REGULATIONS (PI 92-2011) 
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2011 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΝΙΑΙΑΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΥΔΑΤΩΝ (ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ) ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ 2011 
Ν. 147(Ι)/2011 
2011 – [THE LAW] ON/ABOUT THE SINGLE 
WATER MANAGEMENT (AMMENDMENT) LAW 
OF 2011 N. 147 (I) / 2011 
2010 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΝΙΑΙΑΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΥΔΑΤΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ 2010 - Κανονισμοί δυνάμει 
των άρθρων 107 και 132 (2) (στ) 
2010 - [THE LAW] ON/ABOUT THE SINGLE 
WATER MANAGEMENT LAW OF 2010 - 
Regulations under Articles 107 and 132 (2) (f) 
2010 - ΝΟΜΟΣ ΠΟΥ ΠΡΟΝΟΕΙ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ 
ΑΞΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΗ, ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΤΙΜΕΤΩΠΙΣΗ 
ΤΩΝ ΚΙΝΔΥΝΩΝ ΠΛΗΜΜΥΡΑΣ Ν.70(Ι)2010 
2010 - LAW THAT PROVIDES FOR THE 
ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND 
TREATMENT OF FLOOD RISK N.70 (I) 2010 
2010 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΝΙΑΙΑΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΥΔΑΤΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ Κ.Δ.Π. 452/2010 
2010 – THE LAW ON THE SINGLE [INTEGRATED] 
WATER MANAGEMENT LAW OF PI 452/2010 
2010 - ΝΟΜΟΣ ΠΟΥ ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΕΙ ΤΟΝ ΠΕΡΙ 
ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ 
ΝΟΜΟ Ν.113(Ι)/2010 
2010 - LAW AMENDING THE PROTECTION AND 
WATER MANAGEMENT LAW N.113 (I) / 2010 
2010 - Διάταγμα δυνάμει του άρθρου 26 ΤΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ 
ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ 
ΝΟΜΟΣ Κ.Δ.Π. 500/2010 
2010 - Order under Article 26 ON/ABOUT THE 
PROTECTION AND WATER MANAGEMENT LAW 
PI 500/2010 
2009 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΤΩΝ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ TOY 2004 - ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΙ 
Κ.Δ.Π. 272/2009 
2009 - [THE LAW] ON/ABOUT PROTECTION AND 
WATER MANAGEMENT LAW OF 2004 - 
REGULATIONS PI 272/2009 
2009 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΤΩΝ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ - ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ N. 
67(I)/2009 
2009 - [THE LAW] ON/ABOUT PROTECTION AND 
WATER MANAGEMENT LAW - AMMENDMENT 
N. 67 (I) / 2009 
2009 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΕΛΕΓΧΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΡΥΠΑΝΣΗΣ ΤΩΝ 
ΝΕΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΔΑΦΟΥΣ ΝΟΜΟΣ Ν.68(Ι)/2009 
2009 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT THE CONTROL OF 
POLLUTION OF WATER AND SOIL - LAW N.68 (I) 
/ 2009 
2009 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΕΛΕΓΧΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΡΥΠΑΝΣΗΣ ΤΩΝ 
ΝΕΡΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ - TΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ Ν.68(Ι)/2009 
2009 - [THE LAW] ON/ABOUT CONTROL OF 
POLLUTION OF WATER LAW – AMMENDMENT 
N.68 (I) / 2009 
2005 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΑΠΟΧΕΤΕΥΤΙΚΩΝ ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑΤΩΝ 
- ΝΟΜΟΙ ΤΟΥ 1971 ΜΕΧΡΙ 2005 
2005 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT SEWERAGE - LAWS OF 
1971 TO/UNTIL 2005 
2004 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ 
ΤΩΝ ΥΔΑΤΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ Ν.13(Ι)/2004 
2004 - [THE LAW] ON/ABOUT PROTECTION AND 
WATER MANAGEMENT LAW L.13 (I) / 2004 
2003 - ΝΟΜΟΣ ΠΟΥ ΠΡΟΝΟΕΙ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ 
ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΗ ΠΡΟΣΒΑΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΚΟΙΝΟΥ ΣΕ 
ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΕΣ ΠΟΥ ΣΧΕΤΙΖΟΝΤΑΙ ΜΕ ΘΕΜΑΤΑ 
ΠΕΡΙΒΑΛΛΟΝΤΟΣ 2003/4/ΕΚ  
2003 - A LAW TO PROVIDE FOR FREE PUBLIC 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN RELATION TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 2003/4 / EC 
2003 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΕΛΕΓΧΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΡΥΠΑΝΣΗΣ ΤΩΝ 
ΝΕΡΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ (Απόρριψη Αστικών Λυμάτων) 
Κ.Δ.Π. 772/2003 
2003 - [THE LAW] ON/ABOUT THE CONTROL OF 
POLLUTION OF WATER - LAW (Wastewater 
Disposal) PI 772/2003 
2003 - ΝΟΜΟΣ ΠΟΥ ΠΡΟΝΟΕΙ ΓΙΑ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑ 
ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΦΥΣΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΓΡΙΑΣ 
ΖΩΗΣ Ν.153(Ι)/2003 
2003 - A LAW THAT PROVIDES FOR THE 
PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF NATURE 
AND WILD LIFE N.153 (I) / 2003 
2002 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΕΛΕΓΧΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΡΥΠΑΝΣΗΣ ΤΩΝ 
ΝΕΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΔΑΦΟΥΣ ΝΟΜΟΣ 106(Ι)/2002 
2002 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT THE CONTROL OF 
POLLUTION OF WATER AND SOIL LAW 106 (I) / 
2002 
2002 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΣΦΟΡΩΝ ΣΤΟΥΣ ΤΟΜΕΙΣ ΤΟΥ 
ΥΔΑΤΟΣ, ΤΗΣ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΣ, ΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΩΝ 
ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΤΗΛΕΠΙΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ 2002 
29(Ι)/2002  
2002 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT OFFERS [TENDERS] IN 
THE AREAS OF WATER, ENERGY, TRANSPORT 
AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS - LAW OF 2002 29 
(I) / 2002 
2001 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΠΟΙΟΤΗΤΑΣ ΤΟΥ ΝΕΡΟΥ 
ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΗΣ ΚΑΤΑΝΑΛΩΣΗΣ 
(ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΗΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΕΓΧΟΣ) ΝΟΜΟΣ 
87(I) ΤΟΥ 2001 
2001 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT THE QUALITY OF 
WATER FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION 
(MONITORING AND CONTROL) - LAW 87 (I) OF 
2001 
1998 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΕΞΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΗΣΕΩΣ ΝΕΡΟΥ 
(ΕΙΔΙΚΑ ΜΕΤΡΑ) ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ 1991 ΚΑΙ Ο 
1998 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT SAVING WATER 
(SPECIAL MEASURES) ORDINANCE 1991 AND 
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ΤΡΟΠΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ 1998 
Ν.1/91, Κ.Δ.Π. 300/91, Ν.37(Ι)/98, Κ.Δ.Π. 138/98 
AMMENDMENTS TO THE LAW OF 1998 n.1 / 91 PI 
300/91, N.37 (I) / 98, PI 138/98 
1990 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΥΔΑΤΟΠΡΟΜΗΘΕΙΑΣ ΧΩΡΙΩΝ ΓΙΑ 
ΟΙΚΙΑΚΟΥΣ ΣΚΟΠΟΥΣ ΝΟΜΟΣ Κεφ.349,66/1990 
1990 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT WATER SUPPLY IN 
VILLAGES FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES LAW 
Kef.349,66 / 1990 
1972/82/88 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΥΔΑΤΟΠΡΟΜΗΘΕΙΑΣ 
ΔΗΜΟΤΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΛΛΩΝ ΠΕΡΙΟΧΩΝ ΝΟΜΟΣ 
Κεφ.350 25/1972, 31/1982, 172/1988 
1972/82/88 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT MUNICIPAL 
WATER AND OTHER AREAS Kef.350 LAW 
25/1972, 31/1982, 172/1988 
1971 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΑΠΟΧΕΤΕΥΤΙΚΩΝ ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑΤΩΝ 
ΝΟΜΟΣ 
1971 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT SEWERAGE SYSTEMS 
1968/78/89/91 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΔΕΥΤΙΚΩΝ 
ΤΜΗΜΑΤΩΝ (ΧΩΡΙΑ) ΝΟΜΟΣ Κεφ. 342, 130/68, 
5/78, 157/89, 47/91 
1968/78/89/91 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT IRRIGATION 
DEPARTMENT (VILLAGES) LAW Cap. 342, 130/68, 
5/78, 157/89, 47/91 
1968/78/89 - Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΔΕΥΤΙΚΩΝ ΣΥΝΔΕΣΜΩΝ 
(ΙΔΙΩΤΙΚΟΝ ΥΔΩΡ) ΝΟΜΟΣ Κεφ.115, 131/1968, 
6/1978, 156/1989 
1968/78/89 - [LAW] ON/ABOUT IRRIGATION 
ASSOCIATIONS (PRIVATE WATER) - LAW 
Kef.115, 131/1968, 6/1978, 156/1989 
(Source: WDD, 2017) 
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APPENDIX 4: The structure of the Water Development Department 
 
Table A4: WDD sectors and divisions 
Water Development 
Department Sectors Divisions within given sector 
Sector 1 
Water Resources and 
European Union 
Hydrometry division 
- Quantitative, qualitative, and biological monitoring of rivers and dams 
- Quantitative and qualitative groundwater monitoring 
- Ecology and hydrobiology 
- Environment issues, pollution, and protection of water bodies 
- Maintenance of monitoring stations and equipment 
- Quality control of monitoring data and results evaluation 
- Automation and the provision of data 
- Implementation of the European Water Framework Directive 
- Implementation of the program of measures of the Water Framework 
Directive 
- Licensing and monitoring of water abstractions 
- Licensing and control of borehole drillers 
- Protection zones for drinking water wells [well head protection] 
 
Hydrology and Hydrogeology division 
- Engineering hydrology and hydrogeology 
- Surface water studies 
- Groundwater studies 
- Water resources quality and pollution control studies 
- Information technology 
 
Water quality control division 
- Chemistry 
- Microbiology 
 
European Union division 
- Legislation and monitoring of the implementation of the European acquis 
- Coordination, communication, and data collection 
- Coordination of structural funds and the cohesion fund 
- International affairs 
 
Wastewater and reuse division 
- Planning and design 
- Wastewater monitoring 
- Implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive and EU matters 
Sector 2 
Planning and Design 
Planning division 
- Project evaluation and strategic planning scenario 
- Feasibility studies 
- Environmental impact assessment 
- Water Framework Directive implementation of river basin management 
plans / programme of measures / development / public participation 
campaigns 
- Programme of measures monitoring 
- Land expropriation and water rights 
- Topography 
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Design division 
- Irrigation works studies 
- Domestic water work studies 
- Drafting office 
- Supporting services 
 
Tenders and contracts division 
- Tenders 
- Contracts 
- Monitoring and executing 
- Archive and data processing 
 
Information technology and publicity division 
- Publicity, enlightenment, and training 
- GIS working group 
- Information technology and data processing 
- Telemetry and library services 
Sector 3 
Construction, Operation, 
and Maintenance 
Construction division 
- Project management and supervision 
- Dam safety 
- Geotechnical works 
- Soil mechanics 
 
Operation and maintenance of irrigation works division 
- Operation and maintenance 
- Water management 
- Water [irrigation] pricing 
 
Operation and maintenance of drinking water systems division 
- Water treatment plants 
- Operations and maintenance of distribution network 
- Management and planning [of drinking water systems] 
- Desalination 
 
Electrical-mechanical works division 
- Design and planning 
- Construction 
- Large electrical-mechanical project supervision and contracts monitoring 
- Tenders and supply of equipment 
- Maintenance and repairs 
- Limassol and Paphos district office coordination 
Sector 4 
District Offices 
Offices – Nicosia/Lefkosia; Lemesos; Larnaka; Pafos; Ammochostos; 
- Hydrometry and hydrology 
- Design for local projects 
- Construction 
- Regional operation and maintenance 
(source: WDD, 2016) 
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APPENDIX 5: Water prices and tariff structures in Cyprus 
 
Table A5.1: Summary of fees for drinking water supply from Governmental Water 
Projects - drilling/boreholes and other sources 
 
 Water Fees [Τέλη Νερού] 
 
WATER (drinking water) - Regulations 4 and 5 
and Annex I 
[ΥΔΡΕΥΣΗ (πόσιμο νερό) - Κανονισμοί 4 και 5 
και Παράρτημα Ι] 
Finance - 
economics 
[Χρηματο- 
οικονομικό] 
Environment & 
resources 
[Περιβάλλοντος 
& Πόρου] 
Total  
[Σύνολο] 
 
Water supply from Government Water Projects / 
Government Water Supply Systems to 
Local Water Authorities 
 
[Παροχή νερού ύδρευσης από Κυβερνητικά 
Υδατικά Έργα / Κυβερνητικά Συστήματα 
Υδατοπρομήθειας προς τις Τοπικές Αρχές 
Υδατοπρομήθειας] 
€ / per cubic metre 
 
[€ / κυβικό μέτρο] 
1 
From the Southern pipeline plan (Government 
Water Supply Systems of Nicosia, Limassol 
and Larnaca-Famagusta) 
 
[Από το Ενιαίο Σχέδιο Νότιου Αγωγού 
(Κυβερνητικά Συστήματα Υδατοπρομήθειας 
Λευκωσίας, Λεμεσού και Λάρνακας-
Αμμοχώστου)] 
0,77 0,05 0,82 
2 
From the Government Water Supply System of 
Paphos 
 
[Από το Κυβερνητικό Σύστημα Υδατοπρομήθειας 
Πάφου] 
0,59 0,05 0,64 
3 
From the Governmental Water Project of Pissouri 
to the Communities of Pissouri, Avdimou, 
Alectora, Fasoula and Archimanthrita 
 
[Από το Κυβερνητικό Υδατικό Έργο Πισσουρίου 
προς τις Κοινότητες Πισσούρι, Αυδήμου, 
Αλέκτορα, Φασούλα και Αρχιμανδρίτα] 
0,60 0,05 0,65 
4 
From Governmental Water Project of Souni-
Zanatzia to the Community Souni-Zanatzia 
 
[Από Κυβερνητικό Υδατικό Έργο Σούνι-Ζανατζιά  
προς την Κοινότητα Σούνι-Ζανατζιά] 
0,34 0,05 0,39 
     
 
Abstraction of water from outside Governmental 
Water Works (from underground aquifers / surface 
sources) 
 
[Απόληψη νερού ύδρευσης εκτός Κυβερνητικών 
Υδατικών Έργων (από υπόγειους υδροφορείς / 
επιφανειακές πηγές)] 
€ / per cubic metre 
 
[€ / κυβικό μέτρο] 
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1 
Fees applied by WDD to Local Water Authorities 
where they receive water from sources outside 
Governmental Waters Projects (boreholes, springs 
or rivers) 
 
[Τέλη που εφαρμόζονται από το ΤΑΥ σε Τοπικές 
Αρχές Υδατ/θειας που λαμβάνουν νερό ύδρευσης 
από πηγές εκτός Κυβερνητικών Υδατικών  
Έργων (γεωτρήσεις, πηγές ή ποταμούς)] 
 
 
(a) For the supply of water intended for household 
water supply and other water uses. 
 
[(α) Για παροχή νερού που προορίζεται για  
ύδρευση οικιών και άλλες χρήσεις ύδρευσης] 
- 0,05 0,05 
 
(b) For water supply to water resellers water 
supply (tankers / bottlers) 
 
[(β) Για παροχή νερού σε μεταπωλητές νερού  
ύδρευσης (βυτιοφόρα/εμφιαλωτές)] 
- 0,12 0,12 
2 
Charges applied by the WDD to drinking water 
vendors with tankers, potable water bottlers, or 
other drinking water uses 
 
[Τέλη που εφαρμόζονται από το ΤΑΥ σε πωλητές 
πόσιμου νερού με βυτία, σε εμφιαλωτές πόσιμου 
νερού ή για άλλες χρήσεις πόσιμου νερού] 
- 0,12 0,12 
(Source: WFR, 2017) 
 
 
Table A5.2: Summary of fees for irrigation water from Governmental Water Projects and 
recycled water 
 Water Fees [Τέλη Νερού] 
 
IRRIGATION - Regulations 6(1) and 7 
and Annex II-A 
[ΑΡΔΕΥΣΗ - Κανονισμοί 6(1) και 7 και 
Παράρτημα ΙΙ-Α] 
Finance - 
economics 
[Χρηματο- 
οικονομικό] 
Environment & 
resources 
[Περιβάλλοντος 
& Πόρου] 
Total  
[Σύνολο] 
 
Provision of fresh-water irrigation water 
by Governmental Water Projects / 
Government Irrigation Networks 
 
[Παροχή φρέσκου-αδιύλιστου νερού 
άρδευσης 
από Κυβερνητικά Υδατικά 
Έργα/Κυβερνητικά Αρδευτικά Δίκτυα] 
€ / per cubic metre 
 
[€ / κυβικό μέτρο] 
1 Fixed annual fee [Πάγιο ετήσιο τέλος] 
€2,40/ 
[€2,40/δεκάριο] - 
€2,40/ 
[€2,40/δεκάριο] 
2 
For persons for agricultural and livestock 
use or aquaculture 
 
0,15 0,02 0,17 
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[Σε πρόσωπα για γεωργική και 
κτηνοτροφική χρήση/ή υδατοκαλλιέργεια] 
3 
To irrigation water providers 
 
[Σε παρόχους νερού άρδευσης] 
0,10 0,02 0,12 
4 
For industrial consumption 
 
[Για βιομηχανική κατανάλωση] 
0,23 0,02 0,25 
 
For industrial use (with returns on the 
network). The amount that is not returned 
to the network is charged 
 
[Για βιομηχανική χρήση (με επιστροφή 
ποσοτήτων στο δίκτυο). Χρεώνεται η 
ποσότητα που δεν επιστρέφει στο δίκτυο] 
0,23 0,02 0,25 
5 
For irrigation of other areas 
 
[Για άρδευση άλλων χώρων] 
 
 
(a) lawns for football and sports fields; and 
islands, parks and other green areas that 
fall under the jurisdiction of State / Local 
Authorities 
 
[(α) χορτοτάπητα γηπέδων ποδοσφαίρου 
και αθλοπαιδιών και νησίδων, πάρκων και 
άλλων χώρων πρασίνου που εμπίπτουν 
στην αρμοδιότητα Κρατικών/Τοπικών 
Αρχών] 
0,21 0,02 0,23 
 
(b) private lawns for football and sports 
and private green areas and hotel gardens 
 
[(β) χορτοτάπητα ιδιωτικών γηπέδων 
ποδοσφαίρου και αθλοπαιδιών και 
ιδιωτικών χώρων πρασίνου και κήπων 
ξενοδοχείων] 
0,34 0,02 0,36 
6 
For overconsumption (quantity which 
exceeds the annual approval) 
 
[Για υπερκατανάλωση (ποσότητα που 
υπερβαίνει την ετήσια εγκριθείσα)] 
 
 
(a) For agricultural production and 
livestock 
 
[(α) Για γεωργική παραγωγή και 
κτηνοτροφία] 
- - 0,45 
 
(b) For other uses 
 
[(β) Για άλλες χρήσεις] 
- - 
Twice the norm 
[διπλάσιο του 
κανονικού] 
     
 Supply of recycled water from tertiary units which fall within the competence of 
€ / per cubic metre 
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the State Regulations 6 (2) and 7 and 
Annex III 
 
[Παροχή ανακυκλωμένο νερού από 
μονάδες τριτοβάθμιας επεξεργασίας που 
εμπίπτουν στην αρμοδιότητα του κράτους 
Κανονισμοί 6(2) και 7 και Παράρτημα ΙΙΙ] 
[€ / κυβικό μέτρο] 
1 Fixed annual fee [Πάγιο ετήσιο τέλος] 
€2,40/ 
[€2,40/δεκάριο] - 
€2,40/ 
[€2,40/δεκάριο] 
2 
To Persons for agricultural production 
 
[Σε πρόσωπα για γεωργική παραγωγή] 
0,06 0,01 0,07 
3 
For / to irrigation water providers 
 
[Σε παρόχους νερού άρδευσης] 
0,01 0,01 0,02 
4 
Industrial consumption 
 
[Βιομηχανική κατανάλωση] 
0,15 0,02 0,17 
5 
Irrigation for other uses 
 
[Άρδευση για άλλες χρήσεις] 
 
 
(a) lawns for football and sports; and 
islands, parks and other green areas that 
fall under the jurisdiction of State / Local 
Authorities 
 
[(α) χορτοτάπητα γηπέδων ποδοσφαίρου 
και αθλοπαιδιών και νησίδων, πάρκων και 
άλλων χώρων πρασίνου που εμπίπτουν 
στην αρμοδιότητα Κρατικών / Τοπικών 
Αρχών] 
0,10 0,02 0,12 
 
(b) private lawns for football and sports 
and private green areas, hotel gardens and 
houses 
 
[(β) χορτοτάπητα ιδιωτικών γηπέδων 
ποδοσφαίρου και αθλοπαιδιών και 
ιδιωτικών χώρων πρασίνου, κήπων 
ξενοδοχείων και οικιών] 
0,15 0,02 0,17 
 
(c) irrigation of golf courses (according to 
the decision no. 75.654, dated 28/8/2013) 
 
[(γ) άρδευση γηπέδων γκολφ  (σύμφωνα 
με την απόφαση του Υ.Σ. αρ.75.654, ημερ. 
28/8/2013)] 
0,15 0,08 0,23 
6 
For over-consumption for all uses 
 
[Για υπερκατανάλωση για όλες χρήσεις] 
- - 
Twice the norm 
[διπλάσιο του 
κανονικού] 
     
 For all uses of water for irrigation and recycled water from the ΚΥΕ / ΚΑΔ fees  
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apply as follows: 
 
[Για όλες τις χρήσεις νερού άρδευσης και 
ανακυκλωμένου νερού από τα ΚΥΕ / ΚΑΔ 
εφαρμόζονται τέλη ως ακολούθως:] 
 
Hydrometer / water meter connection: 
 
[Σύνδεση υδρομετητή:] 
€ 200,00 
 
Reconnect hydrometer / water meter  
 
[Επανασύνδεση υδρομετρητή:] 
€ 20,00 
 
Filter connection 
 
[Σύνδεση φίλτρων] 
€ 5,00 / δεκάριο 
(Source: WFR, 2017) 
 
 
Table A5.3: Summary of fees for irrigation water from drilling/boreholes and other 
sources [other than governmental water projects] 
 
 Water Fees [Τέλη Νερού] 
 
IRRIGATION - Regulation 9 and Annex II-B 
 
[ΑΡΔΕΥΣΗ - Κανονισμός 9 και Παράρτημα ΙΙ-Β] 
Finance - 
economics 
[Χρηματο- 
οικονομικό] 
Environment & 
resources 
[Περιβάλλοντος 
& Πόρου] 
Total  
[Σύνολο] 
 
Abstraction of irrigation water outside 
Government Water Works - They are applied by 
the WDD to consumers of irrigation water 
who receive water from sources outside the KYE 
(drilling, springs or rivers); and from aquifers 
enriched with recycled water) 
 
[Απόληψη νερού άρδευσης εκτός Κυβερνητικών 
Υδατικών Έργων - Εφαρμόζονται από το ΤΑΥ σε 
καταναλωτές νερού άρδευσης που  λαμβάνουν 
νερό από πηγές εκτός ΚΥΕ (γεωτρήσεις, πηγές ή 
ποταμούς και από υδροφορείς που εμπλουτίζονται 
με ανακυκλωμένο νερό)] 
€ / per cubic metre 
 
[€ / κυβικό μέτρο] 
1 
For agricultural use / livestock farming and 
aquaculture 
 
[Για γεωργική / κτηνοτροφική χρήση και 
υδατοκαλλιέργεια] 
- 0,01 0,01 
2 
For other uses as follows: 
 
[Για άλλες χρήσεις ως ακολούθως:] 
 
 
(a) irrigation of lawns for football and sports 
grounds 
 
- 0,02 0,02 
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[(α) άρδευση χορτοτάπητα γηπέδων ποδοσφαίρου 
και αθλοπαιδιών] 
 
(b) irrigation of islands, parks and other green 
areas under the authority of State / Local 
Authorities 
 
[(β) άρδευση νησίδων, πάρκων και άλλων χώρων 
πρασίνου αρμοδιότητας Κρατικών/Τοπικών 
Αρχών] 
- 0,02 0,02 
 
(c) irrigation of private green areas and hotel / 
farm gardens 
 
[(γ) άρδευση ιδιωτικών χώρων πρασίνου και 
κήπων ξενοδοχείων/οικιών] 
- 0,10 0,10 
 
(d) industry 
 
[(δ) βιομηχανία] 
- 0,10 0,10 
3 
For irrigation of golf courses 
 
[Για άρδευση γηπέδων γκολφ] 
 
 
(a) from surface sources - licensed private dams 
 
[(α) από επιφανειακές πηγές - αδειούχα ιδιωτικά 
φράγματα] 
- 0,11 0,11 
 
(b) aquifers enriched with recycled water 
 
[(β) από υδροφορείς που εμπλουτίζονται με 
ανακυκλωμένο νερό] 
- 0,23 0,23 
(Source: WFR, 2017) 
 
 
Table A5.4: Historical pricing of drinking water from governmental supply systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: WDD, 2007) 
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APPENDIX 6: Applicability analysis - a comparison between theoretical expectations and 
practical findings in Cyprus 
 
The table uses a symbol and colour-based format in order to highlight the applicability of given 
categories, namely; green and a  symbol to signal good evidence of the variable in practice 
and a good match with theoretical expectations; orange and a  symbol to show the variable 
being partly evident in practice, with perhaps some aspects found and other aspects that 
disagree with the theory; as well as red and a  symbol to signal limited evidence of the 
variable in practice and a lack of agreement with the theory.  
 
A score system is also used in an attempt to provide a level of applicability for each of the 
rationalities when comparing theoretical expectations and practical findings. In this case, an 
aggregate score is given based on the number of variables that are fully evident [each given a 
score of 1], partly evident [each given a score of 0.5], or non-existent [each given a score of 0] 
in practice. For example, in terms of administrative rationalism, the first category of 
‘institutions and practices’ has a maximum score of seven in terms of theoretical expectations 
[one point for each of the categories], while the practical findings score for this category is also 
seven points based on each variable being evident and agreeing with the theory. In contrast, the 
second category of ‘basic entities recognised or constructed’, the maximum score in terms of 
theoretical expectations is three points [one point for each of the categories], whereas the 
practical findings score for this category is 2.5 points based on two variables agreeing with the 
theory [each scoring one point] and one variable being partly evident in practice [scoring 0.5 
points].  A final percentage score is also provided based on the scores for each category and the 
individual variables within these. This attempts to quantify the level of applicability for each of 
the rationalities according to the accumulated scores for both the expectations and findings. 
 
Table A6: A comparison between theoretical expectations and practical findings 
ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALISM 
Expected characteristics Practical findings in Cyprus 
Institutions and practices 
▪ Professional management bureaucracies 
- An important feature of the discourse 
that is assumed to be the result of 
governments seeking to manage 
natural resources and the economic 
activities associated with given 
resource sectors. 
Institutions and practices 
▪ Professional management bureaucracies   
- These were found to exist and operate.  
- In terms of water the primary examples were 
the MANRE and the WDD. 
- The WDD was the most influential, and 
consisted of a wide range of experts, which 
were defined as technical officers. 
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▪ Pollution control agencies 
- These are key institutions that provide 
evidence of a direct response for 
tackling and managing pollution 
issues. 
- Their existence signals a form of 
authority based on scientific expertise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Regulatory policy instruments 
- These instruments are central to the 
administrative rationalism response. 
- They involve regulations, policies, and 
laws that are formed by government, 
namely through associated resource 
management bureaucracies and 
pollution control agencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Environmental impact assessment 
- The technique signals presence of the 
discourse and involves a process of 
systematic assessment designed to 
evaluate the potential environmental 
damage expected by a given project. 
- Management issues can be expected 
when implementing these types of 
assessment, especially when large and 
controversial projects are involved. 
 
 
 
 
▪ Expert advisory commissions 
- The commissions are formed in order 
to bring together scientific expertise 
and offer advice to government with 
regard to environmental issues. 
- Formed through policy, in response to 
general or specific issues, while being 
validated through policy and their high 
level of perceived expertise. 
- At national level, they exist in a 
position between the highest level 
▪ Pollution control agencies   
- This agency type was noted to exist through 
the Department of Environment, which was 
situated within the MANRE. 
- The department has been responsible for; 
pollution control; urban wastewater treatment; 
general inspection and monitoring; waste 
management; as well as nature protection. 
- The WDD and general laboratories also work 
alongside the Department of Environment to 
monitor, manage, and respond to pollution and 
quality issues. 
 
▪ Regulatory policy instruments   
- Regulations have been developed for water 
management in response to the problems of 
scarcity and quality. These have included laws 
relating to; municipal water usage; sewerage 
systems; irrigation; pollution control; water 
quality; resource protection; pricing; and 
integrated management. 
- The regulations were formed by government 
through the main resource management 
bureaucracies and pollution control agencies, 
namely the MANRE and the WDD. 
 
▪ Environmental impact assessment   
- Evidence of environmental impact assessment 
and strategic environmental assessment. 
- The technique has been utilised for projects 
such as; dams and reservoirs; water treatment 
facilities; as well as desalination plants 
- Bypassing of assessment procedures was 
noted in the case of desalination plant 
construction. This agreed with expected 
management issues, and showed the influence 
high level politicians had in shaping decisions 
and bypassing procedures in order to 
implement desired outcomes. 
 
▪ Expert advisory commissions   
- An expert advisory committee on water 
management was found to exist and operate in 
conjunction with the Council of Ministers and 
the MANRE, as well as the various ministries 
that have responsibilities in the water sector. 
- The committee was a direct outcome of 
policy, namely the IWM Law, and has the role 
of advising the MANRE on matters relating to 
water resources and the formulation of policy. 
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actors and government departments, 
often having a direct link to presidents, 
prime ministers, or parliaments. 
- At international level, they have had 
more limited power, unless the given 
committee has been positioned within 
the structure of a supranational body. 
 
▪ Planning 
- Based on centrally established plans 
and targets that are set by government, 
with objectives to achieve these targets 
also being defined and communicated 
from the top of the organisational 
structure towards the bottom ground-
level actors and consumers. 
- Plans and decisions are made by those 
positioned at the top of the decision-
making system, such as parliament, 
ministers, and politicians. 
- A form of planning structured 
according to the top-down perspective. 
 
▪ Rationalistic policy analysis 
- Mainly concerned with identifying the 
best possible form of policy to be 
applied in a given situation. 
- The central role of expertise 
legitimates this type of analysis and 
problem-solving. 
- Involves a range of techniques, 
namely; cost-benefit analysis; risk 
analysis; technology assessments; 
forecasting; and decision analysis. 
 
Potential maximum score: 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Planning   
- The expected form of planning was evident, 
based on a top-down format of planning 
structures, and more generally through the 
pathway of policy implementation. 
- Key role played by top-level actors, through 
parliament and the Council of Ministers, as 
well as an overall technocratic outlook based 
on control through technical bodies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Rationalistic policy analysis   
- Evident based on the use of techniques such 
as; cost-benefit analysis for infrastructure 
projects, water services management, and 
pricing structures; risk analysis and 
assessments for management options such as 
water recycling and reuse; as well as 
forecasting and risk analysis for understanding 
the effects of drought and climate change. 
 
 
 
Practical score: 7 
 
Basic entities recognised or constructed 
▪ Liberal capitalism 
- A structural status quo of liberal 
capitalism is a given. 
 
 
 
 
▪ Administrative state 
- The most important and established 
basic entity in terms of the discourse. 
- Government exists and operates as the 
role of the administrative state, while 
Basic entities recognised or constructed 
▪ Liberal capitalism   
- The presence of a structure centred on liberal 
capitalism is observed to be the governance 
system and political economy in place. This 
provides the suitable and necessary context for 
administrative rationalism to exist and operate. 
 
▪ Administrative state   
- The nation state was the first established and 
controlling entity with regard to water 
management and when shaping the response 
to problems of quantity and quality. 
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the process of governing is non-
participatory and based on rational 
management that is guided by 
scientific and professional expertise. 
- The government is considered to exist 
in unitary terms, which involves a 
system of political organisation that 
operates with a central government 
having authority over and making 
decisions for subordinate local 
government offices or bodies. 
- Organisation of technical expertise, 
through a bureaucratic hierarchy and 
unitary government, is considered to 
be central in serving the nation state. 
 
▪ Experts and managers 
- The experts and managers assumed to 
have the primary role in decision-
making, and adopt dominant positions 
in the state hierarchy. 
- Experts are defined as those that have 
scientific or technical expertise that are 
organised into bureaucratic hierarchy 
and motivated by the public interest. 
- Managers are defined as those that 
have a professional capacity to manage 
the response to a problem, being 
positioned to coordinate efforts. 
- An emphasis on the expert and 
manager, rather than the citizen or 
producer or consumer. This dynamic 
serves to establish how the social 
relationships of the discourse are based 
on bureaucratic hierarchy, rather than 
aspects of equality or competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- The state is an important construct based on 
socio-political and organisational structures. 
This was based on factors such as; a highly 
political system; a closed community and 
society; a distinct culture; as well as strong 
hierarchal levels of organisation. 
- All water resources were controlled, 
developed, managed, and allocated by the 
state through government [WDD], and thus 
administered by the state before being given to 
water boards, district offices, municipal 
authorities, and regional or village boards for 
distribution to users. 
 
 
 
▪ Experts and managers   
- Experts and managers have a key role, noted 
through examples such as expert policy 
guidance provided by the WDD and managers 
that operate at ground-level within the water 
boards and municipalities/villages. 
- Although the importance of experts and 
managers was evident, they did not exhibit the 
primary role in decision-making as expected. 
- Experts were defined in practice according to 
scientific or professional knowledge, specific 
skills, as well as roles in terms of research, 
policy guidance, and interaction with the 
advisory committee. 
- Experts were more prominently situated at the 
policy and executive levels of organisation, 
namely within the advisory commission, 
ministries, and technical departments that 
develop policy and give direction to the 
government on matters relating to water. 
- Managers operated further down the 
organisational hierarchy and had a focus on; a 
balance of multiple skills; working through 
groups; and implementing expert guidance 
that was given regarding different topics. 
- The managers played a greater role at the 
executive and consumer levels of organisation, 
for instance within water and sewerage 
boards, municipal authorities, irrigation 
divisions, and some sections of the WDD. 
- Some actors were identified as being both 
experts and managers. This was noted for 
experts within the MANRE and WDD, who 
showed responsibilities associated with both 
roles, as well as certain managers in the water 
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Potential maximum score: 3 
and sewerage boards who exhibited expertise 
or had previous positions in expert roles. 
- The experts and managers identified in 
practice compared favourably with the expert 
and managers envisaged by Dryzek. In 
particular, key attributes were show, such as; 
an important standing; rational management; 
and public interest informed by expertise. 
 
Practical score: 2.5 
 
Assumed natural relationships 
▪ Nature subordinate to humans 
- Nature is deemed to be subordinate to 
human activities and problem-solving 
responses, thus implying that problem-
solving gains priority above all else. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ People subordinate to state 
- The state is assumed to be the 
controlling force in comparison to the 
people.  
- In terms of this relationship, the 
position of the state can also be 
potentially occupied by a transnational 
authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Experts and managers control state 
- The experts and managers are assumed 
to be positioned in dominant roles 
within the state’s hierarchy. This 
position is justified through expertise, 
and thus they are argued to control the 
state in terms of problem-solving 
responses and decision-making. 
 
 
Assumed natural relationships 
▪ Nature subordinate to humans   
- This relationship was evident through 
historical water management approaches, 
which were primarily founded on supply-
based approaches and the development of 
infrastructure. 
- A range of examples noted how nature has 
assumed a subordinate position in comparison 
to problem-solving. These included; the vast 
number of dams and reservoirs constructed; 
development of the southern conveyor water 
transfer system; the exploitation of 
groundwater; as well as the expansion of 
desalination. 
 
▪ People subordinate to state   
- Society found to be subordinate to the state, as 
well as both society and the state also being 
subordinate to a supranational authority [EU]. 
- Evidence of this relationship based on; state 
control and the limited role of society in 
decisions made with regard to supply 
expansion and desalination. 
- The European Union was identified to be a 
strong influence and controlling force on state 
and society, through direct policy, economic 
requirements, and socio-cultural influences. 
 
▪ Experts and managers control state   
- Although experts did have an important role, 
especially shown by the influence of the 
WDD, it was the higher level actors positioned 
above the experts and managers, namely 
ministers and politicians, that actually held the 
most power in terms of decision-making and 
problem-solving responses. 
- Politicians and ministers had the ability to 
control the direction of government and the 
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Potential maximum score: 3 
state in relation to the management of water 
problems, specifically in the cases of water 
pricing and responses to drought. 
 
Practical score: 2 
 
Agents and their motives 
▪ Experts and managers 
- The variable of agency is attributed to 
both collective and individual actors. 
- The government is considered to be 
the primary agent, although not all 
individuals within government are 
viewed to have the equal ability to act. 
- Technical experts and managers are 
considered to be the most important 
agents, and they are assumed to have 
the greatest capacity to influence 
decision-making and the problem-
solving response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Motivated by public interest 
- The motives of actors are orientated 
towards the interest of society, thus 
implying that important agents such as 
experts and managers seek to act in the 
public interest. 
- Motivations are assumed to be entirely 
‘public spirited’,  
- Public interest is understood in unitary 
terms. This implies that identifying 
and applying this public interest is a 
technical procedure. As a result, 
technical experts are assumed to be in 
a better position to achieve this. For 
example, cost-benefit analysts or those 
Agents and their motives 
▪ Experts and managers   
- Agency was recognised through collective 
groups such as the government, boards, farmer 
unions, and advisory committees, while 
individuals such as experts, managers, 
ministers, and politicians were also 
acknowledged. 
- The government was argued to be the primary 
decision-making authority with regard to 
water, while the capacity to act varied 
according to ministry, position, control, and 
relative authority. 
- The capacity to act for those in government 
was variable. For instance, those in the 
MANRE and WDD had greater authority and 
capacity to act with regard to water 
management when compared to others such as 
those in the Ministry of Interior or municipal 
authorities and district offices. 
- Decisions are often heavily influenced and 
shaped by politicians, ministers, and 
parliament, thus meaning that the experts and 
managers do not have a greater capacity to act 
in comparison to these other collective and 
individual agents. This was highlighted in 
terms of changes to water pricing policy and 
in the case of drought management. 
 
▪ Motivated by public interest   
- Civil servants, experts, and managers do try to 
act in the public interest, although exceptions 
to this rule were also found in which self or 
group-interests were the main motives. 
- Other individual or collective actors, such as 
politicians, municipal representatives/offices, 
or unions/organisations, did not always act in 
the public interest. 
- Many experts and managers sought to act in 
the public interest, even though these actions 
or decisions were often restricted by factors 
such as a lack of authority, limited control 
with regard to a given issue, and the complex 
politics associated with decision-making. 
APPENDIX 6 
364 
 
that assess risk can more effectively 
define what is in the public interest 
rather than the public or any other 
actors/groups. 
 
 
 
 
Potential maximum score: 2 
- Despite many civil servants, experts, and 
managers trying to act in the public interest 
there were still exceptions, with self-interest in 
these cases often being determined by factors 
such as; a desire for votes; career promotions 
or opportunities; financial gains; as well as 
collective group benefits. 
 
Practical score: 0.5 
 
Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
▪ Administrative mind 
- Considered to be much like the human 
mind, although it is collective and 
personified by the administrative state. 
- The administrative mind controls the 
state, just as the human mind controls 
the body. 
- Represents impartial reasoning and has 
unquestionable authority for the 
wellbeing of the administrative state. 
- An aura of knowledge and power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Navigating and steering 
- Associated with the imagery of the 
administrative mind. 
- The idea that society is steered in the 
appropriate direction and that effective 
navigation is needed in order to work 
through complex socio-environmental 
problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential maximum score: 2 
Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
▪ Administrative mind   
- This can be argued to exist based on the role 
and control of the state, which operates 
through government and administrative bodies 
that have long held authority for water 
management and problem-solving in Cyprus. 
- The government has sought to guide problem-
solving in specific directions according to the 
perceived water issues at hand. For example, a 
period of supply expansion was deemed 
necessary when responding to the ongoing 
issues of scarcity as well as more frequent and 
severe drought periods. 
- Any presence of an administrative mind has 
been made weaker as a result of reduced 
control and authority held by the state and 
government in matters related to water. This 
has occurred as a result of the increasing 
influence of the EU in terms of new concepts, 
management approaches, and legislation. 
 
▪ Navigating and steering   
- The idea of navigation and steering was 
evident based on the government guiding 
problem-solving in certain directions 
according to the perceived water issues a 
given time. These were identified through 
notable periods such as supply expansion, 
demand management, and more recent forms 
of integrated resources management. 
- Navigation and steering by the administrative 
state has been made weaker as a result of the 
increasing influence of the EU. 
 
Practical score: 1 
 
Total potential score: 17 Total practical score: 13 Applicability: 76% 
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DEMOCRATIC PRAGMATISM 
Expected characteristics Practical findings in Cyprus 
Approaches and practices 
▪ Public consultation 
- A primary tool when attempting to 
achieve public participation and 
involvement in decision-making. Thus 
it is assumed to have a central role as 
part of the discourse. 
- Can occur independently or as part of 
specific impact statements or 
procedures such as environmental 
impact assessment. 
 
▪ Alternative dispute resolution 
- Builds on the technique of consultation 
by providing a more formal procedure 
with defined roles being given to non-
governmental actors that take part. 
- Often utilised in legalistic systems, in 
order to avoid a legal impasse. 
- Attempts to bring together disputing 
actor groups to resolve issues under 
the authority and guidance of a neutral 
third party, such as a professional 
mediator. 
 
▪ Policy dialogue 
- This technique attempts to provide a 
more flexible style of mediation, 
which is based on discussions that are 
inclusive of relevant actor groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Lay citizen deliberation 
- A technique that focuses on the 
inclusion and role played by lay 
citizens in decision-making, rather 
than supporters of certain groups 
[defined as partisans by Dryzek]. 
Approaches and practices 
▪ Public consultation   
- Evident through both independent procedures 
as well as part of specific techniques such as 
environmental impact assessment.  
- It has occurred mainly as a result of EU 
legislation and the WFD. 
- Changes in policy due to supranational 
influences helped to drive changes in 
behaviour, which resulted in the adoption of 
more structured consultation procedures. 
 
▪ Alternative dispute resolution   
- Poorly represented, with no clear evidence of 
the technique being used in practice with 
regard to the management of water problems. 
- The closest examples of this type of mediation 
were related to joint projects in Nicosia 
regarding water supply, sanitation, and shared 
water treatment facilities, which caused 
conflicting groups to come together in order to 
produce a decision and provide an outcome 
with regard to infrastructure/services. 
 
 
▪ Policy dialogue   
- The technique has been more apparent and 
used in certain cases with regard to water. 
- The policy dialogue process has included 
actors such as; experts in government 
departments; board representatives; municipal 
or village officials; non-governmental 
organisations; industry representatives, farmer 
unions; as well as community groups. 
- Evident in the case of; dialogue between the 
WDD, boards, and municipal and village 
authorities with regard to allocation; as well as 
discussions and mediation between the WDD 
and farmer unions in relation to irrigation 
water allocation and pricing. 
 
▪ Lay citizen deliberation   
- Types of lay citizen deliberation were 
observed to exist in practice, mainly through; 
village meetings, municipal and town planning 
talks, as well as community discussions. 
- These were found to be related to topics such 
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- A softer form of participation that 
utilises situations which are centred on 
ordinary citizens, such as discussions, 
consensus conferences, planning cells, 
as well as town meetings. 
 
▪ Public inquiries 
- Assumed to enable a more visible 
forum for discussion, while 
encouraging arguments to be put 
forward by both advocates and 
opponents of a given project. 
- Considered to be useful democratic 
mechanisms, especially when projects 
are controversial or cause significant 
conflict between competing interest 
groups and different actors. 
 
▪ Right-to-know legislation 
- This type of legislation encourages 
public access to relevant information, 
which can often be enabled by 
freedom of information laws. 
- Specifically in terms of environmental 
problem-solving, right-to-know 
focuses on the need for actors, in 
particular industry, to disclose 
information with regard to the impact 
[or potential impact] of activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential maximum score: 6 
as water supply and allocation, infrastructure 
projects, irrigation networks, distribution, and 
water pricing. 
 
 
 
▪ Public inquiries   
- Poorly represented and have been essentially 
non-existent in practice. 
- A severe lack of evidence in Cyprus, despite 
similarities with impact assessment which 
itself has been observed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Right-to-know legislation   
- This form of legislation was severely limited, 
and found to be almost non-existent. 
- A law ensuring public access to information 
for activities relating to water was not evident. 
- Access to specific information with regard to 
water was limited for the public, with the 
government only providing some information 
through certain reports, articles, and gazette 
journals or proceedings. 
- Requests for information could be filed by 
individuals to specific departments. For water, 
these could be primarily directed to the WDD. 
However, the amount and type of information 
disclosed was found to be highly variable. 
 
Practical score: 3 
 
Basic entities recognised or constructed 
▪ Liberal capitalism 
- The structural status quo of liberal 
capitalism is a given. 
 
 
 
 
▪ Citizens 
- Government provides a framework 
and setting for a form of governance 
based on interaction. 
- Governance does not focus on large 
single entities that have full control 
Basic entities recognised or constructed 
▪ Liberal capitalism   
- The presence of a structure centred on liberal 
capitalism is observed to be the governance 
system and political economy in place. This 
provides the suitable and necessary context for 
democratic pragmatism to exist and operate. 
 
▪ Citizens   
- It was found that citizens actually did not 
adopt a major role in problem-solving and 
decision-making. 
- The findings opposed the expected 
characteristics of democratic pragmatism and 
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and authority over decisions. 
- The network replaces the hierarchy, 
any central locus of authority is 
downplayed, and the response is 
considered in terms of multiple 
decision-making processes that are 
made-up of and directed by different 
actors with a focus on citizens. 
- The idea of Homo-civicus [power and 
organisation with the citizens, through 
public debate and being capable of 
taking into account the public good] is 
assumed to be the most important 
variable in decision-making. 
 
Potential maximum score: 2 
the idea that Homo-civicus is the main 
underlying force that drives government, 
governance, and problem-solving. 
- Despite evidence of certain practices that 
signalled the existence of democratic 
pragmatism, such as public consultation and 
forms of deliberation, these still only served to 
provide very limited involvement for citizens 
in decision-making. 
- Citizens [and relevant actors] were often not a 
part of decisions, especially relating to; the 
construction of dams/reservoirs and expansion 
of infrastructure, such as desalination plants; 
as well as the pricing and allocation of water. 
 
Practical score: 1 
 
Assumed natural relationships 
▪ Equality among citizens 
- The discourse contrasts other problem-
solving rationalities by recognising 
equality among citizens. 
- It is assumed that all actors, such as 
technical experts, elected officials/ 
politicians, civil servants, pressure 
groups, as well as the public, have the 
right to exert political pressure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Interactive political relationships 
- Political relationships are considered 
to be more complex and interactive 
when compared to those observed in 
other discourses. 
 
 
 
 
▪ Mix of competition and cooperation 
- Decision-making interactions are 
expected to involve a mixture of 
cooperation and competition, with 
both cooperative problem-solving as 
well as conflict taking place between 
Assumed natural relationships 
▪ Equality among citizens   
- A certain level of equality was identified due 
to the major influence of actors such as farmer 
unions [pressure group leaders] and politicians 
[elected officials], which debated alongside 
scientists, experts, and the public, while 
exerting pressure on decision-making. 
- However, even though there was evidence of 
different actors having the opportunity to exert 
pressure, the citizens/public that are deemed to 
be central to the discourse actually played a 
less prominent and limited role in practice. 
- The situation of equality in Cyprus was 
observed as being more uneven in practice, 
with the roles and influences of actor groups 
varying in their intensity. 
 
▪ Interactive political relationships   
- Political relationships were historically 
complex, while over time and particularly 
after EU accession, it was noted that 
interaction between actors had improved. 
- The aspects of cooperative problem-solving as 
well as conflict due to competing interests 
were evident in practice. 
 
▪ Mix of competition and cooperation   
- Cooperative problem-solving was observed 
through consultations and community 
discussions that involved various stakeholders. 
- Conflict was also evident through numerous 
examples, including; delayed decisions and 
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different actors that hold competing 
interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential maximum score: 3 
disagreements relating to water pricing; 
conflict with regard to water allocation, 
particularly changes and restrictions during 
drought periods; as well as regional conflict in 
terms of drought management and restrictions 
on water usage. 
 
Practical score: 2.5 
 
Agents and their motives 
▪ Many different agents but citizens 
central 
- Agency in problem-solving is for all, 
and many different individual or 
collective actors are recognised. These 
include; citizens, experts, politicians, 
government agencies, unions, and 
community or environmental groups. 
- The citizen is considered to have a 
central role and influence in decision-
making, and thus holds a primary role 
of highest importance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Motivation a mix of material self-
interest and multiple conceptions of 
public interest 
- The discourse acknowledges that actor 
motives are often based on self-
interests and material benefits, such as 
financial gains, job security, career 
progression, profit, or subsidisation. 
- Alongside this understanding, it is also 
assumed that at key points in the 
decision-making process, agents can 
be motivated by the public interest. 
- The public interest is often defined in 
plural terms, based on balanced 
compromise for all actors, with 
multiple conceptions recognised. 
 
 
Potential maximum score: 2 
Agents and their motives 
▪ Many different agents but citizens central   
- Many agents observed that existed and 
operated as part of the problem-solving and 
decision-making process. These included; 
government bodies; technical experts; civil 
servants; politicians; boards; municipal and 
community representatives; as well as farmer 
unions and other environmental or non-
governmental organisations. 
- In contrast to the discourse, agents were often 
observed to have varying roles and extent of 
influence, thus implying that in reality agency 
was complex, changeable, and not always for 
everyone. 
- Citizens in Cyprus were often not central to 
decision-making, while the importance and 
inclusion of the public only became more 
prominent through joining the EU and as a 
result of legislation such as the WFD. 
 
▪ Motivation a mix of material self-interest and 
multiple conceptions of public interest   
- Evidence of certain individuals and groups 
pursuing self-interests, as well as those acting 
in the public interest. 
- Observed through experts, such as those in the 
WDD, trying to act in the public interest, 
alongside politicians, ministers, and elected 
officials that were often found to be acting 
according to their own [individual or group] 
interests in order to primarily secure votes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Practical score: 1.5 
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Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
▪ Public policy as a result of forces 
- These forces attempt to shape and 
move a given response in different 
directions according to the actor 
groups applying these forces. 
 
 
 
 
▪ Thermostat description 
- It is assumed that problem-solving 
interventions and management 
responses are triggered based on the 
extent, type, and importance of 
environmental problems. 
- This analogy considers problem-
solving interventions to occur as soon 
as the ‘temperature’ of an issue moves 
outside a desired range, with the 
heating and cooling temperature 
reflecting a wide range of political, 
economic, or environmental variables. 
 
▪ Network system 
- Considered to exist as a type of 
metaphor, particularly by actors who 
embrace communication, technology, 
and the information society. 
- Networked governance emerges as an 
important variable through which 
responses proceed without any central 
controlling actor, but instead through a 
combination of different actors as well 
as coordinated efforts and forms of 
decision-making. 
 
Potential maximum score: 3 
Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
▪ Public policy as a result of forces   
- Observed particularly in the case of specific 
pressure groups exerting their influence on the 
decision-making process in order to shift 
policy or a response to favour their interests. 
For example, represented by farmer unions 
applying pressure on politicians and 
government for increased water allocation. 
 
▪ Thermostat description   
- Evidence of this metaphor was observed in 
some cases, and was argued to have mainly 
occurred during the drought period of 2008 
and the subsequent need to import freshwater 
from Greece. 
- In this case, the ‘thermostat’ level increased 
past a given point [temperature] at which 
political, media, and public pressure had 
departed from a desirable range, thus 
emergency measures were taken in order to 
mitigate the condition and ensure sufficient 
water provisions. 
 
▪ Network system   
- Evidence of networks in practice has been 
limited, but their existence was still observed 
nonetheless. 
- The most notable network examples were 
apparent in the case of the Nicosia water 
treatment plant and a strategy on bi-communal 
cooperation for water resource management 
and supply. 
- Comparisons with information technology, as 
noted by the discourse, were not really evident 
in practice. 
 
Practical score: 2.5 
 
Total potential score: 16 Total practical score: 10.5 Applicability: 65% 
ECONOMIC RATIONALISM 
Expected characteristics Practical findings in Cyprus 
Markets and incentives 
▪ Privatisation 
- A central component of problem-
solving and management in terms of 
economic rationalism. Based on the 
Markets and incentives 
▪ Privatisation   
- Privatisation as an extensive system of 
management was limited in practice, as water 
ownership and rights were found to be in the 
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application of economic principles and 
private property rights. 
- The discourse argues that problems 
emerge as a result of the failure of 
governments to privatise resources and 
attach property rights to environmental 
variables. 
- Privatisation adopts a definition that is 
centred on the sale of resource assets 
to the private sector and essentially the 
private ownership of water resources 
and related infrastructure. 
- Privatisation, through the private 
sector ownership of water [property/ 
resource] rights, can give the owner of 
these rights an incentive to protect 
their resource and investment, thus 
limiting damage such as pollution or 
overconsumption. 
 
▪ Market instruments 
- The difficulties and complexities of 
privatisation are recognised by 
advocates of the discourse. As a result, 
market instruments are identified as 
being important to problem-solving 
and resource management. 
- These market instruments are defined 
as management tools that attempt to 
internalise environmental costs, taking 
shape through; incentives; pricing 
structures; subsidies; trading schemes; 
green taxes; and pollution rights or 
permits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential maximum score: 2 
control of the state. 
- Property rights for water were held by the 
state, and managed through government, the 
MANRE, and the WDD. 
- The evidence of privatisation observed in 
practice involved the management of water-
related infrastructure, and specifically the 
operation of desalination plants. 
- The funding and development of desalination 
plants was based on an economic model of 
public private participation. This shared 
similarities with forms of service-specific 
privatisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Market instruments   
- A range of market instruments were evident in 
practice. The most prominent of these 
included; government subsidies; metering; as 
well as groundwater permits and licenses. 
- Government subsidies were considered to 
exist as direct and indirect types based on their 
application and influence. Direct forms 
involved the price of water, while indirect 
forms were deemed to influence water-using 
activities, the adoption of technology, and the 
development of infrastructure. 
- Metering was widely applied in practice. The 
majority of domestic supply was metered, 
even though some management issues were 
still evident in villages and rural areas. In turn, 
metering for agricultural water was prevalent, 
with this involving irrigation systems used to 
better manage resources. 
- A groundwater permitting and licensing 
scheme was applied in order to monitor and 
manage legal and illegal boreholes, as well as 
to deal with groundwater depletion and water 
quality issues caused by saline intrusion that 
had resulted from over-abstraction of aquifers. 
 
 
Practical score: 1.5 
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Basic entities recognised or constructed 
▪ Liberal capitalism 
- The structural status quo of liberal 
capitalism is a given. This is true for 
all of the rationalities. 
 
 
 
▪ Markets, prices, and property rights 
- These are central to the discourse.  
- Markets provide context and the 
systems within which transactions can 
take place.  
- Pricing can be used to dictate 
transactions within a given market. 
- Private rights can allow markets to 
operate and are assumed to encourage 
environmental protection as a result of 
ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Governments not citizens 
- Government is important and needed 
to establish the conditions and markets 
required for the discourse to exist. 
- The citizen is not recognised as an 
entity and does not play a role in the 
decision-making process. 
- As part of the discourse, some level of 
government is deemed to exist as an 
entity that is more than just a 
collection of economic individuals. 
 
▪ Homo economicus 
- The discourse recognises the entity of 
Homo economicus, which assumes 
that actors are driven by self-interest 
Basic entities recognised or constructed 
▪ Liberal capitalism   
- The presence of a structure centred on liberal 
capitalism is observed to be the governance 
system and political economy in place. This 
provides the suitable and necessary context for 
economic rationalism to exist and operate. 
 
▪ Markets, prices, and property rights   
- The existence and use of markets was 
observed to varying degrees. The use of 
metering, pricing, and government subsidies 
was evident, while in contrast there was a lack 
of an extensive market-based form of 
management such as privatisation. 
- Pricing was identified as an important 
economic management tool, while in many 
cases it was also a topic of conflict both within 
government and between certain actor groups. 
- Alongside the tool of metering, pricing was 
applied to control water consumption and 
influence usage in agricultural, domestic, 
industrial, and commercial sectors. It also 
gained further importance as a result of the 
WFD, which encouraged a structure based on 
the recovery of costs. 
- Private sector property rights were found to be 
poorly established, as the state, through 
government, municipal authorities, and the 
WDD, held rights to all water resources. 
- The government waterworks law ensured the 
property rights of almost all water [surface 
and groundwater resources] are owned by the 
state and controlled by government. 
 
▪ Governments not citizens   
- Practical findings recognised both entities of 
the government and citizen. 
- Despite agreeing with economic rationalism 
regarding the importance and key role played 
by government, the idea that citizens did not 
exist or play a role in problem-solving was not 
true. The fact that the citizen is missing from 
economic rationalism does not agree with the 
findings of problem-solving and decision-
making as observed in practice. 
 
▪ Homo economicus   
- The existence of Homo economicus was 
identified in certain cases, mainly being 
observed through some government actors and 
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and seek to satisfy their own 
subjective goals. 
- This is at odds with the entities of 
Homo bureaucratis associated with 
administrative rationalism, and Homo 
civicus put forward by democratic 
pragmatism. 
 
 
 
 
Potential maximum score: 4 
politicians who acted to satisfy their own self-
interests, for example; to achieve job security; 
gain financial benefits through promotion; or 
to demonstrate political allegiance. 
- Self-interest was also represented through 
individual or group benefits, for example; 
individual politicians seeking to gain financial 
benefits; or groups such as the farmer unions 
which made decisions or applied pressure 
according to their associated political parties. 
 
Practical score: 2.5 
 
Assumed natural relationships 
▪ Competition 
- A basic relationship of competition is 
assumed to exist for all actors, and this 
fits closely with the central theme of 
economic markets that encourage 
competitive interaction. 
 
 
 
 
▪ Hierarchy based on expertise 
- A government hierarchy based on 
expertise is deemed to exist, as experts 
must be in a position to assign and 
manage property rights, while forming 
and implementing market-based tools 
such as pricing structures, permits, and 
subsidies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Subordination of nature 
- Nature is deemed to be subordinate to 
humans, the market, and problem-
solving. 
- The discourse is anthropocentric and 
based on suitable expertise to ensure 
Assumed natural relationships 
▪ Competition   
- The existence of competition in the traditional 
economic sense was not observed, due to the 
government ownership of water and prices 
being set by the Council of Ministers 
according to given sectors. 
- Some competition was identified in terms of 
water allocation, with this occurring between 
sectors and for actors or groups within sectors. 
 
▪ Hierarchy based on expertise   
- This hierarchy was partly evident due to the 
position and influence of experts in 
government. 
- The structure of the water sector was based on 
expertise, and within this organisational 
setting experts and managers had a significant 
role in water management. However, it was 
also evident that experts often did not have 
full decision-making control, and instead it 
was the higher level politicians and ministers 
that had the power to shape final decisions. 
- Although a hierarchy based on expertise did 
partly exist in practice, the highest level of this 
hierarchy actually involved actors such as 
politicians and ministers that were deemed to 
be non-experts. It was these actors who 
influenced final decision outcomes according 
to their own individual or group interests. 
 
▪ Subordination of nature   
- This type of relationship was argued to exist in 
practice, based on the extensive development 
of infrastructure and the exploitation of 
groundwater resources through boreholes, 
where human needs had taken priority over 
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that rights, incentives, and market 
instruments are developed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential maximum score: 3 
the environment. 
- Human needs for increasing amounts of water 
were shown to outweigh the associated 
environmental costs of these activities. For 
instance, without the vast and long-term 
exploitation of groundwater the problem of 
saline intrusion could have been avoided. 
 
Practical score: 2 
 
Agents and their motives 
▪ Homo-economicus and self interest 
- Agency in the problem-solving 
process is primarily attributed to those 
who take on the role of Homo 
economicus. These actors are 
essentially motivated by self-interest. 
 
 
 
 
▪ Some government officials must be 
motivated by the public interest 
- In order to allow the problem-solving 
process to develop and be effective, 
some agents within government must 
be motivated by acting in the public 
interest, with these individuals being 
required to carry out the arrangement 
of rights and the implementation of 
market instruments. 
- In terms of recognised agents, the 
concept of citizenship is not 
acknowledged in the context of 
economic rationalism. 
 
 
 
 
Potential maximum score: 2 
Agents and their motives 
▪ Homo-economicus and self interest   
- The existence of Homo economicus was 
identified in many cases, and was related to 
the motivation of self-interest. 
- In practice, this was observed through 
politicians, ministers, and non-experts, as well 
as some government actors and experts [even 
though these were a minority] who sought to 
satisfy their self-interests. 
 
▪ Some government officials must be motivated 
by the public interest   
- Agency and motivation was not observed in 
the form expected by economic rationalism. 
The majority of experts and civil servants 
sought to generally act in the public interest, 
while it was the politicians, ministers, non-
experts, as well as a minority of experts and 
civil servants who sought to act according to 
their self-interests. 
- Citizens were recognised as part of the 
decision-making and problem-solving process, 
with evidence of this found through public 
consultations, water board group meetings, as 
well as public forums for interaction. As a 
result, these findings opposed the expected 
characteristics of economic rationalism. 
 
Practical score: 1 
 
Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
▪ Mechanistic 
- The social world is considered to be a 
machine that meets human needs and 
is made up of components with 
associated functions. 
- Involves the idea that the machine may 
need to be reassembled at some point, 
with this being achieved through the 
Key metaphors and rhetorical devices 
▪ Mechanistic   
- Two scenarios were linked to this concept in 
practice, namely; the changes in pricing that 
were a result of cost recovery; as well as the 
widespread and ongoing rearrangement of 
borehole permits and abstraction licenses for 
groundwater resources. 
- These have involved changes in management, 
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rearrangement of property rights. 
 
 
 
▪ Regulation as ‘command and control’ 
- Regulation and regulatory approaches 
are defined as forms of ‘command and 
control’, thus giving a negative 
meaning to this response. 
- This rhetoric is used in an attempt to 
weaken other approaches, in particular 
administrative rationalism. 
 
▪ The use of horror stories 
- Rhetoric formed in relation to 
governmental actions. In this case, 
stories are created and defined as 
‘horror stories’ based on the overly 
negative representation of government, 
while associated decisions or actions 
are deemed to give poor, inefficient, or 
expensive outcomes. 
 
 
Potential maximum score: 3 
a rearrangement of organisational systems, 
and the changing of ‘components’ associated 
with pricing and groundwater control. 
 
▪ Regulation as ‘command and control’   
- This rhetoric was evident in Cyprus, mainly 
based on the interpretation and blame attached 
to government and regulation by certain actor 
groups, such as water boards, farmer unions, 
and the mainstream media. 
 
 
 
▪ The use of horror stories   
- These stories were identified through a range 
of examples, including; the drought of 2008 
and regional government conflict associated 
with water allocation and supply restrictions; 
the self-interest of politicians as negatively 
portrayed in the media; as well as negative 
connotations associated with water usage and 
allocation, such as a lack of supply restrictions 
for tourists during drought periods. 
 
Practical score: 3 
 
Total potential score: 14 Total practical score: 10 Applicability: 71% 
 
 
 
